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THE CREED QUESTION IN SCOTLAND.

A MOVEMENT for revision of creed is at present culminating in Scotland. It has been my fortune to watch it somewhat critically for nearly the quarter of a century. It was the first stirring of the question which led me in 1867 to publish a volume on the "Law of Creeds" in Scotland. The treatment of the subject, there was no doubt purely legal and external, dealing not so much with changes in theology as with changes in the documents of creed. Not the less it enabled and perhaps compelled me to follow every step in the subsequent process of development by our churchmen and theologians which has now resulted, even in the most conservative of our large Presbyterian churches, in the proposal to reconsider the creed and its document, and the connection with both of the church in Scotland. Of that process it is time to give some account.

In that year 1867 the chief churches of Presbyterian Scotland were all bound to the unrevised confession of Westminster. It had its origin in the "solemn league and covenant" of the two nations who banded together to be free under Charles I.; and for its sake Scotland, long before the Revolution of 1688, was willing to forget its original national confession—that laid by John Knox on the table of the Parliament of 1560. Knox's confession lasted a century, and was laid aside by the Puritans. The Puritan confession had now lasted two centuries, and every Presbyterian minister and elder was bound to it by subscription. The United Presbyterian Church indeed, which since the later or

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European Revolution has held the American or voluntary church theory, had qualified its subscription in more ways than one. It asked subscription to the Westminster creed and catechism on the understanding that the church "did not approve of anything in these documents which teaches compulsory and intolerant principles in religion." The intolerant passages referred to are those which the American Presbyterians cut out in revising the same confession in 1788, and they are now universally condemned. Even the Free Church, when it left the state in 1843, felt the pressure of them so far as to pass an act to disclaim "intolerant or persecuting principles." But it still maintained subscription to the unchanged confession. And the form of subscription in it and in the Established Church alike was still the very strict one dating from 1711: "I do sincerely own and believe the whole doctrine contained in the confession to be the truths of God, and I do own the same as the confession of my faith." The United Presbyterians had already adopted a more reasonable formula, subscribing the confession generally "as an exhibition of the sense in which I understand the Holy Scriptures."

But already the waters had been stirred. In 1866 the two general assemblies, claiming to represent the Church of Scotland historically, met as usual on the topmost ridge, on either side of which Edinburgh is "piled, close and massy, steep and high." Each elected its moderator, and the moderator took for his subject the question of creed. In the Free Church Assembly its chairman, Doctor Wilson, took the lead by the statement that "no confession of faith can ever be regarded by the church as a final and permanent document. She must always vindicate her right to revise, to purge, to add to it. We lie open always to the teaching of the Divine Spirit; nay, we believe in the progressive advancement of the church into a more perfect knowledge of the truth." Ten days later Doctor Cook, the moderator of the Church of Scotland, closed his assembly in the presence of the Queen's Commissioner by a statement that the Scottish Dissenting churches were no doubt free to change or modify the creed. "But it is not so with the Established Church. Our confession, submitted to the estates of Parliament, was accepted as the truth of God; and the church was endowed and established, not free at any time to modify, alter, or depart from it, nor to hold the truth of any of its doctrines an open question." This utterance, listened to at the moment with submission, became three days later the occasion of a weighty protest by some seventy ministers led by Prin-

cipal Tulloch. They did not question the alleged constitutional position of the church. But they urged that, as Dr. Tulloch had said in his pamphlet two years before, "the old relation of our church to the confession cannot continue." For even if, and all the more if, the creed and subscription remained unchanged, the administration of doctrine in such a church should be most liberal and tolerant. And from that day to this the individual latitude of opinion to be found within this church, even when its subscription and creed were nominally of the narrowest, has been supposed to be undoubtedly greater than in any other in Scotland.

But the converse of the case stated by the moderator—that of a church becoming bound to the state—was now about to happen in Ireland, and Scotchmen eagerly watched the experiment. Mr. Gladstone was not yet prime minister, and I found him in May, 1868, full of interest in the subject which I had been studying,—the legal "limits of deviation" competent to a church in matters of doctrine. In truth, of all the lawyers and of all the clerics with whom I had conversed upon it in Scotland and in England alike, not one had half the knowledge of a question so appropriate to their professions, or showed half so much interest in it, as did this statesman, who, while neither cleric nor lawyer, was filled with the enthusiasms of both. Long ago he had followed through the courts the rights and claims of non-established English churches in the famous case of *Lady Hewley's Charities*, and, now that he was on the point of being a second time prime minister, he was called upon to make use of his early studies for the benefit of the church about to be disestablished. What constitution and doctrine was Parliament under his advice to give the Irish Church? Every man in London was asking this question. That very forenoon I had found Dean Stanley full of it. But Dean Stanley, like all the men whom I met, assumed that Parliament would retain the right of regulating the creed of the Disestablished Church. I had a strong view against it, and I resolved to put the question to the one man on whose undisclosed plan all were now speculating. His answer was instantaneous and explosive. "So long as I have any influence with Parliament, Parliament shall not lay a finger on the constitution of the Irish Church—or of any church!" The church, in his view, if disestablished, should be at least free. But how was this to be effected so as not to interfere with the identity and private revenues of the church, which was now to have power to modify her own creed and constitution? A skillful solution of this problem I now found—

as the whole country a few weeks afterwards found with admiration—that Mr. Gladstone had already discovered. He discovered it, not as we had hoped in Scotland, but in America! For I may here mention that the precedent for the free constitution of the Episcopal Church of Ireland is to be found in the very moderate Episcopacy of the American revolution, recorded (from a modern and High Church point of view) in the book of Murray Hoffman, published as long ago as 1850.¹

I need scarcely apologize for this digression; for the Irish Church incident produced a great effect in Scotland as elsewhere, in the direction, not only of the American theory of church and state, but of that free and open expression of church conviction which the American political system sanctions because it relieves it from statutory fetters. Dean Stanley, to whom I have alluded, expressed to me his idea that in Ireland the state should have endowed both religions, instead of liberating one; and he regarded with great distrust the movement for the abolition of patronage, already begun in the Established Church of Scotland. Accordingly he came down to Edinburgh in the spring of 1873, and, in four lectures read there, passed with swift and graceful but occasionally inaccurate finger over the whole history of the Church of Scotland as a body changing with the nation in the past. The defense of that church as a body, through its career independent even of the friendly state, was taken up in the answering lectures of Principal Rainy; and both volumes, very different from each other in their respective and undoubted merits, remain as monuments of that memorable tournament. But Stanley's lectures raised also the question of the expediency of subscription by churchmen to a statutory creed which they do not believe; and in the discussion which ensued,² Dr. Tulloch, who had won honor as the consistent promoter of liberalism of thought, went much too near to the defense of this unfortunate kind of freedom. The abolition of patronage was, however, a popular movement, and, the risk of its going the whole length of disestablishment being obviated by the return of a Conservative Parliament and ministry in 1874, it was at once resumed. Those who had brought it forward made an attempt to have the Presbyterians outside, who had always opposed patronage, or had left state support in connection with it, included in the movement, or

¹ *A Treatise on the Law of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States*, by Murray Hoffman, Esq. New York, 1850.

² See *Contemporary Review* for March and November of 1872.

at least consulted; but this was opposed in the assembly's committee. The result was that the measure which was passed in the Parliament of 1874 failed as a means of immediate union between the churches; but it was a step in the direction of freedom from the feudal past and of congregational independence. It brought the Church Established, too, on one great and important point, to the level of practice and principle already attained by the two chief Presbyterian churches outside. And these two churches had, during the ten years preceding, been carrying on negotiations, which failed likewise on the point of formal union, but, on the matter in which we are at present interested, resulted in an agreement that "in principle," and as to their doctrines, there was no bar to their becoming one. Of the two, the United Presbyterian Church, as we have seen, was in advance of the Free Church; and it was clear that, in the years to come, the conjunction would be by the other following its lead; while the day when that, the new position, was attained by a body so strong in the old prestige of 1843, and in the elements of present national life, as the Free Church, would be a decisive day for Scotland.

In the first instance, however, discussion was chiefly carried on in the Established Church, and it came almost to deserve to be described as a "religious upheaval." Dr. Tulloch and Dr. Cunningham, of Crieff, both published able pamphlets, the latter maintaining that the confession should be neither abolished nor revised, but maintained as a "historical monument." But an attempt to anticipate the change, afterwards effected, of subscription by elders, was negatived by a large majority; and Dr. Phin, who happened to be in the moderator's chair in 1877, made a strong speech, not only pointing out that the "church would have to go to the state" before it could change its confession, but denying that there was in any part of the body any serious tendency to change. Only one formal step was this year taken by Scotland, and it was a step outward rather than forward, putting itself again in touch with America and the church universal.

Presbyterianism is a much narrower thing than the church universal. But if we take the Christian congregation as the unit, Presbyterianism does represent the striving — perhaps the exaggerated striving — after the great idea of church unity; and that not in the despotic and monarchical, but in the representative and constitutional form. Like most other great systems, it has during the last hundred years become a world-wide thing. And when the first ecumenical council of Presbyterianism met in Edin-

burgh in July, 1877, it might have been supposed that the first result would be a sense of the mass, firmness, and solidity of the system. But the assembly was one merely consultative, not one exercising authority; and one of the first and most wholesome feelings aroused in it was the sense of diversity, variety, and multiplicity of administration to be found within the one Presbyterian name. In some things this came to us as a revelation. In nothing was it more important to bring out this combination of unity in the substance with variety in the detail, than in the matter of creed. Accordingly, at the very first public sitting of the council, the present writer proposed a committee which should gather together and tabulate all the creeds and confessions of the fifty churches from all parts of the world which were represented in the room, with the formulæ of subscription or other adherence demanded from church officials or members. The proposal was unanimously agreed to, but it took three years to carry it out. And the result (presented by Dr. Schaff to the Second or Philadelphia Council in 1880) was very interesting. It showed that this large Christian body, divided by the Atlantic into two not unequal parts, and now no longer connected with any particular state or nation, was still resting historically on the new Puritan creed of 1647. All the free churches had more or less revised their connection with that creed: some, in America, only tied themselves to the "system of doctrine" contained in it; others, in Scotland, held it "an exhibition" of their understanding of Scripture; others, like the Welsh Calvinists in 1827, had exchanged it for a creed wholly different in form, but alike in substance; and others, including almost all the smaller Protestant bodies scattered over Europe, had in this century adopted, instead of it, short utterances of central and saving truth. The platform, the whole extent of which was thus disclosed, became a most encouraging one for revision. It was plain that the body as a whole was already in a course of progress to be accomplished by separate action in its independent parts.

In Scotland the United Presbyterian Church, as had been expected, at once took the lead in legislation. The controversy in which, a generation earlier, the names of Dr. Balmer and Dr. John Brown had appeared, had resulted in this church enlarging its doctrine of the atonement so as to acknowledge its original "general reference" to all sinners of mankind (being the body to which it is offered), as well as a "particular reference" to those who accept and embrace it when so offered to all. Two West

Country ministers had for some time been urging dogmatic revision, — Mr. Macrae, of Gourrock, chiefly in the interest of eschatology; and Mr. Fergus Ferguson, who fell into a process for heresy on the matter of the atonement, but on offering explanations was restored to his work to the satisfaction of all. This history made it easier for his church to pass an act in May, 1879, by which it declared, as vital and important doctrines, three which the Westminster confession fails to emphasize, — “the love of God to all mankind, his gift of his Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and the free offer of salvation to men without distinction on the ground of Christ’s perfect sacrifice.” It added that the doctrine of the divine decrees and election is to be taken along with the truth that God is not willing that any should perish. It added, that man’s depravity and inability does not prevent his responsibility, his power to perform actions in some sense good, or his experiencing the strivings of God’s Spirit; and lastly, that “it is not required to be held that any who die in infancy are lost, or that God may not extend his grace to any who are without the pale of ordinary means, as it may seem good in his sight.” To these important alleviations of the older Calvinism on this central subject, a few changes on other points were added. The previous abjuration of the anti-toleration principles of our forefathers of Westminster was retained; and instead of the old duty of the state to support and to suppress religions, a positive obligation was affirmed, as laid upon the church by Christ, to maintain her own ordinances by free-will offerings. And generally, in addition to these points, in which Scripture teaching was merely alleged to be set forth “more fully and clearly” than in the old standards, the act declared that “liberty of opinion is allowed on such points in the standards, not entering into the substance of the faith, as the interpretation of the six days in the Mosaic account of the creation, the church guarding against the abuse of this liberty to the injury of its unity and peace.” All this “Declaratory Act” proceeds on a preamble that the standards, “being of human composition, are necessarily imperfect,” and wound up with the provision that the formula, acknowledging the confession and catechisms as an exhibition of the sense in which Scripture is understood, should have the words added, “this acknowledgment being made in view of the explanations contained in the Declaratory Act of Synod thereanent.”

The whole proceeding was a valuable step, not only in substance and on the side of doctrine, but in the matter of form. A mere

declaration by the church would have only expressed the *animus imponentis*, a change in whose *animus* does not necessarily or satisfactorily relieve the conscience of the subscriber. But the corresponding alteration in the formula carried over the change into the utterance of him who accepts it; and the whole doctrinal movement was carried out, in the usual Scottish fashion, by open and keen debating for and against, so fairly and frankly that, at the ultimate vote, none of its conservative opponents thought it necessary to record their dissent. The only protest, indeed, was from the other side, Mr. Macrae, now of Dundee, refusing to accept as adequate the modicum of revision which had now passed into the legislation of the church.

While one church was thus definitely advancing, another was struggling amid much confusion with principles which necessitated change. Professor Robertson Smith, a young but distinguished scholar of the Free Church, had been appointed her teacher of Hebrew and Exegesis at Aberdeen. He was soon also made sub-editor (and afterwards editor-in-chief) of the new "Encyclopædia Britannica," and in it naturally wrote some of the more important Biblical articles. As early as 1876 some of these, and especially one on Deuteronomy, had raised strong feeling; for in it Mr. Smith had represented that the last book of the Pentateuch was written many ages after Moses, and that its apparent historicity was merely a dramatic form into which the sacred author chose to throw his great *brochure*. The committee of the Free Church on its colleges at once met, and, while finding that there was no ground of process for heresy, yet left the matter to Mr. Smith's own Presbytery to investigate. The Presbytery might also have taken an intermediate course, but the professor, to the general surprise, rather challenged a prosecution under the Westminster Confession of Faith, which he alleged favored his general doctrine of Scripture. The matter was carried on through the years 1878 and 1879, the assembly of the latter year finding, by a majority, only one out of eight charges valid. But that charge, also, the assembly of the following year, by a small majority the other way, dismissed, and so quashed the whole case. The result, narrow as it was, was very remarkable. For Professor Smith's formal answer to the accusation in his Presbytery had broadened the question largely. He deliberately maintained that Scripture is only divine, and is only infallible, where it reveals to us "that knowledge of God and his will which is necessary to salvation." To that element in it, and to that alone, there is the witness of the

Spirit. In other respects — as a credible account, for example, of the origin of our religion — it is to be proved, where it can be proved, by the ordinary modes of historical evidence. In short, Scripture is only infallible, and only divine, in what relates to faith and life. These positions were already largely accepted in the two other Presbyterian churches, and were not strange to the younger ministry and scholarship of the Free Church, — something like them having been about this time set forth in separate publications by Professor Candlish and Dr. Marcus Dods, two of the most influential of its younger leaders; while another equally distinguished, Dr. A. B. Bruce, of Glasgow, has familiarized the American public with their liberal principles of interpretation. But what was strange and unexpected was the discovery that the Westminster Confession should be so expressed on this point as, in the judgment of the most orthodox of the Scottish communions, to leave room for this root position, or at least for a whole series of applications avowedly founded upon it. Undoubtedly to some extent the whole thing was, in popular language, a *fluke*, — a “happy inconsequence,” as a theologian called it. Professor Smith himself acknowledged that there is one sense that may fairly be ascribed to the confession in which you must acknowledge infallibility, not only in Scripture, but in every word and letter of the present Greek and Hebrew texts. And the latitude which the final judgment of the Free Church Assembly seemed to give to the chapter of its creed which deals with this subject was probably due, not so much to the undoubtedly simple and large views of the Reformers, as to the fact that the modern question, raised by modern criticism, had not come to the front when that creed was framed two hundred years ago. Even a giant of Puritanism cannot answer a question till it has been put. But one result of this state of matters was, that all through the Robertson Smith controversy in Scotland there was a curious feeling of perplexity and paradox. The young men and the innovators took their stand upon the old paths, and professed the highest regard for the existing standards. The old and the conservative declined to be strictly bound by them, and made their appeal rather to popular and traditional feeling. And all this came to a head when, in the year 1880, the question suddenly reëmerged. The assembly of that year had dismissed the existing charge against their professor, “declaring that the Free Church, in declining to decide on these critical views by way of discipline, expresses no view in favor of their truth or probability, but leaves the ultimate decision to future

enquiry, in the spirit of patience, humility, and brotherly charity." But before the year was out, this suggested truce was broken by the appearance in the "Encyclopædia" of other articles written by Professor Smith at an earlier date, and containing views which it was contended were to be tolerated under the recent decision. The explosion was sudden and strong, but its bearing on the question of the creed was specially interesting. The regular course would have been, either to leave the "decision to future enquiry" extrajudicially, or to commence a new judicial process. That might, like the previous one, have taken four years; but it would be by no means too long for the interests involved. And that, as before, was the course demanded by Professor Smith and his friends. But the lovers of orthodoxy with one voice declined to stand upon the creed: they refused to try their professor by it, or to inquire whether he stood within it; and by a large majority, in the assembly of 1881, they summarily declared that it was "no longer safe or advantageous for the church that Professor Smith should continue to teach."

This violent procedure was chiefly prompted by indisposition to enter at once and publicly upon the field of prolonged "enquiry" which the assembly had the year before invited; for such an enquiry would plainly have involved the question, not merely whether such views were within the creed, but whether the creed itself was adequate for the time. Dr. Norman Walker, the vigorous editor of the official magazine of the body, publicly avowed that it was not, and that, in the interests of sound doctrine, the time had come for parting from the Westminster Confession in its capacity of modern standard. There were fifty points, he maintained, *within* the confession whose denial he should be sorry to pronounce heresy; while there were many others outside it, the denial of which neither the church in the present day, nor the individual member of it, should tolerate even for a single meeting of assembly. It was plain that the "future enquiry," which the final decision in Doctor Smith's matter cut short, was thereby only postponed; and that, when it again came to the surface, this, like so many other important questions, would lay as a duty on the conscience of the Free Church the revision of an obsolescent creed.

It did not come to the surface again for years. But the "unconscious cerebration" of the Christian mind was working below, and in this church (the others in the mean time being passive) it at last took effect in an enactment in 1884 as to deacons. These

office-bearers, comprising a great army of the younger men of the Free Church, had since 1843 signed the same doctrinal formula with ministers and elders. They were bound to the "whole doctrine" of the Confession of Faith. But it was now decided, not without strong protests, that this preposterous uniformity should no longer continue. Henceforth the deacon, called "to administer the temporal affairs of a congregation," was released from the Confession of Faith, and bound only to "own and receive, as in accordance with Holy Scripture, *the system of evangelical truth* taught in this church, and set forth in the Westminster *Shorter Catechism*."

But the liberation of the younger laymen made more difficult the position of those students and young preachers, to whom (as well as to the ruling elders) the more elaborate document was tendered. In the south, also, the English Presbyterian Church, under the able guidance of Dr. Oswald Dykes, the successor of Edward Irving and Hamilton in Regent Square, had proposed, not only a revised formula, but a new Compendium of Doctrine. By the year 1887 the Scotch movement, originating very much with the younger men in the colleges, had become irrepressible. Its representative had been Dr. James Candlish, whose wise and cautious suggestions had pointed rather to a declaratory statement, like that of the United Presbyterians. The more general question was now taken up elsewhere, among others by Professor Blaikie of Edinburgh, who had acquired great authority with the Presbyterian churches as, more than any other man, the founder of their Alliance begun in 1877. Doctor Blaikie's first utterance on it had been ten years before, and in view of the coming assembly he now restated his views as follows:—

"My late colleague, Professor John Duncan, used to say that he liked to have a long creed for himself, and a short one for other people. For himself, he felt the obligation to try to have a definite opinion on every point touched in Scripture; in other words, a definite conception of what God taught upon it. But it was not necessary for him to impose all that he thus believed on others as the necessary basis of Christian fellowship with them. If he found in them the broad lineaments of the common faith, that was enough for fellowship. With some modification, the same is true of what a church should believe for itself and what it should impose as a term of fellowship on all its ministers. No doubt a larger amount of agreement is needed of men who are to teach than of those with whom, in a private capacity, Christian fellowship is to be maintained. But the church should recognize the distinction between the longer creed that she should endeavor to hold and the shorter creed that she imposes.

This, I think, the Westminster Assembly failed to do. The Confession of Faith was the embodiment of their longer creed; it was their 'symbol' (συμβόλαιον), their agreement among themselves. Very naturally the members of that assembly were highly pleased that the points of agreement among them, even the minuter points, were so numerous. The longer and more minute the document became, so much the better; for it indicated so much larger an agreement. But the very quality that enhanced its excellence in this respect made it less adapted to be imposed as a term of communion on every office-bearer of the church in all time coming. And if it had been proposed to the Westminster divines to frame a creed, the belief of which, in every article and clause, should be a *sine quâ non* of office forevermore, — which should carry its authority down through the centuries with all their modifications of light and shade, which should claim the homage of the young converts of India and China, the converted cannibals of the South Seas, the Zulu and the Hottentot, and peradventure of every variety of the human race over the surface of the globe, — we can hardly doubt that a document far shorter and simpler would have been the result."

The practical alterations, however, proposed by Dr. Blaikie, were few and cautious, and some who agreed with him hesitated in raising so large a question with so small a result. Thus Dr. Marcus Dods, one of the most distinguished of our Scottish theologians, promptly said: —

"Were the proposed alterations radical, the church might well afford to be disturbed in such an interest. It were worthy of any church to consider whether creeds, used as terms of office, have not done more harm than good, accentuating peculiarities and perpetuating inconsiderable distinctions; whether freedom of thought and the currents of public opinion are not more likely than the imposition of a creed to bring all Christendom to a common recognition of the truth; whether a church is justified in holding a creed which cannot be expected ever to become the creed of the Church Catholic, thus dooming herself to everlasting sectarianism; whether a church is justified in exacting from her ministry any confession of faith beyond the one article of faith in Christ as the Living Supreme, which she is justified in demanding of her members."

Views varying like these necessarily raised the question of the timeliness of action, and not a few were heard to counsel postponement. To some — among others the present writer — postponement of such a question seemed not morally justifiable. And even on the side of expediency it appeared not so much timid as reckless, — "passiveness, in the admitted presence of explosive forces, being morally undistinguishable from a policy of precipitation and explosion." Great interest attached to the coming General

Assembly, because its chair was about to be filled by Principal Rainy, who had for years now exercised alone that Free Church leadership which after 1843 had been divided among men of the highest eminence. Was he to repress the movement or encourage it? He did neither; but in an opening address of great beauty and power he called upon his church to observe that the present age is "one of those times of rapid and remarkable movement which are critical in human history,"¹ — that the stirring of earnest doubt and debate is by no means mere loss, and that the church must at all times hold the truth and seek for more truth. The Free Church moderator's declared intention to speak also on union with the other churches was perhaps arrested by the proposals now raised in the Church of Scotland to deal with the whole matter of creed. These came to a head in the Established Assembly of 1888. It was proposed then, as formerly, that the Westminster standard should be exchanged for Scripture alone; but the committee recommended that the only practicable change was "to bring the practice of the church into accordance with statute law" in the matter of subscription. Fortunately, in the matter of elders there is no statute, and this enabled lay rulers to be allowed henceforth simply to "subscribe their approbation" of the confession. Even this is a strong step for one who confesses, as the Rev. Dr. Cunningham did in proposing it, that the confession "has put Calvinism in the most offensive possible way." But it is much more serious to retain a clerical subscription which declares the confession thus spoken of to be "the confession of my faith," and sincerely owns "the doctrine therein contained" — though no longer the "whole" doctrine — as the doctrine to be adhered to. Yet this statutory form was retained by the assembly, the only excuse for it being that it is imposed partly from without, and that the *animus* towards freedom of the administering church (which is to be referred to in a preamble) does not change the *animus imponentis* of the enacting state.

The bearing of all this on subscription, as Principal Rainy now pointed out in publishing his addresses of the previous year, made it desirable for the church outside to take up its more responsible duty without much delay. And before winter it was urged² that

¹ Dr. Marcus Dods, speaking in Glasgow, in April, 1889, said: "He believed the best-read man in the hall could not pick out any term of twenty-five years in this world's history which had seen so little outward change, and such enormous inward changes, as these last twenty-five years."

² *Theological Review*, Edinburgh, 1888.

the Free Church Presbyteries should move without *any* delay. Accordingly before April a large number of them had sent up "overtures" on the subject to the Assembly of this year, and the reception of these made it nearly certain that a committee would be appointed. In that month the proposal of Dr. Marcus Dods to fill the suddenly vacant chair of New Testament Exegesis in Edinburgh raised a sharper question. His eminence was undeniable; but at the Presbyterian Council in the previous year he had read a paper, amid the protests of some not very well known Americans, that the church made a great mistake when it perilled the central faith upon the accuracy or infallibility of all parts and details of Scripture. On 29th May last, two days before the confessional question came up in General Assembly, Dr. Dods, strongly protested against on this ground, was elected by a majority of more than a hundred over the votes of two other candidates combined. And the significance of the vote was, that his appointment was proposed on the very ground on which it had been at first objected to; the mover broadly asserting that no professor should be trusted who did not put Christianity first, and the documents of Christianity unmistakably second. After this vote on Tuesday, there was no doubt about the result of Thursday. The first motion, indeed, protested against change either of creed or subscription. But Principal Brown, the venerable head of the Free Church College at Aberdeen, then rose and moved that, while the church must adhere to its great doctrines, it recognizes "a present call to deal with" the confession, and appoints a committee to inquire as to the advisable mode of action. The Westminster divines, he said, had made two great mistakes. They put too many things into their confession, and they reversed the order in which Scripture had put them. The centre of gravity, as he had expressed it to his Presbytery, was not now where the framers of the confession had put it. He had signed that document, but it was fifty-six years ago, as a young man; and the document, like Mr. Gladstone's Bill, was "dead." Dr. Adam, who seconded, preferred amending by means of a Declaratory Act. Dr. Bruce, of Glasgow, leaned rather to a new, shorter, and working confession, going straight for the things that pertained to the essence of the Gospel; and a young minister, seconding him, declared for himself and his Hegelian friends that they adhered to no system of theology at present in existence. The assembly groaned a little, but Professor Thomas Smith, while speaking against any movement, covered the statement by confessing that, if he had to frame a

theology, he certainly should not frame it on the lines of the confession. Dr. Walter Smith, poet and preacher, denied that the movement was to be at all revolutionary, but maintained with Dr. Brown that the centre of gravity of the system should be no longer the sovereignty of God, but the love of God. The discussion throughout was full of kindly feeling, though burdened with a sense of its historic gravity; and at its close, in a very crowded house, the motion for a committee was carried by 413 to 130, or more than three to one! Such a vote only a few years ago would have been astonishing and revolutionary. But this year the great majority of the dissentients have, after the vote, withdrawn their opposition so far as to serve upon the committee. It has thus become thoroughly representative, and its work in the future, built upon such a development in the past, will be watched from both sides of the Atlantic.

A. Taylor Innes.

EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND.

THE HALF-BREED INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA.

It was a long trail before us — a hundred and thirty miles; a buckboard called a mail stage; much of the way over the sage-plains on a cattle trail; the Green River to be forded six times; ranch houses about ten miles apart; ours the last one far up north; and between it and the Yellowstone Park, one hundred and fifty miles farther due north, no cabin-smoke of white man. We were to be three days on the route through those great ranches of Wyoming, and see some of the 3,000,000 steers in that territory.

Of course we were inquisitive about our resting-place for the night, for I had not then learned that in our dim border-land any cabin is a public-house for a traveler late in the afternoon of any day. The driver assured us of Smith's Hotel an hour before sunset, but we did not realize his solemn joke till we left all traces of wheels, turned a bend in the river, and in a witching poplar grove, carpeted with rich grass, saw two tents. A generous campfire was in front of the larger, and the landlady was busy in preparing dinner, aided by two men-waiters. Passing over to them some ducks, rabbits, and sage-hens, wayside spoils from the buckboard, we were at home. Throwing our blankets

into the smaller tent, empty of everything but some fresh hay, we registered for our apartments, and were soon summoned to the dining-hall. Between the main tent and the campfire a four-foot square of canvas was spread on the ground, and a good dinner covered it. This was the *table d'hôte* of the establishment. The dishes were varied, abundant, and well prepared, and one seldom finds better bread, butter, tea, and coffee, even where he has change of courses and finger-bowls. A pet antelope kid would reach his nose over our shoulder for the tempting biscuit, and his foot was careless of our teacup. Fortunately a beautiful Angora goat, half grown, was not so bold. A large cottonwood stood near by, overhanging the "hotel" and grounds. Its foreshortened limbs afforded natural hooks and pegs for all the loose miscellany of a kitchen, sitting-room, and sleeping-room. A coarse box standing against it was a good washstand, and the limb-pegs held water-bucket and towels above the long-reaching neck and nose of the beautiful, impertinent antelope.

Back of us, screened by the poplar grove, flowed and rippled the Green River (well so called from its marine color), two gunshots wide. On both its banks, and here and there, and from one to ten miles off, were the stock of this ranchman, steers, sheep, and Angora goats, all counting up strongly into the thousands. In front and to the east the illimitable sage-plains ran off into the horizon, broken some with mesa and butte; and far beyond, one, two, and three hundred miles, one could discern the low, blue line of mountains, extending up north from the South Pass to the Wind River Mountains. Over the whole tumbled panorama Fremont's Peak, high lifted, keeps watch, and for hundreds of miles in all directions from our hotel you cannot escape the eye of that watchful sentinel for any long time.

The nearest human shelter, unless a wigwam, was probably ten miles off. Into such a "rural district" our host had moved for a summer rest, and in Abrahamic style, with his flocks and herds, and men-servants, that is, cowboys. In doing it he had escaped the hum and bustle of his home life, fifty miles up the river, where he had a log cabin, and not three houses more, for neighbors, within twenty-five miles! How he must have enjoyed his quiet vacation in this flight to the country! No pavements for rattling wheels on those square miles of lawn; no tablet warnings to "keep off the grass"; no newsboy cry of some third edition of an awful accident; no importunate offer of a wide-awake boy to "shine" his moccasins!

This was a "half-breed" family. The woman was a full-blood Snake Indian, and the two young men, or rather boys, were her children by a former white husband. Her present husband, a man of many good qualities and of wealth in his stock, made the good point and defense of his matrimonial choice, that he needed a house and home, and that it was no fair thing to take a white woman, from civilized life and its social enjoyments, into that wild, uninhabited country. We saw in his explanation the reason why seven of the fifteen ranch houses, which we passed in our one hundred and thirty miles' ride up that splendid valley, were bachelor homes. Good specimens of manhood the men were, mentally and morally, and socially when they had opportunities, but they realized that range and ranch life could but poorly allow for the true home.

Fortunate it is for those who will take a native wife that they are color-blind; and with a convenient blindness over some few other things, which some greatly need who have white wives on the border, life passes pleasantly among the half-breeds, where the husband furnishes a fair amount of civilization. True, our hostess of the Cottonwood Hotel expected us to furnish our own bed, as we did, she providing only that softness and spring which sweet hay and Wyoming prairie ground always afford. True, also, that on the dinner-table there were no perplexing changes in the courses.

Here was a fair sample of a large body of the American people, much larger than the old East and even the Middle States realize. I therefore studied it with the more care, and have here sketched it in fuller outline. As I found afterward, I was to see much more of this mixed blood and life while completing my tour through our extreme northwest, and somewhat over our national boundary into the Dominion of Canada, and about old, fur-trading Fort Garry.

Was this what Mr. Secretary Crawford meant in his Report on Indian Affairs in 1816? As secretary of war under Madison, he had charge of the Indian Department, and made the following recommendation:—

"If the system already devised has not produced all the effects which were expected from it, new experiments ought to be made. When every effort to introduce among them [the Indian savages] ideas of exclusive property in things real as well as personal shall fail, let intermarriage between them and the whites be encouraged by the government. This cannot fail to preserve the race, with

the modifications necessary to the enjoyment of civil liberty and social happiness. It is believed that the principles of humanity in this instance are in harmonious concert with the true interests of the nation. It will redound more to the national honor to incorporate, by a humane and benevolent policy, the natives of our forests in the great American family of freemen, than to receive with open arms the fugitives of the old world, whether their flight has been the effect of their crimes or their virtues."¹

Mr. Crawford had been a member of Congress, and also our minister to France, and for a short time acting vice-president under Madison. While secretary of war in 1815, he aspired to the presidency in opposition to Monroe. The politicians seized on his intermarriage scheme for saving the Indian race, and, as may easily be supposed, used it with great effect against him. He was caricatured and lampooned, and his theory was variously set forth in social and domestic illustrations by the Nasts of those days, seventy years ago, and with such abusive personalities as might give even a demagogue of to-day some new hints for working a campaign.

Our Indian Question seems to take on new intricacies and perplexities as the decades go by. There are some unknown or unrecognized quantities in the problem which will not easily be eliminated. Among these is the complex and diffuse fact of intermarriage and half-breeds.

This fact is as old as any knowledge of the Indian races in North America by Europeans. In the fifth of his able Historical Letters on the Oregon Question, Albert Gallatin says that "all the American shores of the Pacific Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are occupied by semi-civilized states, a mixture of European and Spanish descent and of native Indians, who, notwithstanding the efforts of enlightened, intelligent, and liberal men, have heretofore failed in the attempt to establish governments founded on law, that might ensure liberty, preserve order, and protect person and property." This he said in 1846.

The basis of this semi-civilized condition of society, it will be noted, is the mixture of European and Indian blood, which made it impossible to "establish a government founded on law" that could protect person and property.

From the earliest colonial dates the Canadas were permeated by the same uncivilizing causes. The immigrants came into the

¹ *Report on Indian Affairs.* By W. C. Crawford, Secretary of War, March 13, 1816. Senate, 14th Congress, 1st Session.

country as unmarried men, either as employees of the Hudson Bay Company or as soldiers or adventurers, and very naturally formed domestic relations with the Indians. These ties generally had the strength and continuance only of fancy, or the conveniences of their wandering life in an unlimited wilderness. The two races became simply gregarious. The home government was intent mainly on population, regardless of race or legitimacy. Marriage was enjoined and at early years. The daughter of the governor of Three Rivers was married at the age of twelve, and one of the children of this marriage was the discoverer of the Rocky Mountains (Varennnes de la Verendrye). Young women were imported, and not always with moral scrutiny, and royal bounties were paid on large families. The twelfth chapter of Parkman's "Old Régime" has authentic details enough on this to satisfy the most curious.

But especially all pursuits, as agriculture, mechanics, and manufactures, were overshadowed and lost sight of in the wild passion of the fur trade, with its social *abandon*. The industry and thrift of young homes and villages, the ties of wife and children, were ruthlessly thrown away in a popular passion for forest life and the spoils of the chase. "Many of these *coureurs des bois* became so accustomed to the Indian mode of living and the perfect freedom of the wilderness, that they lost all relish for civilization, and identified themselves with the savages among whom they dwelt, or could only be distinguished from them by superior licentiousness."¹

"The French merchant at his trading-post in the primitive days of Canada had his harem of Indian beauties and his troops of half-breed children."² Colbert, an official, writes to the intendant, that "those who may seem to have absolutely renounced marriage should be made to bear additional burdens, and to be excluded from all honors," and bachelors were forbidden to take to the forest for the Indian trade. Parkman adds the note to this: "The prohibition to go into the woods was probably intended to prevent the bachelor from finding a temporary Indian substitute for a French wife."³

Du Lhut, whose name stands misspelled at the head of Lake Superior, in one enterprise led off hundreds of the Canadian young men into this decivilizing life, and under Duchesneau's administration the most active and vigorous of the young men of

¹ Irving's *Astoria*, vol. i. chap. i.

² Irving's *Astoria*, vol. i. chap. i.

³ *Old Régime*, p. 226.

the colonies took to the woods to enjoy the savage freedom of Indian life, and the intendant reported that 800 had thus gone out of a population of 10,000. The king affixed the penalty of branding and whipping for the first offense, and the galleys for life for the second. But the evil could not be suppressed, so fascinating was the fur trade and the domestic life incidental and inevitable to it.

In speaking of the *coureurs des bois*, Irving says that "their conduct and example gradually corrupted the natives." Nor was the influence of the fur trade better on the Indian. He ranged wide and wild in the forests, and sometimes would be gone for years from the settlements, and then return with his fur trophies, flush of money. Says the same author: "A short time, however, spent in revelry, would be sufficient to drain his purse and sate him with civilized life, and he would return with new relish to the unshackelled freedom of the forest."¹

The settlements themselves were not free from the same de-civilizing and debauching influences. In his "Old Régime" Parkman quotes Father Carheil, a Jesuit missionary at Mackinaw, as saying that the soldiery, with brandy, introduced an "infinity of disorder, brutality, violence, injustice, impiety, and impurity" among the Indians. He says the garrisons have only four occupations: first, to keep open liquor-shops for crowds of drunken Indians; . . . and, fourthly, to turn the post into a place which I am ashamed to call by its right name."²

"Our good king," writes Sister Marin, of Montreal, "has sent troops to defend us from the Iroquois, and the soldiers and officers have ruined the Lord's vineyard, and planted sin and crime in our soil of Canada."³

More recent and personal testimony to the influence of soldiery on the Indians may here be introduced. An experienced and candid mountaineer of thirty-five years between the Missouri and the Pacific, and who spoke several Indian languages, and knew well the tribes, said to the author, in the Rocky Mountains in 1885: "The soldiery will have access to the Reservations. The officers and missionaries cannot prevent it, and they are being consumed by imported diseases. . . . The tribes are ruined beyond all chance of hope by the soldiers and cowboys and ranchers. . . . You can have no conception of their outrageous conduct."⁴

¹ *Astoria*, vol. i., chap. xii.

² Pp. 319, 320.

³ *Old Régime*, p. 369.

⁴ *The Indian's Side of the Indian Question.* By William Barrows, D. D. Pp. 154-157.

In a change of sovereignty to sterner rule, morals and manners degenerated still lower, so that "it was thought a fine thing and a good joke [for the young men] to go about naked and tricked out like Indians, not only on carnival days, but on all other days of feasting and debauchery."¹

Fremont, in his exploring tour of 1843-44, found a similar state of things among the trappers. Speaking of Roubideau's trading-post on the Uintah River, south of Salt Lake, he says: "It has mostly a garrison of Canadian and Spanish *engegés* and hunters, with the usual number of Indian women."

The same is implied in what General P. St. George Cooke says of Bent's Fort on the Arkansas in 1846: "Here were many races and colors, a confusion of tongues, of rank and condition, and of cross-purposes."²

In the "Narrative of a Journey Round the World," by Sir George Simpson, Governor-in-chief of the Hudson Bay Company, made in 1841-42, is a hint of this mixed condition of the races at that date. At Stikine, British Columbia, the governor says, "fourteen or fifteen of the men of the establishment asked permission to take native wives, and leave to accept the worthless bargains was granted to all such as had the means of supporting a family. These matrimonial connections are a heavy tax on a post, in consequence of the increased demand for provisions, but form, at the same time, a useful link between the traders and the savages."³

It is pertinent and instructive to see how this policy pervaded and shaped the administration of the Hudson Bay Company, from the beginning of its two darkening centuries in British America. A few facts will make its course manifest: "The servants of the Company purchased Indian women, and half-breed families were raised. The Company found it for their profit to encourage their employees thus to marry, as it attached them to localities, and made them contented in a wilderness home, while the offspring, as children of a slave mother, were themselves slaves, and became both profitable and inexpensive to the Company."⁴

In his "Report on Slavery in Oregon," to the United States government, Mr. Slocum, of the navy, says: "The price of a slave varies from five to fifteen blankets. Women are valued higher than the men."

¹ *Ibid.* p. 375.

² P. 8.

³ Vol. i., p. 231.

⁴ *Oregon: The Struggle for Possession.* By W. Barrows, D. D. Pp. 91, 92.

In the famous Lord Selkirk grant, the primitive Manitoba, there were in 1840, and after its absorption in the Hudson Bay Company, about 6,000 persons, but the most of them were Indians and half-breeds; but very few of them were Europeans in blood.¹

As to the agency of the Hudson Bay Company in introducing a half-breed population into the wilds of America, Gray, in his "History of Oregon," makes the statement, with his not unusual excessive force: "They had agreed, in accepting their original charter, to civilize and Christianize the natives of the country. This part of their compact the individual members of the company were fulfilling by each taking a native woman, and rearing as many half-civilized subjects as was convenient."²

"At some villages there were but one or two traders; at others, ten, twenty, and sometimes as many as fifty [French and English]. For the most part the traders were married to squaws, and had children by them. . . . We have heard of but two instances where traders had white wives living with them in Indian villages."³

All readers of our history recall the Seminoles as one of the most numerous and powerful of all our Indian tribes. Of these Dr. Morse says: "The pure Seminoles, Captain Bell verbally stated to me, are about twelve hundred in number." As the entire number of the tribe at that time was 4,560, the number of pure blood was about one fourth.⁴

It does seem as if a prediction made in 1820 is likely to prove true, with extension of time: "In the course of another half century no genuine trace of them probably will remain in our borders."⁵

In speaking of the mixed population of Lower Louisiana, Major Amos Stoddard, who was our first governor of it, says that "among these are Spaniards, Creoles, aboriginals, a vast variety of mixed bloods, forming no less than seven distinct castes. Their moral principles are extremely debauched, and their intercourse with each other is marked by the most corrupt profligacy of manners."⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

² *A History of Oregon*, by W. H. Gray, 1870, p. 78.

³ *Magazine of Western History*, December, 1884, p. 120.

⁴ *Report on Indian Affairs*, 1820, Appendix, pp. 309, 311.

⁵ *Emigrants' Guide to Upper Canada*. C. Stuart, Esq., London, 1820, p. 267.

⁶ Stoddard's *Sketches of Louisiana*, p. 291.

This mixture of white and Indian blood was but the outcome of the trapping and trading and gold-hunting interests of Europeans from the Canadas to the Gulf of Mexico. Nor were domestic alliances sought only on the part of white men among the natives. In his "Travels in the Valley of the Mississippi," 1815-1825, Timothy Flint found among the Cherokees "a young woman, not only a full-blooded American, but rather fair and pretty, a wife to one of the young warriors."¹

While this Hudson Bay Company controlled and covered a country one third larger than all Europe, its employees of European blood would hardly exceed 3,000. Of the rest, about one fourth were Hawaiian, one fourth Orkney, and the rest Canadian, Indian, and half-bloods.

One friendly historian of the Company says: "A large proportion of the Company's servants, and, with very few exceptions, the officers, are united to native women."² Speaking of social life at Vancouver, as late as 1849, he adds: "The residents mess at several tables: one for the chief factor and the clerks; one for their wives, it being against the regulations of the Company for their officers and their wives to take their meals together." A sad reflection this on English business and English civilization which interdicts the family table over a region one third larger than all Europe!

Sometimes, though rarely, a European was imported to order for a wife, and she was received as goods, and in one case at least the receipt stands: "Received, one wife, in good condition." But this was a luxury which few could afford to enjoy. As a general result, the increase of population was half-breed; European civilization stooped to nominal matrimony in the low type of the wigwam. The elevating, ennobling, and refining influence of woman, which makes the true home, was wanting under the Hudson Bay Company, and society was a dubious hyphen between savagery and civilization.

John Grant, agent for the Fort Hall trading-post of the Company on Snake River, Idaho, was a man much married, and head of a tawny family. He held this post as a Gibraltar against all immigration into Oregon, and turned the human tide southerly to California, till Dr. Whitman broke through with his "old wagon," and brought over Oregon into the Union.

¹ P. 149.

² *Hudson Bay Territories and Vancouver's Island.* London, 1849. By R. M. Martin.

This miserable policy and practice of the Company for domestic life of course had their influence within the territory of the United States on the wild border, and facts in this line, therefore, must not surprise us. In 1842 a band of one hundred and thirty-seven persons from the States passed this same Fort Hall for Oregon. There were in it men, women, and children, adventurers and missionaries, both Protestant and Catholic. Of this company twenty-five of the men had native wives.¹

Long before this, such a social condition had become the common order on the Illinois. "The early French on the Illinois were remarkable for their talent of ingratiating themselves with the warlike tribes around them, and for their easy amalgamation in manners and customs and blood."²

When in Wyoming in 1885, one town of sixty families was pointed out to me in which one fourth of the families were of mixed blood.

In July, 1701, Sieur Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, under the order of Louis XIV., founded Detroit. To secure population he encouraged his soldiers to marry the Indian girls. He had prepared for this by settling the Miamis, Pottawatomies, Hurons, and Ottawas in the close vicinity of Port Detroit. He made an eminent success of his plan. In 1837 Judge John W. Edmonds, appointed by President Jackson to pay off the Pottawatomies for their lands, found that fully one half of them bore French names, or were classed distinctively as half-breeds. Many of the Detroit half-breeds rose in civilization, and to high social and civil positions, and founded some of the most influential families in Michigan in the second and third generations.³

"The Fond du Lac tribe consists of forty-five men, sixty women, and two hundred and forty children. There are about thirty of the half-breed, and three freemen, who have families. They are Canadians married to Indian women, living entirely with the Indians, and are not engaged to the Company, by whom, as well as by the Indians, they are considered a great nuisance, being forever exciting broils and disturbances."⁴

"In this place [Fort Brown], on both sides of the mouth of Fox River, are about eighty families, some say less, principally French, — all the married men but one connected with Indian

¹ Barrows' *Oregon*, p. 149.

² Monette's *Mississippi Valley*, vol. i. p. 182.

³ Edmund Kirke, in *Harper's Monthly*, August, 1866, p. 330.

⁴ Report of Dr. Morse, Appendix, p. 37.

women. There are here about two hundred and sixty children of mixed blood, growing up without any public-school education, and by far the greater part of them without any education at all.”¹

While spending some time in the Indian Territory in 1880, it was our good fortune to be able to attend the great Indian Fair at Mus-ko-ge. Besides the Five Nations, there were probably twenty-five tribes represented, and the whole multitude was between two and three thousand. It was entirely an Indian fair, agricultural, mechanical, industrial, and domestic, as well as in administration; and the Ladies' Department was attractive both for its superiority over that of the gentlemen in the number and quality of articles on exhibition, and for its intelligent and ladylike superintendence. The women were marked for their beauty, grace of manner, good style of dress, and general deportment. The ordinary observer in Cincinnati or St. Louis would pass them for beautiful white ladies of the Lower Mississippi, with their attractive brunette complexions. They had had the education of letters, taste, and refinement at the North. Very like, they were wealthy, or heiresses of quadrupled fortunes in live-stock, and some of them with “squaw men” for husbands, who were greatly their inferiors in appearance and civilization.

The gentlemen officials showed white blood, and in their bearing carried themselves as well as New-Englanders in like circumstances. One, less than half-blood, a graduate of Dartmouth and bred to the law, with an Ohio wife, made a very fine impression. Massive yet symmetrical in person, Websterian in his English diction, he would stand as a man of mark anywhere, regardless of complexion or pedigree. He made a very good address on the stand at the fair.

One need not be an expert in ethnology to mark on the streets of Montreal and Winnipeg, St. Louis and Omaha, aboriginal as well as imported blood, in making up their ardent and energetic populations; and often is it a difficult discrimination to tell which blood has the mastery and brings the honors. In time, race peculiarities disappear in a new and complex type of man.

We quote below a remark, in one of the Reports of the American Board, on the pride some most noble families will take in tracing their ancestry back on one side to the Five Nations of the Indian Territory. This is very strictly true, and justly so, of some Virginians. It will be remembered how proud John Randolph was of his descent, on the father's side, from the prin-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

ness Pocahontas. And it comes into the romance of history that Theodoric Bland, great-grandson of Pocahontas, poet, scholar, and patriot, was one of the committee of five, on the part of the House, to receive Washington on the New Jersey shore as he journeyed from Mount Vernon to New York to take his inauguration oath and first place in our long line of Presidents. Bancroft has well said of the marriage of Rolfe and Pocahontas that "she stammered before the altar her marriage vows, according to the rites of the English service," and that "distinguished men trace from it their descent." She was admired in England, and made a social ornament at court when Lady Delaware presented her. A similar treatment of other American princesses of the forest would have left a nobler record for our Christian States, and for our civilization which historians will discount at no flattering per cent. "Many a descendant of Pocahontas has been prouder of his lineage than the nobly born in other lands; and hereafter, no doubt, men of the Southwest will love to reckon among their ancestry some godly and large-hearted Indian."¹ And this despite the low white ancestry that usually introduces the first generation of half-breeds.

"When the tide of emigration sets strong towards the wilderness occupied by the native tribes, a large proportion of the most lawless and worthless part of the population is carried in advance of the older settlements, like driftwood upon a swollen river. Hence it is almost impossible for the civil authorities to restrain acts of lawless violence in such persons on the extreme confines of civilization."²

In speaking of the remnants of Indians in Massachusetts in 1820, Dr. Morse says: "The number of pure-blooded Indians is extremely small, say fifty or sixty, and is rapidly decreasing. The mixture of blood arises far more frequently from connection with negroes than with whites."³

In connection with these remarks on Indians in Massachusetts, Dr. Morse speaks of those in Rhode Island, and gives their number as four hundred and twenty-nine, "nearly all, if not every individual, of mixed blood and color in various degrees and shades." And this is the last of the Narragansetts, the tribe which was such a terror to the colonists and to the surrounding Indian tribes. Dr. Bacon, in his "Genesis," page 357, gives the estimate of their number in 1622 at 30,000.

¹ *American Board Report*, 1853, p. 22.

² Monette's *Mississippi Valley*, vol. i. p. 369.

³ Report, Appendix, p. 70.

In 1877 the Earl of Dufferin, late governor-general of Canada, addressing an audience at Winnipeg, made this politic and laudatory reference to this mixed class of which we are treating: "There is no doubt that a great deal of the good feeling subsisting between the red men and ourselves is due to the influence and interposition of that invaluable class of men, the half-breed settlers and pioneers of Manitoba," — the ancient Winnipeg, or Red River Colony. "They have preached the gospel of peace and goodwill and mutual respect, with results beneficent alike to the Indian chieftain in his lodge and to the British settler in his shanty."¹

On this Red River Colony Lord Selkirk expended about \$400,000, and when it was sold out to the Hudson Bay Company in 1835 it had for population Canadians and half-breeds, Indians and naked savages, farmers, hunters, and fishermen, and missionaries of various denominations. When we visited it in 1885 the mixture of blood was not so obvious. That had faded out, even as the wigwams and shanties of primitive and wildwood times had given way to a neat and well-ordered town, honored and magnified by the stately offices of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, with flags flying commemorative of the day we were there, when the road was formally opened to the Rocky Mountains. The change was great from the condition given of it in 1835 by Dr. Ellis: "The inhabitants of the region at the time were of as motley and miscellaneous a make-up as any extensive region on earth would have afforded, — Canadians, half-breeds, Indians, and naked, painted, and feathered savages, strutting and fuming voyageurs, farmers, hunters, fishermen, furnished with missionaries of rival creeds, and not without means of education. . . . Well-furnished and well-stocked houses and farm-barns, and the filthiest, dreariest cabins and wigwams."²

In writing of Green Bay, Dr. Morse says: "This place and Prairie du Chien will probably be the future capitals of the Northwest Territory, which is now without any white population, except the garrisons of the United States and a few families of mingled French and Indian blood settled around them."³

"More than half the Cherokee nation, a large part of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and I may add, indeed, of all other tribes with whom the whites have had intercourse, are of mixed blood."⁴

¹ *Speeches and Addresses of the Earl of Dufferin*, pp. 237, 238, and quoted by Ellis, *Red Man and White Man*, p. 301.

² *Red Man and White Man*, p. 494.

³ Report, p. 14.

⁴ Morse's Report, p. 74.

"Prairie du Chien is a military post near the confluence of the Ouisconsin with the Mississippi, an old French settlement, where are three or four hundred inhabitants, principally of mixed blood."¹

In 1803 Captain John Whistler and son were ordered from the army at Detroit to build and occupy a post at Chicago, and they erected Fort Dearborn. Their wives came with them, the first two white women ever in Chicago. They found there four cabins of Canadian trappers with their Indian wives. And so Chicago was founded in half-breeds. And the first child born in Denver was half Indian, of an Arapahoe mother, in 1858. It is probable that a historical search into the beginnings of many of our larger towns beyond the Alleghanies would show that Chicago and Denver are typical in regard to the combination of the two races.

The holidays, sports, and sociables are a very good index to the state of society, and a ball in Rupert's Land — the royal trapping ground of the Hudson Bay Company — shows what a volume could be written on the civil, social, and moral life of the mixed races in British America. It continued for three days in eating, drinking, dancing, and sleeping. "From time to time as many as are requisite to keep up the festivities are awakened; and being forthwith revived with raw spirits, join in the dance with renewed vigor."²

Mixed French, Spanish, and Indian society held sway in Louisiana long after its purchase, and after it came nominally under the laws of the United States. True, the English language was introduced into the courts by statute as early as 1808, but the change in manners, customs, and morals did not follow so early, or gain footing so readily. "The language, manners, customs, laws, usages of the American people began to extend over the French settlements and to change the aspects of the country. . . . Yet as late as the year 1814 St. Louis had not lost either its French population, aspects, or usages," when it was a border town of about 2,000 people.³

Nor was it changed radically from this when we took residence there in 1840, among its 16,000 inhabitants, though Monette's description would apply best to the lower and eminently French part of the city, Vete Pouche. A picture of St. Louis in 1810, as given by Irving from the Notes of Wilson P. Hunt, should

¹ Morse's Report, Appendix, p. 316.

² *The Great Fur Land*, by H. M. Robinson, p. 324.

³ Monette, vol. ii. p. 546.

have a place here. "The old French houses engaged in the Indian trade had gathered around them a train of dependants, mongrel Indians and mongrel Frenchmen, who had intermarried with Indians. . . . Here were to be seen, above the river banks, the hectoring, extravagant, bragging boatman of the Mississippi, with the gay, grimacing, singing, good-humored Canadian voyageurs. Vagrant Indians of various tribes loitered about the streets. . . . A motley population, composed of the creole descendants of the original French colonists; the keen trader from the Atlantic States; the backwoodsmen of Kentucky and Tennessee; the Indians and half-breeds of the prairies; together with a singular aquatic race that had grown up from the navigation of the rivers — the 'boatmen of the Mississippi.'"¹

In his "Sketches of Louisiana," Major Stoddard thus speaks of one village of Indians on the Arkansas, about forty-five miles from its mouth. "The French visited this place as early as 1685, where they opened a trade with the natives, built a fort, and formed some settlements about it. At that period the Arkansas nation of Indians was deemed one of the most powerful in the country, and the French, to preserve peace with them and to secure their trade, intermarried with them. Most of the inhabitants of that village are of mixed blood, and the mixture is observable among the Indians, who are now reduced to a very few in number and live in two small villages, above that of the whites."²

The same author, speaking of the habits in Indian hospitality, says: "Among some, it is customary for the chief to present his youngest wife to his stranger guest, and if he refuses it is considered as an affront. Among others, the chief presents his daughter, or some other unmarried female relative. . . . In some nations of Indians, adultery is punishable with death, and fornication permitted. In others, fornication is a capital offence, and adultery is practiced with impunity."³

"Of the seventy thousand persons inhabiting the Indian Territory, scarcely half are of pure Indian blood. No white man can reside there unless he has for a wife an Indian squaw, and so secures the noble title of "a squaw man." There are four thousand whites. The mongrel breeds are steadily increasing, and the pure race dying out."⁴

¹ *Astoria*, by Washington Irving, chap. xiv.

² *Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Louisiana*, by Major Amos Stoddard, p. 206.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

⁴ Dr. Ellis's *The Red Man and the White Man*, p. 580.

After the meeting of the American Board in St. Louis in 1881, a company of the attendants visited Vinita, in the Indian Territory. Vinita is one of the leading towns in the Cherokee nation. The Rev. Mr. Scroggs, long time a teacher there, made this remark to his visitors: "I do not feel sure of more than four pure-blood Indians in this place." There was an Indian population of possibly a thousand.

A correspondent in Montana gives me the following: "In an early day, before there were any white women in the country, many whites of education and good social standing lived with, and in some cases married, Indian women. A few of these have kept their Indian wives for the sake of their children. One notable instance of this is Mr. Blank, as finely educated and highly accomplished a gentleman as can be found in Montana." He has held positions of high honor in civil affairs, and "got married to a Snake woman, who, I believe, does not even speak English. In Helena there is now living a daughter of another Mr. Blank, and a Blackfoot squaw. She was educated in the East, and moved in the best society there. . . . Now very few whites are living with Indian women. A few such couples are found around the Indian Reservation, but the officials discourage it, and there is, on the whole, comparatively little white blood mixed with the Montana Indian tribes."

In 1874 the Osages numbered about 3,000 at the agency, of whom 300 were mixed bloods. The Commissioner reports them as "educated, wear citizens' dress; nearly all of the half-breed families have good houses and farms, with from 20 to 100 acres in cultivation, and self-supporting. About seventy-five families of the civilizing half-bloods are living in comfortable hewed-log houses, with from five to twenty acres improved; a few of them have wagons, farming implements, and milch cows. All of them have horses, hogs, and poultry."¹

In reporting on the Nez Percé Indians, in 1874, John B. Monteith, the agent, says they are importuning that murder, theft, polygamy, adultery, etc., be punished in accordance with the laws of the States. He recommends a law "compelling white men to care for their half-breed children. A law declaring all whites who are living with Indian women the same as married, and recognizing them as the lawful protectors of said women in all respects, ought to be passed."²

¹ *Report of the Commissioner on Indian Affairs*, 1874, p. 222.

² *Indian Commissioner's Report*, 1874, p. 286.

Some provisions in Cherokee legislation were directed to similar ends, and as early as 1820, as note the following statutes: "Single white men are hereby admitted to be employed as clerks in any of the stores that shall be established in this Nation, by natives, on condition that the employer obtains a permit and becomes responsible for the good behavior of such clerks." "Any man who shall hereafter take a Cherokee woman to wife, shall be required to marry her legally by a minister of the Gospel, or other authorized person, after procuring a license from the National Clerk for that purpose, before he shall be admitted to the privilege of citizenship." And marriage did not put the property of the squaw at the disposal of the white husband without her consent. "It shall not be lawful for any white man to have more than one wife."

Statutes may well be provided against polygamy of the whites among the Indians, in view of what the Rev. John Sergeant, missionary among the Delaware and Stockbridge Indians in the Northwest, writes to Drs. Morse and Worcester, of the American Board, in 1818: "The Reservations ought to be large, and at least twenty miles from white or black inhabitants. Civilization and religion must go hand in hand. 'The plough and Bible must go together.' I am decidedly of the opinion that, if the good people in your State [Massachusetts] had fallen into this plan in Apostle Elliot's time, there might now have been large and flourishing towns of natives in the vicinity of Boston. It is a settled point that they cannot flourish where white people are allowed to mix with them. In order, therefore, to have religion and civilization flourish among Indians, the societies and missionaries must use their influence with the government to keep them at a distance from all immoral squatters on Indian lands.

"I wish your Foreign Missionary Society would, at their meeting, take up the subject of praying the government to allow the Indians a large and handsome Reservation, and by some effectual means prevent immoral people from getting among them when they have settled upon it. I can with truth inform you, that among the Indian tribes in Indiana there are white men who have half a dozen wives. Here are the strongholds of Satan."¹

Dr. Morse, in his Report, quotes from a manuscript memoir on the civilization of the Indians, by one "Mons. Peniere, an exile from France during her Revolution, a man of genius and information, who resided four years among the Indians, a careful and

¹ *Report on Indian Affairs*, by Dr. Jedediah Morse, pp. 113-117.

intelligent observer of their character. Mons. Peniere speaks thus on the subject of intermarriages: 'Encourage marriages between the whites and Indians. The second generation resulting from these alliances would be totally white and beautiful. The Indians in general are better shaped and more robust than the whites, and their birth is as pure and as noble as ours.' "

And of similar import, but less boldness, as if the theory should be kept yet on social quarantine, were passages in a paper read at the Mohonk Lake Conference, in 1886, by Mr. Philip C. Garrett: "Some prejudice, it is true, appears against the idea of admixture or mingling, in the sense of intermarriage and entire loss of race identity. But it is impossible to prevent the mingling of blood on the same soil, even if desirable. A large part of the population enumerated as Indian is now half-breed. . . . Nor am I sure that the fusion of the whole Indian population in that of the United States would be to the detriment of the latter. On the contrary, I am quite sure it would not be to its serious detriment. . . . Are we not 'straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel'? . . . God has placed them and us together; the Indian first in point of time, the white man next. . . . We are descended from a common father; God has made us 'of one blood'; nor have we any right, except that derived from power, to withhold from them any privileges or immunities which we grant to the more civilized people. In all this, I do not recommend the intermingling of the races; but I do not fear it—the nightmare of a confusion of races." ¹

As to the quality of the father of many of the half-breeds, much is to be considered. Some of them have cast off civilization and have barbarized themselves. Others never had any civilization to cast off, but are from birth and breeding of a semi-animal grade, and live lives of the instincts and low passions. "As a rule, they abandon every respect for decency, and are leaders of the most disturbing element, and often the means of creating uneasiness among the Indians. They have no higher ambition than to enjoy the rights of an Indian." ² This is said of the "squaw men." Of the sporadic and miscellaneous offspring of the joined races better stock might be wished, but, according to the laws of heredity, the children of the "squaw man" must be often mere human trash.

¹ *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Board of the Indian Commissioners, 1886, Appendix D, Mohonk Lake Conference, pp. 52, 53.*

² *Indian Commissioner's Report, 1885, p. 78.*

And in one of the Indian Commissioner's Reports this fact is dwelt on, with important reflections : —

"A serious difficulty in the not distant future is before these tribes [Choctaws and Chickasaws], arising from the large and steady influx of white people. Since the emancipation of their slaves, these Indians have sought exemption from labor by inviting emigration of the lowest whites from the surrounding States, to whom they rent their lands for one third of the crops raised. These whites, once in the country, are seldom known to leave, and thus their numbers are rapidly increasing ; the result will be a mixture of the lowest white blood with the Indian, thus propagating, instead of curing, the indolence and unthrift with which they are already cursed." ¹

The same misfortune came on the Pueblos by intermarriage with low and inferior whites. "We know that it is the rule that wandering, broken-down, and poverty-stricken white men are adopted by women, who casually offer aid with their native generosity and pity, and afterwards become the willing slaves of these waifs. . . . Then the faith and good works, the care and tenderness, are all on the gentler side, and this in spite of desertion and neglect." ²

Hence the fact that the Pueblos, though pagan, have fallen off in civilization and general morality since the Europeans came among them, about 1540 and afterwards.

Sometimes it would seem that not only the bloods, but the wild border passions of the two races combined. Strife and competition for ascendancy and gain in the rough interior ignored the limits of a common civilization and humanity even. In the Congressional discussions between the adoption of the two Oregon Boundary Treaties, 1842 and 1846, Buchanan said : "The Hudson Bay Company had murdered four hundred or five hundred of our citizens, as we have learned from good authority, either directly with their own hands, or indirectly through the agency of the Indians, who were under their exclusive control. They had murdered and expelled all our citizens who had gone there for the purpose of interfering with their hunting and trafficking and trading." Choate said that this was done in the strife between the Hudson Bay Company and the Northwestern Company, between 1808 and 1821. Of course it was inevitable that in those domestic forest alliances civilization,

¹ *Report of Indian Commissioner, 1874, p. 71.*

² *A Political Problem: New Mexico and the Mexicans.* By an Officer of the Army, p. 8.

as well as physical and animal humanity, would stoop to the grade of the wigwam. Dr. Ellis states it well : —

“The red man and the white man on the frontiers have very often interlinked their lot and destiny, and merged all their differences. Hundreds of white men have been barbarized on this continent for each single red man that has been civilized. The whites have assimilated all the traits and qualities of the savage, and mastered his resources in war and hunting, and his shifts for living, in tricks, in subtlety, and cruelty.”¹

I found it a proverb on the plains and in the mountains that it takes six years to make an Indian into a white man, but six weeks to make a white man into an Indian.

The fears of Washington Irving and of Commodore Wilkes were based on the progeny of the degenerated white man and the Indian savage whom he had debased. “It is to be feared that a great part of this desert will form a lawless interval between the abodes of civilized man, like the wastes of the ocean and the deserts of Arabia, and, like them, be subject to the depredations of the marauders. . . . Some [of its half-breed races] may gradually become pastoral hordes, like those rude and migratory people, half shepherd and half nomad, who, with their flocks and herds, roam the plains of Upper Asia. But others, it is to be apprehended, will become predatory hordes, mounted upon the fleet steeds of the prairies, with the open plains for their marauding grounds, and the mountains for their retreats and lurking-places.”²

Commodore Wilkes had similar forebodings. “It seems probable that, in a few years, all that formerly gave life to the country, both the hunter and his prey, will become extinct, and that their place will be supplied by a thin white and half-breed population, scattered along the few fertile valleys, supported by pasture instead of the chase, and gradually degenerating into barbarism, far more offensive than that of the savage which degrades the backwoodsman.”³

Irving and Wilkes were both in error as to the future of our interior, while they judged well of the qualities of the half-breed and border white men of their day. Civilizing forces have averted the perils which they foresaw to the extent to which we have been civil and Christian missionaries.

¹ *The Red Man and the White Man*, by George E. Ellis, p. 364.

² *Astoria*, chap. xxii.

³ *Wilkes' Exploring Expedition*, vol. iv.

And this recalls the defense of John Smith, of the Virginia colony, when blamed by his company for not making greater progress in civilizing and Christianizing the Indians: "Much they blamed me for not converting the savages, when those they sent us were little better, if not worse." Lord Bacon, very like, had the Jamestown colony in view, for he was contemporary with its founding, when he wrote: "It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked, condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it spoileth the plantation; for they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation."¹ It is not fairly acknowledged, even if understood, that the greatest obstacle to the civilization of the Indian is his uncivilized and decivilized white neighbor. All our history shows this, from the Jamestown and Plymouth colonies down to the last telegram of Indian violence on the frontier.

Judge Burnet, speaking of what he had seen in the Northwest Territory, between Marietta and Detroit, says: "In the short period of half a century the condition of the Indian has been so changed that scarcely a trace remains of what they were when their country was first entered by the pioneers of our race, — an event which sealed their destiny."²

Here, therefore, is a phase of the Indian Question which will force itself more and more on the attention, as we struggle along and find more difficulties than methods of solution. Many may be surprised to discover to what a percentage in race mixture it is a white man's question. Therein the misfortune is that the admixture and lineage are so much of inferior white blood, since in working the sociological problem the laws of heredity are to be resisted and overcome. Then we are not so far along in civilization as to be able to give the elements and qualities of true manhood pre-eminence over what is merely incidental and accidental, and along which race lines run, and demark man from man.

As the observing traveler drops into the thoroughfares anywhere beyond the Mississippi, he soon finds himself among the bleached and the browned, till races are obscured, and he brings himself unconsciously to taking his fellow-travelers on quality, and not shades of color or facial structures. The wider one

¹ *Essays: of Plantations.*

² *Notes on the Early Settlement of the Northwest Territory*, by Jacob Burnet, p. 392.

ranges on our latitudes and longitudes west of the Alleghanies, the more deeply the conviction takes him that we are building a nation, not only in a new world, and under a new system of government, but with a new people. While we take in the enterprising and energetic from all the old world, we are forming a new people or race, as distinct as were the Aryans, or Romans, or Scandinavians. We are no longer English; that expresses but one of our polygenous ingredients. We are Americans.

William Barrows.

READING, MASS.

THE OVER-ESTIMATION OF GOETHE.

WHEN it is related of Professor Bonamy Price that he "refused to read the works of a great modern writer whose character he disapproved," when we find him saying, "I *can't* read them," "with a curious mixture," we are told, "of obstinacy and penitence," we have little doubt, in the absence of knowledge, what writer is meant. There is, we should say, but one, in whose regard the worse has so sedulously been made the better reason, that the "curious mixture of obstinacy and penitence" points to him infallibly.

Schopenhauer somewhere rails at "those rogues" who, "because a great genius discloses to them the treasures of his mind, . . . consider themselves entitled to hale his moral personality before their judgment-seat," — a railing, we may remark in passing, natural to a man who could acknowledge to a sister his dishonorable intentions toward a woman whom there was nothing against his marrying if he would. And admirers and disciples of Schopenhauer are not wanting to assure us that we have no right to interpret the works of a man of genius by his life, if indeed they do not hold Schopenhauer's view that a genius has a right to a certain modicum of cakes and ale in the way of license prohibited to his fellow-men, by virtue of the benefit his genius confers upon them. Schopenhauer's doctrine, stated baldly, is too large for the average attainment. This is shown, we think, by the zeal with which Goethe-worshippers find a moral in the most unmoral, to put it mildly, of writers, — the zeal with which they set up a special standard, to which ordinary standards must be subordinate, for his character and conduct. The doctrine is there, however;

it has worked like a leaven in the estimation of Goethe among the present generation.

It is not the purpose of this essay to repeat the history of Friederike, Lili, or any other, or to discuss the possible or probable character of Goethe's relations with Frau Stein; to analyze the nature of the qualms of conscience for which skating was found to be the readiest quietus; or to attempt to gauge the curious heartlessness in the advice as to coffee-drinking. But when admirers of Goethe, clerical and lay, assure us, as a thing settled and past serious discussion, that the object of Goethe's life being a perfect self-culture, the noble and harmonious development of his intellectual nature, these trifles of broken hearts and poisoned lives, since they tended to that end, are not to be mentioned in the comparison, the proposition is so monstrous a one that the mind pauses thereon in consternation. If a genius, literary or other, has the force to dwell apart, his great soul nourishing itself out of its own vitality, as did the mighty artist of the Medicean Chapel, of the Sistine, and of St. Peter's of Rome, his sole intercourse with a distracting sex being of the character of that artist's with Vittoria Colonna, — this is one thing. But if, after a record such as that of Goethe's youth and earlier manhood, this genius becomes a father like common men; if the mother of his children is not a wife within his house, but a woman who could be spoken of between Goethe and Frau Stein as "that poor creature," when, moreover, the best thing we know concerning this genius in these central relations of life is that he married at last this same "poor creature," with a view to legitimating his children, — we have a right to ask whether this perfect self-culture has left a record of itself commensurate with the sacrifice. Any survey of his works, made up, not of laudation, but of cautious criticism, would seem entitled to a certain consideration. And since it has come to be the fashion to bracket Goethe with Shakespeare, not to mention his being collocated with names of antiquity sacred and profane, it is the more necessary to distinguish between the idol, as we may say, and the man, the author, the real Goethe.

And here we may say, at the outset of an essay which aims to present Goethe in a somewhat different light from that in which it is the mode to regard him, that we are by no means insensible to the better element in his works, or to their fascinating quality. Much there is that is fine and strong, something that is noble. To deny this, would be to make criticism worthless at the starting-point. We have no objection to an estimation of Goethe, only to

an over-estimation ; not to his being credited with what he has done, but with what he has not done, or merely intended to do, — the latter a sort of begging of the question unique in literary criticism. Leaving aside his character altogether, and its possible influence, there is no writer of anything like his reputation whose works require to be read from the literary, from the artistic standpoint, with so careful a discrimination. Far from perceiving in Goethe a genius supreme in poetry, in literature, we might say that no one of his works should be regarded as a work of genius in the higher, not to say the highest sense, taken, that is, in its entirety. It has indeed been asserted, in impatience, we presume, against the sort of idolatry in question, that Goethe did not possess genius, but talent only, of a more or less phenomenal order. This is an excess in the contrary direction. But if we might be permitted to express a candid opinion, based upon a careful perusal of Goethe's most noted works, it would be that the amount of real genius therein is, considering his reputation, singularly little. For the rest, his gift must be described as cleverness ; not, indeed, the cleverness which has been termed "common as dirt, and as cheap ;" Goethe's, at its best, is a sort of transcendental cleverness, but still cleverness, and not the other, — the vision, that is, the faculty divine. It is the mixture, as we think, that makes Goethe so puzzling, so difficult to pronounce upon ; for the more part of clever writers, however clever, are not likely to be mistaken for geniuses, at least in the larger sense ; while on the other hand an unmistakable genius is not likely to be characterized, by any one who appreciates values in language, as a clever writer.

Here, as in many other cases, it is easier to apprehend a difference than to formulate a definition. It is not that the work of Goethe is unequal ; the works of a writer of indisputable genius are often singularly unequal. It is rather, and preëminently, that his work lacks that selective character which is the note of the highest literary art, as of every other. It is lacking, moreover, in unity of construction, in that initial sense in which a work seems to have grown, as the tree grows, in the mind of its author, so that every bough and every branch, with all its detail of leafage, is related vitally to the central life of the whole. Goethe's famous works seem rather like a mosaic, the parts of which have been deliberately fitted together. This mosaic work, however ingenious, however skillfully put together, cannot, in the nature of things, be set beside the other ; it has not the vitality. The peculiarity of Goethe's work is that nuggets and threads of genius are

distributed, as chance may have it, through the whole. It is for this reason, as we conceive, that he is the most tantalizing of writers, in that he constantly arouses an expectation which his work, as a whole, is inadequate to fulfill. It means so much in some places as to impose upon us the delusion that it must mean greatly throughout; and with no other author, perhaps, has so much been *read into* his works as with Goethe.

We are entirely of the opinion that the first part of "Faust" is Goethe's best work, the one, that is, which best illustrates his peculiar intellectual quality. The "Faust," as all the world knows, is based remotely upon various Faust legends which abounded in the Middle Ages, legends which had developed notably, in English, into the "Faustus" of Marlowe. The inevitable woman of course enters into the Faust legend, and presently insists upon being the centre. In the play by Marlowe, Faustus demands of Mephistopheles the fairest maid of Germany to be his wife. Mephistopheles, who has no notion of resigning Faustus to the possible influences of domesticity, dissuades him, and calls up Helen of Troy as his paramour. Faustus loses his soul for Helen, and is summoned at the fatal moment by Mephistopheles in the good old-fashioned manner. Marlowe's work is too near to the mystery plays, the human interest is not sufficiently developed, at least in the modern sense, for us to care very much when the Devil claims his own. The unity of construction, however, the symmetry and proportion, are absolute; and the human interest is developed just sufficiently to arouse the desire for something more, and to prepare the way therefor. Goethe had certainly read Marlowe's "Faustus," and Marlowe's "fairest maid in Germany" may have been the germ of Margaret. For the rest, the tragedy of "Faust" (by which designation we mean the first part only) is so modernized throughout in sentiment, Mephistopheles is so entirely a dissolute, cynical man, that the few shreds of mediæval apparatus which Goethe presents to us, the mantle which Mephistopheles spreads to bear himself and Faust through the air, the magic steeds, seem incongruities, which in a manner break the continuity of interest. But this last is a trifle scarce worth the noting.

There are many, we suspect, who have assisted at Gounod's opera of the name, but who have never read Goethe's "Faust," at least in the original, who are entirely unaware how much of the moral of the piece, when brought out by a lyrical artist of the highest power, as Christine Nilssen or Minnie Hauck, — are

entirely unaware how much of this moral has been imported into Goethe. Even in the opera, the jewel business is a serious stumbling-block, unless the Margaret has a conscientiousness and a capacity for self-denial which comparatively few actresses are possessed of. Coming to "Faust" for a first reading with prepossessions based upon the sort of presentation of which we have just spoken, the mind receives a somewhat severe shock from the comparison. We realize, too, to what extent Margaret was an incident with Goethe, at least in the outset, instead of being that about which the whole revolves, as in the opera. Goethe's Margaret is certainly good, in the negative sense at least, but it would require a stretch of the imagination to call her an ideal character. She repels Faust's first advance in a manner quite suitable; but in the interview with him shortly after in Martha's garden, we are somewhat aghast when, upon the parenthetical "He kisses her," she responds, seizing hold of him (*ihn fassend*) and returning the kiss. As for the jewels, the business in Goethe is cumulative. For the first casket, mistrusted by Margaret's mother, is handed over to the priest, as its safest depository. A second casket is then supplied by Mephistopheles, and this is conveyed by Margaret to the house of the light-minded neighbor, precisely to keep it from her mother's observation. The comments, moreover, of Mephistopheles throughout illustrate how entirely Margaret, thus far, is a mere detail for his cynicism. None the less is Margaret a maiden after Goethe's own idea; he is troubled by no discrepancy between her and an ideal pattern.

In the play, it will be noticed, Faust leaves Margaret for a considerable interval; and then is introduced the naïve and musical lyric, "Meine Ruh' ist hin." The lyric is entirely in character. Margaret is not timid and fearful, shrinking from a love that at the same time she is powerless to resist. She recalls her lover's kiss, and would gladly die kissing him, if so be she might have him for the kissing. Faust returns, and in Martha's garden we have another scene, perfect of its kind. Nowhere more than in this later scene do we realize the truth of the Italian proverb as to flame and tow. Margaret's intuition is keen enough to mistrust Mephistopheles, and she expresses this mistrust to Faust, and endeavors to win from him some expression of religious belief. Faust answers in dithyrambic utterances, in which pantheistic sentiment and *Leidenschaft* are somewhat intermingled, and reproaches her antipathy. He then easily induces her to deepen her mother's sleep by means of the phial furnished by Mephistopheles.

We soon see Margaret in appeal to the Virgin, in another lyric exquisitely pathetic and musical. Perhaps it is an ineradicable taint of Puritanism in the mind that leads us to expect in this lyric a touch of that something expressed in the telling word remorse. But there is none. Margaret is deeply, deeply wretched; but her appeal ends as it begins, that the Virgin should look upon her necessity, should save her from disgrace and its possible consequences. This is very natural, perhaps, for an ordinary sort of peasant girl; it is far from being the Marguerite developed in the lyric drama.

Margaret's tale of misery is soon complete; and we find her in the church, the organ pealing, the evil spirit beside her. The words of the "*Dies Iræ*," as intoned by the choir, are set against the utterances of the evil spirit, sounding, in the pauses, in her ear. We thrill with the tension of the situation, the greatness of the scene. The whisperings of the demon are harrowing; the words of the hymn of judgment crush the soul. Margaret murmurs in her anguish, she gasps in the evil atmosphere which envelops her. The taunts of the demon become more poignant, the words of the choir more terrible. Margaret is past utterance. The demon repeats his concluding "*Woe!*" the choir repeats its "*Quid sum miser*," — and Margaret exclaims, "*Nachbarin, Euer Fläschchen!*" after which we have the parenthetical "*She falls unconscious.*" We are obliged to confess our complete ignorance as to the custom of German peasant girls of having smelling-bottles or not about them. So petty a detail need not be paused upon. But that poor Gretchen could not be allowed to fall unconscious after the repeated "*Quid sum miser*," without this prosaic note which drops us fathoms down from the height on which it found us, is a striking evidence of how little the real centre of this scene was the centre to the mind of its creator. Goethe is occupied with his theatric effect, his setting of the judgment of Heaven on the one hand against the curse of hell on the other. He does not gauge the woe of the woman soul, on which judgment and curse alike are falling. The smelling-bottle, as climax to so great a scene, is disastrous to extremity.

The introduction of Margaret into the Walpurgis Night is a thread of the pure gold of Goethe's genius. Faust sees her moving with difficulty, as if fettered. He looks again; she seems as it were a ghost, and about her neck a line, not broader than the back of the executioner's knife. Mephistopheles assures him that it is all an illusion, that what he sees is the Medusa, who can

present herself as Margaret, or any other ; and furthermore he urges Faust toward a little hill, which becomes at once a theatre. By one of those stage transformations in which Goethe delighted, we are swung at once into the Intermezzo, the "Oberon's and Titania's Golden Wedding." Whether it is good art or not that the Walpurgis Night should run into the Intermezzo in this fashion, may be a question. Certainly there would seem to be no question as to the impropriety of the transition being made upon so strong a revulsion of feeling. Goethe must, we should think, have intended this vision of Margaret to stand as the climax of the scene. It comes in, we observe, after Faust's wild dance with the young witch, out of whose mouth a red mouse has leaped, and comes in more strikingly by the contrast. If the end of the scene was possibly changed upon the interpolation of the Intermezzo, the whole should have been recast, and the vision of Margaret placed earlier, before the Proktophantasmist and his group, for instance, who have no connection with the substance of the scene. But whether the clever trick, the shuffle of cards, at the end, were an afterthought or in the original intention, the effect of disproportion, of lack of relative values, is the same upon the mind of the reader.

No sane person could dispute that the prison scene, as such, is one of the finest passages in modern literature ; that the vision here is perfect, that this is the sort of thing which strikes through to the soul. None the less, that which impresses the mind when the end of "Faust" is reached, is the lame and impotent conclusion. Margaret should either have been less in the play, or she should have been more. Faust has shown himself so human, he so gains upon us, that when he disappears with Mephistopheles we feel a distinct sense of wrong. If Goethe preferred in his splendid heathenism not to be dominated by the chivalrous idea, and the undue influence of woman, her undue centrality, in a literary work, he should not have suffered the Margaret idea to run away with him. Margaret, having become so much, should somehow have availed for Faust's salvation.

But at this point we are confronted by the impression, all along felt, of Margaret's own inadequacy. Perhaps it is the incurable Puritanism to which we have alluded, but others than ourselves must have felt that Margaret's salvation partakes of the nature of a *coup de main*. She is a victim of the tendencies of things, saved by the compassion of an indulgent Heaven. This perception was intensified by the version of "Faust" in which Margaret was

played, not long since, by Ellen Terry. Many will remember how sincere in its way, how pathetic, was the appeal to the Virgin which takes the place of the lyric assigned to Margaret in the original. But the feeling was distinct that in Margaret there was no great sense of moral culpability. If the Virgin by a miracle were to save her from the consequences of her conduct, she might presently, we felt, be imploring again for another miracle. And the point of all this was that Ellen Terry, so widely different from the best Marguerites of the lyric stage, was quite good enough, one felt, for Goethe's conception. Her inadequacy was at the last, in the prison scene. One felt distinctly that she had done nothing to justify the descent of angels, which became, for that reason, the merest stage picture. But here again the discrepancy is in Goethe. An actress capable of the Margaret of the prison scene would be too good for the jewel business and the scenes in Martha's garden; and an actress playing suitably in these earlier scenes would fall off inevitably at the last. Margaret's vivid appeal (in the original "Faust," that is) to the angels and heavenly hosts is out of character. This the more, we may add, since the prison scene itself is not divested altogether of the passional note,—"Hast's Küssen verlernt?" and so on, Margaret asks, when in her distraction she recognizes her lover.

To all this it may be answered that "Faust" has a second part as well as a first, and that we must look to the second part for the rounding out of the perfect plan. "Faust" has, alas! a second part; and it is exactly in this second part that we realize how lacking in Goethe's art is the principle of selection. Goethe had apparently substituted for the Helen of the Faust legends another character, suggesting the possibility of a new development. In the second part he returns to the idea of Helen, expanding and enlarging upon it indefinitely. If poetical literature is valuable in proportion to its obscurity, the first three acts, so called, of the second part of "Faust" are among the most valuable productions of the human mind, for human ingenuity has been exhausted upon their interpretation. It does not console us much to be told that Goethe's plan was to reconcile the romantic and classical elements in modern literature. It is to be presumed that there is intention of some sort in the medley of all things in heaven and earth and in the waters under which make up the first three acts alluded to. The question remains, whether anything is reconciled, whether there is not rather a jumble hopeless and inexplicable.

When some of Goethe's unqualified admirers admit that they can make little of the second part of "*Faust*," it is not surprising that those who hold a more moderate view should share the opinion. A school has, indeed, arisen which regards the second part as superior to the first, and which therefore, we must presume, bases upon the second part their claim for Goethe as supreme in poetry. And this notwithstanding the marked inferiority in workmanship; even if the term senile, of the older, severer criticism, is not applied, it would seem that few could fail to notice the lack of virility in the second part of "*Faust*" as relative to the first. We are concerned here, however, only with our independent judgment, — a poor thing, but our own. And of one thing we feel certain, that we prefer to read the second part of "*Faust*" by the unaided light of nature, rather than by the light of critical interpretation. And we grasp, as we presume, at the principal outcome, that *Faust* is elevated and purified by the influence of the Greek idea of the beautiful.

Notwithstanding this outcome, we find ourselves at the beginning of the fourth act, barring some twenty odd verses which *Faust* speaks by way of soliloquy, for all practical purposes where we were left at the end of the first part. Were this act in continuity with the first part, we should easily perceive that *Faust*, being with increase of years disgusted with pleasure, is desirous of some other resource, some other exercise for his activity, which *Mephistopheles* is about to provide for him. Our Richard is at least himself again, not only in person of *Faust*, but notably of *Mephistopheles*, who was in danger of becoming but a shadow of himself in the reconciliation of elements romantic and classical. And we observe here, as in the first part of "*Faust*," that Goethe throughout projects himself by occasion not only into *Faust*, but also into *Mephistopheles*, with somewhat of injury, at times, to the characterization. For Goethe's capacity for getting outside of himself is in inverse proportion to Shakespeare's, by which token, if no other, we should recognize in his being bracketed with Shakespeare an extraordinary vagary of criticism. Of this fourth act we need observe only that *Faust* gains, of course, through *Mephistopheles*, what he desires, — a territory reclaimed from the sea, where he may lord it as over his own.

It is in the fifth act that the regeneration of *Faust*, in the view of those who find in Goethe's work a lofty spiritual motive, is at length accomplished. Allowing the piece to interpret itself, and

without the aid of any commentary upon it, we can but say that we should not suspect the regeneration. This we say, not at all because Faust is destitute of lofty impulses, not because he is of the nature of a fiend ; such he has never been. Faust is here the same as in our former acquaintance with him ; too good, perhaps, to be lost, certainly not good enough to be saved. He wishes the Devil's gifts, though he does not like the Devil's methods ; as when seizing upon Naboth's vineyard, he throws upon Mephistopheles the blame of the seizure. Restless, imperious, he is occupied in draining his lands, and making them habitable. He is a law to himself, and conceives that since his work will ultimately benefit humanity, the humbler humanity about him is but vassal to his will. There seems to be here the same fallacy that we find elsewhere in the works of Goethe, that if a man only does a certain amount of good, he may safely indulge in a certain amount of evil by way of compensation. To presume salvation upon this basis is to take an inadequate view of salvation. After his seizure of Naboth's vineyard, his steps are dogged by black Care, by whom he is blinded. The treatment is entirely Goethean, and intended, one might conceive, to spring a trap, as it were, upon the reader. Mephistopheles seems to have altogether the best of the argument ; there seems no reason why he should not claim his own. If Margaret's salvation seems a strain upon our sense of the fitness of things, Faust's is of the nature of a trick ; and our surprise is little less than that of Mephistopheles himself, when the angels, sweeping down, bear Faust's soul to a somewhat operatic heaven.

Amid all the turmoil of the second part, we have almost forgotten Margaret, who has never once been mentioned. She appears at the last, as Faust's companion and guide to a higher sphere. We have no objection to Margaret's being saved ; were she of the type of womanhood which has become associated with her, we might have had a passion of desire for her salvation. As it is, we are more than willing that she should be saved ; but when we find admirers of this last act associating her with Beatrice, as met by Dante in heaven, our judgment and sense are in arms against the comparison.

It is impossible to consider the "Faust" as a great work in the great sense, whether we regard the first part alone, rejecting the second from the estimation, or whether we regard it in its entirety. If we consider it in its entirety, it is too lacking in unity, in a real centre about which the whole might revolve itself, not to

speak of the vast prolixity of the earlier acts of the second part, and of the loose and disjointed fashion in which the different scenes are sometimes fitted together. If we consider the first part alone, we are confronted, as has been said, by the unsatisfactory conclusion. Fascinating this first part must always be, if only for a style singularly virile, this being the descriptive word which seems to apply to it preëminently. More, much more, is there in it of genius than in the second part, of the genius peculiar to Goethe. But a work may abound in genius, and yet fall short, as a whole, of the magic test; and "*Faust*," some passages of noble poetry notwithstanding, is rather an abortive work of genius, a splendid attempt, than a work of genius, at least of the higher order.

We can only regret that inexorable limitations of space forbid even the most succinct outline of "*William Meister's Apprenticeship*," the best-known of Goethe's prose works, — a work which an extreme Goethe school would have us regard as a criticism upon life, broad, large, in a manner divine. Starting with no such vast expectation, we start well. Goethe's narrative vein, if not the best in the world, meets our just expectation. We do not find William's account of the puppet-shows of his childhood the soporific that it was for Mariana. We are not prepared to smile at his fervors or exaltations, — in his letter to Mariana he carries our sympathy; and the situation in the whole book which appeals most strongly to the feelings of the reader, which comes the nearest to dramatic in the genuine sense, we should say to be that where he stands under her window, unable to leave her though he has been repelled by her, outstaying the musicians whom he has hired to play for her, and seeing at last his rival, as he believes him to be, glide stealthily from her door. We ask nothing better in their way than the performances of the acrobats, the adventures of the improvised company, and the ways and wiles of Philina, of all the characters of the book the most truly alive, and in her absolute aliveness, her perfect consistency, the best, we had almost said, of Goethe's women. William's affection for Mignon (and we remark in passing that a tender feeling for childhood would seem to be one of the very good things about Goethe) heightens our interest in him. The introduction of Mignon and of the picturesque harper is felicitous to a degree, and we are in a manner indignant when we consider what a thread of gold running through the whole their story might have been, had not

Goethe so ruined it at the close. The adventures of the company and William's share therein, and his subsequent career till he finds himself domesticated with Serlo, are in a manner perfect in the narration. We could say no more for the sketch of Serlo, with the circumstances which went to make him what he became, than that it goes far to atone for much that comes thereafter. William may or may not have found his vocation; if not, it seems a pity that his stay with Serlo and Aurelia should so hold the reader's interest as compared with his stay with Lothario and Natalie.

It is at this point, however, that Goethe outrages our feelings in a fashion past redemption. We might, indeed, have been disposed to stigmatize, not William's relation with Mariana, but the tone of its narration, as of another nationality than the moral and edifying German; but this we passed over, conceiving the purpose of the author to be a development of good from the evil. But a certain passage between William and Philina cannot be excused by any excuse worthy of being called such. It is unjust to Philina, who has abandoned her pursuit of William, and is about to slip away with Friedrich, as the best thing on the whole for her. It is unjust to William, who has resisted Philina when long before she flung herself upon him, his determination being strong not again to outrage his higher nature after the affair with Mariana. We do not condemn the scene from the moral standpoint simply; we condemn it from the artistic standpoint, in that when a certain result has been achieved, with no little pains, the author goes back upon himself and the reader, only because another idea has seized upon him, which idea he develops in the readiest to hand manner, without regard to previous continuity. This incident is a striking illustration of the patchy, done in bits character of Goethe's literary work; it is introduced obviously to carry a point in the Mignon part of the story, a point which, if worth carrying at all, should have been carried in some other manner. We are not expressly told whether Friedrich really stands to Philina in marital relation; but the doubt that is cast in the matter of her expectancy is none the less an odious one, and the jesting between Friedrich and William as to paternity compels us to ask whether there is here some hidden meaning, subtle and profound, which justifies this sort of thing in Goethe, but not in another. If so, we might prefer a teacher whose meanings are less profound and less subtle. It is impossible not to recall a similar passage in *Le Sage*, where *Gil Blas*, with that touch of

masculine bravado which saves him from priggishness, assures the mischievous reader that his suspicion is an unjust one; and to agree that the writer whose utmost posing as a teacher is in the modest hope that his readers will find the beneficial mingled with the agreeable, has the best of it in the comparison.

Instead of that development of Natalie, Theresa, and the countess, by which this group might have counterbalanced in interest and hold upon the reader that of Mariana, Aurelia, and Philina, Goethe has given us the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul," these confessions forming the bridge, as it were, from the earlier part of his work to the later. These confessions, the critics tell us, are based upon the *Reliquien* of Fräulein Klettenberg, a friend of Goethe's early manhood. We have no fault to find with the fair saint, unless it is a touch of spiritual pride. But we should much prefer our pietism by itself, and our romance by itself, with such lesson as naturally attaches thereto. In connection with the fair saint there is introduced an uncle, the guardian in their childhood of Natalie and the countess, with Lothario and the volatile Friedrich. This uncle is a connoisseur of art, and his view of life is balanced against the fair saint's pietism. The uncle, we are told, stands for Goethe himself. Certainly it would seem true that in William we have not a little of Goethe, and something, one must think, in Jarno, as well as in Lothario, — all his writings, as Goethe himself tells us, "forming part of one great confession." Yet this most introspective of writers it is, whom we are required to place with Dante and Shakespeare, as forming a triad in modern literature.

"William Meister," alas! is one of those books which steadily diminish in interest to the close. It is painful to have to acknowledge that William loses his hold upon us as he passes from his mistaken to his true vocation, from his false view of life to his genuine and just one. Any interest that we may have felt in Natalie is quite dissipated by the time we are at last presented to her; and it is entirely in keeping that William, who ever since his glimpse of Natalie upon the mountain has dreamed of her and her only, except when his fancy has reverted to Mariana, should seem not unwilling, before the interview with Natalie is brought about, to accept Theresa. That there is stuff in the concluding portion of the book for any number of full-fledged romances does not help the matter much, for it only illustrates how entirely unselective Goethe's art is. What we chiefly deplore is his subsequent handling of the exquisite theme of Mignon and the harper.

From our childhood we have known of this Mignon, her wondrous song has exercised upon us its weird fascination. If we have waited for full acquaintance till time and opportunity should enable us to cultivate it in the picturesque original, bitter will be our disappointment. Those who have constructed the Mignon episode from the beautiful opera based upon it, will be as much at fault as those who have constructed Margaret from the lyric drama, at least in the idyllic termination. We do not complain, indeed, that poor little Mignon should end her mortal life, seeming, as she does, scarcely a creature of mortal mould. But the theatric preparation of her dead body, the sort of travesty of a burial service in the Hall of the Past, her identification by the crucifix tattooed upon her arm, the story of her origin, on whose head of horror horrors accumulate — Mignon is the child of a terrible sin, assuredly ; but it is difficult to see why it should be visited upon her with this sort of expiation. As for the harper, we do not know whether we are the more disgusted at his coming out smug and young, or at the ghastly physical detail in regard to him which follows thereafter. And what, we have a right to ask, has there been in the first meeting of Mignon and the harper with William, and their idyllic wanderings with him, which could possibly forebode such a termination ?

More and more, as we have become further acquainted with the works of Goethe, have we been impressed by a theatric quality, theatric, that is, in the sense in which this term has come to be used in distinction from dramatic, in the large and vital sense. The dramatic quality, by which, apparently without formal preparation, without adventitious or factitious accompaniment, a scene is made to come vividly before the mind of the reader, a quality which so abounds in the work of Scott, which fairly glows in Victor Hugo, is possessed by Goethe in inverse proportion. In place thereof, we have the theatric quality of which we have just spoken. We must, of course, take our Goethe as we find him ; but there could be few greater drawbacks than the presence of this vicious characteristic. We have had a curious touch of it in the presentation of "Hamlet," where as Hamlet and his companions yield the ground from consternation at the ghostly voice beneath them, jets of flame appear successively where they have stood. This detail, like that of the seven-leagued boots which "stride onward in haste," and more of the sort in the second part of "Faust," is of the nature of a trick of the pantomime. Nothing than the jets of flame could to the English reader be

more un-Shakespearian. And it is curious that the further we remove from the theatre and the play-actors, the more we have of this theatric quality. We are most outraged by the parade over the dead Mignon; but the climax of absurdity is reached in the secret tower, when the sort of society which has all along been tracking William down, with a view to drawing him from his false to his true vocation, has it all its own way. Of William personally, the best and strongest thing is his ready assumption of the obligation of paternity, as soon as he has reason to believe that Felix is his son; but we fail to see how the oracular voice in the tower can establish the conviction, which has wavered after Mariana's dying attestation, and the complete circumstantial evidence of the old Barbara.

We cannot leave "William Meister's Apprenticeship" without observing, as a certain offset to our dissatisfaction with Natalie as crown of the work and ornament of William's true vocation, that we find in Goethe a just discrimination, a certain quality of his defects, so to say, in its way admirable. If Natalie is a failure, if Theresa, excellent housewife and stewardess as she is, is so much only, he at least does not leave his doubtful women in unrelieved badness. Mariana is better than our fears, and her pitiful end excites our commiseration. Aurelia is not an exalted character, but she makes an end not altogether ignoble; and Philina, whom we had almost despaired of, turns out very well, — for Philina. It is impossible not to smile when we find her in the predicament she has derided in Madame Melina. We may add that Serlo, whose vocation is evidently play-acting, though William's is not, after a certain amount of skirmishing, marries decently the young girl of the company whom he has been deluding, apparently, to her ruin. On the other hand, Lothario, whom we are expected, it would seem, to admire as a lofty character, we find casting a loving glance back to the beginning of his gay career, as evidenced in an episode entirely Goethean, at the moment when he is desiring above all things else to marry Theresa. Truly we have in Goethe's great work a gordian knot, — a hopeless entanglement of threads good and evil.

The worst charge we have to bring against Goethe is that which we have just glanced at, — that he is incapable of bringing before us, in her habit as she lives, a natural, innocent, large-minded girl. That which was to Scott a turn of the hand, that which was to Schiller a native air, is somehow beyond him. Even in "Her-

mann and Dorothea" we have felt this, for Dorothea, when she enters in person into the story, is *doctrinaire*, almost to the point of repelling sympathy. And all the elaborate apparatus which leads up to the introduction of Natalie does not make her much more than a lay figure. The greatest blemish, however, in "William Meister," to our thinking, does not concern any woman of Goethe's own creation. It is found in the explanation of Ophelia's singing licentious songs in her madness, which he puts into the mouth of William. The criticism on "Hamlet" may be the best thing in "William Meister;" to the individual reader it is of course valuable, according as he has thought out for himself or not the Hamlet question. But the passage concerning Ophelia, if we understand Goethe's language, which seems sufficiently explicit, we have a right to protest against, as conveying a wanton insult, we had almost said, to the most ideal of Shakespeare's women. So far as regards our admiration of Goethe, the worst of this passage is that it is so much like him, — Goethe was not only incapable of creating an Ophelia, he was incapable of apprehending one when created. We have only to read Lady Martin's exquisite fancies as to Ophelia's thus singing (though the explanation that most obviously suggests itself is quite sufficient) to realize how far apart may be two interpretations of one and the same point in Shakespeare.

Of "William Meister's Travels" we might repeat what we have said of the second part of "Faust," that if Goethe's unqualified admirers can make little of it, it is not surprising that others should share the opinion. As for travels, it might occur to us that there is as much of traveling in the "Apprenticeship;" and as for William, the hero of the "Travels," if hero there be, is not William, but Felix, his son. Speaking again out of the unaided light of nature, and putting aside, for the moment, a deference to critical opinion, we should say that the book is made up of the odds and ends of a literary workshop, put together with the very slightest regard to continuity or coherency. When a thread of connection is supplied for the short stories which make up so much of the bulk of the work, it is sometimes to more grotesque result than if there were none; the cord is so slight for the holding of the weight attached thereto. Certainly there is a background to all this, a background of which the theme is education. We have glanced before at a certain tenderness for children as being one of Goethe's best characteristics; but his views on edu-

cation are perhaps a little too fantastic for widespread application. For the rest, the remnant of our interest in Lothario and Natalie is dissipated hopelessly. Lothario, who after his own youthful travels has settled down on his estates, emphasizing his intention to remain there by the assertion that "here, or nowhere, is America," sets out again, presumably for an establishment in Pennsylvania. With him goes Natalie, who is doubtless weary of waiting for such an abstraction in the way of lover as William. In place of Natalie, we have a certain Hersilie, a copy of Natalie in fainter outlines, who comes into possession of the key to a certain casket, which casket, found by Felix, has been preserved by his father; from all which we may perhaps gather that Hersilie is to represent the undeserved blessing, to be exchanged for nothing in the world beside, which at the end of the "Apprenticeship" William assured us that he had found in Natalie. But our interest in Hersilie does not induce us to attempt to solve the enigma. Still less are we able to say whether the strange being Makarie, whose life is somehow associated with the movements of the planetary bodies of our solar system, and who at the time of our making her acquaintance is somewhere between the orbits of Mars and of Jupiter,—whether Makarie represents merely a weird play of fancy, or whether there is wrapped up in her some transcendent mystery. When we encounter Philina, scissors in hand, preparing *trousseaux* for some of the walking ladies who so confuse the stage of Goethe's narration, we scarcely know whether to find it amusing or depressing. We had hoped, and indeed taken for granted, that marriage would steady her; but we should prefer to remember her as Philina.

The best thing, as we think, in the "Travels," the really fresh and strong portion, is that which brings before us the life in the Swiss mountains, the spinning and the weaving, and the sketch of how this little life takes hold of the great world's activity; and the best of the short stories is that with which the book opens, in which we have a sort of transcript of the holy family of Scripture, and in which the characterization of Joseph, and the description of his abode and labors, are alike delightful. On a small canvas Goethe's hand is often strong and true; on a broader and larger it wavers, and he loses himself.

From a consideration of Goethe's most famous work both in poetry and in prose, he would seem to have been a man of beginnings, incapable of rounding out a perfect and symmetrical whole.

We approach the "Elective Affinities," therefore, with more satisfaction, since we are at least not troubled with a sequel, with its harassing effect upon what has already been accomplished. As before, we can only regret that we are unable to give an outline of a work so famous, and within its author's limitations so powerful a one, — we must presume that the chief features of the story and the characterization are in the memory of the reader.

Here, in verity, we have a sense of unity of construction, of the presence of a definite aim which the author has set before himself. We have this sense for a time, that is; the scheme is unfolded, and we are prepared for the development. It is then that we are lost in mazes truly Goethean. When, indeed, under the architect's loving hand, Ottilie's beautiful face looks down upon us in perfect semblance from the heaven in which he has placed her, we freely forgive him, for this exquisite touch, his retarding the action; and we tolerate the schoolmaster and his views upon education. Luciane we may presume to be introduced as a counterpoise to Ottilie, and she has a certain hold upon the narration, and claim upon the reader. Luciane, we may remark in passing, is a woman of the Philina type, — not so unique indeed as Philina, as we have seen this last the centre of William Meister's life with the strolling company, but the family likeness is unmistakable. There is here no wavering in the characterization, Goethe's touch is as firm as it is crisp, his instinct is infallible; and Luciane and her following are at least a diversion. It is otherwise when there appears a traveling Englishman accompanied by a *Begleiter*, which *Begleiter* performs a scientific experiment, and narrates a tale after a fashion which we have become accustomed to in the "Travels" of William Meister. This *Begleiter* may be a trap for the unwary reader, for his experiment has for object the demonstrating that Ottilie's headache on the left side is caused by a peculiar relation which she sustains to the mineral world, and his tale is hung on to the main narration by a thread of statement that something similar had once happened to the captain. We are led to surmise as to the captain's previous entanglements, while a wild idea seizes us that this wondrous *Begleiter* may be able to eradicate Ottilie's propensity to headache on the left side, and by extension Edward's propensity to headache on the right side, thus destroying their disastrous affinity. But Englishman, *Begleiter*, scientific experiment, and tale, are only one of Goethe's curious *longueurs*.

In the "Elective Affinities," too, we find illustration of a view

already commented upon, that well-doing is not necessarily a stepping-stone and incentive to higher well-doing, but rather an excuse for indulgence; as when William, after prosecuting with diligence for a time his father's affairs, feels himself justified in loitering in the mountain town where he meets Philina. In similar manner we hear Edward arguing that since he has distinguished himself on the field of action, fulfilling an expectation long ago reasonably cherished of him, he has surely a right to such a trifle of indulgence as the putting away of a wife determinedly loyal, and the abandonment of a child whose sole crime is its resemblance to another than himself, for which crime he knows himself to be responsible in double measure. Having destroyed Otilie's life, he pitifully follows her; and the point of all is, that Goethe seems quite satisfied with his *dénouement* as poetic justification.

The interest of the "Elective Affinities" centres strongly in Otilie; though both Charlotte and Otilie, in their hold upon us, are a distinct advance upon the women in "William Meister." Charlotte, who is of the type of Theresa in "William Meister," and whom we have liked all along for her brightness, her cleverness, her capacity for making the best of things, comes out strongly at the last; her disinterestedness, her genuine love for Otilie, ennoble her, notwithstanding her temporary aberration; and she is perhaps, on the whole, the best of Goethe's female creations. But in Otilie we have the nearest approach, among Goethe's creations, to ideal characterization, the nearest approach to a type that may be called Shakespearian. We say Shakespearian; of all characters that we remember in imaginative fiction, Otilie — the ideal Otilie, that is — is the nearest to Byron's Haidee, alike in her gentleness, in the character of her influence over those about her, in her delight in loving, in the manner in which she rises toward the last, and in which, after the sudden flash, she sinks into a quiescence which is the beginning of the end. But in order to get at the ideal Otilie, we have to divest her of a considerable accretion. Nowhere do we more deprecate the alloy with the gold, the chaff with the wheat, nowhere more than here do we regret that Goethe could not have kept his genius and his cleverness apart, at least so far as regards Otilie. Left alone with Charlotte, after the captain's and Edward's departure, Otilie realizes, upon her perception of Charlotte's fidelity, what the love means that she has been cherishing. She does not know of the agreement come to between Charlotte and Edward; she knows only that Edward has gone, whither or for what length of time

she has no notion. Could she know that he was happy, she would ask no more concerning him ; but she has not even this consolation. As for her own life, it has no outlook ; she is hemmed in on every side. In this unhappy case, it is well for Ottilie that her nature is a dutiful one, since to do her duty day by day is all that is possible to her. Ottilie has the gift of making those about her willing and faithful ; the household waits upon her slightest sign ; she is thus able to relieve her aunt of every vexation. The old gardener misses Edward, and she becomes his resource and chief adviser ; at any hour Edward may return, though the hope, so natural a one, is no sooner breathed than it is despair for Ottilie.

We should be less than human, we feel, not to sympathize with Ottilie ; but we cannot, there is an obstacle which is insuperable. This girl, of love and loving service all impact, keeps a *Tagebuch*, in which she writes down, La Rochefoucauld fashion, maxims and sentences upon life and character. A girl who could keep such a book ought, we feel, to be able to rise above the situation. The *Tagebuch* is a very singular outcome of Ottilie. Goethe assures us that this *Tagebuch* is like a note of color in a uniform, by which we may trace always Ottilie's inner life and thought. We could trace them much better without this identification. She is so overloaded with *Tagebuch* that the stream of our sympathy is turned aside, it will not flow over ; water cannot run up hill. The maxims and sentences become so profound that even Goethe sees the impropriety of presuming them to be Ottilie's ; he admits this, and suggests that since she could scarcely have originated them, she must have copied them from some source or other. A girl who could find mental diversion in such accumulation ought, we feel, to be able to swing herself clear ; whereas Ottilie can only love, and her sole resource is that same duty day by day. At last we perceive the trick, notwithstanding the clever Goethe has so played upon us. The *Tagebuch* has nothing to do with Ottilie, with the Ottilie, that is, of his inner genius ; it is only that Goethe, having this grist by him in his literary mill, sends it to market at chance opportunity, with very little consideration as to whether the burden is proportionate to the bearer. After this discovery, we do not trouble ourselves much about the *Tagebuch*, though we are glad when it ceases to be sandwiched in between the chapters of the narration.

Ottilie, meanwhile, must have grown upon her creator, notwithstanding that error of the *Tagebuch* ; and we are glad when we

find her happy, in her day-by-day sense, in the new opportunity for love and service that comes to her. She dares not love Edward, yet her love cannot die within her at command. But she may love Edward's child, and upon this child is expended all the pent-up ardor of her nature. The child, it will be remembered, a beautiful boy, resembles strikingly the captain, but with the eyes of Ottilie. We may remark that we might have realized that this child is in a certain subtle sense a child of sin, without the detailed narration our author seemed to think necessary. That the detail would be nothing with writers whom all the world finds corrupt, is not at all to the purpose; for we are dealing with a writer who is regarded preëminently as a teacher, and in whose works we are expected to find a lofty moral. This, however, we do not care to dwell upon. The necessity of Ottilie's loving nature is met in the child, to whom she is another and younger mother. The babe expands in her walks with him about the park, he develops in strength and beauty. The picture of Ottilie by the lakeside, as she sits quietly reading, the life of nature regarding her as it were with admiring interest, the babe slumbering by her side, is not the least charming in literature; and it is this calm which Edward's whirlwind of passion breaks in upon. In the boat with the dead child our commiseration for Ottilie is utter and entire, — as she tries in vain to restore the little drenched creature she has rescued from the water; as, tearing aside her own garment, she presses the child to her very heart, in the hope to warm into it a life of her own; as, when all is unavailing, she throws herself upon her knees in the boat, her face toward heaven.

Thereafter, in conversation with Charlotte about her return to the school, we are startled by a sudden development in Ottilie of a mentality quite out of character; but we are pretty well accustomed by this time to this sort of ups and downs in Goethe. Ottilie has over-estimated her strength when she determined to attempt life by herself and unaided; and that the end has not been sufficiently forecast for her to be allowed to fade quietly out of life is among the vagaries of Goethe's genius the most inexplicable. Instead of such an end, we have the labored device of Nanny, of the penance Ottilie lays upon herself not to speak to those about her, of her withdrawal from the rest of the family, and of her death as brought about by voluntary starvation. We readily perceive that Charlotte, while entirely conscientious as mother, must none the less feel a sense of unacknowledged relief

that the child has been removed whose very sight was a reproach to her. Ottilie has no reason for such feeling; so far from it, the child was a basis for her life, which had been wavering in the void. That the loss of this something which alone enabled her to live, together with her anguish of self-reproach that her reckless passion has cost the life of a fellow-being, even were that fellow-being not so unimaginably dear, — that this should not be enough, without the pitiful apparatus Goethe has brought to bear upon Ottilie's end, would alone reveal him as incapable of sounding the depths of feminine nature, as well as of estimating moral values, of gauging the sense of retribution.

Acquainted as we have become with the theatric quality which has been commented upon, with the extent to which Goethe is possessed to have a scene in what with any other great author would be moments of transcendent calm, we turn the page for the last chapter of the "Elective Affinities" with a certain trembling. The trembling is justified by the result, and we spare the reader a further criticism. There is one lucid moment, when the young architect who has loved Ottilie in his negative fashion comes to see her as she lies in the chapel, with the semblance of her which he has himself painted looking down upon them. But that a writer credited with a superb heathenism could evolve such stuff as makes up much of this chapter must be regarded as one of the phenomena of literature.

If the scope of this essay admitted of extended criticism, it would be unfair not to pass in review those play-poems, upon which must rest so much of Goethe's claim to be great in literature; with these, too, the *Gedichte*, some of which, coming to them from a perusal of his larger works, we might describe at first hand as un-Goethean, gushing as they do like a living spring from a well of poetry undefiled. And we should not, of course, presume to assign Goethe's place in the literature of his own country, or to estimate his importance thereto. If we have dwelt in this essay largely upon his faults, it is, as was said at starting, merely as offset to the undue estimation in which he is held among English-thinking people of the present generation. It has often been regretted that Coleridge, who seemed best adapted to the work, could he have been brought to it, did not give us a clear and just estimation of the literary work of Goethe. He did not do it; and the field was left open for the caprices and the capitals of Carlyle. The undue estimate, however, goes back, no doubt, to

Goethe himself, being found in his imposing and fascinating personality. This gift, which a genius, a great writer, may or not have, like any other person, Goethe enjoyed in full proportion. When Heine tells us that by the motion of his hand he seemed to direct the stars in their course, we detect the note of exaggeration. To the imposing personality was added every gift of fortune and position. It would have been extraordinary if Goethe's estimate of himself, at least toward the end of his career, had not been a somewhat exalted one. Something of an actor, at least from the standpoint of posing and of costume which in his day went so far to fulfill the requirement, it is not surprising that this exalted estimate should have been imposed upon those who came in contact with him. But the distorted criticism and extravagant laudation of Carlyle are greatly responsible in that Goethe's is to-day, among English readers, the most over-estimated name in literature.

We entirely admit that we have nothing to do with Goethe's character, save so far as it affects his work. When his supporters tell us that we have no right to interpret his works by his life, when they tell us that his character has nothing to do with his works, we find rather, from careful study of them, that his character is in his works, and has left upon them, from the standpoint of literary art pure and simple, an inevitable and ineffaceable flaw. Moral perversity, we should find rather, when persisted in, has its counterpart in an intellectual perversity. Whether Goethe's limitation was by nature, or whether it was the result of the mental confusion following upon an inverted moral standard deliberately set up, the result is the same for the reader. This we believe to be the solution of the "Faust" problem. Goethe had in his mind vaguely, we must presume, some such scheme as his supporters credit him with bringing to perfect, or something like perfect, accomplishment. Already in the first part we see a wavering in certain directions, a lack of grasp of central idea; in the second part, or in such portions of it as bear directly upon the solution, he is like a ship without rudder, at mercy of wind and wave. We have not desired to find in "Faust" a sermon of Jonathan Edwards, or any other. But poetry must have its base upon certain rocks; the rocks may be covered with the splendid flow of poetic imagination which adorns the wondrous world of Spenser's creation, but they are there.

If, then, Goethe's character affects his work, as we believe, inevitably, we have a right to protest against the special attitude of

his supporters in regard to him. This is quite another thing from denying that geniuses, with certain limitations, are not to be judged by common rules. What we complain of in Goethe is that he deliberately inverted the standard. A genius might commit all the lapses of a Burns, a Byron, and a Goethe together, and if he acknowledged them, even tacitly, to be lapses, that were one thing. What we complain of is that Goethe inverted the standard; that he said, "Evil, be thou my good;" and that his extreme admirers support him in this, to the extent of declaring that wrong is right, at least so far as regards Goethe. Against this we have a right to protest, until it can be proved that a genius, by virtue of being such, is destitute of that sentiment of right which Kant declared to be one of the two beautiful things in the universe. It is to Goethe's personality that the observations we have quoted from Schopenhauer apply preëminently; and upon Goethe's works we base the judgment that few things could be more disastrous than that Schopenhauer's view should become the opinion of mankind in general, or of any large number of the writers who could be called great in literature.

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THE OXFORD MOVEMENT IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH.¹

THE appearance of Mr. Wilfrid Ward's book entitled "William George Ward and the Oxford Movement" has been eagerly waited for by those who wished more than Cardinal Newman's "Apologia" and Canon Oakeley's pamphlet volume on "The Tractarian Movement" as a statement from the point of view of the Roman converts who followed its possible leadings into the Roman body. W. G. Ward did not originate it, nor did Canon Oakeley, but when it had reached a certain development they powerfully assisted to give it a Roman interpretation which Newman had not intended and greatly deprecated. It is the middle and later stages of Tractarianism which Mr. Ward's biography covers. The book is a supplement to Cardinal Newman's account of his religious opinions, but it is more than simply a personal statement. It largely enters into the reason of things. Mr. Wilfrid

¹ *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement.* By Wilfrid Ward. New York: Macmillan & Co. 8vo. pp. 392.

Ward is dealing with his father's Anglican life, and is fair and candid in his treatment of it, but the whole tendency of the book is to vindicate his father's action in entering into the Roman communion. The charm of the biography is that it reveals the secret motives which guided his father in an almost unexampled career, and groups around him the brilliant contemporaries at Oxford who were powerfully attracted by his personality and charmed with his conversational powers. The Oxford common room and the intellectual breakfast parties which he gave or attended while a fellow at Balliol, and at which gathered such men as Jowett, A. C. Tait, Mark Pattison, Arthur Hugh Clough, Dean Stanley, Frederick Temple, and Dean Church, were the field where his personal qualities were displayed at the greatest advantage. It was in maintaining logical discussions, in bringing others to his opinions, in a sort of personal mastery of his topics, that he most delighted. His biography presents one of the raciest pictures of Oxford life that has ever been drawn. In Newman's "Apologia" these pictures are strictly subordinated to a great purpose, but in the present instance the men who best knew W. G. Ward have been invited to contribute their reminiscences of him, and in doing this they have unconsciously given almost photographic sketches of what was most distinctive in Oxford life fifty years ago. But the greater value of this book is its contribution to the accumulating materials which are necessary if the Oxford Movement is to be estimated as a whole. The difficulty with all writers upon this episode in the English Church has been that they were too near it to appreciate it correctly. The reason why so many who started with Newman found themselves drifting toward Rome was that they could not see its larger bearings as a phase of life in the Church of England. It is here that W. G. Ward's career is most valuable to the student of this period, and we must sacrifice references to the entertaining personal details in this memoir, if we are to deal with the Oxford Movement in the large way which these fresh materials suggest. Every one interested in theological changes as they are manifested in the lives of remarkable persons will turn to this work and devour its personal revelations, but for many the possibility of now presenting an outline sketch of the Tractarian episode will seem to have greater importance. Without further delay I turn at once to the Oxford Movement.

It is the characteristic of historical churches, as distinguished from modern denominations, that they allow schools of thought or interpretation within certain limits which do not disturb the fun-

damental principles of the Christian faith; while the modern denominations, being in most instances the outgrowth of special interpretations, have no room for allowable divergences in belief. In the history of the Christian Church in its organic parts, there is a constant ebb and flow of these schools, which are represented in the Gallican and Ultramontane parties in the Church of Rome, which have their manifestation in High, Low, and Broad parties in the Church of England, and which are known by the same terms in the United States. These schools of thought, varying in the degree in which they are dominant in historical churches, have a directive influence, but they do not change the constitution or order of the Church itself. It is from this point of view that what is called the Oxford Movement is to be understood, if its relation to the Church of England is to be rightly interpreted. Since the Reformation, the Puritan and Anglo-Catholic parties of the seventeenth century, the Evangelical and Latitudinarian parties of the eighteenth century, and the Catholic and Broad Church parties of our own time, have helped to keep the religious life warm and fervent in the Church of England. No one school of thought has entirely predominated at any one time, but each in its turn has been dominant, and has helped to present Christianity in those phases which best indicate its adaptation to the changing aspects of human life and civil society. The Catholic movement in the English Church of the seventeenth century was not the same as the Catholic revival of the nineteenth century. It emphasized principles but was controversial in its position toward Rome, while, within our own time, the Catholic revival has brought out the affiliations between the English and Roman churches to a remarkable degree. None the less, however, has the Oxford Movement been a distinct and positive force in the English Church. It brought to light nothing which was new to the Church, but a great deal which had not been used or had been overlooked in its working system. It especially brought out, at first in the devotional system, and then in doctrinal statements, the means by which the Church in England could be revived on the basis of its old Catholic life, — its order and its worship, which were not distinctively Roman, but Catholic as distinguished from Roman. It was felt by Newman, Keble, Pusey, Perceval, Palmer, and Hugh James Rose that unless the Catholic offices and theology were revived in the Anglican Church it could not maintain its claims to be the spiritual teacher of the English nation.

This was what the Movement aimed at. Probably few of those

who met together in the Hadleigh Rectory at Hugh James Rose's invitation in the summer of 1833 had the slightest idea of the distinction which would be given to their efforts, or the results to which they would lead. The Evangelical party, under the lead of men like Simeon and the elder Wilberforce, had represented the live elements in the English Church since Wesley began his work among the middle and lower class people in England, and the Catholic features of the Church of England had been almost entirely obliterated. The services were decent and decorous; the bishops pompous and good-natured; the preaching ethical and worldly-wise; and the nation in a comfortable religious slumber. It is said that half a dozen earnest men working together can reform the world. Newman and his confrères represented these men, and for five years,—from 1833 to 1838,—during which the "Tracts for the Times" had risen to No. 88, the Movement had gone on without public rebuke and without disaster. Newman says that in the year 1838 his fortunes were at their highest in the English Church. He had been forced into the position of a Tractarian leader. The younger religious life of Oxford University was with him. He had the teaching of the prospective clergy who would mould the English Church. Perhaps not since the university career of Wycliffe has a single individual influenced so many persons at Oxford through the intellect, through common sympathies, and through a belief in the spiritual qualities of the man himself, as Newman then controlled. The memoirs of that period, which are now largely in hand, contain touching and inspiring accounts of the wonderful inspiration which men found in all that Newman thought or did or said. Not in a belligerent sense, but in the position of a leader of the Faith, Newman stood, like Athanasius, against the world. Everybody felt his influence, some dreaded it, but to most it was welcome as the rare breath of a new life. Men as far apart as Principal Shairp and Canon Oakeley found in Newman points of common sympathy, and received from him a common inspiration. Newman was conscious, even to pain, of the responsibility which had been laid upon him. It was a serious task to be at once a leader and a pioneer. While Newman had these gifts of leadership, he was himself seeking guidance. He found that while the formularies of the Church of England were Catholic in their character, they required a different *apologia* from that which had commonly been rendered. In other words, the doctrinal ethic of the Church of England had to be constructed anew, expressed in less Protestant terms than the

Reformation compromises ; and the greatest legacy which Cardinal Newman has left in his writings is found in his efforts to construct a rational basis on which the Church of England can depend for the validity of its position as a part of the Catholic Church. Newman worked out this new statement of Catholic truth, mainly for himself, with great freedom, with a strong grasp of intuitive truth, and with a very true insight into the fundamental conditions on which the Church depends for its leverage in society ; but he was hemmed in by a thousand prejudices ; there were few to assist him ; and before his new defense of Anglicanism had been completed, he was met with difficulties which led his inquiring mind into another direction, and caused him to lose confidence in the very system which he was constructing.

Newman shared with most other Oxford men of that day the inability to see things in wider relations than his education or prejudices allowed. No Oxford man of that period saw the Church as a whole ; each one saw it through the prejudice of his personal education, and believed that what he saw was the whole of it. Dr. Arnold, John Keble, Richard Hurrell Froude, Archbishop Whately, Dr. Pusey, and Hugh James Rose, all of whom shared the direction of the Church revival with John Henry Newman, made the mistake of thinking that their personal view of Church questions was the only one that could be justly and rightly maintained. They were too narrow to justly conceive of the bearings of the questions which they had raised. They detested Evangelicalism ; they hated Liberalism ; they had very little conception of the solidarity of the Church as an institution, because they had never studied society as a corporate unit which is affected by a great variety of forces or agencies. They were working a neglected mine in the Church of England, and the further they went the more they saw the glory, the beauty, the integrity of the Catholic idea. Emerson had a mind, as he had a physiognomy, like Newman's, and felt as deeply as he did the wholeness of ethical and spiritual ideas, and Newman was the largest-minded man of the entire company that was under his leadership. Studying carefully to-day the Movement which he inaugurated, it is seen, again and again, that he grasped the Church revival as legitimate, organic, and rightly a part of the religious system of the Church of England. He is the only man, excepting W. G. Ward, who tried to justify the Church revival on grounds of reason and philosophy. The defect in Newman has often been pointed out ; it was the defect of a man who sees a part for the whole, and who

acts without waiting till disused functions are properly restored to their rightful place in the body politic. His studies of ecclesiastical history in the fifth century in 1839 first threw doubt upon his efforts to construct a *defensio fidei*; the Monophysite heresy caused the section of the Church in which that view was held to take the same attitude toward the whole Church which he found that the Anglican Church took toward the Roman Church, and the Roman Church then ruled as the mistress of the world. This comparison between ancient and modern history threw a doubt upon the validity of the Anglican position, in part represented by the *Via Media*, which he could not overcome, and from that moment he was in doubt as to the rightfulness of his staying in the Anglican communion as a true part of the Catholic Church. It was not that the Church revival had defects, it was not that the Church revival had not a rightful place in the Church of England, which disturbed him, but simply the similarity between the defective condition, as he thought, of the Church of England, and the light thrown upon it by St. Leo's treatment of the Monophysite heresy, which first impaired his confidence.

Then a personal issue entered into the Oxford Movement, in which there was hasty action by the English bishops, and equally hasty action on the part of Newman. It is not necessary here to recount the full story of the condemnation of Tract 90, in which Newman undertook to turn back the weapons of controversy employed by English divines before him, and establish the interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles in a Catholic sense. He did this, not to impose a new doctrinal interpretation upon the Church of England itself, but to show those who were depending upon him for direction that there was legitimate standing-room for them in the English Church on truly Catholic ground. This document was utterly misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Anglican bishops, and compelled Newman and his friends to answer for their interpretation of it as a publication disloyal to the teachings of the Anglican Communion. His own bishop at Oxford was one of the first to give him trouble, and the Hebdomadal Board of the University, controlled by liberals who were utterly out of sympathy with the Oxford Movement, hastened with all speed possible to secure the condemnation of Tract 90 by the Oxford authorities. They were goaded on by the anger and resentment of bishops and clergy outside, among whom Dr. Bagot, then Bishop of Oxford, was foremost. Newman addressed a letter of explanation to Dr. R. W. Jelf, March 13, 1841, begging that Tract 90 might be candidly

considered, and on March 25 addressed a similar letter to the Bishop of Oxford, in which he set forth his own position still more distinctly; but these communications amounted to nothing amid the fury and excitement with which men hurried on the condemnation of the Tract. Two of the men most active in securing his condemnation were A. C. Tait, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, and H. B. Wilson, who twenty years later was condemned for his liberal opinions as one of the authors of "Essays and Reviews." Newman stood no chance amid the excitement that then prevailed. The Tracts were suspended, but the Movement was simply arrested in its development, and the "British Critic," which had also been Newman's organ, was continued, though the editorship was placed in the hands of Thomas Mozley, his brother-in-law, the principal contributors being Oakeley and Ward, both of whom now came out more distinctly than before in favor of Roman Catholic positions.

This was a very critical time in the Oxford Movement. The early promoters, Keble, Pusey, and Isaac Williams, stood loyally by it, and no one doubted their integrity; but Newman soon retired from active work in the University, and established himself in Littlemore, which is a suburb of Oxford, where he gave himself to studious work, and again met the ghosts of doubt, as to the Catholic character of the Church of England, that had visited him before he wrote Tract 90. While the Movement was held back from positive publications authorized by Newman, to use Cardinal Newman's words, "a new school of thought was rising, as is usual in doctrinal inquiries, and was sweeping the original part of the Movement aside, and was taking its place." It consisted of eager, acute, resolute minds, who had heard much of Rome, and who cut into the original Movement at an angle, and then set about turning it in a new direction. It is here that W. G. Ward, who says Cardinal Newman "was never High Churchman, never a Tractarian, never a Puseyite, never a Newmanite," represents the changed current or direction. F. W. Faber, J. B. Dalgairns, John B. Morris, James Anthony Froude, Frederick Oakeley, and Charles Seager now became prominent. All these men at the time, excepting Froude, represented Rome-ward tendencies, and Oakeley was in the Roman Church, as was also Ward, before even Newman got there. Newman's bridge, called the *Via Media*, had broken down as a working theory through its own inconsistencies with facts, and he was at his wits' end to see where the path of duty lay. He was distracted by the

way things were going. The condemnation of Tract 90 caused him to be distrusted by those who were not his immediate followers, and the new turn of the Movement made him responsible for Roman teaching to which he did not really consent. His feeling is truthfully set forth in the "Apologia." At the same time two influences were operating on his own thought. One was, whether the Catholic principles which had been the true motive of the Oxford Movement, and which were fully embodied in Tract 90, could find room in the present authoritative teaching of the Church of England; and the other was, whether, even if this were accepted, the English Church was not in a fatal condition of schism toward the Church Universal. It must be remembered that Newman at this time had not seriously thought of joining the Church of Rome. He was holding back within safe lines in the Church of England, and trying to control a company of impulsive men and women who had taken him for their leader, and whose vagaries of thought and action were a constant disturbance to him. He says at this period: "From the end of 1841, I was on my deathbed as regards my membership in the Anglican Church, though at the time I became aware of it only by degrees." It took him four years to see his way clear to reception into the Church of Rome, and even then he was hardly a willing convert. All his ties, all his thought, all his plans, were in the Church of England. Sir William Palmer, in his additions to the "Narrative of Events," blames Newman for impatience at his condemnation by the Anglican Church, and cites the condemnation of Pusey in 1843, and his subsequent vindication, as an example that Newman might have followed with equal grace and inward satisfaction. But Sir William will find, on reading the biography of William George Ward, and comparing it with certain passages in the "Apologia," that Newman's case was entirely different from Pusey's. The latter never doubted that the Anglican body was a true part of the Catholic Church, and Newman did doubt it; indeed, this was the fountain-head of all his troubles.

This brings us to the new element which was introduced by W. G. Ward, who, as Dr. Jowett says, "had never had any hope of finding the way of truth or of life through philosophy, and the want of some guide was a practical necessity to him, without which he could neither have clearness of thought nor consistency in action." He differed from Newman in being unable to depend upon himself in points where authority is needed. He had no imagination and no historical sense. He depended upon the

authority of another mind, and his English Churchmanship meant that Newman had applied his best thought to these questions, and could not be mistaken in his positions. In points of history, in matters of fact, in questions of reason, he leaned on Newman, not on that candid and deliberate examination of vital subjects which every reasonable and gifted man is bound to make for himself. Dr. Jowett strikes the keynote of Ward's mental and spiritual position, and states it frankly, in the following remark: "I think that he was led to join the Roman Catholic Church chiefly for two reasons: (1) By a logical necessity, because such a step seemed to be the natural conclusion of premises which he had held for several years, and in favor of which he had always been arguing with himself. 2. But he had also another feeling. For the world, and especially for himself, there seemed to him to be a need of some authority to which they could resign themselves unreservedly." His unwillingness to take the trouble to verify his postulates for himself, which was constitutional, made it easy, when he lost confidence in Newman's mental soundness and leadership, to transfer to the Roman obedience that confidence which as an Anglican he had reposed in one or two individuals. The stress of the conflict, which Newman was compelled to write a book to overcome, was never felt by him. He wrote, indeed, "The Ideal of a Christian Church," to justify his going to Rome, but the book simply expressed a foregone conclusion, and aimed to show that the nearer the English Church approached the Roman the nearer it came to the ideal of what a Christian Church ought to be. Newman's book, "The Development of Christian Doctrine," was written to justify the existence of modern Roman teachings which were repugnant to him, and which had no witness to their existence in primitive antiquity. Newman had to give a reason to his conscience and his intellect before he could act; while Ward, already biased toward Rome, sought the unity of the two churches upon the basis of the conformity of the Anglican to the Roman obedience. His idea was, to let the whole body of the Movement party go freely forward and act for some years together, at the end of which time he held that the free and unchecked development of thought in individuals would be found to have brought the great bulk of them in far closer accord with Rome. It is easy to see why the then University of Oxford should meet this book with cold favor, and condemn its author by taking away his degree, which it did early in the year 1845, his reception into the Church of Rome following six months later, on the 14th

of September. When W. G. Ward was condemned, the Oxford Movement, to all outward appearance, came to an ignominious end. The old leaders were paralyzed, and the new directors had proved the quality of their service by advancing toward Rome as rapidly as their convictions could carry them.

It is not easy to analyze the Movement, either from the point of view of its promoters, or as the giving of emphasis to a special school of thought in the Church of England. What it seemed to those who were in it is one thing, and what it seems to those who now consider it as a whole is quite another. It has always been studied by partisans. Roman Catholics were thankful for it because it brought to them men who have given a new status to the Roman Church in England; and the best interpretations of the Movement have come from Cardinal Newman, Canon Oakeley, and Mr. Wilfrid Ward. The fundamental ideas which were behind it, so far as they find expression in philosophy and life, are gathered up in Cardinal Newman's "Grammar of Assent" and in Dr. W. G. Ward's "Philosophy of Theism," both of which are intended to supply a working principle to those who believe in God and in Christianity, and would justify that belief on grounds of reason. The field which Newman undertook to cover as a Tractarian and as a Catholic entitles him to rank among the profoundest religious teachers of the century. Without the keen logical powers of Dr. Ward, he had the power of brooding in the unseen realm of ideas, among the facts of consciousness which supply the grounds of human reasoning, and here his philosophy became rooted in the first principles of being; and it is here that he began to construct anew the processes of thought by which the belief in God and in Christianity could be brought home with certainty and power to the minds of men. Newman had the temptation to be an Agnostic, but through the imagination and reason the constructive element in him worked toward positive results. When you take up his writings that are outside of special questions of the Church, you always find him constructive, positive, incisive, inspiring, and interpreting truth to the whole nature of man. This is his enduring claim as an English thinker. Dr. Ward had not Newman's power to search out first principles, and to pioneer the way where others had failed, but, granted the lead of another mind, or the first principles of belief, he could work out with wonderful mastery of detail, and with the logical force of an intensely earnest and honest mind, the conclusions to which these principles led. His "Philosophy of Theism" is a faithful interpretation of

the theistic side of the thinking of the last fifty years, which began with Mill and Bentham and has found its latest expression in Herbert Spencer, and the germs of all this are found in his first book, entitled "The Ideal of a Christian Church." Mr. Wilfrid Ward makes a very accurate estimate of the work which Newman and his father accomplished, and has been the first to point out, which he does in the chapter of his book entitled "The Oxford School and Modern Religious Thought," what these two have contributed permanently to the philosophy of religious belief. Archbishop Whately contributed nothing beyond a suggestion and a method; Dr. Arnold was venturing into deep water, but died before he had thought through the questions which were coming up; Keble was too narrow to see things beyond a certain spiritual point; Pusey never had any large religious insight, and knew nothing of philosophy; men like Clough, Stanley, and Pattison never developed what their careers seemed to promise as religious thinkers; and when the substance of things is considered, the two men who have most helped in our time, among English thinkers and writers, to deepen and broaden our conceptions of God and Christianity are Cardinal Newman and Dr. W. G. Ward. Their writings are of permanent value; and though they worked chiefly to find their own way to the truth, they worked helpfully for all other fellow-searchers after the same truth. Dr. Ward has not the same distinction that belongs to Cardinal Newman, but, with all the limitations which the frankness and candor of his son reveal, he wrought within limits to show that we have faculties for knowing God which can be trusted, and that Christianity exhibits itself as the perfection of moral truth and of the natural law.

After the collapse of the Oxford Movement by the defection of Ward, Oakeley, and Newman to Rome, and the Romeward tendency had been clearly manifested, the Catholic party in the English Church was for a time quite demoralized. Dr. Pusey was the only one left who had sufficient prominence in the University of Oxford, and commanded largely enough the confidence of Churchmen as a loyal son of the Church of England, to take the reins in hand and assume the leadership. He had himself passed under the ban for his famous sermon on the Real Presence two years before, and had patiently abided the interdict of his bishop. So far as the English Church was concerned, it was a difficult matter to gather up the loose ends of things and make headway. The Catholic party had primarily been organized in 1833 to withstand the influence of liberals like Dr. Arnold and Archbishop

Whately, who in politics and religion were carrying everything before them. It was now a conglomerate mass of opinion, out of which it was difficult to tell what might come. Dr. Pusey, until the reaction toward Liberalism or Broad Church had reached its full expression in the "Essays and Reviews" of 1860, was the only man in the Church of England whose character, attainments, and thorough honesty of purpose combined to form a rallying point for the Catholic interests which had once been centred in Newman and Ward. What went on in the period from 1845 to 1860, during which Dr. Pusey was the head of the Catholic party, will not be known to the world until Canon Liddon's "Memoir of Dr. Pusey" is published; but it was during this period that the Church of England, beset by many difficulties which grow out of the relations of a national Church to the state, had a double life. The Catholic party slowly matured and concentrated its forces, not going forward toward Rome, not leaning too hard upon primitive antiquity, but vindicating Catholic positions against the doctrinal decisions of an ecclesiastical court controlled by the state, and working forward to the expression of Catholic doctrine in Christian worship, and the incorporation of Catholic methods in the religious life of the nation. No one can say that the Oxford Movement, thus working itself clear of Rome and acquiring a positive character and position, reached its full expression in the English Church after an ideal method, but with much misunderstanding, under the lead of men like Canon Carter and Dr. Littledale, for the verification of Catholic truth in Church doctrine, and under the direction of parish priests like Dean Hook, Charles Lowder, and A. H. Mackonochie, with the venerable Father Pusey behind them, for the realization of this truth in practice, the Catholic school of thought has worked itself into the very heart of the Anglican Church, and to-day at Oxford, and even at Cambridge, divides with the Broad Church school the allegiance of the best religious life in England.

It is possible to-day to take a large view of the position in which parties or schools of thought stand toward a corporate institution like the Church of England, and the Oxford Movement has better illustrated than perhaps anything else in English religious history, during the present century, the attitude in which a religious body with historic and Catholic antecedents stands toward modern religious life. The problem raised at the English Reformation, stated in terms of philosophy, was the possibility of the combination of Catholic authority with the freedom of the individual mind

and heart as controlled by the modern spirit. It was, how to retain the breadth, the continuity, the Catholicity, of the historical Church in all its essentials of organization, orders, sacraments, and methods, and incorporate into this permanent part of the Church the living spirit of the society of to-day. It is in the light of such a broad statement as this that the Oxford Movement is to be justly understood in its relation to the Church of England. The Roman Church since the Reformation has distinctly and constantly antagonized the principles that rule in civil society. It has not sought to inspire the new age with the permanent principles of the old life, but has required the suppression of the individual life to fit the mould of the ecclesiastical idea. It has failed to organize human life in freedom under the lead of institutions. It has made the institution everything and the individual nothing. In this way it has failed to control modern thought, or give the lead to society. The modern thinking world is outside the Roman Church, and is destined to remain there. The lines of connection between the two do not exist. On the other hand, the mission of the Church of England in modern society has been to impart to it the permanent or Catholic principles which have always ruled in the teaching of Christianity, and to vindicate these principles in a philosophical method by which they are verified to the human reason. It was here, as has been already intimated, that Newman and Ward worked constructively, and have placed all modern Christians under debt to them. At the same time, men representing the better lines of rationalism, such as are illustrated by following the historical and comparative methods in Biblical criticism and in the study of Church history, among whom may be named Dr. Jowett, Dean Stanley, Frederick Maurice, Canon Westcott, Bishop Lightfoot, and Dr. Edwin Hatch, have done a great deal, not so much to reaffirm ecclesiastical positions as to show that the permanent elements of Christianity are the perfection of moral truth and of natural law. Neither the Catholic nor the rational elements in the teaching of Christianity can be spared; and what the Oxford Movement illustrates in one direction, and the Broad Church Movement which has succeeded it illustrates in another, is that, where Christianity undertakes to deal constructively with the whole of human life in modern communities, the Catholic principles and the spiritual interpretation of life in conformity to the laws of right reason are equally important for the incorporation of Christianity in a large and free way into all that is vital in modern society.

It is here that the Oxford Movement vindicates for itself all that has been claimed for it by its most ardent friends and supporters. It is a part of that process, initiated with the Reformation, by which the people who were destined to take the lead in modern thought and activity have endeavored to make organized Christianity a part of the national consciousness, and a reality in its ethical and spiritual meaning to each individual. It is easy for the Roman Catholic to say that the Church of England lacks this or that; and it is easy for the free Protestant to say that the Anglican affirmations of Christianity are too slow for the modern spirit to profit by them; but it is this power on the part of a Church organization to hold dissimilar views or separate schools of thought in vigorous activity within its limits, and yet utilize their life and strength for a common end, which is just the charm and glory and power and majesty of Christianity in modern life; and the lesson, above all others, which is taught by the way in which the Oxford Movement, with all its limitations and disappointments, has found itself a true, real, and organic part of the Church of England, is, that a living Christian body must hold in solution and without precipitation, and with the ability to use them for higher ends, elements which are dissimilar in character, and yet which have their place in the higher unity that presents God and Christ in relation to the whole of humanity. The English Church has very grave and serious defects, and people are not slow in pointing them out; at a period when statesmanship should have guided the Anglican bishops, and large principles should have ruled their conduct, they behaved like a set of schoolboys who are chiefly anxious to get the better of their antagonists: but whatever may be the defects of their treatment of Newman and his companions, or of the inconsistencies in which the rulings of a state court have involved Christian discipline and authority, the comprehensive movement of the Church of England, little as it may resemble the primitive Church in a less highly organized civilization, vindicates the principles by which Christianity is maintained in its full influence and strength in modern life; and the history of the Oxford Movement, viewed in its length and breadth, points out how a school of thought can be used, through a term of years, for larger ends and even greater interests than its original promoters ever dreamed of.

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WHAT IS REALITY?

PART III. THE ANSWER OF LIFE.

AT the close of the last article, the reader was promised a direct answer to our main question. Risking abruptness, therefore, I will proceed at once to submit a test of reality. It is as follows: *The necessity of LIVING the affirmation of a proposition shows that this proposition expresses a reality.* For the sake of antithesis, I have ventured to frame my statement somewhat after the fashion of Mr. Spencer's universal postulate. That postulate, said to be the ultimate criterion of truth, is: "An abortive attempt to conceive the negation of a proposition shows that the cognition expressed is one we are compelled to accept." We have already seen the impracticability of this test as applied to the world of concrete experiences. But it is necessary, at this point in the discussion, to clearly understand *why* it is impracticable.

Mr. Spencer's mistake is in attempting to apply a criterion that is valid within a limited sphere to the whole realm of truth. There is no universal test of truth, for the simple reason that all truth is not of the same kind. On the one hand, there is the truth that expresses the relations between pure abstractions; and, on the other hand, there is the truth that expresses the relations between the concrete realities of life. When we are dealing with the former, the test of the non-conceivability of the opposite may be legitimately applied, because we are here concerned solely with concepts. We have marked off for ourselves a particular sphere of thought by means of definitions and postulates, and within this sphere our knowledge is absolute and complete. It is, so to speak, inclosed within walls, so that there is a perfect rebound for every proposition. We have absolute agreements and disagreements, because we ourselves have made the absolute definitions to which every statement is referred. And the inability to conceive the negation of a proposition demonstrates its truth, simply because such a negation contradicts the definitions of the terms in which the proposition is stated.

But when, on the other hand, we are dealing with the concrete realities of life, we are quite outside the realm of absolute agreements and contradictions. Our knowledge of the elements with which we have to do is, in no sense, complete. They have relations altogether unknown to us, and the progress of knowledge is

continually bringing within the range of conceivability combinations that were once unthinkable. Moreover, the relations that *are* known are so differently apprehended as to make any consensus, on the ground of conceivability, impossible. The specialization of knowledge does not tend to draw men of cultivation into such a consensus. On the contrary, it separates individuals and groups, and makes the theoretical inconceivabilities of one group the theoretical conceivabilities of another. To find a ground of agreement, therefore, we must retrace our steps from the widely extended frontiers of theoretical knowledge to that common experience that binds all classes of minds together.

This course commends itself to us, not simply as the sole practicable one, but also as the only rational one. For in referring the question of the truth of concrete existences and agencies back to life, we refer them to the sources from whence our belief in them has sprung. And just as we found it legitimate to test the statements of an abstract science by an appeal to *conceivability*, because the whole structure of thought in such a science rests upon *concepts*, so we affirm the legitimate and necessary test of statements about the realities of life to be an appeal to *life* in which they have originated.

But this account of the origin of our fundamental beliefs may be challenged. On what ground do we say that they have originated in life or experience, rather than in the nature of the mind itself? I would reply, that the former statement is not the denial of the latter; it is only a more complete expression of the facts. The nature of the mind is not something that has been created outside of experience. It has been developed and made what it is in connection with experience, — not simply the experience of the individual, but also that of the race, handed on from one generation to another.

The process by which our convictions with regard to the reality of things have come to be what they are may be studied to advantage in the developing mind of a child. Every infant has to find out for himself that there are solid things that he cannot walk through, forceful things that he must avoid to escape injury. In short, by an unending series of encounters with the external world he learns to respect it, and to govern himself with reference to agencies that rigidly hold their own. At the same time, he learns his own powers. In his conflicts with things, the growing boy discovers that, within certain limits, he can become their master. If a solid thing is not too heavy he can remove it.

Though he cannot crack a nut with his hands or with his teeth, he learns that he can attain his object by compelling a stone to assist him. The most real things of the world to him are the things that can do something. To his thinking the atmosphere is nothing because he discovers no resistance from it. But the wind is decidedly something because it can blow his hat off; and he also is something because he can run after it and put it on again.

It is the same with the mature man. He continually increases the range of his knowledge of real things, and of their relations, by experimenting; and though he can greatly assist himself in this by the use of analogies, it is to experience that he must always come back for the verification of his analogically conceived hypotheses.

A little reflection will convince us that the tenacity with which we hold to the belief in the reality of *things*, as against the skeptical argument of the idealist, and to the reality of *mind* as against the skepticism of the physical realist, is a tenacity not born of argument. For if it were born of reasoning it would also succumb to reasoning; and we have already seen that the destructive argument is just as good as the constructive. Kant states only the truth when he says: "If any one could free himself entirely from all considerations of interest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason, attending only to their content irrespective of the consequences which follow them, he would live in a state of continual hesitation. To-day he would feel convinced that the human will is free; to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he would look on freedom as a mere illusion, and declare *nature* to be all-in-all. But if he were called to action, the play of the merely speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream, and practical interest would dictate his choice of principles."¹

As matter of fact, we do continually obey the dictation of the practical interests of life; and in so doing, we recognize an authority more forceful, more arbitrary than that of reason. This same authority, and no other, it is that, in the face of all skeptical objections, holds us faithful to the postulates of common realism. For however closely beset with reasons for denying one of these postulates, we know, even in the very moment of our faltering, that if, for the sake of argument, we pronounce it to be unreal, we shall presently be compelled to dishonor our words by our acts. Let us observe further, that the *degree* of our conviction with regard

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 982. Bohn's ed.

to the reality of anything is measured by the extent to which it enters into life.

It has probably already occurred to the reader that our test of reality is one that admits only of a restricted application. As to the reality of some things it will give only an uncertain answer, and as to the reality of others it will give no answer at all. But we are not looking for a universally applicable test, but only for one that is true in so far as it is applicable. If we can get a foundation for reality, a few ultimate data, it is all we ask.

We have compressed our statement of reality into four propositions, which we assumed to be universally held by unsophisticated men.¹ And if now we inquire *why* there is universal assent to these particular propositions, I think we must acknowledge that it is because all men are obliged daily to *live* the affirmation of them. The truth of this may not be equally apparent with regard to all four of our postulates; and for the sake of making sure that it is as true of one as of another, it may be worth while to examine the grounds on which the assumption is based. To simplify the matter we may reduce our four propositions to two, as follows:—

First, *The external world, known to us through our senses, is a world of real agencies that act and react upon us.* Second, *The human mind is a real originating cause, which to some extent modifies and directs itself and external agencies.*

It might, at first sight, seem sufficiently clear that daily life involves the necessity of living the affirmation of both these propositions. But there is this difference between them: when the necessity of living the latter is called in question, the reaffirmation of it is less decisive and absolute than it is in the case of the former. It is more clearly seen that the former abuts, so to speak, on substantial, permanent things. The latter seeks first its verification in a complex process which presents a more yielding front to skepticism. When, for instance, a philosopher, in denial of the reality of the external world, proves satisfactorily to himself that a precipice has no existence except as a subjective phenomenon, the possibility or impossibility of living, his denial may be quickly demonstrated by ascending to the roof of his house and walking off into space. But when the physical realist denies the distinctive reality of mental causation, we do not so quickly bring matters to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

¹ These propositions are as follows: *First*, I exist. *Second*, There exists, in time and space, a world external to myself. *Third*, I can produce changes in myself and in the external world. *Fourth*, Changes take place in me, and in that world, of which I am not the author.

As the agency in question is a subjective one, we are easily drawn into the analysis of self-consciousness for the determination of the controversy. We are told that effects *apparently* produced through the agency of mind are *in reality* produced by purely physical causes, — causes that are lost to consciousness because of their complexity. And in the dazed contemplation of this complexity we ourselves get lost. The wielder of physical necessities fixes us with his eye and holds us as with a spell. He bewitches our judgment with the tale of transformations so manifold and intricate that any impossibility is made to seem possible. But under this spell we need not remain. The appeal to experience is just as open to us for the decision of this question as for the demonstration of the reality of the things of the external world; and the answer it will give is just as decisive. Let us see just what it is that we affirm, and what it is also that the physical realist denies.

The belief that the mind has a unique power of influencing the course of events is often so stated as to constitute a palpable absurdity. When, for instance, the will is said to be absolutely untrammelled, the deliverances of experience are disregarded as much as when its freedom is altogether denied. What life really testifies is that the soul has the power of modifying both itself and external events *to some extent*. Unconscious habit and routine, in response to a proximately uniform environment, constitute the largest part of every man's life; and it is only when we come to that smaller part, where routine is interrupted, that we recognize ourselves as free, intelligent agents. Much of that which is now almost mechanical had, without doubt, its origin in that which was conscious and deliberate. Conscious self-determination first constructed much of the machinery that has subsequently run almost without consciousness. But, so far as current experience is concerned, it is only in a small part of life that we are actively engaged in modifying, with set purpose and by a purely spiritual agency, ourselves and the course of events.

Now, the position of the physical realist involves the unconditional denial of purposive or spiritual modification in any part of life. There can be no half way about it. It is not unfrequently the case that those who deny the freedom of the will, in deference to the mechanical view of things, seek to evade the consequences of their denial when they confront the problem of moral responsibility. The will is held to be powerless to withstand the impulses that urge to immediate action, but, at the same time, it is

said that men are responsible for their actions, because they can exercise control over the first springs of thought and will by the direction of the attention. But this is only to temporize with the mechanical tyrant of thought. At whatsoever point exerted, and whether weak or strong, the power of the spirit to control and modify events is the same power. If it is recognized as existing at all, in any nook or corner of human life, a principle is affirmed that cannot be tolerated by the law of energy, as an exhaustive expression of the powers that be. It is impossible, therefore, for us to live our lives as responsible beings, or to treat others as if they were responsible for their choices and actions, without *living* the affirmation of the proposition that mind is, to some extent, an independent cause of events.

Nor is it alone within the realm of morals that the denial of mind as an independent cause can be brought to the test of life. For, as we have already shown, to interpret the whole world from the standpoint of the law of the persistence of force makes it necessary to exclude from reality not only the power of moral choice, but equally the power of effecting any modification in events through what we call *purposive action*. All that element in life which this word purposive expresses is, from the mechanical standpoint, pure illusion.

This position is not, as a rule, unreservedly stated by the physical realists; but Professor Huxley has no reserves in this matter. He distinctly declares that consciousness has absolutely no power of modifying the course of events. "The consciousness of brutes," he says, "would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body, simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of such changes." What is true of brutes, Professor Huxley continues, is equally true of men. We are "conscious automata" . . . "parts of the great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be, the sum of existence."¹ In another connection we find the following: "Any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant

¹ *Science and Culture*, pp. 243 and 246.

gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.”¹

I have quoted this last passage in addition to the first one, because it is more sweeping and absolute in its statement. There can be no controversy about this. Every form of what we call mental efficiency is denied. Intelligence enables us to be spectators of what is passing in the machines we call ourselves; but it gives us no power whatever of influencing the course of events.

It is needless to say that every one of us is daily living the affirmation of that which this view of things denies. All that part of our life which transcends that of the baser tribes is the direct outcome of the *belief* that we can shape events to our necessities and desires. We are civilized beings because we have this belief. But this is not all. Because of our consciousness and intelligence we are able to conceive the possibility of living the opposite, and of putting it to the test of experience. Just as we may question the reality of the external world by trying to live the refutation of it in some specific case, receiving the answer in the diminution of life and well-being, according to the measure of the experiment; so also may we test the reality of our power to intelligently influence events by becoming for a time mere spectators of them. The same experiment will do for both cases.

We will have two philosophers, the one an idealist, the other a physical realist. They are walking upon the railway track, absorbed in discussion, when suddenly they perceive an express train bearing down upon them. I challenge you, exclaims the realist, to demonstrate the unreality of the things of the external world by not leaving this track. And I challenge you, returns the idealist, to demonstrate the truth of your belief that we have no power of intelligently influencing events by becoming a mere spectator of them and remaining where you are. For humanity's sake we will have it that our philosophers, though deeply attached, each to his own skepticism, is yet more fond of life, and therefore that they withdraw in time to demonstrate the necessity of *living* the affirmative of that which they theoretically deny.

But some one will say: “This is not philosophy at all, it is mere Philistinism. You have not untied the knot, you have cut it. You have not solved our difficulty by reason, you have simply refused to reason. After many words, you have brought us back to the place whence we set out; and as an answer to the question ‘What is reality?’ you offer us two contradictory state-

¹ *The Fortnightly Review*, February, 1869.

ments which we must accept on peril of our lives." Now I cannot complain that this criticism is unjust, in view of what has hitherto been developed. It is very true that the test of reality offered is not a philosophical but a practical one. It is not addressed to reason. It is rather the knock-down argument of facts, — an argument with which science, at least, cannot quarrel. We have not yet begun to philosophize. We have been seeking a foundation for philosophy in a substratum of reality; and we have found it, where alone it can be found, in *experience*. But now we are ready to enter upon the justification of our acceptance of these two propositions from a rational point of view.

To begin with, then, we deny altogether the affirmation that the two aspects of reality in question are the proved contradictions of each other. At the beginning of this article we showed *why* Mr. Spencer's test of reality was impracticable; and now I ask the reader to look a little further and see that the error that lurks in the "universal postulate" is also the underlying error of all the negations of physical realism. It was shown that it is impossible to have exhaustive, absolute truth except when we are dealing with pure abstractions; and therefore that it is only within the realm of the formal sciences, like mathematics and logic, that we can have absolute agreements and contradictions. When we are dealing with concrete things and their relations to each other we are never in possession of anything more than partial truths. We have not fathomed, and cannot fathom, all the possibilities of anything. It is, therefore, continually happening to us that the discovery of new relations changes for us the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, and the harmonious into the discordant. By the same means, also, our discords are transformed into harmonies, order is substituted for confusion, and agreements appear in the place of contradictions.

We can never say that one concrete fact of experience necessarily excludes another. For although we cannot harmonize them, it is always possible that new facts coming in between these two which are contrasted may show that what *appear* to be contradictory phenomena are in truth the complementary parts or functions of a many-sided reality, not fully known to us. As Lotze very truly says: "The word *thing* indicates, so far as known to us, nothing other than the performances which we expect from what we call things as evidence of their reality."¹ But the performances of things are as manifold and as varied as their relations. Hence

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. ii. p. 579.

we may confidently affirm that the *thing* of our imaginations is never the absolutely real thing, though *some* of the relations which it sustains to us and to other things are truly known and stand as realities.

So also when we come to classify these relations, linking them together in orderly combinations which we call laws, the result, no matter how broad in extent, cannot be an exhaustive statement of reality, but only of certain aspects of it reduced to order. As Judge Stallo puts it: "A particular operation of thought never involves the entire complement of the known or knowable properties of a given *object*, but only such of them as belong to a definite class of relations. In mechanics, for instance, a body is considered simply as a mass of determinate weight and volume (and in some cases figure), without reference to its other physical or chemical properties. In like manner each of the other departments of knowledge effects a classification of objects upon its own peculiar principles, thereby giving rise to different series of concepts in which each concept represents that attribute or group of attributes — that aspect of the object — which it is necessary, in view of the question in hand, to bring into view."¹

From these considerations, Stallo argues, it is apparent that each of our concepts of a given object is a term or link in a special series or chain of abstractions; and further, that these chains or series, which are innumerable, not only vary in kind, but are also divergent in direction, so that the scope and the import of any particular concept must always be dependent on the number and the nature of the relations with reference to which the classification of objects has been effected. From this, also, it is clear that all our thoughts of things are fragmentary and symbolical representations of realities whose thorough comprehension, in any single mental act or series of acts, is impossible.

These are general truths; but the application of them to our problem is not difficult. We have two controversies with physical realism. First, on account of the assumption that the mechanical realities of the world are the contradiction of its spiritual realities; and, second, on account of the claim that one of these realities as genuine is able to suppress the other as spurious. The above general truths show us that both of these assumptions are errors, and that they have their root in one and the same misconception; that is, the false idea that the human mind occupies such a central position with regard to the known elements of

¹ *Concepts of Modern Physics*, p. 134.

the universe that it is possible for it to gather them up in a single series, or, in other words, organize them into one harmonious and logical whole.

It is not difficult to see that the group of relations which yields the mechanical conception radiates from an entirely different centre from that which gives us the conception of the power of the human spirit to modify the mechanical order. The former regards things in their relation to an abstract principle which we call force. The latter regards things in their relation to an abstract principle which we call spirit. They cannot agree with each other, they cannot contradict each other. One cannot be the proof of the other, but no more can it be its disproof. They are on different planes; and how many or how deep may be the strata of reality lying between these two we cannot guess. The unmistakable and all-important fact is that they coexist in experience. And the circumstance that they cannot be brought into one, that we cannot understand how they are complementary, that they even *appear* to be contradictory, is not a matter for wonder to us. It is just what we ought to expect.

It is what we ought to expect in view of that conception, accepted equally by theology and science, that the universe is an organic whole, dependent upon a central controlling principle or being. If it is assumed that, as viewed from this central position, the cosmos presents the appearance of absolute order and perfect harmony, it follows, necessarily, that when viewed from an extremely one-sided position, treated as the centre, — a position like that occupied by the latest product of evolution, man, — the appearance of things must be the reverse of harmonious.

But, it may be objected, this proves, or rather assumes, too much. If we are so far removed, by reason of our position, from the possibility of grasping the harmony of the universe, how is it that we have been able to reduce so large a number of its elements to harmony? Instead of finding *two* great divisions of thought opposed to each other, we ought to detect innumerable discrepancies and impossibilities. This certainly seems a reasonable consideration, but it does not weaken our position. Our answer to it is, that what we *ought* to find is just what we do find. Our experience, and even our science, is full of just such contrarities as that which makes mental causation appear to be the antithesis of physical causation; and our basis for reality is not, in truth, twofold, but manifold.

In any comprehensive structure of thought which we build for

ourselves, we have to arch over not one space, but many spaces, whose depth we cannot fathom. How can motion be transferred from one body to another? How can any one atom of matter act upon any other? These questions are equally unanswerable with that which asks how mind can act upon matter. When we ignore these questions, taking the facts which they challenge for granted, this is not because everybody understands all about them, or because they are too simple to require an explanation,—but because physical science cannot touch them; they are not in its plane of operations. And if it seems to us that science has made the problem any more intelligible by such a phrase as the “homogeneity of matter,” we are simply deceiving ourselves with words. We mistake a mere statement for an explanation.

As Lotze remarks: “Though it needs but little study of physical science to teach us that all forms of action and reaction between substance and substance are equally obscure, it has yet become a habit, hardly to be overcome, to look upon the mutual influence of body and soul as a particular and exceptional case, in which unfortunately, and contrary to our expectations, that *will* not become clear which in every example of merely physical action is perfectly intelligible.”¹

But what shall we say of those great generalizations of science that disclose the universality of certain principles? Does not the verification of a law like that of the attraction of gravitation, or that of the persistence of force, prove that we *are* capable of reaching the ultimate truth of the relations of things? Does not every such law of universal application bring us nearer to the goal of a perfectly harmonized conception of the cosmos? On the contrary, the addition of each generalization increases the number of connected views of the universe that hold together when considered each by itself; but which, as related to one another, refuse to be reconciled.

As we have already seen, each one of these is a series of abstractions that regards only certain peculiar characteristics in the objects with which it deals. The farther we push any series of abstractions, therefore, the more isolated is the result reached,—isolated both as regards all forms of concrete reality, and also as regards other extreme generalizations. The series of relations which it reduces to a law may be coextensive with the universe; but the very fact that it is the outcome of the last results of abstraction shuts this particular series up to itself.

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. i. p. 278.

This may seem to the reader to be a harmless assault of purely metaphysical reasoning upon the firmly-compacted, deeply-laid foundations of physical science. We have heard so much about the exactness of modern science, about its carefulness to criticise and prove every step, and we have been told so many times that it is a perfectly consistent and harmonious whole, that an attempt to prove by abstract reasoning that it *ought* to be disjointed and self-contradictory may seem worthy of a smile rather than serious attention. But here, as once before, our answer is that just what *ought* to be, for the justification of our reasoning, *is*. Modern science is *not* a consistent whole. It is self-contradictory at its foundations. Each series of abstractions which gives rise to what we call a law of nature, though it may be a wonder of precision in itself, is hopelessly in conflict with other generalizations of science that seem to be equally well-grounded.

This has been set forth with startling clearness in the volume¹ from which I have already quoted; and though it is impossible, in short compass, to produce the impression that results from a careful study of it, I will, for the sake of illustration, try to set before the reader some of the conflicts of thought which it exposes to view.

Fundamental to the mechanical theory of the universe is the assumption that the ultimate atoms of mass are *equal* and *perfectly homogeneous*. This is a corollary from the proposition that all the diversities in nature are caused by motion. But over against this most essential part of the mechanical theory we have to place a fundamental law of chemistry, — the so-called law of Avogadro, or Ampère, which, we are told by Professor Cooke, “now holds the same place in chemistry that the law of gravitation does in astronomy.” It is as follows: *Equal volumes of all substances, when in the state of gas, and under like conditions, contain the same number of molecules.*²

It follows from this that the weights of the molecules must be in proportion to the specific gravities of the gases. But the specific gravities of the gases are different. Having, therefore, different weights to apportion among the same number of molecules in different gases, we are forced to the conclusion that the molecules of one gas weigh more than those of another. As thus stated, it might appear that this difference is true only of compound chemical molecules. But as some substances are monatomic, and

¹ *Concepts of Modern Science*, by J. B. Stallo.

² *The New Chemistry*, by Professor J. P. Cooke, p. 13. 1888.

some others have molecules consisting of the same number of atoms, it follows that the *ultimate atoms* themselves are of different weights. Here, then, we have a contradiction surely not less startling than that which makes the doctrine of the persistence of force the contradiction of the belief in mental causation. But this does not stand alone.

A second fundamental assumption of the mechanical theory is that *the elementary units of mass are absolutely hard and inelastic*. This is at the same time a necessary postulate of the atomo-mechanical theory, and a necessary antithesis of the doctrine of the conservation of energy or persistence of force. Elasticity cannot be a characteristic of simple atoms, because all elasticity involves motion of parts. The concept elastic atom is, Professor Witwer affirms, "a contradiction in terms." But, on the other hand, Sir William Thomson says we are forbidden, by the modern theory of the conservation of energy, to assume inelasticity, or anything short of perfect elasticity, of the ultimate molecules, whether of ultra-mundane or mundane matter."

The necessity here referred to is imposed upon science by what is known as the *kinetic theory of gases*. In the light of this theory a gaseous body is a swarm of innumerable solid particles incessantly moving about with different velocities in rectilinear paths of all conceivable directions, the velocities and directions being changed by mutual encounters at intervals, which are short in comparison with ordinary standards of duration, but indefinitely long as compared with the duration of the encounters. Now, if these particles were wholly inelastic, or imperfectly elastic, the motion must soon come to an end.

Stallo draws attention to the fact that distinguished advocates of the kinetic hypothesis have taxed their ingenuity in the search of methods for the extrication of the mechanical theory from the dilemma in which it is thus involved. But, after passing in review the most notable efforts made in this direction, he reaches the following conclusion: "The difficulty, then, appears to be inherent and insoluble. There is no method known to physical science which enables it to renounce the assumption of the perfect elasticity of the particles whereof ponderable bodies and their hypothetical imponderable envelopes are said to be composed, however clearly this assumption conflicts with one of the essential requirements of the mechanical theory."¹

Again, according to the mechanical theory, motion, like mass,

¹ Page 51.

is indestructible and unchangeable; it cannot vanish and reappear. There is, therefore, no such thing as potential energy. All energy is, in reality, kinetic. But, as in the former case, "modern science peremptorily refuses its assent. It asserts that all, or nearly all, physical changes in the universe are mutual conversions of kinetic and potential energies; that energy is incessantly stored as virtual power and restored as actual motion." To make this clear, our author briefly reviews the history of the doctrine of the persistence of force, and shows that it has been, in effect, a progressive abandonment of the proposition that *all potential energy is, in reality, kinetic*.

These examples are, perhaps, enough to illustrate our point. But I will adduce one other, which may prove the most impressive of all, because of our familiarity with the law involved. There can hardly be any question as to the preëminence, among scientific discoveries, of that one of Sir Isaac Newton generally called *the law of the attraction of gravitation*. In one view this law may be said to be the central principle of modern science. Chemistry, as a science of weights, is built upon it as really as astronomy and physics. What, then, shall we make of the fact that it is, in another aspect, the absolute contradiction of the fundamental postulates of scientific thought? — that it refuses all classification with other known physical forces as absolutely as the concept spirit?

A postulate of the mechanical theory universally accepted by physicists has been that all physical action is by *impact*. The elementary units of mass are absolutely inert, therefore a mass can have motion induced in it only by contact with another mass. In short, there are in nature no pulls but only thrusts. All force is not merely *vis impressa*, but *vis a tergo*. There cannot be any such thing, therefore, as action at a distance. The reason for this is set forth substantially as follows by Professor Challis. There is no other kind of force than pressure by contact of one body with another. This hypothesis is made on the principle of admitting no fundamental ideas that are not referable to sensation and experience. It is true that we see bodies obeying the influence of an external force, as when a body descends toward the earth by the action of gravity; so far as the sense of sight informs us we do not in such cases perceive either the contact or the presence of another body. But we have also the sense of touch or of pressure by contact, for instance, of the hand with another body; and we feel in ourselves the power of causing motion by such pressure.

The consciousness of this power and the sense of touch give a distinct idea, such as all the world understands and acts upon, as to how a body may be moved. And the rule of philosophy which makes personal sensation and experience the basis of scientific knowledge, as they are the basis of the knowledge that regulates the common transactions of life, forbids recognizing any other mode than this. When, therefore, a body is caused to move without apparent contact and pressure of another body, it must still be concluded that the pressing body, although invisible, exists; unless we are prepared to admit that there are physical operations which are and ever will be incomprehensible to us."¹

This aspect of the law of gravitation attracted great attention when it was first formulated, and called out the severest criticisms and opposition from Newton's contemporaries. "It is interesting," Stallo remarks, "to note the energy with which the philosophers and mathematicians of his day protested against the assumption of physical action at a distance. Huygens did not hesitate to say that 'Newton's principle of attraction appeared to him absurd.' Leibnitz called it 'an incorporeal and inexplicable power.' John Bernoulli denounced the two suppositions of an attractive faculty and a perfect void as revolting to minds accustomed to receiving no principles in physics save those which are incontestable and evident." Among later physicists, Euler observed that the action of gravity must be due either to the intervention of a spirit or to that of some subtle material medium escaping the perception of our senses; and his rival, D'Alembert, classified gravity as one of the causes productive of motion, whose real nature is to us entirely unknown, in contradistinction to action by impact, of which we have a clear mechanical conception.

This contrariety between the doctrine of gravitation and the accepted principles of physics was as clearly seen by Newton as by any of his critics; and he repeatedly and emphatically disowned the implications which his formula seemed to involve. He carefully explained that the force which urges bodies in their central approach was to him a purely mathematical concept, involving no consideration of real and primary physical causes. "It is inconceivable," he says, "that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter, without mutual contact. . . . That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a

¹ *Concepts of Modern Physics*, p. 56.

vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and through which their action may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man, who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of my readers."¹ In another connection he says: "The reason of these properties of gravity I have not as yet been able to deduce; and I frame no hypotheses."

Have later physicists made any advance upon this position? In one sense they have, for they have made *many* hypotheses. In some of these gravitation is referred to the wave motion of an elastic interstellar and interatomic fluid similar to, or identical with, the luminiferous æther; but the criticism of Arago is considered fatal to these. It is briefly summed up as follows: "If attraction is the result of the impulsion of a fluid, its action must employ a finite time in traversing the immense spaces which separate the celestial bodies." This is fatal, because it is demonstrable that the action of gravity is instantaneous. There have been also impact theories. But the only one of these seriously discussed by modern physicists and astronomers, that of Le Sage, has been conclusively set aside by the criticism of Clerk Maxwell.

We are brought, then, to this: the broadest and most fruitful generalization of scientific thought, the fundamental law of cosmical significance, has to be stated in language which involves the contradiction of the mechanical theory. "Every particle of matter in the universe," it says, "*attracts* every other particle with a force directly proportioned to the mass of the attracting particle, and inversely to the square of the distance between them." Without this idea of *attraction*,—this conception of one body acting upon another at a distance, the above law could never have been discovered by Newton. It never could have been imagined by any one. When we state it, when we think it, we are just as much in conflict with the mechanical conception of things as when we think of ourselves as free agents; and when philosophy builds upon this latter conception as a reality it has the indorsement of reason no less than science has it when building on the law of the attraction of gravitation. In other words, the idea of mental causation as related to the idea of mechanical causation, presents no *exceptional* difficulties.

¹ *Concepts of Modern Physics*, p. 54.

The emphasis that has been laid upon the conflict of these two ideas belongs, then, not to this age but to one of narrower outlooks. It had its rise in the infancy of science, when the two great generalizations, of which mind and mechanism are the expression, faced each other in solitary grandeur. But the progress of science has broken up this duality. For, instead of throwing the whole weight of its authority on the mechanical side, as physical realism assumes, it has in reality brought to light the manifold antagonisms that hitherto unperceived lurked within the concept mechanism. Each great generalization, as it has taken definite form, has declared itself as a more or less independent aspect of the reality of things. It has contributed one more evidence to support the view that the study of the external world tends not to the unification of our knowledge, but to the enlargement of its area, and to the multiplication of the points of view from which its reality must be contemplated.

In the words of one who, both from the side of science and of philosophy, has made a profound study of this problem: "By nothing but by a fatal confidence in its own infallibility can science be led so far astray as to attach its knowledge of complex series of phenomena by preference to the fewest possible axioms, or to the slender thread of a single principle, which causes the whole to fall if it gives way. Its labor will be more wisely directed if, instead of raising its structure on the sharp edge of a single fundamental view, and performing the marvelous feat of achieving the greatest possible instability by the most recondite means, it looks out for the broadest basis on which to build; and, starting modestly, traces the given facts to the proximate grounds of explanation required by their distinctly recognized peculiarities." ¹

As to the *rationality*, then, of holding beliefs with regard to the world that are apparently destructive of each other, we reach a conclusion that may be summarized as follows: Since we are unable to penetrate to the essential reality of the world by analyzing its parts, and since, as a *whole* of vast complexity, it far transcends the range of our comprehension, therefore, it is reasonable to reject any system which professes to deduce all our knowledge from a single scientific principle. It is reasonable to say of such a system that its very completeness and exclusiveness is its own condemnation. And, on the other hand, it is reasonable to believe that we make our nearest approach to reality when we

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. i. p. 271.

entertain as real a plurality of principles, or aspects of the world, which we are not able *directly* to combine into an harmonious whole.

The bearing of this conclusion upon the question of our higher beliefs will be discussed in the next article.

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EDITORIAL.

ARE OUR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES IN DANGER OF OVERTRAINING?

In a recent public discussion of the question, How can we increase the number and improve the quality of the ministry? one speaker suggested the possible need of returning to the more private ways of training men for the ministry, because of the overloading of seminary courses of study. The speaker did not positively advocate this reversion of method, though he expressed his sense of gratitude that he had acquired his own theological education before the new departments of theological learning had been introduced, but he intimated that the thought of such a change was in the minds of not a few laymen and ministers. He also instanced the case of a college student who had come to him for advice, asking whether it was not better for him, in view of the amount of study called for or offered in the curriculum of a theological seminary, to study for the ministry privately with some successful preacher and pastor.

The charge of a tendency to scholasticism is a very old and a very common charge against theological seminaries. But the new form in which it is preferred may be worth considering. The present charge is that our seminaries are so widening their courses of study that they confuse and burden the minds of students, and especially that they prevent that singleness of purpose which ought to characterize the preacher of the gospel, and which may be expected to be fostered by study in connection with the active work of the pastorate.

In considering this charge we have no desire to defend mere institutionalism as it may find expression in theological seminaries. Much less would we detract from the merits of exceptional men in the ministry, whose power and method is personal. We wish that there were more of them. Religious genius, like every other form of genius, is a law unto itself. "Genius," John Foster says, "lights its own fires." There is nothing to be said about the man who has little or no need of borrowing light or heat. But it is quite absurd to apply the methods of the exceptional man to the average man. Exceptional men in the ministry seldom repeat their power in their disciples. They are not good teachers and trainers. And it is doubtless in the consciousness of this deficiency that when such men wish to work out in others their more personal ideas and plans they almost invariably resort to institutional methods, as was notably the case with Mr. Spurgeon, and now with Mr. Moody.

Are our theological seminaries in danger of overtraining for the ministry? The question is partly a question of fact and partly of judgment.

It would be of interest, did our space allow, to show in detail the scope of a theological education which the founders of the older theo-

logical seminaries had in view. A comparison of their views with present attainments would determine whether we are advancing beyond the outlines thus traced. We can only say on this point that, taking Andover Theological Seminary, founded in 1808, as an example, we are astonished at the extent and thoroughness of the education then proposed. We doubt if the present curriculum of the seminary fully satisfies in these respects the intention of the founders. As they modestly stated their purpose, they hoped to make "some provision for increasing the number of learned and able Defenders of the Gospel of Christ, as well as of orthodox, pious, and zealous Ministers of the New Testament." Samuel Abbot, in establishing the chair of Christian Theology, made provision for the more advanced work of special students in critical study, introducing his bequest in these words: "Whereas, the cause of Christ may be essentially promoted by encouraging a few young men eminently distinguished for their talents, industry, and piety, to continue their theological studies and literary researches at an institution, where, with the assistance of able professors, they may enjoy the singular advantage of exploring a public library abounding in books on general science, and richly endowed with rare and costly writings in various languages on subjects highly interesting to the cause of sacred truth, my will further is," etc. This was in 1808. Evidently the men of that generation were determined to provide for themselves, and for those who should come after them, an educated ministry.

But education, we are to remember, is a relative term. An educated ministry is such, according to its relation to the general culture of its time. Certainly it can at no time fall below the general intellectual standards. An educated minister speaks with the authority of one who has gained a wide and sure knowledge: otherwise he has no advantage over his uneducated brother who has equal faith and consecration. The end of preaching is not intellectual satisfaction, but rather spiritual nourishment. But intellectual satisfaction is one part of spiritual nourishment. The preacher cannot afford to ignore the intellect in any congregation, while in some he must beware of offending it. We suspect that the peculiar danger of a half-educated ministry is that of intellectual offense, through the attempted discussion of subjects about which the preacher has really nothing to say, or through superficial references to subjects which betray his ignorance. Certainly the greatest offenders in the matter of unspiritual preaching are those who continually introduce into their pulpits, in the way of polemic, or even tirade, subjects of current intellectual concern, like the authorship of the Pentateuch, or Evolution, or Socialism. Of course sermons from this class of preachers only make it more difficult for well-informed persons to believe. They are aids to doubt, not to faith. It requires a great deal of knowledge for a religious teacher to know what not to say, — in other words, for him to know how to attend to his own business.

In this country, owing to its peculiar educational necessities, the intellectual obligations resting upon the ministry are very great. Most of the colleges and universities of the East, all of the colleges of the West, and a considerable number of its universities, are under the management of ministers. The higher teaching is becoming more and more a distinct profession, for which the ministry is becoming less and less qualified, but for one or two generations to come we may expect that the ministry will have a controlling influence in academical and collegiate education taking the country as a whole. In the training provided for the ministry this fact cannot be lost sight of. In the natural course of events a considerable number of the graduates of our seminaries will be called to collegiate work. It would be unseemly if few of them were qualified to enter upon it.

But the question chiefly concerns the practical and spiritual power of the ministry. Does the present method make good preachers and pastors? Here the contrast is drawn, by those who bring the charge of overtraining, between the English and American method. The representatives in this country of the English method are said to be more simple, more Biblical, more direct and fervid. The number of foreign preachers in the country is altogether too small for the purposes of comparison. A half dozen men drawn to leading pulpits decide nothing. According to our observation foreign preachers are interesting and effective according to their personal power. We have listened to some exceedingly uninteresting and ineffective sermons of their general method where personal power was wanting. Biblical preaching, so-called, depends like any form of Christian preaching upon the preacher's apprehension of truth and upon his sympathy with men. If there were a thousand preachers in this country trained in the English theological schools the comparison of method would be worth something. The comparison in respect to method, drawn from the success of a very few men of personal effectiveness, is worthless.

We are practically shut up in our judgment about the expediency of enlarging the range of theological education to the study of the effect of such enlargement upon the character and work of the ministry. And judging by this test we have no hesitation in saying that we believe in the moral and material effect of the wider and more thorough system. We believe in its effect upon personal character. Suppose that the college student, to whom we referred at the outset, should take the more private course of preparation for the ministry about which he made inquiry; it is evident that he would lose not a little of the moral discipline which comes from facing for one's self the questions and the problems which belong to the common thought of his time. He would be conscious of having evaded something. There is always a private, easy, irresponsible way of getting into the world, but he who takes that way does not become the master of men; he is never the master of himself.

Something is always lacking in the power of sheltered faith as of sheltered virtue. The great personal qualities, which in the long result are influential, are humility of mind, seriousness of conviction, and charity, and these qualities are developed under full exposure to the truth, and through contact with other minds in their search after the truth.

Opinions will vary as to the precise quantity and nature of the equipment for the ministry. What is a sufficient outfit for one person may be quite insufficient for another. It must be remembered that theological seminaries cover a great variety of capacity, and of mental and spiritual aptitude, as well as of practical purpose. We do not see how the courses of study could be reduced with justice to all, though we can see how the general course might be made more elastic. And it must also be considered that while the chief work of a seminary is positive and constructive, the actual furnishing of material and method, there is a subsidiary work which is critical and apologetic. Would any one really wish our seminaries to abandon this subsidiary work, to ignore the questions of Biblical and historical criticism, to put by philosophical inquiry, to refuse all attempts to adjust the church in its working ideas to the current life of the world? Let this be done, and it would be quickly seen how much this related work enters into the real equipment for the ministry.

The student who graduates from a seminary ignorant of what the Bible is, as well as of what it teaches, or of what the church is in its relation to *society* as well as in its duty to the individual, will find himself wanting in a most necessary preparation for his work.

We lament with our brethren, who question the present methods of ministerial training, any failure in the ministry to accomplish the full task set before it, and so far as we are concerned with the course of preparation we welcome all well considered advice, but we fail to see the remedy for any present insufficiency of result in the reversion to narrower methods, or in the reduction of the standards of a theological education.

MISSIONARY SELF-DEVOTION.

Is the Martyr Age of missions now past, and is it to be succeeded by the age of Stipendiary Missions, in which the work of preaching the gospel abroad shall be regulated as a business enterprise, evolving itself by almost mechanical methods?

Some are inclined to think that the rapid development of great civic interests, of a much deeper reach than those which were once involved, of questions affecting the inmost relations of society, is likely to draft off into civil life the strongest minds and the most heroic characters. And indeed Christendom is evidently on the dividing way of a Hercules' Choice. It will not long be allowed to remain on the narrowing ledge of semi-christianized relations which at present serves it for a resting-place, discouraging violence but allowing an urgency of private interest which

is to violence what oxidation is to combustion, corroding as effectively, without the grandeur of a flagrant destruction. It must either ascend the Christian heights whose pure air, exalting individuality, refines away from it all the grossness of greed, or else plunge into that abyss, in which the community of free brotherhood finds its infernal counterpart in the forced community of godless and all-coercing selfishness. As Dr. Roswell D. Hitchcock has said, the application of the Epistle of James, in the region of social economy, is that which alone can save our civilization, and it is that which alone can save the present fabric of our Christianity. It will, therefore, and it should, in the next generation, draw to itself much of the finest and noblest material of Christian manhood.

Nevertheless, the endeavor to realize, in every direction and in every sense, the kingdom of God at home ought not to throw into the shadow, but ought rather to evoke into wider consciousness, the endeavor to realize the kingdom of God throughout the world. The oneness of mankind, towards which all things are now working, receives its purest expression, its highest significance and the most powerful motive for its realization, in the work of the Christian missionary. We do not believe that the high wisdom which, three centuries ago, when Christendom was reeling and plunging in the shock of intestine convulsion, suffered such a spirit as Francis Xavier to wander off to India, and China, and Japan, in order to become ever since, to all the branches of our divided Christianity, a perpetual reinforcement of spiritual strength, we do not believe that this high wisdom will be withheld from the various branches of the Church of to-day.

Certainly we see thus far no lack of heroic men and heroic women among Christian missionaries. Williams, and Patteson, and Hannington, and Damien, are only shining examples, which the providence of Christ has of late singled out, for more concentrated effect, of "the virgin heart of obedience," which is realized in many a hundred of the servants and the handmaids of God dispersed through all the world.

It is a good thing that the light of searching criticism, sometimes unkind enough, should be cast on every corner of every enterprise the world over. Genuineness will come out like gold; and pretense will be sloughed off. And it is as unwholesome to have it imagined that every missionary is *virtute officii*, holy and unworldly and self-devoted, as to have it imagined that every monk or friar is such. Besides factiousness and fractionness, and imperiousness, and obstinate perseverance in methods barren of results, which have often been exemplified in the noblest men, the damning fault of worldly selfishness is by no means impossible. The scope of the missionary work is sublime. But of course it is not expected that every man who stands within that scope is to be sublime. In missions, as everywhere else, sincerity, sound judgment, and faithfulness, form the stock of the work. The most permanently effective missionaries, whatever sublimity of qualities may have now and then flashed out in them,

have appeared, during most of their lives, simply as faithful toilers in a most honorable, but altogether human vocation. The work of a pastor at home, so much richer in appliances, and wrought among so much more highly developed consciences and intellects, will often have a far more distinctly ideal aspect than the work of a missionary, toiling in weariness to stimulate the first instincts of regenerate life. But in reading the unpretending reports of many German and Scandinavian and Finnish missionaries, who are usually of a less highly educated class than ours, we have often been struck with their self-devotion, of which they seemed unconscious, in a monotonous and outwardly most ungrateful work. They seem also to have an instinct of finding out fields of labor, in Africa or New Guinea, from which they may be expected to be soon forced away by broken health, or soon to sink under it, yet with no more thought of making a merit of this than any other soldiers. In our British race, assuredly, there is no less of this; and the higher accomplishments, or more eminent families, of many of our missionaries, often give it more illustration, though certainly not more reality. But read the accounts of our French Protestant brethren on the Zambesi. Equal grace in a Saxon, without the unconquerable gayety of a French temperament, could hardly support him through plagues whose form varies a little, but the amount of whose privation and monotonous misery never varies, unless it be to increase. They remind us of their great countrywoman, the *Mère Angélique*, in her insect-haunted chamber, as she prosecuted her work of reforming the rebellious cloistresses of Maubuisson. To contend with the vices of an African king is less picturesque, but not less heroic, than to grapple with the vices of a bold bad abbess, who torments her godly friend with the help of the choicest chivalry of France. There is one spirit of self-devotion, in all lands, and in all forms of work in every land, the deeper results and apprehension of which will serve to divest the missionary work of its singularity, and to take from it the crown of imaginary exemption from human stains and frailties, but which will both deepen and widen its efficiency.

We have been glad to note, in recent discussions of the German Parliament, that its members, most of whom have been wont to regard foreign missions with much contempt, give token that this tone of feeling is greatly changing. From all sides of the Chamber, and perhaps most emphatically of all from the Social Democrats, hostile to Christianity as they are, are heard ungrudging acknowledgments of "the ideal motives and aims" of the missionaries, of the testimony rendered by their labors "to what love and patience can effect among all races of men." The imperial senators, absorbed as they are in the novel greatness of reconstituted Germany, do not imagine that it is a loss of force for Germany to send out her children to make known the gospel of God to the ends of the earth. On the contrary, they are emulously endeavoring to secure for the behoof of their own schemes of colonial empire the help of men who,

staying at home, would have been viewed by them simply as so much possible food for powder.

Considering the dazzling recency of German greatness, and the vistas of struggle opening before it and within it, certainly inferior in momentousness to none in the world, we might think that here, at least, missionary interests would be content to suffer a temporary depression of their proper force, and to become ancillary to schemes of secular aggrandizement. But we are glad to notice that the heroism and the heroes of the kingdom of God are resolute to maintain the distinctiveness of their own ends, and to stand, with prophetic dignity, against even the designs and apparent interests of their own beloved and honored fatherland, whenever these cross the essential rights of the humblest races, or the way of the Prince of Peace.

One thing is reasonably certain : men like Canon Taylor, whose natural appetency for misstatement seems to be as irresistible by himself as that of a stone for the earth, will not be apt to move the quiet toilers for the kingdom of God to follow his recommendations, and to hope for the accomplishment of great things by attitudinizing antics, and artificial austerities. The Jesuits have, once for all, shown us a better way. Francis Xavier was willing to wear what was put upon him, whether it was the dirty frock of a bonze, or the gold and velvet of a grandee ; and to eat what was set before him, as the Saviour bids, whether it was a little rice, supplied out of a wooden bowl, or the sumptuous fare of a viceroy's table. In the steadfastness of his aim, and the blessedness of his faith, he had no time for posturing. The lofty austerity of Adoniram Judson's life resulted from no thought of filling out any such fantastic programme as Canon Taylor propounds, but from the intensity of his purpose. The same is seen in William Burns, in Carey, in more men and more women than any one can number up except the Captain of their salvation.

We ought not to contrast Stipendiary Missions with Martyr Missions. Peter, for himself and his family, received a stipend from the church. Paul chose rather, from special regards, to toil with his hands or to depend on precarious gifts of favorite congregations. But both fared scantily in life, and each followed his Lord in a martyr's death. "Snug gentility" is a British varnish which it is to be hoped will soon be rubbed off from the missionary work where this conceals the noble grain that is so often found beneath. And no one can disguise from himself that there is coming to be a restlessness, at home and abroad, over our inadequate, conventional, and too straitening methods. But this hardly augurs a decline of missionary heroism. It seems rather to argue a brooding sense of vaster opportunities, of more peremptory calls, and of a new venturousness of faith.

THE DECLINE OF ACADEMICAL ORATORY.

By academical oratory we mean the orations which used to be pronounced by eminent men during the week of college commencement. It was until recently the almost universal practice to provide learned orations under the auspices of the literary and philosophical societies of the colleges. These addresses were the principal feature of the public exercises, and there was little difficulty in securing the services of men distinguished in literature, philosophy, science, and statesmanship to present with the elaboration of precise statement, and with the advantage of rhetorical elegance, the results of those investigations by which their reputation had been gained. The oration before the Phi Beta Kappa or the Philomathean or the Athenian Society was the event of the week. But in nearly all of the larger colleges this custom is now much impaired, and even where an orator is still invited, his address, with rare exceptions, takes a place of secondary interest as compared with the other events of the week.

The decline of academical oratory is accepted by some as a sign of the times. It is thought to indicate a failing appetite for public speech. It is believed to prove that the days of sustained and stately eloquence are passing away. Before such a conclusion is accepted, however, it should be observed that there are certain reasons quite independent of the changing tastes of the community at large which partly account for declining interest in academical oratory.

One reason is that there are now other places better adapted than the college platform to the consideration of those subjects which are of large importance in the progress of knowledge and of public affairs. The formation of societies having for their exclusive object the promotion of learning in science, language, economics, archæology, and other branches of knowledge has provided a better means for discussing and disseminating the results of investigation. All that is technical is presented at the meetings of these societies or in their publications, and much that is of general interest is brought out in the same way. This method is more satisfactory to specialists than the limitations of a public address in the midst of an academical anniversary. Even literary topics require greater advantage of presentation than is afforded by the college platform. Nothing short of a course of lectures satisfies the critic or the student. There is appetite enough for prolonged courses, as the ready sale of tickets season after season testifies. The transition from a single oration in the middle of July to a dozen lectures in midwinter indicates greater thoroughness of treatment in respect to scientific, philological, and literary subjects. It came about thus that scarcely anything was left for commencement but politics. During and after the war the college platform was eloquent and influential in impressing the duty of the scholar in politics, and the many claims of patriotism, on educated men. The academic oration held its place as long as it did because the peril and

need of the country made commencement a real opportunity to kindle the ardor of young scholars. The survival of the political address is found now in occasional addresses on political economy and socialism. In general, however, the interests which formerly centered in the college anniversary have been distributed to other points where they are still promoted by public speech as well as by the printed page. As the occasion became inadequate the oration became inappropriate, and therefore unreal. The real discussion of the same themes, having been transferred to a more ample arena, the academic oration lingers merely as the survival of a vanishing custom.

Another reason for the decline of academical oratory is the enlargement of certain uses to which the opportunity of the anniversary is most congenial. These uses are two, the religious and the social. There is no lack of reality in the attitude of educated youth to religion. The last Sunday of the collegiate year is a fitting occasion to address the students on the great themes of religion. The baccalaureate sermon has never before held so important a place as now. The president or one of the professors discourses earnestly on the debt of learning to Christianity, on the superiority of character to mere knowledge, on the service which educated men of Christian spirit can render to society. There is that fitness of theme and of persons to occasion which creates reality. It is a signal opportunity for the preacher to speak his most impressive word for religion and for consecration. For similar reasons, a sermon during the same day before the religious society of the college holds its place and has its justification. Eminent preachers still appear, and will continue to appear at the public meeting of the Society of Inquiry or of the Christian Association, although the same men can with difficulty, if at all, be induced to deliver a literary or philosophical oration later in the week. Also, social entertainments and reunions are claiming a good share of the time, — a highly satisfactory evolution of the college anniversary. Returning graduates get more good from meeting socially by classes at a dinner than from enduring the heat and burden of a set oration. Undergraduates entertaining friends of both sexes at lawn parties and spreads strengthen their own interest in the college, and unite it at the same time with the other interests of life. The most real occasion, after the religious, is the Alumni dinner, in which the exercises culminate. Dining together emphasizes the social relation of those who honor the same *Alma Mater*, and the speeches usually have that spontaneity, directness, and humor which belong to reality. The best things are said at the dinner, having the advantage of appropriate setting and natural occasion.

It cannot justly be argued, therefore, from the disappearance of formal orations at the commencement season, that the appetite for oratory and the influence of it have abated. There is still much effective speech even at those anniversaries, and the oration has merely sought a broader platform.

Similar changes in other associations of men indicate a similar evolution. Conferences of churches for general discussion are kept alive with no little difficulty. Committees are perplexed to find subjects for debate which will awaken interest. But the deliberative assemblies of the church, such as councils which have a definite task, and the annual meetings of missionary societies which have a tangible object, are alive with interest, and often furnish a platform to real eloquence. A difference of religious opinion kindles fervid oratory.

It is quite apparent that the uneducated mind is keenly responsive to public address. The influence gained by leaders of workingmen's societies is partly secured through pamphlets and newspapers, but chiefly through speeches at crowded meetings.

It may perhaps be a question whether the educated mind is becoming weary of public speech and less responsive to it. This question, however, cannot be decisively answered in view of the changing use of college anniversaries and the decline of academical oratory. It is undoubtedly true that there is increasing impatience of display in public address. There is a demand for directness, simplicity, and conclusive argument. This demand is banishing the formal, ornate, pretentious type of oratory. But such a change is an improvement, for it is in response to a demand for reality. Moreover, on proper occasions, rhetorical finish is appropriate, as in panegyric oration, eulogy of the illustrious dead, and in presenting some of the loftiest themes of religion.

In quiet times, when no danger threatens the nation from without, and no great moral issue stirs it from within, the oratory of patriotism and statesmanship cannot, of course, be as influential as in times of commotion. But if the occasion arises eloquence will again have a mighty sway over the minds of men.

The platform changes and the form changes, but the sensation produced by genuine oratory is not likely to be relinquished, and the power of the real orator over a public assembly is not likely to pass away.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY.

For the full outline, and for general authorities, to be used under Section I, see January number, pp. 85, 86.

SECTION I. THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF LABOR.

Topic 7. *The Political Relations of Democracy to the Laboring Classes.*

REFERENCES. — Popular Government. Maine.
Democracy in Europe. May.
The Nation. Mulford.

Democracy in America. De Tocqueville.
 Democracy and Monarchy in France. Adams.
 History of the People of the United States. McMaster.
 The American Commonwealth. Bryce.
 Democracy. James Russell Lowell.
 Constitutional History of the United States. Von Holst.
 Socialism of To-day. Laveleye.
 The Labor Movement in America.
 Progress and Poverty. Henry George.
 Wealth and Progress. Gunton.

NOTES.

I. *Conflicting theories in regard to the relation of Political Freedom to Industrial Progress.*

(1.) Social equality the natural outcome of political equality.

"When the Declaration of Independence in the United States, and the French Revolution, proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, and inscribed the equality of men among the articles of the Constitution, the principle of the brotherhood of man descended from the heights of the ideal to become thenceforth the watchword of the radical party in every country to which the ideas that triumphed in America and Paris have spread. Equality of political rights leads inevitably to the demand for equality of conditions, that is to say, the apportionment of well-being according to work accomplished. Universal suffrage demands as its complement universal well-being; for it is a paradox that the people should be at once wretched and sovereign. As Aristotle and Montesquieu so continually insist, democratic institutions presuppose equality of conditions, for otherwise the poor elector will use his vote to pass laws for the increase of his share of the good things of life at the expense of the privileged classes." — *Laveleye*, "Socialism of To-day," Introduction, p. xx.

(2.) Industrial progress is the cause, not the consequence, of political freedom.

"Whatever may be, theoretically, the form of government, the political freedom — real power and influence — of the masses is always proportionate to their industrial prosperity and progress. Thus the political influence of the masses is far greater under the present European monarchies than it was under the ancient republics. And the political influence of the masses is greatest to-day in those countries where the industrial conditions — real wages — are the highest. The laboring classes possess more political influence and freedom in England under a monarchy, with higher wages, than they do in France under a republic with lower wages; and there is still more real democracy with higher wages under a republic in America than with lower wages under a monarchy in England.

"We repeat, therefore, that the popular idea that pervades the literature and forms the basis of the statesmanship of the period, which ascribes our superior civilization to our democratic institutions, and which has just been emphasized by an international monument in New York harbor, representing liberty as enlightening the world, is *radically and fundamentally false*. It is not true that our superior civilization is due to our democratic institutions; it is not and never was true that liberty enlightens the world. On the contrary, our democratic institutions are the natural consequence of our industrial prosperity and superior civilization; and liberty, like morality, instead of enlightening the world, is the golden result of the world's being enlightened by the material and social progress of society. Were this otherwise, the industrial depressions which afflict the Old World would be unknown here. The notorious fact is that the frequency and severity of industrial depressions are

as great under the democracies of France and America as under the monarchies of England, Germany, and Belgium." — *Guntton*, "Wealth and Progress," pp. 206, 207.

II. *Contrast the relative influence of the terms Liberty and Equality in America and France.*

See De Toqueville, "Democracy in America," Book II. chap. i.

III. *The United States as the chief example of a democracy is to be studied in connection with the modifying influences which have affected the conditions of labor.*

- (1.) The valuation put upon religious and civil liberty by inheritance from England.
- (2.) The formation of so many customs and methods during the provincial period.
- (3.) The immense resources of the country for agriculture.
- (4.) The material effect of immigration.
- (5.) The industrial relation of slavery to the national life.

IV. *The sentiment of individualism in a democracy, upon which industrial tyrannies may be founded through the principle of competition, is in the United States modified by experiments in State interference.*

"The new democracies of America are just as eager for state interference as the democracy of England, and try their experiments with even more light-hearted promptitude. . . . Unrestricted competition has shown its dark side ; great corporations have been more powerful than in England, and more inclined to abuse their power. Having lived longer under a democratic government, the American masses have realized more perfectly than those of Europe that they are themselves the government. Their absolute command of its organization (except when constitutional checks are interposed) makes them turn more quickly to it for the accomplishment of this purpose. And in the state legislatures they possess bodies with which it is easy to try legislative experiments, since these bodies, though not of themselves disposed to innovation, are mainly composed of men unskilled in economics, inapt to foresee any but the nearest consequences of their measures, prone to gratify any whim of their constituents, and open to the pressure of any section whose self-interest or impatient philanthropy clamors for some departure from the general principles of legislation. Thus it has come to pass that though the Americans conceive themselves to be devoted to *laissez faire* in theory, and to be in practice the most self-reliant of peoples, they have grown no less accustomed than the English to carry the action of the state into ever widening fields." — *Bryce*, "The American Commonwealth," Part V. chap. 92, — on *Laissez Faire*.

V. *The wages of the laboring classes in the United States at the beginning of the century.*

"The hours of work were invariably from sunrise to sunset. Wages at Albany and New York were three shillings, or, as money then went, forty cents a day : at Lancaster, eight to ten dollars a month : elsewhere in Pennsylvania workmen were content with six dollars in summer and five in winter. . . . In Virginia, white men, employed by the year, were given sixteen pounds currency. Slaves, when hired, were clothed and their masters paid one pound a month. A pound, Virginia money, was in Federal money three dollars and thirty-three cents. The average rate of wages the land over was therefore sixty-five dollars a year with food and, perhaps, lodging. Out of this small sum the workman must, with his wife's help, maintain his family. Hod carriers and mortar mixers, diggers and choppers, who from 1793 to 1800

labored on the public buildings and cut the streets and avenues of Washington City, received seventy dollars a year, or if they wished sixty dollars for all the work they could perform from March first to December twentieth. (They were of course found, but not clothed.) Type setters were paid twenty-five cents a thousand ems, and even at this rate made, the publishers complained, as much as eight dollars a week. Such great wages, combined with cost of type, paper, and clerks, induced the publishers of six newspapers in the city of New York to combine and put up the price of subscription from eight to ten dollars a year." — *McMaster*, "History of the People of the United States," vol. 2, p. 617.

VI. *For the narrative of the organization of labor, the formation of trade unions, and the development of a labor literature, see "The Labor Movement in America," Chaps. III., IV., V.*

The following is the first proclamation in behalf of the general government fixing the hours of labor of its own employees, according to the ten-hour system ; —

"NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, April 10, 1840.

"By direction of the President of the United States (Martin Van Buren) all public establishments will hereafter be regulated as to working hours by the ten-hour system. The hours of labor in the yard will be as follows, viz. : From the first day of April to the thirtieth day of September inclusive, from 6 A. M. to 6 P. M. During this period the workmen will breakfast before going to work, for which purpose the bell will be rung and the first muster held at 7 A. M. At 12 o'clock, noon, the bell will be rung, and the hour from 12 to 1 allowed for dinner, from which hour to 6 P. M. will constitute the last half of the day.

"From the last day of October to the thirty-first day of March the working hours will be from the rising to the setting of the sun. The bell will be rung at one hour after sunrise, that hour being allowed for breakfast. At 12 o'clock, noon, the bell will again be rung, and one hour allowed for dinner, from which hour, say 1 o'clock till sundown will constitute the last half of the day. No quarter days will be allowed."

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

EASTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA — *continued.*

THE reports of the Universities' Mission have a good many touches of description that render the country more familiar. After the severe unity of the course of the tragic events in Uganda, a somewhat miscellaneous collection of extracts respecting these opening regions may not be unwelcome. We go back somewhat over two years, rather overlapping the former report, as no very definite sequence of events seems as yet to have established itself in this mission.

Bishop Smythies, writing from Lukoma, on Lake Nyassa, says: "On the night of Saturday the 31st, we slept in a hut on the top of the mountains, and, as I was told it was only a walk to Mbamba Bay, I thought it best to go on after our early service on the Sunday. In half an hour we had crossed the top of the range, and a wide and splendid view burst

upon us. Some 4,000 feet down, perhaps, lay the lake, stretching as far as we could see to north and south, with high mountains just visible on the opposite shore. In the foreground was a mass of varied color and beauty, rocks and foliage mingled together in all directions." Writing from Blantyre, the Church of Scotland station some distance south of the lake, of the river Shiré, the bishop says: "From Pimbi we started by moonlight, and walked for three hours, slept, and went on over the mountainous spires of Zomba on Saturday, reaching Mr. Buchanan's settlement in the afternoon. It is a beautiful place up under the mountain, rising 3,000 feet above, and very precipitous on all sides. We were received most hospitably by Mr. Buchanan and his three brothers." Mr. Buchanan appears to be a missionary planter, belonging to the Church of Scotland. The bishop describes him as having "gardens full of English vegetables, fields of corn, and coffee plantations, streams of water flowing through them in all directions." On the following Sunday, the Anglicans and the Presbyterians seem to have joined their forces. The bishop, who was accompanied by the Rev. Mr. Maples, now one of his archdeacons, says: "We had a full Sunday. First, Swahili services with our own six men; then Mr. Buchanan's Yao service, at which Maples spoke in Yao; then an English service and sermon, to which the consul came. In the afternoon Maples and I climbed Zomba and enjoyed it, but the weather was too hazy from the grass fires to see far. There were fields of wild flowers on the top of the mountain; I saw Michaelmas daisies, St. John's wort, and blackberries."

Mr. Sherriff, captain of the "Charles Janson," missionary steamer on Lake Nyassa, writing from Matope, says: "Mbamba is the funniest place I have seen, for all the people live in the rocks, like birds; some on rocks in the water. It is amusing to see them swimming ashore with one hand, holding up their cloth with the other: the cloth is what they wear; some have a goatskin. Their gardens are on level ground; they grow Indian corn and sweet potatoes and tobacco. They take their goats and oxen up in the rocks about four o'clock in the afternoon. They live like this in fear of a very large tribe that takes away their wives and cattle. The small tribes live much in fear of the large ones."

"Central Africa," the organ of the Universities' Mission, has a description of the African Lakes' Company, of which we give a part:—

"This company was constituted in 1878, not as a mere trading venture, but with the object of assisting the missions in the countries discovered by Livingstone, of developing the resources of these districts, and of introducing legitimate commerce.

"Besides a very fine new stern-wheel steamer, now on its way to the Zambezi and Shiré rivers, and calculated to meet every possible requirement of the missionary societies (ourselves included) for years to come, the company has three steamers, a staff of twenty-five Europeans, and twelve trading stations. . . . The company is also steadily endeavoring to introduce and foster the cultivation of new produce, such as sugar, coffee, indigo, cocoa (cacao), fibre plants, etc. Of coffee, it has already a flourishing plantation. Indigo is indigenous, and the company has lately imported from Calcutta the Indian variety, which gives promise of being successful. Suitable soils and localities are selected at different parts of the company's route. On Lake Nyassa it manufactures oil for its steamers and for culinary use, and proposes making soaps and candles for the large consumption by Arabs and natives there, as it would not pay to export the groundnuts from so far inland. It thus aims at the judicious development of the varied resources of the different districts. The enterprise, thus conducted, cannot fail permanently to raise the commer-

cial value of the country, while at the same time it affords regular employment to the natives, supplies their legitimate wants, and educates them to habits of steady and peaceful industry.

"The liquor traffic, which deteriorates the African even more than the European, as experience has undeniably proved, has as yet penetrated but a short distance from the coast. Not only does the company abstain from this demoralizing traffic, but it has so far entirely prevented its introduction into the Lake District.

"Difficulties, such as might have been expected in starting a new enterprise in an almost unexplored country, have been encountered, but, largely owing to the energy of the management, these have now been overcome, and traffic is carried on with great regularity in bartering calicoes and other goods for india-rubber and the native stores of ivory, large lots of which have from time to time been sent home. The total shipments of ivory have amounted to 40,815 pounds. In some measure this diminishes the traffic in slaves, for it will be remembered as a rule the Arab merchant buys a tusk, and then a slave to carry it, both being sold when the coast is reached."

The company wishes the Episcopalians to join with the Presbyterians in taking shares, as both are so hard at work on Lake Nyassa, and "Central Africa," cordially acknowledging the brotherliness of the proposal, encourages its readers to unite in the enterprise, as both Christianly beneficent and financially successful.

Archdeacon Farler, whose district is near Zanzibar, describes one of those celebrations, which combine the social and the ecclesiastical, the spiritual and the ritualistic, elements in precisely that way which is most apt to lay hold strongly and beneficently on the African temper and heart, as the present writer can testify from ten years' intimate experience: "August 23d, preparing and decorating for the Harvest Festival, St. Bartholomew's Day. The church was profusely decorated with ferns and flowers, corn and rice. The first service was a choral celebration for the Christians, they bringing their offertories of rice or corn in little baskets, which, at the time of the offertory, they poured into large baskets placed at the church-gate. Soon four or five large baskets were quite full. There were a large number of communicants, and a special prayer of thanksgiving for the harvest was said. At ten o'clock there was a second service, specially for catechumens and hearers. The church was crowded and presented a glorious sight, the nave and aisles thronged with natives. The morning offerings were piled up in two great heaps at either corner of the altar, and again the baskets were filled to overflowing with grain. Mr. Geldart preached in Bondei, and the service concluded with a *Te Deum*." After this there was an abundant feast. "About 600 people were separated into groups of chiefs, men, women, boys, girls. It was hard work, and required some generalship to keep them all supplied and satisfied, but mountains of beef, buckets of gravy, and basins of rice were quickly consumed."

Archdeacon Farler gives an interesting account of one of his mountain tours. He spent the night nearly 4,000 feet above the sea:—

"In the early morning it was very cold, with an European sharpness in the air, rare in tropical Africa. I went for a walk for myself before breakfast, but the thick mists—for we were in the clouds—made it very gloomy, yet most beautiful. The wondrous profusion of ferns growing upon the branches of the trees, the orchids and quaint mosses, had an enchanting effect. The trees were regular giants, and so thick that the sky was not visible through their tops. The foliage was strange and fantastic: huge wild mountain plantains, palms of a species never seen in the lowlands, gave the impression of

the Palm House at Kew, only on an unlimited scale. After a time the path began to descend, and took me out of the region of mists and clouds : in front, as far as the eye could reach, was a sunny champaign, full of villages. . . . In the afternoon went up to the very top of the peak; taking a rug and a book with me, and making a nest in the braken, I contemplated the glorious view before me with delight. Far below was seen our mission station, Magila, with the new church standing out a conspicuous object, and the whole country dotted with innumerable villages. The lowlands, which appear a very hilly country from below, appeared quite flat from the mountain top. There in the distance appeared the wilderness, with the rivers Luvu and Zigi flowing through it like silver threads, and in the far distance the sea, with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. I stayed there reading 'Paradise Lost' until it grew so cold that I had to beat a retreat."

A letter from the Rev. F. Flynn, Royal Navy, gives some impressions of the work of the Universities' Mission, at what may be called its base, the island of Zanzibar and its neighborhood. This rests on a background of general impressions respecting the missionary work. Mr. Flynn says :—

"During the past twelve months I have had opportunities of seeing something of mission work in the Telugu country, on the east coast of India, in Ceylon, in Rangoon, in Mauritius, on the east coast of Africa, and the island of Zanzibar. I have, at the expense of time, trouble, and money, visited mission stations in connection with the Church of England, the Wesleyan and the Baptist societies; I have also seen something of mission work as carried on by the Roman Catholic Church; I have examined carefully, so far as was possible for me, the working of most of these societies, and what I shall now tell you I can personally vouch for.

"In the first place I wish to say that, having met many missionaries in these various places I have mentioned, I have no hesitation in saying that I have not met one—not one—of whom I would dare to say that he was living a life calculated to reflect discredit either on the particular society he represented, or, which is of infinitely more importance, the cause of that Master whom he professed to serve.

"There are many things of interest that I could tell you of the work of Christian missions in Ceylon and Mauritius, but I will confine my remarks to the work of the Universities' Mission in Zanzibar and on the mainland of Africa. On the island of Zanzibar there are three mission stations in connection with this society; one in the town, on the site of the old slave market. There is here a very large and beautiful church built by the late Bishop Steere. On this spot, prior to the establishment of the treaty between the Sultan and our Queen, which was brought about by Sir Bartle Frere, slaves were publicly bought and sold every day. Now that the *public* traffic in slaves is no longer permitted in Zanzibar, this place is used for the far different purpose of proclaiming to these poor Africans the Gospel of Liberty; and noble indeed was the mind that conceived and carried into effect the idea of substituting for the horrors of the slave market the house of God where the gospel is preached, the Mission House where the poor rescued slave boys are housed and fed, and the school where they are instructed in the religion of that Master 'whose service is perfect freedom,' and whose chains are not iron fetters, but golden links of love.

"A short distance from the town, at a place called Kiungani, there is another of these stations; this is a school for boys, and at present upwards of 100 boys, some of these the sons of chiefs from various parts of the mainland, but for the most part rescued slaves, reside within the walls of this institution. Of the working of this establishment I have the most intimate knowledge, having been there for some months past almost daily. . . . Day after day I have been amongst them, observing the self-denying lives of these missionaries, their devotion to their work, their love for the boys thus committed to their care; and I believe it is impossible to overrate the importance of the work that is being done in this establishment. . . .

"At Mbweni, about four miles from the town of Zanzibar, there is another station, which comprises a large school for girls, in which there are at present about eighty scholars, of ages varying from six to seventeen years; and also on the 'Shamba' (a farm of considerable extent) there are residing upwards of 300 souls, the greater part of whom are Christians, the direct result of this mission. All, or nearly all, of the girls in this school are rescued slaves. How different their lives now from what they were, from what they would have been but for the intervention of this mission, which provides them with a home, where they seem supremely happy, with kind friends and careful training!

"Through the energy of the archdeacon of the island, Mr. Hodgson, a very handsome church has been built at Mbweni, where the people of this 'Shamba' come daily to offer prayer and praise to that God whom, in common with ourselves, they have learned to regard and address as 'Our Father.' Here, too, Sunday after Sunday, in the early morning, they come reverently and devoutly to receive the sacrament of holy communion. I was staying with the archdeacon one day when the people came, according to the rule he has established, an old church rule, to give in their names as those who purposed communicating the following Sunday, and as name after name was written down until the list amounted to about sixty people, he assured me they all came of their own free will and choice, without the slightest constraint.

"I have been privileged to see some of the work that is being done on the mainland at Magila, one of their most flourishing stations, some thirty-five miles from the coast. Here Archdeacon Farler is in charge, exercising supervision over Magila and the three out-stations connected with it. They have a considerable staff of Europeans, both lay and clerical, at Magila, but none too much for the growing work of the mission. No one can fail to see here that the missionaries are exercising a wonderful influence over a large district of country; truly it is the Lord's work, and it is marvelous in our eyes. Were space at my disposal, I could write page after page respecting the manifold phases of work carried on here. I could tell you of the beautiful stone church they have built; of the hospital, with a properly qualified doctor at its head; of the day schools filled with boys, the sons of chiefs and others from the neighboring towns; of the Sunday services, both for Christians and heathen; of the Sunday schools for 'hearers' and 'catechumens,' the latter class nearly 100 strong; of a class of old men, the chiefs of surrounding towns, who come to receive instruction from the archdeacon every Sunday. The Sunday I spent at Magila there were sixteen old men, chiefs of sixteen towns, who gathered round the archdeacon after morning service, and, seated in a shady place, learned from him with evident delight texts of Scripture and verses of hymns, such as we might have learned when children at Sunday-school.

"The church of Magila is capable of accommodating about 400 people. I have seen it nearly filled with baptized Christians at early morning holy communion service, and again at 10 A. M. well filled with heathen who came to hear the Gospel preached unto them.

"At the various out-stations there are missionaries, European and African, who carry on the work on similar lines, but on a smaller scale than at Magila. The direct evangelistic work, visiting the towns and preaching in the streets, is carried on day by day. I have been with the missionaries when so engaged, and I know they are welcomed most warmly. The archdeacon has told me that over and over again the chiefs of the more distant towns have asked him to send them a 'teacher,' either European or African, and he has had to refuse for want of men. 'The harvest truly is great, but the laborers are few.'"

Two Mohammedans were baptized at Magila, Christmas day, 1887.

Bishop Smythies, when at home in attendance on the Lambeth Conference, remarked that baptism was not made easy for these people. The missionaries had no wish to parade a long tale of converts, but what they did aim at was to ensure that every baptized person should be a centre of light to all around him. The people were kept waiting a long while, first

as hearers and then as catechumens. After remaining catechumens for one or two years, they were baptized. All round that neighborhood Christianity was making a deep impression, and that, too, beyond the actual number of converts made, — a fact which could be seen in the gradual dying away of heathen customs, such as burning for witchcraft, which had ceased in the neighborhood of the mission. Outside the mere circle of converts, then, there was a gradual leavening of Christian feeling which was preparing the way for a wider acceptance of our holy religion in the future. But even in a country where there were so many baptized people as at Magila, the converts had to make great sacrifices. They had to break off from their family customs, which were often polluted with heathenism. Thus there were some initiatory rites through which boys and girls had to pass before arriving at manhood and womanhood, and which were almost always of a very polluted nature. This custom was source of great trouble to Christian converts, because their families were most anxious that they should go through the rite, for, unless they did, when they were married the nurses would try to kill their children.

“Central Africa” for November, 1888, referring to some remarks of Canon Taylor, and also of Dr. Cust, very pertinently says : —

“Whilst both insist upon the spirit of self-sacrifice as the essential of the missionary's life, they do not equally insist upon the like spirit being required at home, as a necessary condition of success in foreign mission work. Yet how can we reasonably look for ‘heroic missionaries,’ unless we have heroic parents who will bring up their sons and daughters to hold that a life devoted to spreading the kingdom of God is the highest of all earthly callings, and who rejoice in developing the vocation for it in any to whom it has been given? How can we reasonably demand that *all* missionary priests and bishops should be ‘heroic,’ unless bishops and priests at home are heroic also? It was well said the other day, that, whilst we knew of missionary bishops who had been translated to English sees, we had as yet no case of an English bishop resigning his home see to bear the gospel to the heathen. And yet, if we are to demand that all our missionaries be heroic, ‘judgment’ should surely ‘first begin at the house of God,’ and our fathers in God show the more excellent way. It is difficult to conceive of the impetus that would be given to the foreign work of the church by an English bishop, or even a dean, throwing up all home position and power for the love of souls to whom the word of God has never come.”

The authorities of the Universities' Mission, we see, considering how largely the revolt in Eastern Africa has been owing to the intolerable arrogance of the Germans, and their utter want of tact, are very much opposed to any present military coöperation of the two countries. The editors of the *Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift* speak more strongly in condemnation of their countrymen than “Central Africa.” The London committee, in December last, passed the following resolution: “That, in the opinion of this committee, any combined military or naval operations on the coast of East Africa, carried on by England and Germany at the present crisis, will be fraught with injurious results to the friendly relations which have been maintained for many years past between the natives of East Africa and the English missionaries.” “Central Africa” says, sharply but with reason, that, “whatever the ultimate programme of the ‘blockade’ may be, at all events it resolves itself, to begin with, into German revenge for their expulsion, under a kind of international sanction.”

"Central Africa," remarking on the gradual creation of a Swahili literature, as to the importance of which we shall speak presently, says : —

"The *Pilgrim's Progress* is also appearing in a Swahili dress, and can hardly fail to be as popular and useful to all East Africans who learn to read as on other continents. It is curious how uniquely natural and consonant with East African ideas is Bunyan's allegory, treating all human life as a journey through a wilderness. Where are there such wildernesses, or such journeys through them, as those trodden daily, year after year, by the thousands in Africa, to whom they are almost the whole of life? Where do the Pilgrim's experiences repeat themselves with such familiar frequency, — the lions by the way, the morass, the robber's hold, the distant scene from mountains, the valley of horrible fear, the dark whelming river, even the wicked city?"

The special importance of the Swahili may be inferred from these remarks of Dr. Cust in his valuable work on the African languages : —

"This is, and is destined to continue, one of the twelve most important languages of the world, with reference to the vast area over which it is a *Lingua Franca*, its position as a leading language amidst a host of uncultivated congeners, and its power of assimilating alien elements, especially the Arabic, which has done for it what it has also done for the Turkish, Persian, Urdu, Hausa, and Malay. . . . Swahili means 'the language of the people of the Coast.' . . . It is still spoken in the greatest linguistic purity about Patta and the other ancient settlements: along the Coast, proceeding downwards, it has become greatly modified by alien influences, Arabic, Persian, Indian, Portuguese, till in Zanzibar it reaches the extreme degree of divergence. I cannot call this corruption, unless I could at the same time call the magnificent Indian vernacular Urdu a corruption, instead of a development of Hindi, and English a corruption of Anglo-Saxon. It is not even spoken on the Coast to the south of Ibo. . . . A greater tribute can hardly be paid to it than is paid by Cameron, that he only understood this one language, and it carried him successfully through from the East to the West Coast, as some one was found in each tribe passed through who understood it. It has already been stated that the specimens of Swahili aided in the discovery of the great theory of the unity of the Bantu languages. It is not the court language or ruling language anywhere, not even in Zanzibar, but the commercial language everywhere, whether at U-Jiji, or U-Ganda, or Mombasa, or in U-Zarimo. . . . Every drop of European culture that finds its way into the vast language field of the eastern and western sub-branches of the eastern branch of the Bantu family now under description, must filter through this one mouthpiece of Zanzibar and this single funnel of Swahili. It must be borne in mind that portions of the Bible have now been translated and published by Steere in the dialect of Zanzibar. Experience on the West Coast of Africa, the story of the English Bible and of Luther's Bible, warn us that when the language of a country is still in flux, it will settle down and gravitate round the translation of the Scriptures, if a good one, as I doubt not that Steere's is: therefore, humanly speaking, the lines of the Swahili language are laid down forever. The Scotch do not value the translation of the Bible less because it is composed in the southern dialect of the great English language."

"Central Africa" for last December has this : —

"One of our staff, writing from Zanzibar on September 24th, referring to the fight between the Germans and the natives at Bagamorgo, says : 'I have seen nothing all day but 100 dead black bodies, killed for sheer "lust of property." One reads carelessly of such things, but when it comes as near as this it is very terrible. Be quite sure our consul helps us all he can; no one could be kinder, more helpful, more full of thought and care.'

"On St. Andrew's Day, Mr. John H. Bone, accompanied by a native teacher from Kiungani, was swept away in a small canoe from Zanzibar to a

small village south of Bagamorgo. They were on the point of being killed by the coast tribes as Germans, when a bystander recognized the native as a member of the Universities' Mission. Both were immediately released, and dismissed with a message that the tribes were at war only with the Germans, who had taken 100 lives. We could scarcely wish for a more telling proof of the cordial feeling that at present exists towards us. God grant that the 'joint blockade' may not obliterate it."

We greatly regret that Archdeacon Farler, who is scarcely less valuable to the Universities' Mission than Bishop Smythies himself, and who is a good deal older in the work, has been compelled by his health to leave Africa, and is forbidden by his physicians to return. He joined the mission in 1875, shortly after the consecration of Bishop Steere.

Blantyre, the principal mission station of the Church of Scotland, is on the river Shiré, about one third of the way down from Lake Nyassa to the Zambesi. The Rev. D. C. Scott writes to the Convener of the Missionary Board: "We are to have our first communion on Sunday, and I have had classes for some time. Along with us will sit down, if God will, *Kagaso* and his wife *Evangelii*, *Rondau*, *Kapito* and *Kumitawa*, *Malota* and *Chesoyaga*, *Matengo* and *Nacho*. . . . The interest among all the people is very great, and there is much ground for hope; and when one feels that in this there lies the foundation of the African Church, one looks with awe and gratitude upon the humanness in which the Christ is thus incarnate, to be the Saviour of the world. We are not just founding a mission: we are *saving Africa*. I see no way of withdrawing from the responsibilities, and I believe that nothing whatever can hinder the fulfillment if we have the faith we are bound to have." . . . Mr. Scott says, in "The Church of Scotland Home and Foreign Mission Record": "The Arab slave-trade is making frightful progress. It is not an age-long business. Thirty years is almost the beginning of it. Caravans of Arabs are pouring in — for trade? No! Hardly a bale of cloth goes up country from the East Coast; it is guns and powder — not even spirits. It is simply slaughter and slaughter of thousands, and the desolation of the fairest lands — lands where the natives were at peace, where industry and thrift and happiness ruled; where, to get through one village, you might start in early morning and not pass out of it till the sun was half-way down, journeying straight on; and these are now desolate. Fresh routes are opening up to them, and the desolation is spreading. It is not *slave-trade*; it is ruthless massacre of the most barbarous type." And yet there are those that are snarling at Cardinal Lavigerie because he dares to let himself be set on fire by such abominations!

The "Record" publishes this prayer: "O thou Lord of the harvest, who hast commanded thy Church to go everywhere preaching the Word to those who have not known thy name! Grant, we pray thee, that the witnessing for Christ in China and Africa and India, by the Church of our fathers, may be watered with the dews of thy Holy Spirit. Bless the converts who have been already brought in, and keep them by thy power. Increase the number of those who from month to month shall yield themselves unto Jesus; and grant that the present year may be one of fruitfulness and abundant blessing, to the praise of the glory of thy grace, through Jesus Christ. Amen." — The Rev. Alexander Hetherwick, who had buried a native girl that had died, says: "A dreary place is the native cemetery, overgrown with rank grass and weeds, so that one had to bore one's way to reach it, dreary and lifeless like the native

creed. A few broken pots placed here and there mark the last resting-place of their owners, but no token of any hope beyond the grave. The few little articles the girl had were torn up or broken, and put into the grave ere it was closed in. I spoke to them by the open grave of the resurrection from the dead, but how could they comprehend it on whose ears the news had fallen for the first time! If anything could make a man a missionary, 't is the sight of the native mourning and funeral. Is it not something to be even the bearer of the tidings of Him who said, 'I am the resurrection and the life'?"

The "Record" republishes from the "Manchester Guardian" a letter from Bishop Smythies, which gives a fuller impression of the Church of Scotland missions near Lake Nyassa than we have obtained from their own communications. He is insisting on the duty of the British people to maintain open communications with both ends of Lake Nyassa, threatened now at the north by the Arabs and at the south by the rather arrogant claims of the Portuguese to levy customs, now that British activity has made this worth while. The bishop says:—

"The one outlet for the waters of Lake Nyassa is the river Shiré, which flows into the Zambesi. Except for a short distance in one part, this river is navigable throughout its course. . . . About halfway between Katungás and Matope is the African Lakes Company's store and settlement at Mandala, and a little more than a mile from it the flourishing mission village of Blantyre of the Established Church of Scotland. It is wonderful to see this village, with its gardens, schools, and houses, in the midst of Africa. The writer has twice within the last three years, when visiting Nyassa, experienced the generous hospitality of Mandala and Blantyre, and so can speak from his own personal observation. Being situated on such high ground, the climate is much more favorable to Europeans than is the case in most other mission stations in that region. It is easier, also, for the same region to grow fruits and vegetables imported from Europe. It is difficult to overestimate the effect of such a settlement as a civilizing agency in the country. Mr. Hetherwick, who was in charge of the station for some time in Mr. Scott's absence, has mastered the language of the great Yao tribe, and has lately published a translation of St. Matthew's Gospel, which shows a wonderful grasp of the genius of the language. Mr. Hetherwick has now returned to his mission station, some fifty miles to the northeast, under Mount Zomba. Mr. Scott is said to be equally a master of Chinyanja, the language of the Nyassa tribes. The English government have recognized the important influence these settlements are likely to have by appointing a consul to Nyassa, who has lately built a house close to the flourishing coffee and sugar plantations of Mr. Buchanan, under Mount Zomba, some forty miles from Blantyre, and near Lake Kilwa, or Shirwa. Mr. Buchanan is also a good Yao scholar, and takes care to teach the people, who come to him in considerable numbers for employment. Situated high up on the slopes of Mount Zomba, which rises precipitously above it, — the streams which rush down from its summit being diverted and distributed so as to form a system of irrigation for the different crops, — Mr. Buchanan's plantation is a picture of beauty and prosperity, and offers every prospect of health and permanence. But all these settlements must depend very much for their welfare on their waterway to the coast — the rivers Shiré and Zambesi. They were established under the belief that this waterway would be always open to them without interference. It would be very disastrous if they felt that they were entirely at the mercy of what the Portuguese on the coast might at any time choose to do. Those who live there have good reason to watch jealously any encroachment on liberties hitherto enjoyed and supposed to be guaranteed, and there is no doubt that a little firmness on the part of the English government is all that is wanted for their adequate protection. The difficulties of establishing missions in the region of Nyassa are sufficiently great without any obstacles being put in their way by a European power. . . .

"There is another danger which has lately shown itself in acute form, — the danger which arises from the impatience of the Arabs at the presence of Europeans and their influence on the lake. For some time in that district there seems to have been an abatement of those horrors which Dr. Livingstone describes as witnessed by him and perpetrated by Arab slave-traders. In all probability this has been caused very much by the presence of English and Scotch missionaries and traders, with their steamers on the lake. The news of what happened last year at Karonga, near the north end of the lake, shows that the Arabs are only biding their time to repeat on the shores of Lake Nyassa the murderous raids which have always marked their course. . . . Surely we are not going to offer the spectacle to Europe of abandoning Lake Nyassa, discovered by English enterprise, on which subjects of Britain, alone of European powers, have settled for purposes of trade or the higher purpose of religion, to the Arabs and the desolations of the slave-trade.

"It has been mentioned that the Universities' Mission has begun work on the east side of the lake. Three years ago a steamer was sent out for its use in parts and put together at Matope, on the Shiré; a mission station has been formed at Lukoma, an island about the middle of the east side of the lake and five miles from the shore. This island seemed to be healthier than the shores of the lake, and its bays afford a sheltered anchorage for the steamer. Though the island is very small, the population is probably nearly 3,000, drawn there by desire of security from the Magwangwara, the marauding tribe of the neighborhood. The plan proposed by the mission is to form a central school on this island, and a station for English missionaries, and to establish schools under native teachers in all the towns on the lake shores. . . . All this work, too, must depend very largely on there being an open way to the sea by which supplies may be regularly received."

The last statement in the May "Record" gives five "very cogent reasons why we should object to the Portuguese settling down beside our Mission: (1) We think that they have no right to be there. They have done nothing for the country; indeed, worse than nothing, for they have hindered our efforts by greatly raising the tariff at Quilimane. Now that we have made the country valuable, they want to take the fruits of British labor, British capital, and the sacrifice of British lives. (2) So much are the Portuguese disliked by the natives, that their coming would be the signal for hostilities, in which the missions might be destroyed. (3) The Mozambique having been long a convict settlement, the Portuguese community is tainted. They would also bring with them a rabble of degraded natives from the coast. The effect on our young people would be disastrous. Slaving would be connived at. The missionaries have no confidence that orders from Lisbon would be carried out by the local executive. (4) The rum traffic, which our Christian traders have hitherto been able to exclude, could no longer be kept out. (5) Jesuits would counterwork the efforts of our missionaries, and would be favored by the Portuguese. No guarantee from Lisbon would prevent endeavors to drive out our missions."

When the Portuguese hold quiet, we can afford to leave them alone. But when they begin to bestir themselves to the annoyance of better races, we are reminded of Byron's lines: —

"Well doth the Spanish hind the difference know
Twixt him and Lusian slave, the lowest of the low."

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Das Alte Testament und die christliche Sittenlehre. Von Ernst Fischer. Pp. 161. Gotha: Friedr. Andr. Perthes. Mrk. 2.40. — That the Scriptures are the sources of Christian ethics is generally admitted, but the question of relative values is sharply discussed. The main question relates to the authority of the O. T. in the construction of a scheme of morality. Schleiermacher regarded the O. T. as superfluous for Christian doctrine generally, and "for Christian ethics quite useless." Rothe, on the other hand, asserts an equal ethical value of the O. T. with the N. T. Instead of fixing an impassable gulf, Rothe allows no line of demarkation between them. The author regards these positions as Charybdis and Scylla, and seeks the safe, middle way. The guiding thought is the announcement: "The kingdom of Heaven is at hand." The value of the O. T. is fairly recognized, but we find in the spirit of faith and freedom of the N. T. the needed life and strength. The discussion of the elements of Christian morality and the relations of Law, Prophecy, and Gospel, are interesting features in the work.

Biblische Psychologie, Biologie und Pädagogik als Grundlagen christlicher Erziehung und Selbstzucht. Von Prof. Dr. Karl Fischer. Pp. xii, 119. Gotha: Friedr. Andr. Perthes. Mrk. 2.40. — Dr. Fischer is director of the Royal Prussian Gymnasium. In theology he belongs to the realistic school of J. T. Beck. He conceives the aim of education to be determined by character. To misunderstand character is to confuse all. The history of education from Socrates to Herbart shows the need of some fundamental and permanent principle upon which to build. This is found in the revealed wisdom of God; hence the Biblical psychology, out of which grows biology and pedagogics. In the first chapter the Biblical doctrine of human character is developed; in the second, the limitations under which life is exhibited; and in the third, the aims, methods, and forces of a Biblical pedagogic. The final chapter is a review of the subject with a statement of its results. Dr. Fischer has rendered an important service to all educators. The Christian educator will feel the strength of his foundations and the wisdom of his methods.

Deutsche Pilgerreisen nach dem Heiligen Lande. Von Rheinhold Rohricht. Pp. x, 352. Gotha: Fried. Andr. Perthes. Mrk. 6. — The volume is a condensation and clarification of a much larger work which was received with favor eight years ago, but on account of its middle-high-German text and technical fullness was confined to the few. The period illustrated by these pilgrimages begins with 1800 and ends with 1697. After an historical essay on the period and a review of the songs of the pilgrims, the chief tourists are taken up in chronological order. This part of the work (pp. 95-316) is of peculiar interest by bringing to light strange personalities; new phases of social and religious life; quaint views and customs; curious experiences, financial and political. We are shown how the old crusading sentiment was kept alive through many centuries, and how strong was its hold upon the religious life, especially of the nobility. The treatise is of positive value to the student of history.

Theologia Sacrosancta. Grundlinien der Biblischen Theologie. Von
VOL. XII. — NO. 67.

Dr. Carl Julius Römheld. *Erster Band: Der Name Gottes.* Pp. viii, 526. Mrk. 8. *Zweiter Band: Christus Jehovah.* Pp. x, 618. Mrk. 9. Gotha: Verlag von Gustav Schoessmann. — The aim of the work as a whole is to prove that the Christ of the N. T. is the Jehovah of the O. T., and that they are identical, and that "Christology is the real theology." The name of God as it occurs in the O. T. in 237 relations, and in the N. T. in 116, is examined to bring out the doctrine of identity. The unity of revelation is maintained, and no difference of value is recognized between the two testaments. Holding that "incomplete proof is no proof," Dr. Römheld has entered fully into comparative exegesis and defended his position from every point of view. Besides the original texts of the Scriptures, seven different translations of the same are noticed. It is believed that "theological science should lead men into the Bible, not away from it." The work may be called Lutheran if we keep in mind that Luther appealed directly to the authority of the Scriptures. They who take a Christocentric view of Biblical doctrine will find a full and vigorous exposition and support of their position in these two volumes.

Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft. Erstes und zweites Heft. 1889. Pp. 383. Tübingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 8. — In view of the intimate relations of political economy to sociology, and of the growing importance of these relations, we call attention to the leading organ of German economists. This quarterly is conducted by professors of different universities, and its aim is, "to serve the truth, independent of bias and free from all party interest." In the present volume, Professor Roscher writes an outline of the doctrine of absolute monarchy (pp. 1–110) from the thirteenth century to the present time. The article is of great value in showing the origin, institutions, and species of this phase of government. Dr. Feilbogen's "James Stewart and Adam Smith" (pp. 218–260) shows how "the father of political economy" adopted some of his children and where he got them. American economics are not neglected. A valuable feature of the work is the review of important publications, home and foreign, on political and economical science.

Abriss der Philosophie der Geschichte. Von K. C. F. Krause. Aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlasse des Verfassers. Herausgegeben von Dr. P. Hohlfeld u. Dr. A. Wünsche. Pp. ix, 185. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. Mrk. 4. — In many of his ideas, Krause had a strong affinity to Schelling, and in his all about knowledge resembled Leibnitz. His conception of the Absolute as knowable through the life of nature and spirit is so strong and central in his system that his entire work may be called the philosophy of the Absolute. Religion and morality consist in the harmony of the life and will of man with the life and will of God. The life of the individual is not to be understood apart from the life of all. The science of history must recognize history as an organic whole; an unfolding of the life of all that exists, in which the eternal Being reveals himself. "Pure history is an empirical science." Krause recognizes three stages in the history of man, — childhood, youth, and manhood. This is true of all nations and peoples, all is the unfolding of the spirit of man toward conscious unity with God. From this point of view we have an interesting outline of history.

Die Ueberlieferung. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung. Von Ernst von Bunsen. Zweiter Band. Mit einer Tafel. Pp. 316. Leipzig: F.

A. Brockhaus. Mrk. 7. — In the last number of the REVIEW we noticed the first volume of this work. This second part continues the study, closing with a review of the Reformation and its results. The topics treated are, "Messianic Expectation," "Jesus the Sower of the Word of God," "Stephen and Paul," "The Angel Messiah in the Epistle to the Hebrews," "The Double Messiah in the Revelation," a very valuable chapter on the "Traditions of the Roman Church" (pp. 131-245), "Mahomed's Place in the Church," "The Reformation and the Catholic Church." In his conclusion, Von Bunsen says, "Although we cannot discover the oldest sources of religion, yet we find enough to lead us to suppose no other revelation than that in the reason and conscience." "We by no means deny supernatural influences, — exterior sources of inner revelation, — supersensuous power in man and nature and facts of experience which are inexplicable through known natural laws." The work has an excellent index, and its form, paper, and type are of the best.

Die Einheit des Hermas-Buchs. Von P. Baumgärtner. Gekrönte Preisschrift. Pp. 95. Freiburg i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Mrk. 2. — This study falls into two parts, the first of which considers the integrity, division, and language of the book; the second, its historical setting, literary position, and the personality of its author. In conclusion "we must assert the unity of the author, yet deny the original unity of the book itself."

Rechtsvergleichende Studien ueber islamisches Recht, das Recht der Berbern, das chinesische Recht, und das Recht auf Ceylon. Von Prof. Dr. Kohler, Professor an der Universität Berlin. Pp. 252. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. — Those who are interested in the study of comparative law will gladly acknowledge their obligations to this excellent piece of work. The value of this department of knowledge, for the understanding of man and his history, is rapidly increasing through scholarly investigation. Two thirds of the work is given to the study of Mohammedan law. There are two features of special worth: first, the vast amount of literature that is noticed and made available by topical reference; and, second, the thorough treatment given to the institution of the family and the laws by which it is governed.

Die Altjüdische Religion im Uebergange vom Bibelthume zum Talmudismus. Von Israel Sack. Pp. xvi, 612. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung. Mrk. 7. — In his former work, "The Religion of Ancient Israel," Dr. Sack sets forth the religious ideas of the O. T., apart from all exterior influences, to the time of the Captivity. The present work is a study of the conflicts and changes through which this pure and ethical religion passed into Talmudism. This period extends from 600 B. C. to about 200 A. D., — a period in which the historical critic needs the aid of intuition. Thus the method becomes somewhat psychological. Social and political phases are studied for the light which they throw upon the religious. The period opens with the conflict of religious parties in the Babylonian exile and the remembrance of the deliverance from Egypt, of Moses and his law. The work of Ezra and Nehemiah could not break the spell of Babylon. New influences were at work which exhibited themselves in priest and prophet. The latter drew from the Zend religion ideas of the spirit-world and of the resurrection of the dead, and drifted toward monastic habits. About 300 B. C. Grecian influences begin to exert a powerful influence. Political life becomes strong and party lines are sharply drawn. The first ele-

ments of Talmudism appear, contributed by the Sadducees. The author pictures, with excellent expression, the social and political, the religious and moral conditions of the three centuries preceding our era. The founding of Christianity and Talmudism are synchronous. The Essenes, their organization, tendency, and doctrine, lead directly into Christianity, and in the person of John the Baptizer become its founder. Dr. Sack has seven arguments to show "that Jesus and John the Baptizer were one and the same person, (*i. e.*) that to the latter, after his death, the name Jesus, the Salvation, is attributed." Should one suppose this position somewhat fantastic and in need of *one* good argument, he is reminded that it is not written "for obdurate orthodoxy, neither Christian nor Jewish." It is thought that the rite of circumcision kept Judaism from becoming a world-religion, and that the freedom of speech saved it from founding an infallible church. We have but hinted at some of the characteristics of this brilliant and fascinating work. Dr. Sack has a minute knowledge of the whole texture of Judaism, and has thrown much light upon the dark and confused period in which the old was transformed into the new.

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
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.CHANCE OR DESIGN.

As soon as men rose above the level of the brutes and began to take an interest in the world about them, they perceived, however imperfectly, a certain order of sequence in the arrangement of natural objects. They saw that plants and animals continued in apparently endless succession, kind reproducing kind, that the stars steadfastly marched across the heavens, and that the seasons followed in their due order. The only explanation of this order in nature possible in the first state of human intelligence, was found in the supposition that they were brought about by the intervention of an intelligence superior to man. At first, this apparent intelligence was explained in a simple and natural manner. Death, the most familiar and yet the most mysterious of all natural facts, constantly removed their fellows from the world. The departed were looked upon as still acting according to their natural powers. They were supposed to people the unseen world, and to afford it the control which was exhibited in natural phenomena. Gradually, these souls of vanished men were endowed, by the imagination of the living, with more than human ability. The departed chieftain grew to be a demigod, and was, finally, assumed to have even more supernatural powers. With more or less variation in the form of the supposition, this primal notion appears to have supplied primitive men with their explanation of the observed order in nature. Such a view is natural, indeed, almost necessary, for otherwise men could not begin to explain the ordinary occurrences of the world.

When observational science came to exist and the conception of natural law was formed, a certain antagonism between the philosophical and religious conceptions of the world began. Out of this antagonism there came much strife. Religious-minded naturalists endeavored to effect a reconciliation between these diverse views by showing that the order of nature was consistent with the supposition of intelligent control directed to the good of man. Two centuries and more of our modern science bear the marks of this effort towards a reconciliation with religion. Of late these endeavors have fallen into a general and, in good part, deserved disrepute. The disposition of naturalists has been to abandon the problem concerning the ideal or moral control of the universe entirely to the theologians, limiting the work of science to the task of interpreting the fact through the understanding of the conditions which preceded its occurrence. There can be no question that this attitude has been on the whole better for science. In justice to itself, science can only undertake to study the operations of law. When they endeavor to invade the field of the moralist or of the theologian, the votaries of science find that their methods cease to be of any use. They cannot safely trust themselves with considerations which rest upon the intuitional part of man.

The immediate cause which led to the abandonment of the effort to prove the existence of design in the contrivances exhibited by the structure of animals and plants was the sense of the illogical nature of the undertaking. The best-known works of this sort which have been produced are embodied in the *Bridge-water Treatises*. The several volumes contained in this series of works were designed to illustrate "the power, wisdom, and goodness of God." They all follow substantially the method of the illustrious Paley, and endeavor to show that in the physical and organic world we have the proof of an intelligent creator who adapts the machinery of the world to subserve the best interests of man. Throughout they embody the notion that contrivance must exist in nature, that the infinite being is in a way cramped by the same conditions as those which limit our own undertakings. The work of these treatises was cleverly done from the point of view taken by the several writers. From that view of creative power, the arguments are fairly well drawn, and for a time the public in general, as well as many scientific men, were captivated by them.

Even before the doctrine of Darwin and others had done much

to undermine the argumentative basis on which these works rest, their method fell into disrepute not only with men concerned with physical science, but also with the abler theologians. The argument rested on the assumption that the divine power was exercised in the reconciliation of difficulties. Such a view is repugnant to any exalted conception of a creator. It rests upon the notion of a finite and not of an infinite power controlling the world. The arguments offended the naturalist for another reason. He had already begun to find many indications of grave imperfections in the organization of animals. Geoffroy St. Hilaire and others had shown that many animals have aborted organs, the relics of previous and lower states of development. It was difficult even for the theologian to reconcile this feature with the hypothesis that these creatures came directly from the creator with the stamp of perfection upon them. When the researches of Lamarck and Darwin forced naturalists to believe that the organic forms now upon the earth were the descendants of those that had been before, and that all organic life had been evolved from the simplest stages of existence, a large part of the arguments derived by the school of Paley ceased to have any place in science. The work of this sort which has recently been done has come to us from the theological side rather than from those who are really informed by the spirit of physical inquiry. Some naturalists have held more or less to this line of argument, but it is clear that on the whole they have been moved rather by their theological impulses than by their motives as investigators of nature.

A somewhat careful study of the problem discussed by the followers of Paley has convinced me that it is not quite reasonable to dismiss the methods of their inquiry in the summary fashion in which they have been cast aside, that it is worth while to give more discussion to the problem in the light of our better knowledge. In making this inquiry, the results of which I am about to set forth, it may not be amiss to state that I have undertaken this study with every effort to clear my mind of prepossessions and to do the work with no prejudices whatever. I cannot be sure as to the measure of success at which I have arrived in this endeavor, for the evident reason that no one can ascertain the extent to which he has cleared himself from the intellectual past on which all his thought immediately depends.

The first point which the inquirer may be asked to note is, that the hypothesis which holds this universe to be the seat of design is quite as legitimate as the theory that design has no place in the

known world. At present, many of our naturalists, animated by an atheistic spirit, in its way as unscientific as the theistic motive of the older students of nature, are disposed to regard the hypothesis of design as in itself illogical. A fair consideration of the question will probably lead the unbiased student to the conviction that the world may, for the purpose of hypothesis, quite as well be supposed to exhibit design as to be without that feature. Manifestly, the universe either is or is not the place of design. The supposition that any other condition can exist transcends the bounds of our understanding. We are obliged to interpret the visible universe on the basis of our mental organization, and to suppose that there is a third condition in which either design or the lack of it can exist is essentially unreasonable.

The difficulty encountered by the older students of the problem arose from the fact that the contrivances exhibited by organic forms do not necessarily involve design. For instance, in the case of the human hand, it may be shown that it is admirably fitted for the peculiar needs which it serves; but it is equally evident that the hand is descended from the ordinary feet of the lower animals through slight progressive adaptations towards its human form; that probably these several stages in its evolution have been brought about by the necessities of life encountered by the predecessors of man. As soon as it is proved that there is a spontaneous modifying influence at work under the operation of evident natural laws, the argument to support the hypothesis of beneficent control in the universe is fatally weakened. It is true that we can in a fashion strengthen the argument by the supposition that these natural laws are themselves the expression or mode of action of the intelligence, but by this supposition we place the question beyond the range of human understanding, and carry it into a field where intuitions alone can avail us, or, in other words, we take it beyond the realm of physical science and into that of theology.

It is evident that in the present state of biology we cannot safely undertake any arguments founded on advantages of structure to support the hypothesis of intellectual control. Until we have determined in a somewhat accurate way the extent to which the survival of the fittest has served to give shape to the animal and vegetable world, all arguments of the Paleyan sort will be futile. Therefore, in reviewing the field in order to ascertain the possibilities of extending the arguments from design, it seemed to me best to limit the considerations in the main to physical

laws, for in that realm we are clear from the risks of confounding progressive adaptations based upon the inherited experience of organic life with those which are of an intellectual nature, if such there be.

My first object will be to show that organic life is made possible by an extremely fine adjustment of the various terrestrial circumstances which permit of its existence, an adjustment so fine and depending on so many conditions that we cannot logically suppose that it is the result of chance alone. As will be seen in the development of the reasoning, I endeavor to show that the doctrine of probability makes it appear that the chances of organic life being instituted and maintained on the earth's surface by pure chance is, as the mathematicians phrase it, something like "one to infinity."

The first point to be noted in our inquiry is the narrow range of the temperature conditions which permit the existence of organic life on the earth's surface. For the development of organic conditions it is imperatively necessary that the temperature on the surface of the planet shall not be below the freezing point or above 150° F. At a less temperature than the freezing point all vitalized organisms not endowed with the power of maintaining internal heat by warm blood necessarily die. Above the temperature of 150° , all save the lowest forms, or the eggs of certain inferior organisms, are likewise destroyed. Save for the most inferior creatures in the organic series the possible range of temperature is much less than that which we have noted. If the earth had been peopled only with protozoan life, or that of the lower stages of being, it might have been possible for such beings to have maintained themselves in a range of temperature amounting to as much as 130° ; but for all higher forms the range at the place where they live must be less than 100° F. The reason of this narrow limitation in the possible temperatures in which organisms dwell depends in the main upon certain peculiar properties of water. At the freezing point water absolutely ceases to be fit to serve as a vehicle of life, for the reason that it becomes a solid substance. Above the temperature of 150° its unfitness for vital purposes depends upon the fact that albumen and kindred substances change their character and thus become devitalized.

Observing, first, that organic life has been preserved on the surface of this planet in an essentially undisturbed condition for a period of time to be measured by tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of years, let us next notice how delicate is the

adjustment of the conditions which serve to maintain the earth's surface within this narrow limit of temperature. Within the solar system we have a range of temperature which extends from that of the space which surrounds our planet, which must be considered as several hundred degrees below zero F., to that of the sun's surface, which probably exceeds 100,000° on the same scale. The temperature of the earth's interior is also extremely high, probably amounting to not less than 20,000° or 30,000° F. Thus the organic zone of the earth's surface has been held since the dawn of life in a condition of singularly delicate adjustment as regards heat between the realm of the nether earth and that of the sun, with the intervening space of intense cold separating these two regions of high temperature. There has never been a time since the beginning of this life when at five miles above the earth, even in the tropics, there has not been a cold sufficiently intense, if it came to the surface, to destroy vitality. In no age has the death-giving temperature of the earth's interior ever been more than five miles below the ground.

Thus, considering the distribution of temperature alone, we can see that this film of life has been marvelously held upon the earth; again and again in glacial periods, or in times of great volcanic activity, the endurance of this delicate adjustment would have appeared to the human understanding almost impossible, particularly in glacial periods when the ice sheets made their way from the poles towards the equator, but also in those times when great volcanic outbreaks produced such great lava fields as those which we find in the valley of the Columbia, in the Deccan of India, and elsewhere, it would have appeared to such an observer as if this life could scarcely hold its place amid the forces which contended for its destruction; but always before the fatal moment came there has been a turn in the tide, and these delicate creatures which constitute the organic world have found profit in the peril which environed them. The conditions which seemed to threaten their existence appear to have been really the steps which have led them to higher states of being.

Our sense of the delicacy in the adjustment of the temperature conditions to suit the needs of life upon the earth's surface is much enhanced when we consider certain relations which water bears to organic life. These conditions are somewhat complicated, yet they are of the utmost importance to our inquiry. First we have to note that water is peculiarly conditioned in relation to heat. Above the temperature of about 200° F. in the existing

conditions of the atmosphere water is in the state of vapor. In this state, as we know full well, it cannot have any relations to organic life. It, in fact, becomes a destroyer of all animal and vegetable structures. It cannot, indeed, maintain some of its relations to organisms, relations on which all animal and plant life depends, at a heat above 150° F., and its most effective work cannot be done at temperatures much above 100° F. Below the temperature of 100° , and above the temperature of 32° , water, by the various properties which belong to it in that range of heat, is an essential condition of all organic structures. It is impossible for us to conceive the existence of any animals or plants save through the action of water within that narrow range of heat. All organic forms depend upon the capacity which water has for taking substances into solution and conveying them through the circulation, sap or blood, to the tissues and other bodily parts which continuously appropriate the materials, and by that appropriation maintain the process of life.

At the temperature of 32° water passes a singularly critical point: from the fluid it enters into the solid state; from being a vehicle of change, the agent of all organic activity, it instantly becomes the very type of stability, a resister of all transitions. Thus, while in the range of organic temperatures, water maintains the functions of an animal in incessant activity; when frozen, it may, as in the case of the ice-embalmed elephants of Siberia, preserve the body unchanged for millennial periods. It is thus easy to see that the maintenance of organic life depends absolutely upon the peculiar property of water in the narrow range of temperatures which have long existed on the earth's surface. If water were so constituted that it existed as a fluid at temperatures above 200° , or from zero to 100° minus alone, under the present condition of heat adjustment on the earth surface, organic life would be quite impossible. If water remained in its fluid state only within the range from 32° F. to, say, 80° F., the development of all higher forms of organisms would likewise have been impossible. Organic life depends absolutely upon the coincidence between the temperature adjustments and the physical properties of water within a certain very limited range of heat. If water had been solid, fluid, and gaseous at temperatures which produce these several conditions in other ordinary substances on the earth's surface, our planet would have had no organic history.

But organic life depends upon yet other conditions of water, those which owe their existence to the relations of that fluid to

other substances. Water is the vehicle of organic life, because it has the power of taking materials into solution in certain quantities when it is in its fluid state. Thus, for instance, water has a peculiar capacity for absorbing carbonic acid, the carbonic dioxide of modern chemists. Furthermore, all marine life depends upon the fact that sea-water can take into its structure a considerable proportion of this gas which is yielded to the marine plants, making their development possible. These plants in turn afford food for the animals of the sea. But for this peculiar relation of carbonic acid to water, organic life could not have begun its existence or have maintained its place upon the planet for a single day. If carbonic acid were a solid at 100° F. in place of 100° on that scale, it could not have entered into the relations with water on which all organic life depends. So, too, with the other substances which are of importance to organic forms, they all have a peculiar power of entering into solution with water at the given range of temperature of the earth's surface, and thereby become essential ministers to life. It seems to me quite reasonable to conclude that these adjustments of temperature and of the physical properties of water and other substances to the temperatures which prevail on the surface of the earth would almost inevitably have been, if the determination of the relations were due to chance alone, quite other than we find them.

We have above indicated only a few of the juxtapositions in the conditions of substances which are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of organic life. A careful examination of the field would enable us to show that there were at least a score of these coincidences between the properties of matter and the temperatures of the earth's surface, any one of which failing to occur would make organic life processes impossible. Coincidences which bring about the maintenance of something like a permanent temperature on the earth's surface are of themselves hard to explain by the hypothesis of fortuity; but when we note the great number of these agreements, and perceive their full importance, it becomes vastly more difficult to satisfy our reason by the hypothesis of chance alone. What we may call the mathematical probability of the occurrence of these coincidences is so small on the hypothesis of chance that we are led to adopt that of design. It would be interesting to carry our inquiry into the coincidences of a physical sort which have brought about the conditions which permit the development and maintenance of organic life on the earth's surface much further than we have done. To accomplish this task

would, however, demand an elaboration of this class of considerations which is impossible in the present writing. We will, therefore, turn our attention to another class of considerations in which the argument is derived from a less recondite field.

The existence of life upon the earth's surface depends not only upon the curious juxtaposition of conditions controlling the physical properties of the materials which constitute the superficial parts of our planet, but also in an essential way upon the general structure of that surface. The circumstances of this dependence are very numerous, and as before we can only note some of the most essential of them. First among these geographic conditions which determine the possibility of life is the division of the earth's surface into areas of land and water. All life of the earth, that of the seas as well as of the lands, originated within the water areas; only the higher forms have gone thence to their more elevated stations on the surface of the continents.

The origination and maintenance of life in the seas in the beginning depended and still depends upon the peculiar capacity possessed by water which enables it to take substances into solution. This work is most accented in the circulating fluids of the organic body, but it is also indicated in essentially a similar way in the action of the great masses of water on the earth. The ocean water may indeed with no undue stretch of the metaphor be called the external blood of all organisms contained in it. Now, this supply of dissolved matter necessary to the life of the ocean comes to the seas from two sources: a large part from the land areas where the material is taken into solution by rain-water and conveyed thence through the rivers to the sea or is given to the ocean by the action of the waves along the shore. In part it is furnished to the waters of the sea by volcanic action. This work is done in the following manner. A vast amount of dust is thrown into the oceans by submarine volcanoes which discharge their emanations directly into the seas. This dust falls through the atmosphere upon the ocean surface. If for any considerable period either of these sources of supply should be denied to the oceans, the marine life would become impoverished. If both of them should fail in the course of a relatively brief geological time, the sea would become unfit for life. But for these processes, land life, which was immediately derived from that of the seas, could never have existed.

The conditions which led to the production of these solutions of mineral matter in the ocean waters depend upon singularly nice

adjustments in the under conditions of the earth, one of which we shall now trace. The growth of the continents is probably due to the considerable contraction of the earth's internal parts from constant loss of heat which takes place from the globe, combined with a relatively slight shrinkage of its outer parts. A difference in bulk of the internal and external parts of the earth is the essential cause of these irregularities of its surface. Formed by this process of contraction, the continents, at least in their parts which are above the level of the seas, are subject to very great erosion from the direct action of the ocean on its shore lines and the indirect action which the ocean brings about through the rain which it sends to the lands.

The adjustment of these forces, which produce the continents and destroy them, is so delicately accomplished that, although on the average the land areas rise but a little way above the ocean surface, they always have projected in a certain measure sufficient to give a source of sediments which are contributed to the sea and a foothold for the higher life of the earth. If the energy of growth exhibited by these lands were as much as one half less than it is at present, the erosive forces would soon destroy their reliefs, reducing them to the ocean level. If, on the other hand, the rate of growth of the continental reliefs were twice as great as it is now and has been in the past, the rate of erosion remaining the same, the continents would be elevated to the condition of Thibetan table-lands, and would thus be unfitted for the uses of their higher life on account of their uplifting into the zone of sterilizing cold. The beautiful adjustment which has evidently been maintained since the beginning of geological history is one which rests on conditions which are independent yet exquisitely combined in their operation.

Let us now turn from this sketch of the physical conditions on which life depends to consider certain sequences in the succession of organic forms which have led to the existence of man. In considering this aspect of the problem we shall as far as possible put aside all questions which in any way depend upon the process of selection, and so avoid the peculiar risks which we have noted in the Paleyan method of considering the subject. Our first point is that the higher forms of organic life depended on the lower for their existence. If there is any one fact in organic nature which may be regarded as beyond the field of debate, it is this, that men in common with all the other higher organisms in the world have come to their present state of being by gradual steps, which led

by slight gradations from the first and lowest stages of organism to the most elevated forms. If we attentively examine the record of this development, we find certain general and most important facts which appear to throw a striking light on the nature of the control in the universe.

The first of these facts which we shall consider concerns the way in which these successive advances from lower to higher have been effected. It is difficult to convey to the reader a sense of the stages in which the advances of organic life have been accomplished. These stages in gradation have been in a great measure lost through the imperfections in the record of ancient life. It is only by a large view of the facts that the naturalist secures a tolerably clear conception of the conditions under which life advances from one degree of development to another.

The process of organic advance appears to be in general as follows: Beginning with the lowest state of life, the primal form, acting it may be under the conditions of natural selection, continually presses towards a higher state of being. It has what we may call a certain ongoing motive in its development, which causes it to tend upward in grade of structure. To a great extent this upward-going motive is checked by various hindrances encountered in its advance, obstacles which arise in part from internal and inherited qualities by species which already possess the field. Finally, in some given equation of these resistances, the upward tending form breaks through the wall of obstacles and ascends to the higher plane of living. In some cases the work of selection tends to lead the form downward in structure, but these degradations, though numerous, are in the organic world less conspicuous than those which indicate the upward and onward going; though interesting, they are not important for our present purpose, and therefore will not be further considered. Arriving in the new state to which its motive of advance has led it, the species proceeds to extend its geographical limits, to avail itself of the advantages which long continued effort has gained. No sooner is its foothold in the new field well established than we find it again pressing on its upward limits, and in time another step in the advance may be established. By this process of ongoing it may secure many diverse lines of advance, ascending upward in different series of structural or functional elaborations. Thus on the one hand it may gain by better motor organs; on another, by a better system of reproduction; on a third, by better instruments of defense against enemies, and so the primal species may become separated into diverse forms.

Developing in this way, the ascending group becomes divided into several species: by further change into various genera, or by still other modifications, several branches of the parent stem may become separated by family, by ordinal or yet higher differences. Thus it comes about that when naturalists endeavor to indicate the affiliations of forms within the same genus, family, or order, they best accomplish their task by means of a diagram drawn in the familiar shape of a genealogical tree. With the memory of such a tree in mind we may proceed one step further in the large conception which we seek to secure. We will remember that in all large genealogical trees there are certain branches of the parent stem, which come off in each generation, characterized by the fact that they have no succession; the group, in a word, dies out. In the organic tree, where species take the place of individuals in the diagram, we note not only the death without succession of many of the branches, but also that, even where death does not come in, the species or larger group apparently loses the impulses which led it upward and onward, and continued unchanged upon the same plane, or perhaps declines to a lower state of being.

For the purpose we have in view it is a most important fact that, although one of these parent branches may give off many species, some indeed yielding very great numbers of such groups, they never produce identical forms at different points of the line. If a species diverges from the parent branch and then becomes extinguished, it is never by any chance reproduced. At first sight it would seem that in the multitudinous chances of life the peculiar equation of internal and external circumstances which leads to the creations of species would often so recur that we should have identical shapes created at different periods; but the clearest fact which the palæontologist finds in the records of the great stone book is, that organic forms originate but once and are never repeated. Hence it comes about that each of our own ancestral forms, which are perhaps to be numbered by tens of thousands, each of the several species through which we may have derived our life, depended for its existence upon the previous coming into being of the next stage below; in fact, we may repeat the often made comparison between organic life and the steps of a ladder or the links of a chain: any one of the stages of ongoing being wanting, it is impossible to see how the following step or link of the ladder or chain could exist. This consideration is so important to our argument that we must enforce it even at the risk of being a little tedious. Let us conceive the immediate predecessor of man,

whom we will for convenience designate as M1, a species enough below his level to be counted as distinct. Man came off from that species, and we are compelled to believe that he could have originated in no other form. We are compelled to believe this from the fact that at no point do we find another kind of man differing specifically from our kindred, infertile with them, separated, in a word, by trenchant specific characters from other kinds of men. In its time this last stage before the human form depended in a similar way upon some particular species which we will call M2; this in turn originated in an earlier form M3, and so, step by step, we go downward by inconceivably numerous stages to the primal basis of life, every round of the ladder being absolutely essential to the next succeeding.

Let us suppose that at some state of the past a given branch of the life-tree had failed to put forth the twig which led upward to man: all the facts in our possession lead us to suppose that the human form, or anything like it, could not have been attained. As soon as the particular branch had gone beyond the point where the diversification towards man was possible, the opportunity of making man would have been lost. If at any point in the succession of steps the accidents of this complicated world had destroyed the group which held within itself the possibilities of our being, the chain would have been broken, and man would have become an impossibility.

The difficulty of securing this uninterrupted succession leading from the lower animals to man can only be adequately conceived by those who are familiar with the swift recurring death which overtakes the inconceivably numerous branches of the life-tree. At the close of each great geological age the greater part of the species and a large part of the genera are destroyed. Others swiftly take their place and continue the organic life upwards. It is likely that since the beginning of organic life on the earth's surface somewhere near 100,000,000 species have met their death, but in these unending destructions we see the succession of structures, which led to men, has never been interrupted.

The common view concerning the creation of species, a view held only by those naturalists who had paid but little attention to the problem, is that organic forms are constantly climbing from lower to higher estates. It is roughly assumed by many writers, though generally in a tacit manner, that, if all the higher forms of life were extinguished, leaving only the simpler protozoan forms, in time the application of terrestrial life would be restored

in much as its present shape. If such a calamity were to overtake the more elevated beings, there probably would be in time a certain succession of higher life by its evolution from the lower ; but all we know concerning the coming of species is definitely against the hypothesis that anything like a complete elaboration of life in its present shape could be brought about.

The force of this argument is best seen when we consider that only one highly intellectual creature fitted by qualities of mind and body for the work of man has been produced on the earth's surface. All the other intellectual series, of which there are many, save man are to be regarded as failures, at least when compared with the one supreme success. Thus, this intellectual very man is either a marvelously singular accident or the product of some kind of control which has guided the movement of life from group to group through the manifold dangers which overtake all creatures alike in the long ages of struggle from the dawn of organisms to the present day.

By the foregoing glance at the succession of organic forms which afforded the steps that led to man's estate, we perceive that this advance from the base to the summit of the animal kingdom has been accomplished through a succession of steps, each essential to the one which followed, and the whole necessary for the making of man. Each of those steps which led from the lower to the higher form has required a certain coincidence between the impulses proper to each of the successive organic species and the circumstances which environed it. The objector to this view may, it is true, urge that the reason why the later new species do not serve as well as the former to continue the ascending chain is, that the field had been already occupied, and there was no room for the new life to develop in contact with that which had already won the precedence. There can be no doubt that the possession of the area open to life by the higher forms has militated against the rising of other kindred species ; but when we consider how wide the world is, and how manifold are the ways in which life could have worked upward, when we furthermore consider how slender is the ascending line on which one alone has been possible, we cannot regard this position as at all militating against the hypothesis that there has been an element of directing power other than that afforded by natural selection or other chance agents in the development of organic life.¹

¹ The reader will, of course, perceive that at this stage of the argument I take what may be termed an anthropocentric view of the problem which is

We have by no means exhausted, indeed we have scarcely touched upon the variety of considerations which may be adduced to show the element of control in the development of organic life. It is worth our while, however, to consider yet another of these elements of conditioning for the reason that we thereby confront another class of circumstances than those which have previously occupied our attention. This last example is found in the details of structure which have led the vertebrate form to the peculiar intelligence we find manifested in its higher members, principally in our own species. It was long ago remarked that man's intelligence, or rather the rationality of his actions, depends in a large measure upon the peculiar power which his hand gives him of accomplishing the behests of his will. In all the other organic species, save in the vertebrates, grasping organs, where they exist as they generally do, are numerous. The radiate animals are extensively provided with such appendages; the group of articulates, including the insects, commonly have very many pairs of limbs which may be devoted to various purposes. It is only in the vertebrates that we find the number of limbs very small, there being never more than two pairs.

At first sight this extreme limitation in the grasping appendages, the instruments of volition, appears to be a conspicuous disadvantage of the highest groups in the animal kingdom; but when we come to consider the relation of limbs and other volitional appendages to intelligence, we perceive that this peculiar feature of the vertebrates so far from being a disadvantage is the very condition which has determined the development of their masterful intelligence. Thus, in articulates the numerous parts of limbs guide the development of intelligence into the paths of instinct. The machinery subserving the purposes of the will in this group is so well adapted to all the conditions of life that intelligence has hardly, if at all, attained to the stage of reasoning. The action of these limbs is substantially automatic as is that of the heart or other parts which serve single functions, and therefore need no intelligence in their guidance. The insect's intelligence is thus cramped by the very perfection of the physical organization, and rationality is scarcely developed. On the other hand, with the vertebrates all that they can accomplish

before us, and am open to the full measure of criticism which may be directed against those who choose this way of approaching universal problems. Within the space of this paper I cannot undertake the defense of this position, which I would like to present.

through their limbs, save the simplest feats of motion, has to be secured by the adaptation of organs little fitted for peculiar arts, an adaptation which is accomplished by the exercise of thought. When the vertebrate series culminated in the higher anthropoids, the unknown ancestors of man, the need of the creature led to the abandonment of the horizontal progression and all the extensive morphological changes which were necessary to plant the form on the hinder limbs. This was a serious sacrifice of the conditions of strength to the needs of the developing rationality.

It seemed to the Greeks that for the condition of perfect physical and mental life in one animal there should be four limbs for progression and two for the purposes of the hands, and so they imagined the centaur. But if the vertebrate series had been provided with three pairs of limbs, especially if that form had had in addition to the limbs the wings and other functional appendages of insects, it is easy to see that the intelligence developed by the exercise of the faculties in this amply provided body could hardly have advanced beyond the automatic condition which we find in the articulate animals. In all the forms below man in the vertebrate series the limitation of appendages has probably been in the main disadvantageous, but when the last stage of the organic problem came, namely, the development of rationality, every one of these disadvantages becomes the most consummate of all adaptations which we find in the organic world, for to it we probably owe the development of rational thought.

We have now briefly sketched the argument on which we may rest a theory of design. This theory in its general character is essentially unlike that which has been overthrown, though the resemblance to it will probably be sufficient to excite prejudice in many minds. It seems to me, however, as we stated at the outset of the argument, that the hypothesis of design is quite as legitimate as the hypothesis of chance. It seems furthermore that the hypothesis of design controlling the general trend of organic development, leaving at the same time the details to be worked out by selection and other influences, is also in its way legitimate.

It is hardly necessary to state that the foregoing argument does not prove in a mathematical way the existence of purpose in the universe. It only affords a dilemma which may be stated as follows: namely, either intelligence in the high form in which we find it in man is the result of a fortuitous concatenation of unadjusted impulses dependent on one chance in a practically infinite number of possibilities, or that this life of man is the product of

control. In the end it is left to the student to judge which of the two views is most satisfactory to his spirit. *re*

It should furthermore be said that the foregoing argument does not effectually assail the position held by those who take the purely mechanical view of the universe. On the basis of their argument it is still possible to maintain that this apparent order is the result of fortuity alone. Where the reasoner adopts the purely mechanical hypothesis and resists in an obstinate way the impressions which contact with nature serves to bring to his mind, there appears to me no way by which he can logically be driven from his position. It seems to me that he is in the attitude of a person who should postulate that there was a limit to the physical universe. If we should take such a person to the utmost bounds of the known world, he might still claim that the limit lay yet beyond that place, and however far we should journey, there would be no point at which his claim could be shown to be invalid. The advocate of the mechanical theory is by his assumption entitled to deny the influence of the ideal in the universe. The naturalist from his contact with the world obtains a sense of ideals: if that contact be extensive and varied, he generally comes to believe that some form of will is operative in nature. Trusting to this overwhelming impression and founding his hypothesis upon it, it appears to me that he is justified in the argument which I have pursued. The only answer he can make to the advocate of the mechanical hypothesis is, that contact with nature brings him to a state of mind which opposes the mechanical view, and that on the conviction obtained by such a contact he is compelled to found his reasoning.

All that can be claimed for this method of presenting the problem of design is that it puts the idealist into a better position as regards his method of treating facts than that which was secured by the method adopted by the school of Paley. Following the plan of discussion which I have been compelled to present in a very condensed form, we avoid the difficulties with the argument which are necessarily encountered by those who trust to the facts exhibited in the devices of organic forms and which may be the result of inherited experience alone.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MODERN NOVEL.

STUDENTS of the history of literature find it impossible to regard any species of literary composition as wholly peculiar to the present era. Each species, as now cultivated, is a development with its roots in the past. However much insight into the character of any literary product we may gain by regarding it as the child of its own age, we are also compelled to remember that its ancestors, with their hereditary traits, must be sought for in previous ages. And yet it may be claimed that, in some important meaning of the words, *novel-writing* and *novel-reading* are peculiarly significant of modern times. Certainly, no other species of literature, and perhaps no other form of artistic performance, or of æsthetic and ethical influence and cultivation, has had in the last century so surprising a growth as this kind of romantic composition. In some sort, then, the production and use of novels are distinctive of our era. And this is true whether we consider chiefly the number of them and of their readers, or the excellence of the art which the better examples display, or, finally, the astonishing effect which they are producing upon the mental and moral life of the people.

If the word "romance" be used with a range of meaning wide enough to include all the literature of fiction, it may be claimed that every subordinate species of such literature was represented, or foreshadowed, among the Greek and Latin authors. But in order to make this claim valid, it is necessary to use the word "foreshadowed" in a somewhat vague and expansive fashion, and to include among "the Greek and Latin authors" those who wrote in the post-classical periods of Italy and Byzantium. Even then, although we find in both these literatures specimens of fables and tales, marvelous voyages, collections of fictitious letters, stories of love and adventure, as well as prose fictions with a philosophical, historical, or religious bent, the nearest ancient approaches to the modern novel differ from it in several important respects.

It was only after the close of the classical period of literature that fictitious and rhetorical prose composition began greatly to flourish among the readers of the Greek and Latin languages. "It was late, however, and after the decline of its nobler literature," says Dunlop, "that fictions in prose came to be cultivated as a species of composition in Greece." It is suggestive, also, as pre-

paring the way for understanding the psychology of the modern novel, to notice that this development of prose fiction shows the influence of the Orient on the Western civilization, and that it took place in a degenerate age. Excessive delight and unceasing practice in telling and hearing tales belong to a condition in which a luxurious imagination, easy morals, and much leisure are combined. It was the Ionians, a people who were in their manner of living almost as much Asiatic as Greek, that earliest became especially famous for these tales, — and among them, preëminently, the inhabitants of Miletus. Hence they were known as “Milesian tales.” Moreover, the peculiar favor these prose fictions gained at this time was undoubtedly due to the fact that they were much easier writing and reading than the classic drama, or than the forms of romantic poetical literature which had preceded them.

In the literature of the Middle Ages the romances derived from antiquity were perpetuated in certain pseudo-classical works. And it is through these imitations of compositions which in their original form belong to a degenerate age and style of literature, that the modern novel must in part trace its descent. The Greek and Latin romance showed its inferiority by confining itself to a “hackneyed circle” of incidents, and by the effort to compensate for a lack of real invention, and of real insight into the human heart and human life, by crowding the scene with astonishing incidents. Two lovers of superhuman beauty, two or three persecuting husbands and amorous princes, several pirates and banditti, formed the chief *dramatis personæ* of almost all these more ancient tales. But the legend of Troy was the captivating subject for the pseudo-classical works of the Middle Ages.

Another class of prose romances, however, was undoubtedly the more influential historical factor in producing the modern novel. This comprised such mediæval prose fictions as dealt with the characters and exploits of knightly heroes, and grouped themselves in various cycles about King Arthur and the Round Table, Charlemagne and his peers, Amadis of Gaul, and various less celebrated personages. Connected with these larger cycles are other tales of minor importance, recounting the exploits of outlaws, or the final vindication of some chaste wife wrongfully accused of infidelity, and perhaps unjustly punished for a fault only alleged. These progenitors of the modern novel also show somewhat the same poverty of artistic resources as that which char-

acterized the yet earlier romantic literature of the Greeks and Romans.

In tracing the origin of the modern novel historically, it would be necessary to point out how the mediæval romance faded away during the seventeenth century, and at the close of this period the present form of prose fiction began more definitely and widely to be produced. In England the development of romantic literature was doubtless much influenced by the great power and brilliancy of the dramatic compositions and the stage of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Probably the recent decline, in quality and favor, of the products designed for theatrical representation, has operated on the whole to increase the influence, and improve the character, of prose fictions designed to be read.

But our point of view is not chiefly historical; and the few remarks which have already been made are introductory to the subject of the modern novel, that it may be looked at from another point of view.

All literature is the expression of human thought and feeling; it is also addressed to the thinking and feeling mind of man. It is both *of* and *to* the human soul. Whatever its historical origin and historical course of development may be, it has always a yet more interior source from which it springs, a law of spiritual descent and classification to which it must conform. What is thus necessarily true of all literature is, of course, true of the kind of literature called "romantic," and of the particular species which the modern novel constitutes. Indeed, romantic literature is of all kinds the most obviously derivable from, the most strictly subject to, the simpler and more interesting and impressive activities and principles of the human mind. Of the modern novel, then, we raise the question: From what forms of mental impulse does it arise, and to what forms of human desire and want does it minister? And to justify ourselves in raising this inquiry into the psychological origin and import of the modern novel, we appeal to the facts of history. The types and foreshadows and precursors of this peculiar species of literature may, indeed, be discovered in all the history of literature. But within the last century, or somewhat more, this species has undergone the most rapid and marked development. It has developed in such a manner and to such a degree as to become, to a large extent, distinctive of the modern era of literature. There must be certain valid reasons in the human mind for both these historical truths.

Novels, like every other species of literary composition, are addressed from one mind to another mind. The mental impulses in which they originate are, therefore, of two kinds. In part, they originate within the writer, and are impulses to the expression of thought and feeling; but in part they also originate in the minds of the community which is to be addressed, and which is to furnish the patrons of the author's work; they are therefore impulses growing out of some kind of craving or want, or perhaps *repulsions* from states of thought and feeling, away from which the artistic product is expected to bear the mind. In order, then, to understand the psychological genesis and import of the modern novel, we must consider what it is in the mental life of man which urges him to this species of literary production; and also what there is in human mental life to which prose fiction ministers. We must further consider what are the reasons in the peculiarities of our present time which so enlarges and exaggerates the demand for novels and its supply. Nor is it at all certain that the impulses which produce the author, and the reasons for the vast multitude of readers, are to be found in precisely the same movements of human nature. Indeed, here, as in all cases of supply and demand for æsthetic goods, the motives of the producer and the purchaser are to a considerable extent different.

The chief mental impulse in the authors of all romantic literature is toward æsthetic expression. The modern novel, as a species of such literature, therefore falls under those truths and laws of mental life which underlie all artistic effort.

Doubtless there is, in this day of rapid making and wide spreading of books, much writing of poor novels for pay. But it does not follow that the real and potent source of the over-production of even the poorest kind of prose fiction lies in the desire of gain, or in the necessity, under which most men are, of earning a livelihood. If novels did not sell, certainly novels would not be published. If novels were not published, probably comparatively few of them would be written. Doubtless, also, many novels are written, as well as published, solely to reap the pecuniary fruits of their sale. All this, however, may be said of painting, music, and the writing of poetry, as truly as of the writing of novels. Yet no person of real insight into the sources of human life, and of real sympathy with all which is human, would think of claiming that painting, or music, or poetry, does not originate in the æsthetic impulses of human nature. This statement is as true of the cheapest chromo as of the *chef-d'œuvre* of the greatest artist; of

the improvisation on the banjo or the jewsharp by the plantation negro, as of the sonata of Beethoven ; of the doggerel that is received or rejected by the country newspaper, as of the well-turned verses of the poet laureate. Indeed, it is the rule that art tends to become more mercenary after it has attained such excellence or acceptance that it can command its price. In the impulses that propel him, the writer of one of Beadle's dime novels does not necessarily differ from Tolstoi or Daudet.

It accords with this view that we find the philosophy of art attempting to make room for the modern novel among its classifications of the forms of artistic expression. Thus Lotze speaks, though very briefly, of the romance and the novel, together with the drama and the epic poem, under the general head of poetic art. But to admit that the modern novel is an artistic product, chiefly due to the impulse on the part of its writer toward æsthetic expression, does not define its particular characteristics.

We get a closer point of view from which to regard the modern novel by comparing it with two closely allied species of literary art : these are the drama and the epic poem. Both agree with the novel in having substantially the same subject, the contemplation of which stimulates the effort at artistic expression. Each of them, however, differs from the novel by having certain forms and laws of expression dictated to it by the very nature of the handling which it gives to its material. Novel, drama, and epic poem all have regard to human life. They all attempt to depict, and to a certain extent to interpret and to idealize, human life. But the limitations under which this attempt is made by the drama and by epic poetry are much severer and more restrictive than those which encompass the writer of the novel. The drama can have regard only to such a representation of life as is adapted to the stage. It is true to its own nature only when it concentrates itself upon the problem of setting forth, by language and by action, the meaning and effect of the conduct of individuals toward other individuals, in accordance with the laws of scenic art. Movement, deeds, action, either past, present, or prospective, determine the amount and character of the discourse which is allowable for the best æsthetic expression here. Much of the dramatist's realism must take the form of that of Mr. Puff in the play : " I open with a clock striking, to beget an awful attention in the audience — it also marks the time, which is four o'clock in the morning, and saves a description of the rising sun, and a great deal about gilding the eastern hemisphere." The restrictions

under which all epic poetry exists, in the effort to depict, interpret, and idealize human life, are too obvious to need mentioning. The current philosophy of life requires some more untrammelled form of æsthetic expression than that of poetry. This required form it finds in prose fiction, — and nowhere, on the whole, more effectively and agreeably.

The desire to give a freer handling and æsthetic expression to one's thoughts and feelings regarding the subject of human life is, then, the impulse which operates, in the most general and forceful way, within the mind of the authors of our modern novels. It is this fact, in part, which gives to the novel its undoubtedly great significance. No thoughtful observer of mankind can afford to overlook the facts which indicate the enlarging existence and growing influence of this species of literature. He who does overlook these facts omits something which is indispensable for the most comprehensive and sympathetic understanding of our modern era.

And now let the question be raised: Why has prose fiction, considered from the point of view furnished by the impulse under which its production takes place, flourished so exceedingly in modern times? The answer must be found, in part at least, in the psychological peculiarities of the man of modern times.

The modern surprisingly great development of all kinds of literature is, of course, largely due to certain general causes which characterize modern civilization: among these the chief are the discovery and development of printing, and the consequent multiplication of books at low cost; and also the creation, by the whole process of modern education, of a great multitude of people who can read books, and who have a taste for some kind of reading. But we are seeking the causes which lie within the mind of the modern man, and impel him to attempt so much of a peculiar species of literature. For the growth of the production of novels is a literary characteristic peculiar to modern times. Moreover, it is not merely nor chiefly the number of works of prose fiction which is remarkable. The development in their characteristic quality has been even more remarkable. It might almost be said that the conception which rules in this type of literature is a product of modern times.

The free æsthetic expression of one's thoughts and feelings regarding human life involves three factors: these are, the depicting or portrayal of human life, the interpreting of human life, and its idealization. The union of these three factors enters into

every so-called "philosophy of life"; and the effort of the writer of the modern novel is to give some kind of æsthetic expression to his philosophy of life. Of course, it is not meant that every writer of a genuinely artistic novel must aim to give in it a complete representation of his philosophy of life; nor is it meant that every writer of even the most artistic class of novels must consciously aim at impressing upon his readers his own philosophy of life. In no sense of the word can any work of art claim to be a "complete" expression of all the æsthetic aims which rule in its own species of composition. The landscape-painter does not attempt the whole world of landscapes; nor does the sculptor aim to set in marble, in a single masterpiece, every possible significant posture or action of the human body. The landscape painted is a mere bit, and it has a frame. The statue sets forth only one significant posture into which the material part of man may be thrown by the emotions of the mind. So each novel must aim chiefly to represent the character and meaning of life in some one of its multiform aspects, and as experienced by one or more selected individuals with a personal history and personal development.

Even in the undeveloped prose romances of the Greek and Latin authors, or later of the Middle Ages, the true conception of the work designed to be accomplished by this species of literature may be traced. But the conception exists only in a much more germinal form than at present. Merely to tell a story that shall while away time and amuse the hearers, often seems, indeed, to be the only motive of the early Greek and Latin romances. And yet the "wandering adventures and loves" of Dinias and Dercyllis, of Rhodanes and Sinonis, of Theagenes and Chariclea, of Clitophon and Leucippe, and of Daphnis and Chloe, are by no means complete exceptions to the law we have laid down. In these stories there is almost none of that interest in the development and significance of character, of interior human life, in which the modern novel abounds. But even these stories are not without tokens that their authors felt the movement to express, in a manner easier and freer than that afforded by the drama or by epic poetry, their ideas concerning certain phases of human life. It is a mark of the literary degeneracy of the age in which these Greek and Latin romances flourished that the rights and obligations of love between the sexes furnished the principal and almost the only phase of human life which these ancient story-tellers undertook to depict, interpret, and idealize. It is a mark of superiority in the romances of the Middle Ages that the interest they display in

life is more varied, and that the idealization of it which they attempt rises in comparison with the mere effort at portrayal.

The modern novel-writer, far more generally and clearly than his predecessors in the field of prose fiction, understands the aim of his work. He also is, on the whole, far more successful in combining the interpretation and idealizing of human life with its mere portrayal. For this there are reasons in certain definite and mighty forces that are at work upon the mind of man in the modern era. Human interest in the portrayal of every phase of human life, and the power to portray it in an interesting and worthy manner, has greatly increased in extent and intensity during the last two centuries. The different classes of society and the different nations of the earth have been made to interpenetrate, and the customs — foreign before — of these different classes and nations have been made more familiar to each other. The external aspects of life, not only in the nearer places and times, but in remote lands and ages of the world, have been curiously and carefully studied. The world itself has seemed to enlarge, and its inhabitants have come to feel a more eager and extensive interest in each other.

Together with this modern growth of power and interest for the portrayal of human life, there has been a growth in the desire of the human mind to penetrate the meaning of life. Never before were so many of the race eagerly and earnestly inquiring for an interpretation of their own being, conduct, history, and destiny. Never before were so many ready to render an answer to this inquiry, at least as respects some one or more of the innumerable subordinate inquiries of which the main one is composed. Recently Mr. Huxley has complained of the teachers of religion, and of the classes technically called "religious," because they are so ready to assume that they have a monopoly of reflective interest in the more serious problems of life. Whatever we may think of Mr. Huxley's complaint, there can be no doubt that not one class alone, but all classes are more eagerly and earnestly than ever before asking for some light upon these problems. How multitudinous and pressing these problems are! Modern natural science has raised many of them; modern economic science, social science, political science, has raised many more. Modern psychology has awakened from the long period of self-complacency in which it remained satisfied with cumbrous classification and easy-going appeals to so-called intuitions and "common sense," and has filled its world with the asking and attempted answering of strange,

new inquiries about the human mind. Biblical criticism and theology have also been busy propounding inquiries. The interest in many of these problems, subordinate to the one great problem of the meaning and destiny of man's soul, is more than ever spread widely throughout all classes of the people.

But that æsthetic expression which the modern novel gives to the current forms of the philosophy of human life includes also a work of idealization. The artistic writer does not simply depict and interpret the phenomena with which he deals; he also lifts them above the sphere in which they are wholly entangled and obscured by commonplace surroundings toward a certain ideal type. Indeed, the *idealization* of life is necessarily connected with its interpretation. For it is the "ideas" which rule in the phenomena that give us the meaning of the phenomena. Every human life, however, is in its bare actuality so complicated and meaningless — or rather it involves such a hopeless mixture of possible meanings — that no part of it can be understood unless it is portrayed, not simply as it is as a whole and in all its actual features, but in so far as it may be conceived of as corresponding to the ideal. This tendency to idealize is deep and strong and pervading in all human conduct. It accounts for the absurd estimate put upon the virtues of the political or military hero; it voices itself in the hoarse applause which greets his appearance in the political or military campaign. The man is not regarded as he is, in naked actuality, but in the halo of the idea which he is considered to represent. This tendency enters into the acclaim given to the prize-fighter, — to Sullivan in England, or to the criminal at the bar and on the gallows, to Lingg in this country. It is not the coarse, sensual, really cowardly drunkard and wife-beater that men admire and find pleasure in contemplating; but the ideal (low enough surely) of physical endurance and courage, and of muscular development. It is not the cowardly, revengeful braggart of an assassin to whom sentimental women bring flowers and weak-minded clergymen offer verbal tribute; it is the ideal (low enough surely) of endurance in a cause, and courage in facing death for the cause's sake.

In spite of the so-called "practical" tendencies of the present age, and of the strength of the realistic school among the writers and critics of novels, I am firmly convinced that human life was never before so much contemplated in the light of ideals. What is it that quickens the pulses of every species of modern literature? It is the enlarging idealizations, the richer and more ex-

pansive dreamings, of the developing human mind. The science of the nineteenth century requires that everything shall be brought to the test of fact. This is well; but why? It is, that *verifiable* ideals may take the place of those which have been shown to contradict the import of the facts. It is the purifying, not the banishment, of all our dream-life that we seek. The philosophy of the age seeks the point where the truest reality and the highest idea have their meeting and become one. And the common people dimly grope after the ideal state of society, of government, of physical, political, social, and ethical life.

There is one other potent reason why the modern age is so peculiarly moved by the impulse to give æsthetic expression, in the form of prose fiction, to its attempts at a philosophy of human life. The sphere of the novel is with the individual man. Some one person is selected as the character whose experience is to show what the writer observes and thinks concerning some particular aspect of life. But the individual is peculiarly important in the estimate of the modern age. Never before in the history of the race did so vast a multitude so highly estimate, each one in the case of himself or herself, the significance of every member of that race. Never before were so large a proportion of mankind disinclined to enjoy and suffer, to toil and struggle, to sicken and die, without so much as once raising an inquiry into the meaning of it all.

It may, then, be concluded that the psychological origin of the modern novel is to be found, so far as its authors are chiefly concerned, in the impulse to give the freest possible artistic expression to one's views and feelings regarding the life of the individual man. This necessarily includes the portrayal, the interpretation, and the idealization of this life in all its different aspects and groups of experiences. And there are good reasons, lying in the distinguishing characteristics of the modern development of mind, why this species of literature should now find so large and influential a following.

The greater problems which perplex, and so largely baffle, the attempt to frame a philosophy of human life, have been dealt with by certain novelists in a surprisingly skillful, influential, and helpful way. Of none is this more true than of those dark and mysterious problems that concern the unfolding results and destiny of sinful conduct and character. These are the problems with which dealt the great dramas of ancient Greece. Never since the day of these dramas has art dealt with these problems in a

manner worthy to be compared with that of the modern novel. "In the portraiture of evil and criminal characters," says Bulwer, "lies the widest scope for an author profoundly versed in the philosophy of the human heart." Judged by this æsthetic (but also ethical) standard, Tolstoi's "*Anna Karénina*" seems to me one of the world's great masterpieces of art,—a work to be placed in the very highest rank of its kind. Like every really great artistic product, its effect upon the intelligent and right-minded observer and critic is æsthetically and ethically elevating and purifying. So perverse does the criticism which Mr. Maurice Thompson and others have, in the name of morality, bestowed upon this book appear to me as a professional student of the human mind, that I find great difficulty even in comprehending the grounds on which it is alleged to rest.

But what, to make further use of this notable example, is the problem to which Tolstoi gives artistic treatment in his "*Anna Karénina*"? It may be stated in terms somewhat like the following: What will be the fate of a person, however favorably situated, who becomes committed to an illicit connection? The author answers this question by presenting to us a woman, pure, intelligent, gifted, charming. There is in her circumstances, however, every reason which can be realized in any case why she should break over the human and divine laws which bind her to a life of purity. Her husband is her senior in years, repulsive to her in his character and addresses, of a nature and bearing certain to irritate a temperament like hers. The society in which she moves is tolerant of such offenses as hers, if only its conventional restrictions are not broken through in a manner too obvious and disagreeable. Her lover is at first sincerely devoted and faithful. In transgressing the moral law she still, at first and for some time afterward, remains as faithful to all her social, maternal, and even wifely relations as is possible for the transgressor of this one law. Yet what is the result? what becomes of the beautiful, the gifted, the charming and affectionate *Anna Karénina*? Involved in a contest for social recognition with that society which, hollow as was its pretense and thin as was its varnish of respectability, still represented on the whole the side of the great divine law, she finds herself beaten in the contest. Undertaking to control and monopolize the devotion of the man for whom she has forsaken her husband, the loveliness by which she attracted him changes into an irritable and exacting temper, whose result is the alienation of the coveted love. Toward the last her deeper spiritual nature

suffers some sort of an awakening. She sees herself as she has been, — in the light of the idea to which she has been unwittingly conforming herself. “For the first time,” says Tolstoi, “Anna turned upon her relations with the Count this bright light which was suddenly revealing her life to her. ‘What did he seek in me? A satisfaction for his vanity, rather than for his love!’ . . . ‘My love has been growing more and more selfish and passionate; his has been growing fainter and fainter.’ . . . And she remembered with disgust what she called that love. . . . ‘I cannot imagine *any situation* in which my life could be anything but one long misery.’”

Brought round by destiny and her own free action, — in that strange mingling of the two which gives the law to every human life, — after years of wandering, to the place where she first met him for whose love she has lost all (yet selfishly, as she has been made aware, and not with the self-sacrifice of the purest affection), she punishes, at that fitting spot, in one dreadful moment, both herself and him. What a fine touch of true art it is which makes Anna Karénina draw her beautiful head between her shoulders, as with outstretched hands she throws herself on her knees under the car! “She had time to feel afraid,” and attempted to draw back. “‘Lord forgive me all!’ she murmured, feeling the struggle to be vain.”

Surely this masterpiece of prose fiction portrays, interprets, and idealizes one profoundly interesting phase of our many-sided human life. And this it does in such a way as to beget that æsthetic and ethical elevation and purifying which is the result of all the highest art.

Many minor problems of the same general kind have also been most successfully dealt with by the modern novel. How subtle is conscience in presenting and arguing those accusations of wrongdoing which it brings! What treatise in ethics or theology has presented this truth more clearly and forcefully than George Eliot in her narrative of the experience of Gwendolen while her detested husband is drowning before her eyes! “If it had been any use, I should have prayed — I should have prayed that something might befall him. . . . I did kill him in my thoughts. . . . I saw him sink, and my heart gave a leap as if it were going out of me. . . . The rope! he called out — and I stooped for the rope. . . . But he was gone down again, and I had the rope in my hand.” Who can tell, we may ask, whether the throwing of the rope would have saved the drowning man? “Gwendolen’s remorse,”

says the author, "aggravated her inward guilt, and she gave the character of decisive action to what had been an inappreciably instantaneous glance of desire. . . . Still, a question as to the outward effectiveness of a criminal desire dominant enough to impel even a momentary act cannot alter our judgment of the desire." Yet Deronda sees in Gwendolen's remorse "the precious sign of a recoverable nature, — the culmination of that self-disapproval which had been the awakening of a new life within her."

Thus also has the modern novel, by portraying and interpreting certain phases of human life, helped to enrich the philosophy of life through the successful artistic presentation of certain types of character in the person of an individual. An example of this, which possesses, as it seems to me, great artistic merit, is Daudet's "Numa Roumestan." Here is the typical example of the man, the idol of the many, "who traffics in words without troubling himself about their value, or their accord with his own feelings, if they but sound well." He can address the crowd "with flights of fervid eloquence," which draws forth the applause that half smothers such words as, "My soul — my blood — morality — religion — fatherland." He can approach the wife he has cruelly betrayed, and kiss her "with sincere emotion"; yet if he is "the joy of the street," he is also "the sorrow of the home."

But the greater number of modern novels have, of course, dealt with much less serious and profound forms of human experience than those to which reference has just been made. Yet they, too, come under the same principle as regards the psychological impulse by which their authors are chiefly moved. Most writers of prose fiction have not the ability to portray and interpret in the manner of the truest art the grand passions of the human soul. Yet if an author recognizes the limits of his own mental powers he may be a genuine and helpful expositor of other phases of our complex human life. With what delicacy and tact has Mr. Howells, for example, handled the theme of pure romantic love between mature manhood and girlhood, in his "Indian Summer," — the novel which seems to me the most thoroughly artistic of all the works of this author! One experiences from the reading of this book the same kind of æsthetic cultivation which comes from looking at some of the water-colors of Burkett Foster.

The philosophy of life is also elucidated by those works of prose fiction which deal with the peculiarities of human character and intercourse in particular localities, in more or less definitely restricted communities, or as existing amidst and between different

peoples and nations. No more vivid picture of the historical relations maintaining themselves between the Irish and the English, of the virtues and faults of both, and of the extreme difficulty they have in understanding and appreciating each other, can anywhere be found than in Annie Keary's "Castle Daly."

Let it not be supposed that the lower orders of the modern novel — lower, as measured in the æsthetic or the ethical scale — are exempt from the same principle as to their psychological origin. If it be the conscious or unconscious philosophy of the author that all human experience and action are alike worthy of portraiture, or even that all are alike indifferent from the ethical point of view, the impulse to give æsthetic expression to this philosophy will manifest itself in his literary work. And under the modern conditions, the novel will be far more likely than the drama or the shorter poem to furnish the means of such expression.

But it is time to consider the other psychological source of the growth and influence of the modern novel, — the taste for reading this species of literature in which its producers find the demand for the products of their art. Why are prose fictions so much in requisition, so almost universally read? As to the fact, whether we look upon it as simply appalling and disgusting, or rather regard it sympathetically as one of great interest in the literary and ethical development of the age, the proofs of its existence are abundant. The statistics of the public or private circulating library, of the publishing houses and the book-stalls, return the same kind of evidence. The Sunday-school and technically "religious" literature is very largely made up of novels. The boy or miss returns from the half-hour given to the study of the Bible with means for spending the remaining hours of Sunday in the company of one or more cheap novels. The mother cannot interfere; for is she not herself engaged with one of the Nth thousand of E. P. Roe's fictions, or with something similar?

Nor is the patronage of the modern novel largely confined to any one class of readers, however the classification is undertaken and by whatever standard measured, whether intellectual, æsthetic, or moral. Who can suppose that Gladstone had just read his first prose fiction at the time when he gave so much of a certain kind of éclat to Shorthouse's "John Inglesant"? Few of the divines, or other teachers of public morals, speak in entire absence of experimental knowledge when they utter a warning against novel-reading. Indeed, the class of hard-worked and

rather unimaginative professional men is the one which, with the most conclusive reasons, can justify itself in the freer use of this species of literature.

It cannot be maintained, however, that the impulse moving the multitude of readers of novels is the same as that felt by the writers of novels. Only a few of the more mature and intelligent of these readers look upon the examples of prose fiction to which they resort as interesting and helpful expositions of human life. Fewer still seek to find in them a philosophy of life. A larger number of readers take a certain interest in the character sketches, in the pictures of customs, habits, and even dialects, with which these works abound. And shrewd criticism of the artistic genuineness and effectiveness of the author's work often comes from sources from which such criticism would scarcely be expected. Occasionally a reader is found for the pure fictions of the higher order who thoroughly understands and keenly appreciates (understands and appreciates more fully perhaps than the author himself can) the real significance of the views of life which such fictions set forth. But the larger number of any author's patrons fail to meet him halfway. Their interest in his work is not of the same order as his own; it springs rather from a different psychological source. How many of the readers of Stevenson's "Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" have any real insight into that lesson in the philosophy of life which it impresses in such a forceful and artistic way?

In certain circles, for the most part composed of those who deprecate this species of literature, it is customary to refer the existence of novel-reading to a "craving for excitement." This craving is generally assumed to be necessarily something artificial or even morbid. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of truth in this opinion; but the truth is neither well thought out nor well expressed. For what can be meant by "craving," and what by "excitement," in this use of these words? Human nature shows us no craving in general, and human experience is never that of "excitement" in general. There is no doubt a class of novel-readers who find pleasure in shedding tears over fictitious deathbed scenes, in pitying imaginary woes, in sympathy with the successful issue to a romantic love between the sexes. No doubt, also, certain other novels (we will readily concede to Mr. Thompson that he is right in ranking Zola among the number) gain and hold their readers by ministering to the excitement of baser feelings and imaginations than those just described.

There is also a corresponding class of writers of novels whose view of human life is of a predominatingly sentimental or sensuous order. The gushing feelings or the strong fleshly passions have in their minds an exaggerated importance in the picturing and interpreting of life. Fitzjames Stephen, speaking of Dickens as the typical instance of a strong and rather coarse "sentimentality," criticises in detail his treatment of the subject of death. Of the author's "Little Nell" this critic says: "He gloats over the girl's death as if it delighted him; he looks at it from four or five points of view; touches, tastes, smells, and handles, as if it was some savory dainty which could not be too fully appreciated." And Sir Richard Steele remarked of the stories of Mrs. Aphra Behn, who wrote some two hundred years before Zola, that she appeared to have "understood the practical part of love better than the speculative."

It would be, however, a very narrow view of the psychological origin of novel-reading to regard it as belonging chiefly to the more morbidly sentimental and sensuous parts of human nature. There is not a form of healthy intellectual excitement which is not ministered to, more or less helpfully, by corresponding forms of prose fiction. The arousement of intellectual interest in past times and foreign lands, in strange or familiar types of human character, in local or personal idiosyncrasies of speech, in the mysteries of the invisible world disclosed or fictitiously created to be seen through "Gates Ajar" while "Stepping Heavenward," in the solution of social and economic problems and the reform of social and economic abuses, etc., etc., is secured by the modern novel. Nor has the "excitement" occasioned in the present century by this species of literature been without abundant practical fruits; as witness — could we collect and summon such testimonies — the results of works like "Nicholas Nickleby," "Les Misérables," and "Uncle Tom's Cabin."

The success of the realistic school of writers, and the growth of a class of readers who prefer the healthier intellectual and emotional quickening which comes from the æsthetic presentation of life more nearly as it really is, are a protest against that shallow theory which accounts for the attractiveness of the novel by referring it to the excitement of morbid sentiments or unwholesome passions. But that the *bare* presentation of matter of fact in human life is not the object or the kingdom of this kind of art, the psychology of the novel clearly shows.

If, then, we adopt the view which finds the reason why people

read novels in the "craving for excitement," we are compelled to say that the kind of craving which has this effect is the universal want of some kind of action of the mental powers, and the desire of that happiness which such action naturally brings. There is, however, a better way of conceiving and expressing so much of truth as this conclusion involves.

That perverse but ingenious philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, has propounded a theory of life which makes it intrinsically miserable in the highest degree, because all its experiences vacillate between the two poles of want and ennui. Craving drives the restless will, which is the "in-itself" of human nature, in the ceaseless effort to find what can only momentarily satisfy the intolerable pain of craving. But let this craving be, for only a brief time, satisfied, and the soul falls under the equally unbearable burden of ennui. And "ennui is by no means an evil to be lightly esteemed; in the end it depicts on the countenance real despair. . . . For this evil may drive men to the greatest excesses, just as much as its opposite extreme, famine; the people require *panem et circenses*. . . . As want is the scourge of the people, so ennui is that of the fashionable world." The week of life for the lower orders is seven days of want; for the middle classes it is six days of unsatisfied craving and one of ennui; for the so-called upper classes it is seven days of hateful ennui.

With the bitter and exaggerated pessimism of Schopenhauer we have no sympathy whatever. But his view of the great and unceasing influence of ennui in human life contains much truth. As he himself declares, "the activity of our mind is a constantly deferred ennui." The office of this impulse we regard, however, as benevolent, and ministering on the whole to happiness and to success in life. Ennui is indeed the punishment of idleness; but it is merited and beneficent punishment. Together with its twin whip, craving, it is intended to keep human life moving in the lines of healthful, earnest work and restful, improving recreation, — so-called work and so-called recreation, which are only two forms of the excitement and exercise of the powers of one human mind. They are sunlight and moonlight, reality and ideality; both are necessary goods to our complex human life.

Perhaps the strongest reason for novel-reading is to be found in the constitutional repulsion of man from ennui. And since all that is merely actual in human experience is found unsatisfying, — the desire and aspiration of man being on the whole, fortunately, too great for complete satisfaction with his experience, —

one chief relief from ennui lies in day-dreaming. This is but the seeking for, and satisfaction in some kind of uplift from that dull round of commonplace of which all human experience is so largely composed. This dissatisfaction, sometimes like a soothing stimulant, and sometimes amounting to a scornful and intense disgust with the actuality of human life, is the secret cause of many easy-going indulgences, and of many fierce excesses as well. This is why opium-eating thrives in China: the extract of the sacred poppy takes both the wealthy indolent and the poor child of ceaseless toil out of the humdrum and monotony of daytime existence, and gives to each alike the relief of a dream. It lights the pipe of millions of day-laborers and of day-idlers in all parts of the world; it fills the mug of the peasant with its cheap and coarse intoxicant, and the glass of the prince with the choicest enlivening wines. The modern newspaper — in a way far more debasing and harmful than the modern novel — thrives, yes, fattens, on this impulse.

The direction of this impulse away from the ennui that oppresses so much of human life is by no means wholly toward those coarser and more dangerous excitements to which reference has just been made. Indeed, its beneficent work may be traced throughout the structure of human society. It is not desire for society, pure and simple, which forms the whole inward impulse that brings and binds men together in community life; it is also largely the repulsion from that ennui which complete solitariness begets. The same impulse operates powerfully in securing patronage for every form of art; nor is it without considerable influence upon the cultivation of scientific pursuits. What is *novel* is attractive in itself, and irrespective of any intrinsic merit, not only in literature, but also in other forms of art. The new style relieves, for a time at least, that feeling of ennui with which we are apt to contemplate what is old.

Now it is in vain for the stern moralist to insist that men shall find all the satisfaction they crave in the doing of that daily work, which it is man's duty to do; and that the incidents and commonplaces of this daily round should be themselves made to furnish all needed relief from the dreadful spectre of ennui. It is indeed a cause of delight to behold another doing all the details of daily work with a zest which comes only from idealizing them all, and so with a perfect freedom from the pains of ennui. But after all, the line here needs to be very delicately and skillfully drawn. There are some of Wordsworth's poems which are among

the finest in the English language. But there are others where the bestowal of sentiment upon the commonplace and vulgar is felt to be petty, and hard to consider virile and really sincere. So, I think, in performing the details of daily work we regard calmness, and even a large amount of phlegm, as more becoming than any considerable show of enthusiasm.

And, indeed, how dull and well-nigh intolerable does life, with all its round of duties, happinesses, so-called successes, and cares, sometimes appear to the reflective soul! What is the meaning of it all, and what its worth? we ask ourselves and one another. Ecclesiastes may not teach the highest morality, but it forcefully expresses a universal experience in the effort of man to compass his own life. How spontaneous and strong the rush with which the operatives pour forth from the wide doors of the factory when the work of the day is done! In what manner, now, shall the evening hours be spent? Doubtless in the blind effort to find something which shall minister to the other side of the human mind. The old men may, tired out with the toil which is by its results barely to supply the wants of themselves and their families, go to an early bed. But the young men and the maidens will do something to escape ennui, and kill the time that stands between their toil and their sleep. They will seek something novel, something to give a momentary uplift to their otherwise commonplace lives. They will get a waking dream before they give themselves to the dreams of the bedchamber. They will frequent the beer-houses; they will dance, or see a cheap play, or walk the street, or talk or read the romantic stuff which both indicates and gratifies the stage of mental cultivation at which they have arrived.

It is obvious that the modern novel, from its very nature as growing out of and adapted to the modern life of the individual man, has a power to minister to the impulse of which we have been speaking, as no other species of literature can. Its field is the freest artistic treatment of the phenomena of the individual's life. In it we seek for the dream-life that shadows and softens all the life which we call real. It makes far less tax upon the reader, it requires far less of cultivation and of purely intellectual or artistic interest in literature, than does any form of poetic composition. It is a cheaper, more prolonged, and more feasible mode of relieving ennui than the modern drama affords. Moreover, the ability to suit a great variety of tastes and of grades of culture, which modern prose fiction has attained, is incomparably greater than that attained by either of the other most nearly allied species of literature.

It is in such facts and impulses of human nature that we are to discover the psychological origin of the modern novel. But if this view of its genesis and mission be correct, several very important conclusions, touching both the writing and the reading of this species of literature, follow almost as matters of course. Far be it from the professional student of mind to dictate rules to the artist, although the former may perhaps at times be permitted to say, humbly, to the latter: "Thou, too, art a *man*." For myself, I may say that I have the scorn of the literary critics by trade, and the wrath of the *littérateur*, too vividly before me to venture far into their sacred domains.

The principal points in debate as to the correct construction of the novel gather about the rival claims of the romantic and the realistic school. The latter is undoubtedly a necessary reactionary result of the extreme romanticism which controlled prose fiction in the preceding age. But what answer to the rival claims of the two schools does that human nature give whose impulses furnish the sources in which the writing and reading of novels arise? Here, as in so many other debates, the answer is a divided one; it consists in discriminating grades and degrees, to which certain general principles may be applied, but about which, in the detailed application, different tastes and judgments will always differ. In general, then, it must be said: "Both realism and idealism are right." Art must contemplate, and build itself upon, and foster itself in a constant communion with, what is real as matter of fact. But art must also interpret and idealize this matter of fact. To find the ideal in the real, and to show in what direction lies that point of union where real and ideal are one, — this is the effort of modern philosophy, in its technical study and teaching. The two great schools of realism and idealism have together ruled the world of speculative thought since philosophy began to be cultivated. The chief and most encouraging sign of the philosophy of the present era is the tendency of these schools to find some real Ideal, some ideal Reality, on the Being and attributes of which they can unite.

So, too, in modern painting the study and portrayal, with interpretation and idealizing, of the actual, are engaging the attention of the most intelligent workmen. Technical perspective and anatomy, the moods of nature and the habits and phases of plant and animal life, are all to be most minutely observed and diligently studied; but not that the artist may degenerate into the copyist, but that he may build his ideal on the basis of reality.

Thus built, the ideal *is* the highest reality. In the art of novel-writing the same effort should be made, — by each workman, however, according to his own mission and in his own way.

It is interesting to notice how the two schools in novel-writing, antagonistic as they avowedly are, both suffer from violation of the same laws of the human mind. The romanticist may work the vein of the romantic in such a way as to beget that very feeling of ennui which the ordinary reader of the novel seeks to avoid; at the same time he surely loses the goodwill of that more thoughtful reader who seeks to recreate and help himself by contemplating the artistic representation of actual human life. On the other hand, the realist who makes his final purpose the mere portrayal of the minutiae of daily experience, or who stops too long by the way to indulge himself in the work of mere copying from nature, violates the rules of his art. He is also sure to beget in his reader the same feeling of ennui. In detailing external surroundings, describing the characters and narrating the conversations, in a work of prose fiction, great discrimination and skill are needed to attain just the right amount of realism, as it were. The petty arrangements and in themselves distasteful customs of a restaurant, for example, may be all set before us in such a way as either to instruct and please or disgust and annoy. So, too, the talk of common people may be made interesting or wearisome to the reader, according to the faithfulness of the author in depicting, and at the same time his art in idealizing, that which occurs in the speech of every-day life. Tolstoi makes us feel that we can afford to sit through an entire meal and look and listen, with Levin and Stephan Arkadyevitch at the restaurant; but the real experience with the poorest eating-house is scarcely less distasteful and depressing than our repeated visits to "Vatoldi's" in Mr. Stockton's company. Nor can we wholly clear our American authors Howells and Henry James from mistakes in the length to which they carry their realism. What can be more *tiresome*, whether we meet it in real life or in art, than much of the conversations in the "Bostonians" or the "Minister's Charge"?

Few questions concerning the obligations of art have been more warmly debated than the relations which the writer of the modern novel sustains to morals and to moral influence. On the one side stand those claimants who would make all art avowedly didactic, who would have no fiction permissible unless there were some plain sermon in it. On the other side arises the protest against

the submission or degradation of what is æsthetic under ethical rules, — the claim that art must be free to give expression, under artistic limitations alone, to every phase of human experience. A study of the psychological origin and meaning of the novel shows that the truth belongs only in a partial way to either of these extremes. The ideal man and the ideal society are not urged and lifted toward the good by conscience alone. There are other ways of being taught than by sermons, or indeed by any species of didactic composition. And it is perfectly true that there is not a phase of human nature, not a side of human experience, whether it be what we agree to call "wrong" or what we deem "right," the just or the criminal, the elevated or the base, which is not capable and worthy of sympathetic study and artistic portrayal. But it is also true that man has actually, not only an æsthetic but also an ethical nature, and that it is impossible for art to make that which seems morally vile seem also artistically good. Doubtless a great diversity of judgments, a wide range of tastes, must be permitted, and may with safety be indulged.

The painter finds a legitimate field for his art in the swamp and fen, in the poisonous weed or noxious fruit. He may depict the barnyard with its pool and its wallowing swine. But if he choose these subjects, as an artist he is bound to show what of beauty and better meaning is in them all. He is bound to produce in the intelligent beholder somewhat of that pure and elevating pleasure which all real art gives. The same rule applies to the writer of prose fiction. We cannot say that he shall not make the attempt to treat any real phase of human life. We cannot say that he shall not bring us into the acquaintance, not only of those secretly wicked souls in which so-called "good" society abounds, but also of those known to be afflicted with wrong-doing, or even of those wantons and outcasts that are under social ban. But the worthy portrayal of the life of the gambler, the forger, the harlot, the seducer, the adulterer, the drunkard, the opium-eater, is so difficult an artistic achievement that any author may well shrink from it on other than moral grounds. There are subjects where neither coarse indifference to ethical distinctions nor mawkish sentimentality can be indulged. To describe these things so as to commend them, in themselves considered, is intolerable; and few venture to attempt this. But to describe them in all their details and with sentimental effusiveness, is but little if any better, whether it be considered from the æsthetic or the ethical point of view. Nor can we see how, in this regard, Mr.

Roe's "Without a Home" is of any higher moral tendency than Dostojevsky's "Crime and Punishment."

In estimating the alleged evils of novel-reading, I am inclined to think that there has sometimes been an unintentional exaggeration. The proportional number of the patrons of this species of literature is indeed somewhat appalling. But there are few of the readers of novels who, after all, are not employed during the greater part of their time in some form of real work. Nor can we say of most of them, considering the amount of their lives which goes into this work, that the play of romancing in which they indulge themselves is on the whole excessive. Perhaps it may be said that it is not so much a reduction as a redistribution of quantity which novel-reading needs. There are many who would find life less a burden, and its work lighter and cheerier, by increased judicious indulgence in this kind of literature; while there are many others — especially growing boys and girls — whose guardians should certainly take pains greatly to diminish their annual allowance of prose fiction.

The charges to be made against the quality of the current novel-reading are more serious and difficult of alleviation. They do not, however, all bear most heavily in the direction in which they are ordinarily aimed. Just as the music of negro minstrelsy — considered as music and with associations aside — is quite as improving as that of the average Sunday-school, so the romantic literature of the average book-stall — considered as literature and with associations aside — is quite as improving as that of the average Sunday-school. And next to the Sunday-school library, as an offender in this regard, stands the public library. Thus do Church and State seem united to widen and deepen the streams of influence exerted by cheap prose fictions. There is little hope, however, to be discerned in the horizon when one is planted athwart the combined activities of Church and State. But the gradual æsthetic and moral development of the people is bringing about a marked improvement in this as in every species of art. By bettering and not by banishing this form of human dream-life we may expect to escape the worst of its evils and secure its choicer goods.

It will always be remembered, also, by the most thoroughly chastened minds, that the mission of art is not to those already cultured alone; its mission is, as well, to the great multitude of men. In order to accomplish this universal mission, it must reach after men somewhere near the level upon which they are stand-

ing. A chromo is better than no picture at all in the home of the poor. Nor am I at all sure that, as a rule, it is not better that the great majority of readers should read the novels they do read rather than not read at all; for not to read at all would certainly signify, with many of them, a life of a lower intellectual, æsthetic, and ethical character.

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OUT OF TOWN MISSIONS FOR CITY CHURCHES.

THERE is a reverse side to the picture of enterprise and manliness and self-denial presented in the career of the poor country lad who has come up to the city and by dint of those qualities has made himself a name and a fortune. This reverse side is, that from the life of the small village where he lived just that amount of those virtues has been withdrawn. As there is no corresponding gain made by the small towns, the average of intelligence, of enterprise, of culture is less by every life that is attracted away. Every farmer knows what is the result of cutting the grass from the fields, without giving back in fertilizers and dressing the nutritive elements which are taken away. It is only a very short time before such a field is entirely run out. Now this is exactly what has gone on in the field of the spirit in many of the back towns. For a generation or more the process of draining away the best elements of human life has gone on. The back town in a general way represents the survival of the unfittest. Those who remain even while fitted to go, do so because of age, infirmity, for parents' or relations' sake; but this proportion is small, and grows constantly smaller as obligations cease. The life of the smaller country villages, except where they are suburbs or under the near influence of city life, is not only relatively but actually on the decline. Its best spirit is robbed from it; the life that is left is distinctly less able, and what generally follows along with that less willing, to maintain the higher plane of living which existed in former times. There is needed no clearer evidence of this than is given in what is called "society." The social sense, the delight of being together in society, is undergoing a marked falling off in the back towns. Those who remain are often fewer than in the days of their fathers, often have less to do with, but,

more than all, they have less of the spirit and will to undergo the burden of social duties. Social pleasure is apt to take another form, that of entertainment and excitement. It is not the pleasure of human companionship, but it is the thirst for excitement, for something to break the dreary monotony of hard drudgery. Calling upon one's neighbors, meeting together for an evening's social intercourse, harvest gatherings, house warmings, all this is little known in the retired villages, and gives place to picnics and dances. The dance is nearly the only form of social life, and is often accompanied by intemperance.

For any one accustomed to all that is involved in the social intercourse of men in the centres of population, a ride on a winter's evening through a retired country village is full of revelation. Nothing can bring home to one so forcibly the isolation, and the limitations of back-country life. In the bleak but clear and cold night, the country seems to fall back into another age. It seems to lose continuity with the rest of civilized humanity. While it was day, and while men could work in the light, there pass signs of recognition and acknowledgments of relationship between house and house and between farm and farm. But with the fall of black night, all the lines of brotherhood and society seem to shrink up, and as each little home lights its lamps and draws within its doors, huddling itself together, society seems literally to crumble to pieces, and to fall back again into a mere collection of individual units. It comes over one with an appalling sense of the utter dreariness and seclusion as never before. As the scattered lights appear, it seems as though all bonds were broken and all ties severed. And really this is not far from being the case. There will be very little of the common life of mankind to-night in this hamlet through which we are driving. Even in the little cluster of homes that make up the village, the only ones who will be absent are here and there a young man, but by no means all the young men. For an hour around the stove in the village store a motley gathering of men will be seated or standing, but after a day of logging or sawing in the mill there is little disposition to prolong the hours, while by eight o'clock much the larger number will have sought their beds, and close a long day of labor with a labored rest. Nothing so reveals what the country life is as a winter's night, for then civilization falls back into its constituent elements, and the bonds of humanity cease to appear.

Two thoughts come immediately into the mind on such a view of things, and two thoughts which bear a singular relation to each

other. First, what a unique importance the village church has as a focus for all the manifestations of social life; and secondly, how rarely are the resources both pecuniary and spiritual sufficient to let the church become any real power in the community. No sooner do we get hold of the idea of what tremendous importance the village church is, than we are forced directly to think of how poor it is generally and unable to perform its function. It may be said that in the country, the social side is a religious obligation, and that it is a religious duty to provide for it and to foster it. It is no reproach to the church in the country that it is largely a social affair, for one of its chief duties is to draw people together and engage them in the friendly relations of social life. It is hardly too much to say that there is a direct relation between the purity and extent of the social life and the vigor of the church in the country. During the week there are many things which make social duties or pleasures very hard to provide for, there is much to interfere even with the inclination for it; but on Sunday, by the very force of circumstances, by the very fact of being called to church, it is promoted and advanced. There are many people in the village who will have hardly anything approaching the name of social life from Sunday to Sunday. A nod to a passer, a few words over the fence, or at the village store, will make up the social life of not a few, till it comes Sunday meeting, and then better things are possible. But not with this extreme class only, but with all, the church is the rallying point for social living. There is Man, as well as men; there is an approach to humanity, a living bond of mankind. The scattered elements of a village hamlet are welded together, are brought into a union of feeling and purpose, are made to confess relations and obligations to one another, and the effects of their life in this one particular cannot fail to be of the greatest influence during the week. As there is no theatre, and in the way of entertainment little beside the occasional visitation of a "show," as there is very rarely any public meeting, the weekly prayer meeting and the Sunday services are almost the only object lessons in the matter of corporate life that is afforded them. At those times, the idea of one body and many members is brought home to them, "the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace," and it seems easy to understand how "all these worketh that one and the selfsame spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will." The urgency of the need of the church in the country towns cannot be overestimated. A distinct decline is visible in the towns where the

church is allowed to lapse, a lowered conception of life and duty. The church is in these small places almost the only means of conveying any lessons of life in common, of the joys and privileges of associated living. In these small places nothing more unfortunate can happen than for this lamp of life to go out. It is in a literal as well as a spiritual sense "the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world."

No sooner, however, does one think of the dire necessity of it, to show forth the very foundations of human living as well as of eternal salvation, than one despairs of the resources at hand. The country has been drained of the very minds most fitted to see the importance of the church and of the men most willing to sacrifice to maintain it. It is folly to say that because the need of a church is so great materially as well as spiritually that therefore the natural self-interest of the people will keep it up. The natural self-interest of people will do nothing of the sort. In fact, men generally need to be little short of angels to act from self-interest. They act from prejudice, and from spite, and from ignorance, and from fear, but really to act in accordance with an enlightened self-interest requires a self-control and self-suppression which the instinct of self-interest does not afford. The men able to realize how the church is needed in the country town are few and are growing fewer. The men willing to give generously of their small means to maintain it are equally small. One of a parish committee called on a substantial farmer, and laid the case of their church before him. After hearing what they had to say, the farmer responded approvingly, saying he "guessed he'd oughter do his part," and gave *fifty cents* for his year's contribution. The fact is, the people of the country villages who are able and willing to support their church are few. There are always some who are able though not willing, but many more who are neither able nor willing. They cannot be made to feel the need to them of sacrificing for it. They would as lief see it continue, would be sorry to have the church-bell cease to toll, but they will not make it their own charge to anything but a trifling amount. Consequently a few zealous women able to understand how much is derived from their meetings and services contrive in some way to keep the thing alive. There are pay sociables, bean suppers, entertainments, and fairs. The church lives on in a hand-to-mouth fashion. The miserably paid minister becomes unable to cope with the "law of diminishing returns," and is forced to go; then "preaching" is kept up, and so it goes on from bad to worse.

In some cases the time comes when the doors are not closed from Sunday to Sunday, for they are never opened.

I am speaking mostly of the very small interior village towns, hamlets, and post-office settlements. There are many grave church problems to be settled in the larger towns, but that is a different consideration. I am speaking of small church settlements, small towns of a few hundred inhabitants, in all of which the social and the religious life are one. As soon as we pass to towns of a larger growth, the problem remains much the same, save that it is complicated by a multiplication of churches. A town of fifteen hundred or two thousand inhabitants will usually have two or more churches, for in the time of their foundation it seemed more important to bear witness to a truth of church government, or baptism, or liturgy, than to bear witness to the truth that we are all members together of the body of Christ. Once established, these rival churches are a source of great difficulty. They sometimes stimulate a people's sectarian pride, but never lay any foundations of real prosperity.

In proposing Out of Town Missions for city churches, the main point is the imperative need of a church in the smallest country hamlet and the impracticability of maintaining it with the local resources both material and spiritual. The number of small country parishes needing outside assistance is already a large one and will grow larger; while when once the scope of the country church is realized, it will be seen that many parishes are self-supporting only by reducing their work to a point almost below efficiency. The little parish which struggles along with an income from all sources and for all purposes of eight hundred dollars or less is in no condition to cope with the situation. It does good, it bears witness to a truth, and remains a light in the darkness, a voice crying in the wilderness, but hardly more. It is quite unable to be a real *church* in the midst of its community. Counting in these, there is a very large number of country parishes whose own resources are entirely inadequate to maintain them in an efficient condition. The various religious bodies are constantly furnishing grants of assistance; one and another society for the promotion of preaching or for home missionary work donates a sum or supplies a worker. In this way many a church-door is kept open, and the feeble lamp kept supplied with oil. But there is reason for saying that this sort of help does not bear fruit proportionate to the expense. Help given from a central board or a society for the propagation of the gospel hardly awakens any other sense than

that of a desire for more. There is little or no sense of being responsible to any one for the money, there is no being held to account for it, and seldom any strict account required of how much the people themselves do. At least seldom is any strict account required whether they fulfill their promises made in order to obtain the grant. Furthermore, this kind of aid is wholly impersonal. It comes from a board, and is a treasurer's check, and that is about all the relation there is between the parties. There is little or no supervision and personal looking after the church that needs aid. Once the money is obtained, then the parish goes along according to its own sweet will, it calls whom-ever it pleases to its ministry, whether a fitting person or not for its peculiar work, lets its affairs drag along, and disregards all economy and judgment, as when it paints the church before paying the minister. Help of money given in this way advances a church's life to a very small degree. Having once obtained aid, a certain right to it is established in the people's mind, with the natural result that the people themselves feel less and less of a duty to do for themselves.

Cannot help be found in a different quarter and in a way to satisfy the objections to the present system of relief? It is possible to develop a system of aid which shall be personal and responsible and adequate in every way to meet the difficulties of the problem. It will be an aid rendered by a strong to a weak church, and therefore generally aid rendered by a city church to the small rural parish. The matter may be sketched as follows. In some vigorous and active parish in the city an association will be formed calling itself the Out of Town Mission, or the Country Mission, to consider in what way the life and intelligence of that city parish may be put at the disposal of some struggling rural church. The Society or Mission will then look carefully over the ground and see where is the nearest country parish in dire need of aid. Very likely in the immediate suburb will be found some chapel or mission which has succumbed and now presents an ugly look of broken glass. But it is necessary to proceed wisely in this matter. If there is a real need for a church in that suburb of that particular persuasion, it may be left to care for itself, at least after a time of probation. In the suburbs there is money and intelligence enough to provide for it when the need is shown. The Country Mission has in view a much more serious need. Fifty miles from New York, twenty miles from Boston, a few miles from Syracuse, it learns of an only church in a small village. The movement of

population and the attractions of the West have brought the village down from a snug little hill town to a rather lifeless hamlet. Some oldest inhabitant tells the prospecting missionary as he alights from the daily stage that the time was when twelve express coaches each way passed through the town then situated on the great turnpike from New York or Boston to Albany, and that the drowsy little inn over the way is all that is left of a hostelry that did in one day more business than is now done in three months. The missionary, who is a keen-eyed city minister come down to set his project afloat, learns that once three churches raised spires to heaven, and that in any one of them were more worshipers than now gather in the single village church, the sole survivor of the three. He learns that there are about eight hundred people in the town, and that about forty on an average attend church. There is a sort of an attempt at a Sunday-school on fair days, and when the superintendent is able to be present. The minister is a lean spare man, of kindly appearance, but unequal to the task, who subsists with his hard-worked wife and two daughters of refinement considerably beyond their station, on six hundred dollars and his wood. As no one is sufficiently interested to drum up the delinquents and secure all the money promised, the six hundred dollars *de jure* turn out to be something less than five hundred dollars *de facto*. The poor parson is unable to remonstrate, because they are not oversatisfied with him as it is; and if he should be called elsewhere, and were asked what salary he received at X., he would be able to say six hundred because it was at that amount he was engaged. The city minister's heart burns with inward rage at the indignities which a fellow-servant of the Lord must suffer. He thinks of what it must be to baptize the children, bury the dead, comfort the broken hearts of those who knowingly defraud their minister of his just due; but he is not there for indignation, but for advice, assistance, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord. There is one thing certain: here is a field where work is to be done, where the need is imperative, and where the means at command are quite inadequate.

The missionary sent out by the Country Mission of the Church of Christ of New Amsterdam, having made full inquiries as to the whole status of the little parish of X., returns home and makes his report to the next meeting of the interested members of the mission. The needs of X. are genuine. The little church is the focus of whatever life there is in the drowsy little village. On

the broad stone slab, which somehow in former ages got itself set down before the church-door, and which extends nearly across the front of the church, sit and stand on a Sunday, before church and after church, about all the society that X. can boast of. On this occasion is seen about all the dress ever seen in the little village. To let this hearthstone grow cold and the fire thereon die out would be to give over a whole village life to the darkness of superstition, and all the endless bitterness and ill-feeling, hardness of heart and selfishness, which human intercourse serves largely to allay. The good done even in its present feeble condition is very much greater than the effect on the church-goers alone. It helps the whole mass of people, and makes a positive difference in the life of the man who never knows what it is to dress up, and who has not been known to enter church for forty years. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Church Extension Society have been so convinced of the need, that for twenty years they have each given two hundred dollars "toward the support of preaching," while a certain maiden lady dying without heirs left a small sum of money whose annual interest affords another hundred. The ladies sewing circle by means of its annual sale, and by readings and suppers, is able to add one hundred and fifty dollars more. The people themselves in their munificence contribute on paper about two hundred dollars. But as no one has energy or audacity to insist on people's paying, the actual receipts from this quarter are never more than one half. The annual budget is somewhat in this wise: For minister six hundred dollars, for organist seventy-five dollars, for clerk and care of communion service twenty-five dollars, for sexton fifty dollars, and the remaining one hundred dollars of the eight hundred and fifty dollars for fuel, repairs, and odds and ends. There is on Sunday divine service in the morning and afternoon, with Sunday-school and luncheon hour between. During the week there is a prayer meeting, very feebly supported.

The Country Mission of the Church of Christ of New Amsterdam accepts the report, and moves that the parish of X. be considered as a possible subject of their missionary labors. And this is the way they set about it. The mission requires that a few matters should be allowed. It feels that nothing can be done unless all the help given is a personal help, and the recipients made accountable for it. The first thing, however, is to obtain the consent of the parish to be assisted, and to make a proposition. The Church of Christ of New Amsterdam asks the privilege of

adopting as daughter-church the society or parish of X. It will take on itself the burden of all outside aid needed, releasing the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Church Extension Society of all further obligations. In return for this grant, not to be less than the amount at present received, the Country Mission asks to have one of its number put on the parish committee of the church of X. It is also offered to do everything that may go along with the idea of adoption. The ministers of the town and country branch will be in close coöperation, and will exchange services. There will be frequent visitings on the part of the members of the mission, and help of all kinds freely rendered. The little church of X. is considerably staggered at the proposal: not, indeed, at the idea of strangers coming forward to offer to incur the obligations of four hundred dollars annually, and perhaps more, for they have grown accustomed to having money come in from somewhere, none, save the treasurer, knowing exactly where and from whom. But the bald proposal to take a hand in the parish committee, and interfere in their own affairs, — this sort of thing passes understanding. For a time things are in considerable confusion in X. The division of opinion serves to make the only genuine sensation since the post-office was robbed several years ago. Chief in scouting the proposition, and loudest in denunciations of any interference in others' affairs, is the poor minister whose annual deficit is directly due to the present condition of affairs. He declares that he would resign his post at once, but this could hardly be considered as a threat of great consequence to the parish of X. With every day the independent spirit of the good Christians of X. rises higher and higher. They were willing to be adopted to the extent of receiving the money, but they wanted no outside dictation. In all likelihood the church at New Amsterdam would have been forced to abandon the field if something had not happened. Just at this time there were some extraordinary demands made on the Society for Propagating the Gospel and the Church Extension Society to do missionary work in some newly opened up fields in northern California and Oregon. It was voted in their boards to reduce every possible expense in the Home work, and as it chanced to come to the ears of some of the Board that the Church of Christ of New Amsterdam had agreed to assume the annual payments to the church at X., with great joy the executive boards crossed out those items, and sent a notice to that effect to the church at X. A gloom fell over the community. The same amount of

money was forthcoming, but only on that hateful condition. Some proposed to close the church. Better counsels, however, prevailed, and finally the offer of the Church of Christ was closed with. Whether the fears of interference were justified or not will be seen in the sequel.

It was reported immediately to the Country Mission Society that their offer was accepted, and the terms agreed to. A letter was also received from the incumbent at X., asking whether it was at all likely that the last year's deficit should be made good. In the fullness of joy at the prospect of carrying out their missionary idea, it was proposed to raise the deficit on the spot, and it was done. On the next Sunday, at the Church of Christ, amid a good deal of curiosity on the part of the congregation, the minister explained the whole matter. He described the needs of the country churches, explained that, in many of them, the means maintaining them in good working condition were beyond their resources, and besought the people's interest on the ground that many of them had come from just such places, and had prospered by force of the very qualities of which the country now was drained. The next Sunday, he said, he would exchange with the minister of their adopted church, and urged a cordial welcome to be given him. So, on the following Sunday, while an unusually large congregation was present at the Church of Christ to see the country minister and to share in the new excitement, in the church at X. a much larger congregation, proportionally, was assembled to see the noted city minister, and to hear what word he had to bring on the new relationship. And the latter embraced his opportunity. He talked to the new flock very simply and plainly and firmly. He showed them how important the church life was in their happiness; what immediate falling off in morals, in good manners, in the real joys of life, in the home affections, followed a slack connection with the church. He gave them a pastoral charge in the name of God to hold by their church, and to teach their children to reverence it. He talked to them very plainly about paying for their church, and that if it was such a vital matter, and lay at the very bottom of their wellbeing, both material and spiritual, they must be willing to do something to keep it alive. Then, finally, he dwelt on the need of coöperation, and what advantages consisted in town and country working together, and ended with an earnest exhortation that all might dwell together in Christian unity.

Service ended, some held back and seemed a little sullen, but

the majority pressed round and asked to be shown how they might be set to work to carry out the idea. About the first thing to set in order was the finances. Gathering the people around him in a group, he explained to them how they might pay their portions in smaller sums, but more frequently. He produced a package of envelopes prepared for a year's weekly payments, and explained that most of those present could easily give ten cents a Sunday, and the dated envelopes would keep them informed as to how their account stood. They consented to try the system, and one bright young man was chosen to keep the accounts. There were none before who gave over fifteen dollars by the year, after being dunned for it, and a large number who gave no more than two dollars. But now the local magnates smiled rather foolishly at the idea of giving less than fifty cents a Sunday, and most of those who had been giving two dollars a year raised the amount by ten-cent contributions to over five dollars. Many who had hitherto been unable to give anything felt a positive joy at getting a package of envelopes into which they regularly placed a nickel. The children were told that they, too, could do something for their Master's work, and many smaller coins yet were gladly acknowledged. When the subscriptions were added up, it was found that the church at X., which had hitherto been unable to raise above a half of its promised two hundred dollars, had now pledged itself, with a fair prospect of fulfillment, to raise three hundred and eighty dollars, with more to hear from. This was so gratifying a piece of news, that some of the ladies at once proposed to recarpet the church, but their visiting minister strongly insisted on turning over the balance for the present to their minister, and help make his ministrations better by diminishing his cares. They adjourned to the Sunday-school. There everything was at loose ends. A new spirit had to be aroused, and the teachers advised with. When the case was presented to them, of the importance of training up these children, who are the men and women of the future, and the church of the future, they consented to attend a weekly teachers' meeting, to prepare a lesson in a course arranged by the two ministers together. Some changes in the church service were suggested with a view to better holding the interest of tired working-people, and a promise of a repeated visit at an early day was given and gladly received. Sunday afternoon was spent by the visiting minister in going around the parish, and seeing a number of people who held aloof from the church. Some lived all alone, — a man or a woman, —

hardly holding any social relations at all ; some were families of lowly working-people, cherishing all sorts of grudges against people generally ; and not a few of these were gotten to promise to draw together "for the love of Christ," and once more become members of the one body. Such parish work could have been done by no one else. They would have resented the local minister coming to them, and only listened to one whom they had to feel was their superior. Sunday evening came, and a short, hearty service, with plenty of singing and prayer, and a brief word "to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made you free." Then all broke up, with a new feeling born in every heart. The next day several of the village people waited for their returning minister at the station, and his eyes filled with tears when they protested to him that they would all take a new hold. Nor could his heart be less than light, for at the Church of Christ the day before his first quarter's salary under the new arrangement had been paid into the offering as an advance, and for the first time he saw his way to discharge some long-standing obligations.

Such was the beginning of better things. The intruder on the parish committee proved to be not only wholly unobjectionable, but the very mainstay of the church. He did not attempt to force anything, but his recommendations sooner or later were seen wise. Presently they began to be proud of having a New Amsterdam banker for parish committee-man, and nothing would do but he should be chairman. This chairman got into a way of running down there on a Sunday till he was oftener seen there than in the mother church. He helped keep the finances well squared up, and taught the people to look at them frankly and look after them constantly. He had a class in the Sunday-school of the young men, and in the afternoon he also tried to do something in the way of drumming up recruits. In church, the people began to enjoy singing hymns, and had plenty of them, and to read the psalms responsively together, and always the Lord's Prayer. One and another said that somehow it did n't seem so hard to listen as before, and the butcher emeritus, aged ninety years, was able to keep awake well on into the middle of the sermon. The minister of X. felt himself almost a new man. There was such a new, strong sense in everything, and nothing did him or his wife so much good as the frequent exchange. He was able now to redouble his parish work. He could have a Bible class in the middle of the week, and also a prayer meeting, and the weekly rehearsal for the

volunteer choir grew gradually into a service of praise. He could make twice as many calls now on his people, and was twice as able to talk to them about being patient and cheerful and hopeful as when he was worried how the last flour-barrel would be paid for. One Sunday morning Deacon Towns told the committee "he'd just as lief" take care of the communion service for nothing if the stipend of twenty-five dollars might go to the minister, who had been night and day with his sick sister; and then the treasurer said there was accumulating about two hundred dollars over all expenses, and he thought they could easily raise the salary two hundred and fifty dollars. Somehow people seemed more ready than ever before to do something for the church.

But the effect of the adoption told most of all on the mother church. The mission seemed to interest everybody. Country Mission Sunday was the name given to the day when the minister of X. came up to town, and there was always an exceptional attendance. When service was ended, the whole church tried to greet their guest, there was a sort of scramble to take him home to dinner, and many a kind word and token he bore away with him. The town of X. became a sort of annex of the Church of Christ, for the city people found it a lovely place to spend a few weeks in the summer; and then they got interested in the village library, and then a new town hall was built of the country stone, and a village improvement society started. When the members of the Church of Christ of New Amsterdam think of the mission, they are in doubt which way the mission works, whether more good has been done to the little church at X., or whether the Church of Christ has reaped most of the benefit, and found how literally true it is that it is more blessed to give than to receive.

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THE LOST TRIBES.

I BEGIN this paper on the Lost Tribes with a chapter like that on snakes in the history of Ireland. There are no lost tribes.

The popular notion of the lost tribes of Israel is this: There were in the Holy Land twelve tribes dwelling in separate territories, aside from the tribe of Levi, including the Aaronitic priest-

hood, which lived in single cities distributed among all the tribes. After the death of Solomon, ten of these tribes rebelled against the house of David, and set up a kingdom of their own. This kingdom lived on under various dynasties, amid a good deal of strife and civil war, for about two hundred and fifty or sixty years, until it was fully conquered by Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, and its inhabitants carried off into some far off land. The kingdom of Judah lived on for about one hundred and twenty years longer. The small remnant to which its people had dwindled was carried off to Babylon; but their descendants returned to the Holy Land by the permission of the kings of Persia, and from them the Jews of the present time are descended. The kingdom of Judah consisted only of the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, and a part of the Levites and priests; and to these tribes the Jews of the present day ought to belong. This is the commonly received opinion.

The ignorance and superstition of the Middle Ages located the other tribes in various quarters, far away in the vast unknown regions of Asia or Africa; the fancy of modern times has sought their descendants anywhere and everywhere. Major M. M. Noah of New York, some seventy years ago, on the strength of some words in the Iroquois language that seemed to him akin to equivalent Hebrew words, found the ten lost tribes in the North American Indians; George Barnes does greater honor to Ephraim and the sons of Israel, his companions, by identifying them with the British race; the people of Ireland, with their many Dennises, standing for the tribe of Dan. Others have found the lost tribes of Israel in Afghan; others, I know not where. Some Jews in India, in China, and half-Jews in Abyssinia have also been claimed as the true representatives of the kingdom of Israel.

The intensely religious world, both among Jews and Christians, have always looked forward to the reappearance and recognition of the ten lost tribes as coincident with the advent, or second advent of the Messiah. An old legend places them on the shores of the river Sambatyon, that river which vomits forth hot stones on six days of the week, but flows along in tranquillity on the Sabbath. As Sambat is the Abyssinian or Ethiopic form of the word Sabbath, the Sambatyon must be sought for in the interior of Africa. Both the miraculous stream and the mysterious tribes were located by the fancy of our forefathers in the interior of Africa; because this was the least accessible, and most thoroughly unknown part of the old world.

In the folklore of the Hebrews, these dwellers on the Sambatyon were known as the Red Jews, and were at the proper time to come marching on, under the lead of the prophet Elijah, preceded by a golden standard, and escorting the Messiah on his way to Jerusalem.

Christian legends somewhat more consistently located the ten tribes somewhere in the interior of Asia, where Prester John ruled over them.

Only when in modern times the progress of exploration in Asia made it certain that no nation preserving its Hebrew character could live anywhere within its limits, and the growth of reasoning habits excluded the ten tribes from Africa, because they never could have crossed over into it without being seen on their march by all Syria and Egypt, the idea of a secret Hebrew commonwealth waiting for the advent of the Messiah was given up, and the wild theories of Noah and Barnes found a soil in which to sprout. It is enough to say that there is just as little reason or truth in these theories as in the crude beliefs about the dwellers on the Sambatyon, or the subjects of Prester John.

Before referring to the disappearance of the ten tribes, let me recall their original location. On the east of Jordan, on the grassy plains of Gilead and Bashan, are the two tribes of Gad and Reuben, and north of them half of the tribe of Manasseh. The people east of the Jordan lived mainly off their herds and flocks; hence they required, in proportion to their numbers, a much larger territory than their brethren west of the Jordan, who tilled the ground and raised grain and fruit crops.

On the west side of the Jordan, in the true land of promise, the northern region afterwards known as Galilee (G'lil Haggoyim, the circle of the nations) contained the former tribes of Issachar, Zebulun, Naphtali, and Asher; south of these, in the central region which was afterwards known as Samaria, the royal tribe of Ephraim lived, and next to it half of Manasseh. South of Samaria are the four tribes of Dan, Benjamin, Judah, and Simeon, the last named being the most southern. In Roman times the territory which in the Book of Joshua is ascribed to these four tribes is known as Judea.

Now, it is obvious that at least one of the ten tribes, besides Judah and Benjamin, could never have joined in the secession of the northern and eastern tribes, who, under the leadership of the Ephraimite Jeroboam, set up the kingdom of Israel. That one tribe is the tribe of Simeon, whose position in the southeast,

divided by Judean territory from all contact with the seceding kingdom, must have held it down in subjection to the house of David as securely as the position of New Hampshire must have kept it from joining the seceding States of the South. Some cities of Simeon are occasionally mentioned in the history of Judah after the division of the kingdom, among them Beersheba quite frequently, and always as a part of the kingdom of Judah, governed by the successors of David and Solomon. Yet we read in the twelfth chapter of the first Book of Kings that only Judah and Benjamin remained faithful to Rehoboam! What had become of Simeon? why is he not mentioned either among the faithful, nor among the seceders? Well, thereby hangs a tale; a tale of great import, which I will tell, not upon my own authority, but on that of the learned Dr. Dozy, of the University of Leyden.

He is the author of a highly interesting book (in Dutch) under the title "*The Israelites at Mecca*" (*De Israelietin te Mekka*), in which he proves that Israelites of the tribe of Simeon were the founders of Mecca, that Mohammed, while claiming descent from Ishmael, was really of the race of Simeon, and that the worship of Allah, which Mohammed founded, and which he called *Din Ibrahim*, that is, the law of Abraham, was really *Din Ibriyim*, the law of the Hebrews.

But let us now see what the Biblical record says about the fate of the sons of Simeon. In the first Book of Chronicles, chapter 4, verse 24, immediately after the generations of Judah, we find:—

"The sons of Simeon were Nemuel and Jamin, Jarib, Zerah and Shaul; Shallum his son, Mibsam his son, Mishma his son; and the sons of Mishma; Hamuel his son, Zacchur his son, Shimei his son; and Shimei had sixteen sons and six daughters; but his brethren had not many children, neither did all their family multiply, like to the children of Judah."

This prepares us for the conclusion that the dwindling number of the Simeonites were absorbed in the greater and more powerful tribe of Judah.

Further it says:—

"And they dwelt at Beersheba and [thirteen other cities there named] these were their cities unto the reign of David." It seems, therefore, that at some time in the reign of David the tribe of Simeon lost its tribal autonomy, which is no more than when the Plymouth Colony was merged in Massachusetts Bay. Nobody will, for that reason, say that the descendants of the Pil-

grims are lost, because their old home is now a part of a larger state.

The chronicler then proceeds to name some villages reaching as far as "Baal," a city not otherwise known, and the names of several men, from father to son, and proceeds : —

"These mentioned by names were princes in their families; and the house of their fathers increased greatly; and they went to the entrance of Gedor, even unto the east side of the valley, to seek pasture for their flocks; and they found fat pasture and good, and the land wide and quiet and peaceable; for they of Ham had dwelt there of old." Ham, Hebrew חם, Egyptian χεμ, is the native name of Egypt. These pastures which a large part of the Simeonites found long after the reign of David are therefore outside of the land of Israel, south of it, somewhere in northwestern Arabia, probably in the Hijaz, and on the Red Sea." The chronicler proceeds : —

"And these written by name came in the days of Hezekiah of Judah, and smote their tents, and the habitations that were found there, and destroyed them utterly unto this day, and dwelt in their room; because there was pasture there for their flocks."

So until Hezekiah's reign the Simeonites were good subjects of the kingdom of Judah; in his time a part of them went southward into Arabia and conquered new seats for themselves, and lived there as an independent tribe in the days of Alexander, when the Book of Chronicles was written.

Dr. Dozy very ingeniously points to the name of King Lemuel, which appears at the head of the last chapter of Proverbs, as a king of the independent Simeonites in Arabia; Lemuel being another form for Nemuel, a name dear to the tribe as that of Simeon's eldest son.

The chronicler closes the account of the Simeonites by telling us that five hundred of them, under the leadership of four brothers, went and smote the rest of the Amalekites that were escaped, and dwelt there unto this day.

Thus from the ten tribes, usually spoken of as lost, one must be deducted. The Simeonites became part and parcel of Judah. Down to the times of Mohammed there were large Jewish settlements in Arabia; and should we set aside as too bold the theory that the Simeonites founded Mecca, and that Ishmael is but another name for Simeon, yet it is not too bold to assume that the southern colonies of the Simeonites, which were still flourishing in the days of Alexander, became the centre of later migra-

tions from Judea. As the Jews of Arabia undoubtedly did much towards determining the course of Mohammed, and in preparing the people of the Hijaz for his teachings, I might be satisfied with thus claiming for the outbranching Simeonites the glory of being the indirect and remote teachers of the faith in which not less than 175,000,000 are now worshiping the God of Abraham, calling out five times each day, There is no God but He. But as I do not wish to be too far outdone by Barnes, I gladly subscribe to Dr. Dozy's brilliant hypothesis; and if the British do not come from the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, nor any Irish Dennis springs from the tribe of Dan, yet I maintain, on much stronger grounds, that the Koreish, the founders of the Mussulman world, are the lineal descendants of a few families of Simeon.

But, considering those who remained at Beersheba and the other thirteen cities, and were absorbed in Judah, we know that the Jews of our day represent at least three of the sons of Israel — Judah, Benjamin, and Simeon.

Let us go further. The Levites and priests, or sons of Aaron, after the secession of the northern tribes, as we read in the eleventh chapter of the second Book of Chronicles, came to Judah and Jerusalem from all parts of the land; "for Jeroboam and his sons had cast them off from executing the priest's office unto the Lord." But this is not all.

In verse 16 the chronicler proceeds: —

"And after them out of all the tribes of Israel, such as set their hearts to seek the Lord God of Israel came to Jerusalem to sacrifice unto the Lord God of their fathers. So they strengthened the kingdom of Judah, and made Rehoboam the son of Solomon strong three years."

Here we have the distinct allegation, that in Rehoboam's reign some few Israelites at least, of every tribe, left their homes and emigrated into Judea. We can best understand this when we consider that at the outbreak of secession in the Southern States there were in each of them a few men who hated slavery, and would not throw in their lot with a country built on its glorification, and who therefore moved to some of the adhering States.

We might stop at this passage for the assertion that the kingdom of Judah was made up of men from all the tribes. A single immigrant from Naphtali or Zebulun might, for aught we know, be the ancestor, in the male line, of half the Jews of our time.

But, going further on to the fifteenth chapter of Second

Chronicles, we read of Asa, king of Judah (verse 9), as follows : —

“And he gathered all Judah and Benjamin, and the strangers with them out of Ephraim and Manasseh and out of Simeon ; for they fell to him out of Israel in abundance, when they saw that the Lord his God was with him.”

Again, in the thirtieth chapter of the same book, we come to the restoration of the passover by Hezekiah, not noticed in the Book of Kings. The celebration seems to have taken place after the final overthrow of Samaria. The king took counsel with the princes and with the people of Jerusalem, to invite all Israel to the feast, in the language of former times, “from Beersheba even to Dan ;” and letters were posted to all Israel and Judah, saying : —

“Ye children of Israel, turn again unto the Lord, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, that he may return to the remnant that are escaped of you out of the hands of the kings of Assyria.”

Here is a clear assertion that the kings of Assyria, in the deportations to be mentioned hereafter, did not carry off *all* the Israelites of the Ephraimitic kingdom, but left a remnant behind.

But, as many critics look upon the Book of Chronicles as but poor authority for an event happening nearly four hundred years before its publication, I shall quote from a contemporary writer, the true Isaiah, chapter 9, verses 1 and 2, which evidently refer to the message of Hezekiah, sent even to the northernmost and the eastern tribes to take part in his passover : —

“But there shall be no gloom to her that was in anguish. In the former time he brought into contempt the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali, but in the latter time hath he made it glorious, by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan, Galilee of the nations.”

The word “nations” here refers to the numerous Syrians and Phœnicians that dwelt among the northern tribes, who seemed to lack the fierceness with which Judah and Benjamin fought for the exclusive possession of their allotted boundary. See as to this the prediction of Jacob in Genesis xlix. as to the future destiny of Issachar.

Now we read further on about these letter-carriers ; that “they passed from city to city through the country of Ephraim and Manasseh, even unto Zebulun, but they laughed them to scorn

and mocked them. Nevertheless divers of Asher and Manasseh and of Zebulun humbled themselves and came to Jerusalem."

If these few stayed, we find already men of seven tribes (aside from Levites) in the southern capital and kingdom, awaiting the exile to Babylon, and a return, as Jews, to the holy land, that is: Judah, Benjamin, Simeon, Ephraim, Manasseh, Asher, and Zebulun.

Let us now pursue the fate of the Northern Kingdom. It reached its highest power under Omri and his wicked son Ahab, the husband of Jezebel, when it not only held the old boundaries assigned to its constituent nine tribes, but Moab and parts of the Syrian wilderness. But Ahab's son Joram lost these dependencies, and was sorely pressed by the king of Damascus. He was deposed and killed by Jehu, whom Elisha the prophet raised to the throne. In speaking of Jehu's reign, the second Book of Kings, chapter 10, says, "In those days the Lord began to cut off Israel short; and Hazael smote them in all the coasts of Israel; from Jordan eastward, all the land of Gilead, the Gadites and the Reubenites, and the Manassites," — meaning the half of Manasseh in the northeast.

That is, of the Israelites east of the Jordan many were killed or starved, many carried off as slaves; many must have escaped across the Jordan and mixed with the tribes on the west side, those of Gad and Reuben flying to the kingdom of Judah; a few remained on the ground as the subjects of Hazael, the king of Damascus. How terribly destructive these wars were to the Samaritan kingdom we read in the thirteenth chapter, where God's mercy is mentioned that He did not allow the Damascene Syrians to destroy Israel altogether, but nearly so: "For he left not to Jehoahaz (Jehu's grandson) of the people, save fifty horsemen and ten chariots and ten thousand footmen." How large a population such an army represents we cannot say, yet those were times of universal military duty.

It is true the son and grandson of Jehoahaz reconquered many of the lands taken by the Syrians, including Gilead east of the Jordan. But amid the continual wars, both civil and foreign, the people could not have increased greatly, when seventy years after the death of Jehoahaz one Pekah, a captain of the host, conspired and killed his master and became king at Samaria. During his reign a new and more powerful enemy than Damascus appears on the scene, Tiglath Pileser, king of Assyria. The story is told in very few words in 2 Kings, chapter 15:—

"He came and took Ijon and Abel-Beth-Maacah, and Janoah, and Kedesh and Hazor and Gilead and Galilee, all the land of Naphtali, and he carried them captive to Assyria."

This, then, is the first deportation; here, then, are lost tribes. But let us put off the question of what became of them till we come to the second and final deportation.

Pekah reigned twenty years; we are not told in what year of his reign the people of Galilee and Gilead were deported. His successor, Hoshea, became tributary to Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, but rebelled, and sought help from Egypt, and sent no further tribute. The rest of the story is told very briefly:—

"Therefore the king of Assyria shut him up and bound him in prison; then the king of Assyria came up throughout all the land and went up to Samaria and besieged it three years. In the ninth year of Hoshea, the king of Assyria took Samaria and carried Israel away unto Assyria, and placed them in Halah, and in Habor on the river Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes." Further on we read: "And the king of Assyria brought men from Babylon and from Cuthah and from Avva and from Sepharvaim, and placed them in the cities of Samaria, instead of the children of Israel."

The true inference from the text, as to the two deportations, seems to me this: Tiglath Pileser, in the reign of Pekah, carried off many but not nearly all of the Israelites, in the east and north of the kingdom, for those who were left had occasion to mock the messengers of king Hezekiah; and he placed no foreigners in the place of the deported Israelites, which he would have done if he had emptied the land of its former inhabitants.

Shalmaneser, on the other hand, limited his deportation only to the country around Samaria, that is, to Ephraim and the western half of Manasseh.

But he made a clean sweep of it; he established new settlers in the depopulated region, and when these wished to learn the old religion of the country, we are told that he had to send back one of the deported priests, in order to teach it to the newcomers. These, however, did not even cover the whole territory of Ephraim and western Manasseh; for when, some eighty years later, king Josiah of Judah occupied Beth-el in Ephraim, he found no resistance.

I conclude, further, that the number of the deported at each of these two occasions was very small. Tiglath Pileser carried off only a part of the people, though over a large territory; Shalmaneser,

indeed, carried off all that remained, but only from a small district, which had been wasted by three years of war and a very long siege of Samaria, — the horrors of which we can infer from those of other sieges in that ill-fated country.

I do not believe that in either case the number of the deported, including men, women, and children, exceeded thirty thousand. Of these, many must have perished on the journey across or around the Syrian desert, from fatigue, hunger, and exposure.

We should next observe that the places to which these exiles were carried are well known and at a moderate distance from their native land, and in constant communication with it at all times. Media, the most distant of these places, is mentioned very often in the Mishna and Talmud as containing numbers of Jews. The exiled subjects of king Pekah were taken to Assyria, which does not mean the whole Assyrian empire, with all its outlying dependencies, but Assyria proper, that is, the country around Nineveh. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exiles from Galilee and Gilead were never heard of in later ages. Not more than a hundred years after they came into their new homes Nineveh itself was destroyed and razed to the ground, and every trace of it blotted out; its site even was forgotten, till its palaces and libraries were brought to light in our own days by the labors of Layard. The two million or more of people who lived in the intrenched region known as Nineveh, which it took a three days' journey to walk through, vanished away as if by magic; and when Zenophon and his ten thousand crossed the country on his famous retreat, he calls it Media, never speaks of the Assyrian race at all, and does not mention a village even as marking the site of the capital of Sargon, Sennacherib, and Assurbanipal. Along with those millions of Assyrians the few descendants of the exiles of Galilee and Gilead, if indeed they kept up their identity during those one hundred years, perished also.

This leaves the second deportation for us to consider; that is, the remnant of Ephraim, and of half Manasseh, which remained in and around Samaria, after all those who feared the Lord, that is, all who had a strong national and religious feeling as Israelites, had in the reigns of Rehoboam and of Asa moved over into the kingdom of Judah. These were distributed where? According to the authority of Gesenius, Halah is the northernmost province of Assyria proper on the east bank of the Tigris. Habor is on the river Gozan, which runs through Mesopotamia, a region still known to the Greeks as Gauzanitis. And some went to the cities

of Media. Here were at the utmost thirty thousand persons, wholly devoid of any strong feeling for the religion of Israel, scattered over a distance of about four hundred miles between Habor and Media. In Halah and Habor they found both language and religion similar to their own. Those in Halah probably perished in great numbers along with the grandsons of their conquerors at the fall of Nineveh. If among those at Habor there were any that had not forgotten all about their Hebrew origin, they may have joined themselves to the exiles from Judah, who came into the same country after the fall of Jerusalem. If there were any Israelites in Mesopotamia still known as such, but distinct from the Jews, it is very certain that the books of Ezra and Nehemiah would make some mention of them. The apocryphal fourth book of Esdras and Josephus refer to the failure of Ezra to restore the numerous descendants of the ten tribes, but these accounts are given five hundred years after the fact, and are deemed wholly fabulous. According to other authorities, Habor is distinct from Gozan, and both of them in Media. But even on the first assumption, which I take from Gesenius, there remain those of the exiles who went to the cities of Media which are still to be considered.

These, though few in numbers, had a better chance to retain some trace of identity. They came among a people speaking a non-Semitic language, and whose customs and costumes differed greatly from those of Canaan and Syria. And perhaps of these a trace has been preserved to this day. A Semitic dialect being a form of Syriac, differing greatly from the classic Syriac of Edessa, is still spoken by some thirty or forty thousand so-called Chaldean Christians in the Median now Kurdish mountains. For a long time all of them, and even now many of them, belong to the Nestorian church, which does not admit the equality of the Son to the Father. Perhaps this is an outcropping of the old Hebrew spirit, to which the Nicene Creed was an insurmountable stumbling-block. This is, of course, a mere guess; but if there is any visible representative of the lost tribes, it must be this little community of illiterate peasants and shepherds, the Nestorians of Kurdistan.

Let us now return from the lost to the preserved.

Those whom Nebuchadnezzar led from Jerusalem to Babylon, and whose descendants upon their return, first under Zerubbabel, and later on under Ezra and Nehemiah, laid the foundation of the second Hebrew commonwealth, belonged, as we have shown before, to the following tribes:—

First, Priests and Levites ; then Judah, Benjamin, Simeon, Ephraim, and Manasseh, not to mention a few adhesions from other sources. These spoke the classic dialect of Hebrew, known as *Yehudith*, that is, Judaic, the dialect of the southwest, that is, of Jerusalem and its surroundings. This word "*Yehudith*" is found in Isaiah as denoting the language spoken at Jerusalem ; and again Nehemiah thus calls the dialect, to which that great commonwealth-builder endeavored to hold his countrymen. He inveighed against them when they took for wives women from Ashdod, Ammon, and Moab, whose children would learn their dialect, and be unable to speak *Yehudith* or Judaic.

Now there was also a dialect of northern Palestine, which is little else than the Phœnician of Tyre, and which I call for short Galilean. At least one book of the Old Testament, the Song of Songs, is written in it. When reduced to writing, the chief and only striking difference between it and Judaic is that the English "which" is *shē* in Galilean, and *asher* in Judaic. But when read, the divergence is so great that one used to the Galilean system, now used by the German and Polish Jews, can hardly understand Hebrew that is read in the true Jewish style, which is known in our days as the Portuguese pronunciation, and which is followed by the Jews formerly settled in Spain and Portugal, and now scattered through north Africa, Italy, and Turkey, and in some congregations of Holland, England, the West Indies, and the United States.

Throughout the existence of the second temple, the Judaic pronunciation was so far considered the standard, that all the transliterations into Greek proceeded from it alone. For instance, the names of Adam and Abraham, which we find in the Septuagint, would in Galilean style be Odom and Avrohom. The change of the long *o* would, in the northern dialect, turn the name Lot into something like Lout or Löt. The short, open vowel in unaccented syllables, which the Greek version always preserves, is entirely swallowed in the northern dialect. Thus the Greek version gives us in good Judaic the names Samuel, Sodom, Salomon, Zorobabel, which in the mouth of the German Jews are Sh'muel, S'doum, Sh'loumou, Z'rubbyvel. But the dialectic weakness of the Galileans, which most displeased their Judaic brethren, and for which they almost excommunicated them, was their inability to sound the peculiar guttural click denoted by the letter 'Ayin. This the Greek writers could not transliterate except in a few words in which the sound is harder than

usual, and approaches that of the Gamma. Thus the Greek version gives us Gomorrhā and Gaza, which are to the German Jew Amouro and Azzo, without any trace of the initial consonant.

Both the gospel writers and Josephus were Galileans, yet in writing Greek they start from the Judaic sounds. To do otherwise would have looked very much like writing a sermon or history in the jargon of the backwoods, or in the orthography of Josh Billings and Artemas Ward.

These differences in sounding the vowels and the dropping of the 'Ayin and other gutturals, applied not only to the Hebrew, which always remained the language of the Synagogue, but also to Aramaic, which about or soon after the time of Alexander the Great became the language of Judea, and, somewhat later, also the language of Galilee.

We find the distinction of the northern and southern dialects referred to, both in the New Testament and in the Talmud. A story in the latter speaks of a Galilean who comes to Jerusalem to buy something, and asks : *Imar l'man?* "Who has wool?" it may mean, or "who has a sheep," or "who has a donkey," according to the different gutturals with which the word in its various meanings begins; and he is mocked by the mob of the capital for failing to make himself understood.

But after the destruction of the Temple the North came by its rights. Both in Aramaic and in Hebrew, the northern dialects prevailed. The so-called Syriac of Antioch and Edessa became by its copious Christian literature the classic branch of Aramaic; and in Hebrew the vowel signs, now in universal use, were contrived at Tiberias in Galilee, with a view to the Galilean pronunciation, with five simple vowels, to be read *a, e, i, o, u*, and the two diphthongs *ai* and *au*,¹ and the same sign of the short, open, unaccented vowel, as for the absence of all vowels.

Now what is all this to our purpose? Only as it bears upon the history of Galilee; for aside from what the philologist can guess, during the critical period neither Galilee nor all Israel has any history at all.

The last portion of Old Testament history, the rebuilding of Jerusalem by Nehemiah, under the reign of Artaxerxes Longhand, comes down to about 440 B. C. From this date to the time of Antiochus the persecutor we have no source for Jewish history but Josephus.

That no record of passing events was kept or preserved is best

¹ These vowels are to be understood in their continental sounds.

proved by the following odd mistake, which the Talmudic writers fell into. They had a tradition that the second temple stood four hundred and twenty years. This is true, and refers to the temple built by Nehemiah in 440 B. C., and replaced in 20 B. C. by Herod's much larger and more splendid edifice. But in a passage in the treatise *Baba Bathra*, this period of four hundred and twenty years is reckoned from the setting up of the first altar by Zerubbabel in the reign of Darius Hystaspis, say 518 B. C., to the final destruction of the Temple by Titus A. D. 70; an error of no less than one hundred and seventy-eight years. So the history of Israel, after Ezra, must have been a perfect blank to a not very remote generation; and the absence of all known incidents led to the natural belief that the time could not have been near as long as it really was. The present Jewish count of the *Anno Mundi* is based on this mistaken statement in the Talmud.

If, then, we know very little about the whole people of Israel during the two hundred and fifty years that elapsed between Nehemiah and the first troubles which preceded the Maccabean war, it is no wonder that we know next to nothing about who was then in Galilee or east of the Jordan. The few facts told by Josephus refer mainly to the High Priest, to the temple, to Jerusalem.

Yet there is a slight clew. The story of Josephus as to how the Hebrew Scriptures were translated into Greek by seventy or seventy-two elders, chosen six from each of the twelve tribes, at the request of Ptolemy Philadelphus, about 270 B. C., is most probably a fable; not, however, an invention of Josephus, but of much older growth. The existence of such a fable shows that men claiming descent from all the twelve tribes might be found among the Israelites (though commonly called Jews) of the Second Temple.

About fifty years later, Josephus notices that Ptolemy Philopator seized Judea and made war on the inhabitants of Coele-Syria, and "took many of their cities, and particularly our nation who went over to him." It seems, therefore, that the Jews had by this time spread northward even beyond the borders of Palestine to that narrow valley along the Lebanon known as Coele-Syria. In the next generation we find Hyrcanus, the son of Joseph, governing a little Hebrew state, near Heshbon, east of the Jordan. Soon after this the Maccabean troubles break out; and one of the best known incidents in the life of the heroic Judah are the messages seeking his help, both from Galilee and

from *Peræa*, that is, from the north and from the east of the Holy Land.

It seems, then, that by the year 168 B. C., men calling themselves Jews had spread over all of Palestine, except the little spot of Samaria between Mt. Carmel and the Jordan.

Where did they come from? My explanation is this:—

Some of them, including all the Priests and Levites, were Jews in the true sense of the word; that is, descendants of those who with Zerubbabel or with Nehemiah came out of Babylon, but the bulk of them were the old inhabitants of Galilee and *Peræa*. And who were these old inhabitants? Many of them, indeed, Syrians and Phœnicians in the north, Ammonites and Moabites in the southeast, but most of them descendants of the Israelites whom Tiglath Pileser had left behind when he fell upon Israel in the days of Pekah, and whom Shalmaneser, when he took and destroyed Samaria, did not touch. They had, I suppose, a vague recollection of the laws and of the glories of Israel, and they had nothing to oppose to the earnestness of the Jews, who offered them a living consistent faith, a body of enlightened laws, and a well-rounded ritual in temple and synagogue. And thus the descendants of the northern and eastern tribes, and with them many men of Gentile blood, became Jews by adhesion and conversion.

There are two reasons to sustain this view. Galilee and *Peræa* were not an absolute waste, into which the Jews from the southwest could immigrate and there found new cities without meeting resistance; nor would they be allowed to conquer for themselves new seats in a country under the rule and protection first of the Persians, and afterwards of the successors of Ptolemy or of Seleucus. And if there had been such wars of conquest, they would have been boastfully recorded; the history of the two hundred and fifty years following Nehemiah would not be such a blank as we find it. In fact, Josephus mentions with pride the successful wars which Hyrcanus, ruling near Heshbon, carried on against the neighboring Arab tribes of the desert.

The second reason is that of language. The Galilean Jews spoke the dialect of the north, closely akin to that of the old northern tribes, of which the first trace is found in the Song of Deborah, the north-country heroine, and practically identical with the speech of Tyre in Hebrew, and with that of Antioch in Aramaic. If the Jews of Galilee had all been real Jews from the country of Judah and Benjamin they would not so quickly have adopted the northern dialect.

A slight confirmation I find in the language of the ritual, the foundation of which was laid between 300 and 150 B. C. Everywhere in the prayers, the people in addressing God call themselves Israel, not Judah, as the latter term might be distasteful to men of the northern tribes.

When the last war broke out, about 68 A. D., which led to the fall of Jerusalem, the Galileans furnished the largest contingent. Their fertile country teemed with a dense population of thrifty, simple-minded, and madly-courageous men. Great numbers of them must have fallen in battle and at the siege of Jerusalem. But one misfortune Galilee then escaped. Titus carried off into exile and slavery only the inhabitants of Judea, and these were naturally sent across the Mediterranean to Italy and Spain. Galilee quickly recovered from the horrors of war and the fearful waste of life; fifty years later, under the lead of Simon Bar Cochba, a pretended Messiah, it raised a new rebellion against the Romans, and for three years they withstood all the forces that the emperor Hadrian could muster against them. But at last the fortress of Bethar fell, and the Galileans also were led into captivity. Perhaps with the purpose of removing them as far as possible from their ancient seats, the Roman emperor caused them to be deported to Worms and Cologne on the lower Rhine. From these Galileans the bulk of the Jews of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Roumania are sprung; and these have in very modern times sent offshoots to northern France, Holland, England, and the United States.

Among these are many who have in their families kept up the tradition of priestly or Levitical descent, but the bulk of them must be the descendants of the four northern tribes, — Asher, Zebulun, Issachar, and Naphtali, of the Danites at Dan, or of converted Syrians and Phœnicians that dwelt in Galilee.

The feeling of aversion which the people of Judea in the times of Christ entertained against the men of Galilee had nothing to do with religious prejudices. It was purely social, and very much like that which a blue-grass Kentuckian entertains for a Whitley county mountaineer. This feeling is hardly extinct in our days. As late as thirty-five years ago, the Portuguese Jewish families, or Sephardim, of New York or Charleston, looked down upon the Jews from Germany and Poland as altogether beneath them in social standing, and intermarriages were quite rare. In fact, the Sephardim in this country have mostly fallen from grace by their intermarrying with the Gentiles rather than lowering themselves

to a union with the despised *Askenazim*, or Germans. But the latter form more than nine tenths of the Jewish nation in our days; the only large bodies of Sephardic Jews are found in Morocco, Italy, and Turkey. It may then be said: The stone that the builders rejected has become the chief of the corner. No tribes are lost; and those of Galilee are in the lead. The swift hind of Naphtali hath outrun the lion of Judah.

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PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM: A STUDY.

It is not yet seventy years since a representative of the English government resident in Nepaul became acquainted with the existence of a large number of MSS., in the Sanskrit language, which contained a full statement of the Buddhist system. Copies of these MSS., when originals could not be obtained, were soon secured and placed in the public libraries of Europe and made accessible to scholars. English, German, and French philologists and students of comparative religions have vied with each other in their endeavors to master a system which has so profoundly affected the welfare of a large portion of the human race.

Hardly had investigation of these Sanskrit MSS. been begun when it was learned that in Ceylon, in another language, known as the Pali, a language related to the Sanskrit, as the Italian is to the Latin, there were similar treasures of even earlier date. What was of special interest was the fact that the earlier the MSS., in both languages, the more alike were they in thought; yet in course of time the divergence of myths and legends and the corruption of the original simplicity led to the recognition of a southern and a northern Buddhism, according as reference was had to the system as developed in Ceylon, or as modified in the course of its progress to the northeast across Thibet to Mongolia, China, and Japan.

Primitive Buddhism has changed less in Ceylon than in any other country, thanks, doubtless, to native scholars familiar with the Pali language. Colonel Olcott, in 1881, recognized the low estate into which Buddhism had fallen there under the influence of Brahmanism and the religious rites of the primitive native peoples, and the prevalence of devil worship, idolatry, and debas-

ing customs ; but he also found a few persons who held fast to the leading principles of Buddhism as set forth in the earliest MSS.

It was natural that in Nepaul and in Burmah, countries nearest the region of its origin, northern Buddhism should be found most in accord with the southern ; but as the stream gathered impurities, and accepted changes, from each native tribe and country over which it passed, it became quite another thing by the time it reached Mongolia and Japan.

The amount of Buddhist literature now open to scholars, including the earliest instructions of the great teacher, the myths and legends, expositions and commentaries, is said to amount to not less than one million of pages ; and it has been computed that the lives of ten men would be required to become thoroughly acquainted with it as a system of thought and practice, — a somewhat instructive comment on its adaptedness to become a world religion, and on the possibility of presenting anything more than a most meagre outline on an occasion like this, of the Buddhism of its founder.¹

A glance at the religious thought and life of India prior to the rise of Buddhism seems necessary to a just appreciation of the latter.

The earliest religion of the inhabitants of India was that of most, if not all, nature-peoples, now popularly known as Animism, the worship of evil spirits, a belief in fetichism, witchcraft, charms, amulets, sometimes accompanied with sacrifices of various kinds. Such, too, was the religion of the Scythian and Mongol invaders from the northeast prior to the great Aryan immigration from the northwest which took place as early as the year 2000 before Christ.

These Aryan invaders swept over the northern and central por-

¹ The principal authorities consulted in the preparation of this paper are Max Müller, J. Murray Mitchell, Bishop Titecomb, Dr. Dods, but especially Rhys Davids, Sir Monier-Williams, and the "Sacred Books of the East," — a series of volumes now being issued from the press at Oxford under the editorial supervision of Max Müller, containing translations of these sacred books by competent masters, with elaborate introductions and notes that leave nothing to be desired. Since this paper was prepared a volume of lectures on Buddhism by Sir Monier-Williams has been published, which presents the most adequate and on the whole the most satisfactory statement on the subject that has yet appeared. It is some satisfaction to the writer to find that in the results of independent inquiries, covering quite a wide field, he is sustained in his conclusions by Sir Monier in almost every particular.

tions of India, where their descendants still constitute the larger portion of the population. They subdued the earlier inhabitants of the south, but did not supplant them. They brought into India the religious ideas of the various Aryan populations found at a later day in Greece, Italy, and Germany, and these soon became dominant in India in proportion to the completeness of the Aryan conquest. The change in the social life of the people was, if possible, still more marked in consequence of the introduction of caste, as a form of servitude imposed on the conquered races. Only such as betook themselves to the hills and jungles were excepted. It would carry us too far from our purpose to attempt to trace the development of this system, the most elaborate and the most tyrannical ever devised by man.

In the Vedic Hymns, supposed to have been composed between the years 1500 and 1000 B. C., may be traced, apparently in the order of their composition, a gradual descent from the sublime thoughts and aspirations of the earlier poems to the debasement and degradation of polytheistic idolatry. In the earlier hymns, known as the Rig-Veda, there is no trace of idolatry in the use of image worship, no evil divinities, no inculcation of sorcery, no incantation, no obscene practices.¹

The decline went on from worse to worse, till by the year 600 B. C. the simple worship of the earlier Vedic times was lost in a ritual of formal service, and the most debasing practices,—its grosser features derived in part at least from the aboriginal races.

In the meanwhile thoughtful men speculated on the problems of life, and worked out systems of philosophy, which, taking up more or less of the current religious errors and superstitions, have, for substance, despite some attempts at reform, the most remarkable of which is Buddhism, prevailed over the millions of India to this day, at first under the name of Brahmanism, and later of Hinduism.

During what is known as the Brahman period, from 800 to 500 B. C., sacerdotalism reached its fullest development. Religious rites were observed in a language that had become obsolete, and were administered by a selfish priesthood whose tyranny and exactions became simply intolerable. They professed to cite the sacred books, while manufacturing new rules to suit the demands of the hour.

During this period the leading Brahman doctrines had become defined as follows: First, the eternity of souls, both the supreme

¹ Mitchell, *Hinduism Past and Present*, p. 34.

and the individual ; second, the eternity of matter ; third, that a soul can only exercise thought, sensation, consciousness, act, and will when connected with a body ; fourth, that the union of soul and body is productive of bondage and of misery, and that all action entails consequences for good or evil ; fifth, that to realize these consequences, the soul is removed to a place of reward or punishment at death ; after a time to return to another existence in the world, higher or lower, and to continue to do so till emancipated by attaining likeness to God and union with the Supreme ; sixth, that in this transmigration of the soul through an innumerable succession of bodies is found the true explanation of evil in the world. All misery, disease, inequality of fortune or character are thus the consequence of acts in a former state.¹ According to the merit of a man, he is born again into the body of a man, a beast, a bird, a fish, a plant, or a stone.² These various doctrines were wrought out into infinite details.

During three centuries, from 800 B. C. to 500 B. C., these joint processes, religious and philosophical, had gone on, till the time of the Buddha had come.

The best authorities are agreed that the great Reformer was born at a place called Kapila Vastu, near the foot of the Himalayas, one hundred miles to the northeast of the city Benares. There is less agreement as to the date of his birth, whether about the year 623 B. C., according to Edwin Arnold and other authorities, or 557 B. C., according to Max Müller, or 492 B. C., according to Rhys Davids ; all are agreed that he was eighty years old at the time of his death. The Aryan tribe to which he belonged was known as the Sakyas. His father was the head of the tribe. At his birth he is said to have received the name of Siddhartha, which interpreted means "He who accomplished his aim." His family name, by which he is commonly known, was Gautama, though not unfrequently he is called Sakya-Muni, the Sakya sage. By devout Buddhists he is better known by the title Buddha, "The enlightened one." All who have examined into the records are agreed as to the main facts relating to his early life and the careful training which he received in the knowledge of the time. Omitting the mythical stories connected with his early days, so admirably reproduced in "The Light of Asia," there is no doubt that Gautama possessed a character of singular excellence, — that he was a model of manliness, excelling in physical exer-

¹ Williams's *Hinduism*, pp. 50-52.

² Mitchell's *Hinduism*, p. 52.

cises, and beloved by the people. Quite in contrast with the legendary stories of classic and Hindoo mythology, the Buddhist records, overlaid as they are by corruptions, inventions, and misconceptions, yet agree, as the author of the work just named has justly observed, in the one point of recording nothing, no single act or word which mars the perfect purity of his character. As a youth he was possessed of very tender sensibilities, and on that account was carefully excluded from contact with the more repulsive features of life around him. But such seclusion could not last. In time he was brought in contact with the world, where the condition of society and the wretchedness of the great body of the people stirred his sympathies, while his better nature rebelled at the abuses of caste and the tyranny of the priesthood. In his twenty-ninth year he renounced the happiness of domestic life, and gave himself to the study of religion and philosophy. He left a home of comfort and a wife devotedly attached to him, and in accordance with the ideas taught by the Brahmins, as a means of attaining to superhuman power and insight, he became an ascetic, and subjected himself to the severest fastings and penances till physically reduced to the last degree consistent with life. When others were extolling him for his saintliness he found no rest, and despairing of further profit from the course he was pursuing, he again began to take food as other men. But instead of returning to his home and friends he entered on a course of the most careful self-examination and prolonged meditation. Left alone one morning, he is reported to have seated himself under the shadow of a large tree, to be known from that day on as the "Sacred Bo-tree," or the "Tree of Wisdom." His experience is thus described by Rhys Davids : "There he remained through the long hours of that day, debating with himself what next to do. The philosophy he had trusted in seemed to be doubtful ; the penance he had practiced so long had brought no certainty, no peace ; and all his old temptations came back upon him with renewed force. . . . Thus he agonized in his doubt from the early morning until sunset. But as the day ended the religious side of his nature had won the victory ; his doubts had cleared away ; he had become Buddha, that is, enlightened ; he had grasped, as it seemed to him, the solution of the great mystery of sorrow, and had learnt at once its causes and its cure. He seemed to have gained the haven of peace, and in the power over the human heart of inward culture, and of love to others, to rest at last on a certitude that could never be shaken." ¹

¹ Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 39, 40.

This new thought had come to him as a revelation. The end of life was to be reached by self-culture and love to others, without any of the rites, any of the ceremonies or penances instituted by the Brahmins, without any trust in priestly power or in any of the gods in whom he had been taught to believe. He had overcome all worldly influences, all ignorance, all sin, all human desires, and was henceforth to be guided by the law of reason and intuition alone. In view of his experience, he assumed the title of Buddha, "The Enlightened," and resolved to proclaim his discovery to his fellow-men. With prophetic ardor and a true missionary zeal, he at once began to preach to all alike of every rank and class, to men and women, ignorant and learned, recognizing, for the first time in human history, the brotherhood of man and in some measure, also, the true position of woman.

Two months after his experience under the Bo-tree, he called together his disciples, already numbering sixty persons, and sent them forth in different directions to preach the new doctrine. By this time he had matured his general system of teaching, instituted a society or order, in which his disciples were enrolled under pledges of mendicancy and devotion to him as their master and to the doctrines he taught. Throughout his long career of nearly fifty years, he was in the habit during eight months of the favorable season of the year of traveling from place to place with a company of his disciples, begging his food from village to village and from door to door, and giving instruction to all who would listen to him. During the remaining four months he brought his disciples together for special instruction. The method thus adopted by Gautama, in accordance with the usages of other religious teachers of the time, was followed by his disciples. The home required during the season of rest from active labors soon developed into the monastery, and an elaborate monastic system became the great means of diffusing Buddhist doctrines.

Neither Gautama nor his disciples assumed any attitude of hostility to popular creeds and usages ; nor were his followers forbidden to continue their old forms of worship,—as bowing down before the deities worshiped by their fathers. It was only a harmless weakness and would be outgrown with larger knowledge. The burden of Gautama's teaching, which was substantially the same in every place, is graphically set forth in a volume entitled "The Great Decease," or the record of his last days, translated and published in the series of the "Sacred Books of the East."

In the first part of the work he lays stress on adhering to what he terms "the middle path," that is, on being free on the one hand from the enervating pleasures of sense, which are degrading, vulgar, sensual, vain, and profitless, and, on the other, from any trust in religious rites, in sacrifices, or in the efficacy of mortifications practiced by the Hindu ascetics, which were only painful, vain, and useless. The middle path, sometimes called "the noble eightfold path," was summed up in eight principles.¹

1. Right Belief. 2. Right Feelings. 3. Right Speech. 4. Right Actions. 5. Right Means of Livelihood. 6. Right Endeavor. 7. Right Memory. 8. Right Meditation.

The necessity of adhering to this path results from four fundamental truths called "the four Noble Truths."

1. "Suffering or sorrow. Birth causes sorrow; growth, decay, illness, death, all cause sorrow; separation from objects we love, hating what cannot be avoided, and craving for what cannot be obtained, cause sorrow; briefly, such states of mind as co-exist with the consciousness of individuality, with the sense of separate existence, are states of suffering and sorrow.

2. "The cause of sorrow. The action of the outside world on the senses excites a craving thirst for something to satisfy them, or a delight in the objects presenting themselves, either of which is accompanied by a lust of life. These are the causes of sorrow.

3. "The cessation of sorrow. The complete conquest over and the suspension of all natural desires, affections, and motives, the destruction of this eager thirst, this lust of life, is that by which sorrow ceases.

4. "The path leading to the cessation of sorrow is the Noble Eightfold Path briefly summed up in the above description of a virtuous life."²

The Path has its four stages from conversion to sainthood: 1. "The 'entering upon the stream,' Conversion; which follows on, (1) companionship with the good, (2) hearing of the law, (3) enlightened reflection, or (4) the practice of virtue. The unconverted man is unwise, under the influence of sin, enmity, and impurity; but if by one or more of the means just mentioned he has arrived at a perception of the 'four Noble Truths,' he has become converted, and has entered the first Path. While in this path he becomes free successively, (1) from the delusion of self, (2) from doubt as to the Buddha and his doctrines, and (3) from

¹ Rhys Davids's *Buddhism*, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 48.

the belief in the efficacy of rites and ceremonies. 'Better than universal empire in this world, better than going to heaven, better than lordship over all worlds is (this threefold) fruit of the first Path.'"

2. "The path of those who will only return once to this world. The converted man, free from doubt and the delusions of self and ritualism, succeeds in this path in reducing to a minimum, lust, hatred, and delusion.

3. "The path of those who will never return to this world, in which the last remnants of (4) sensuality and (5) malevolence being destroyed, not the least low desire for one's self or wrong feeling towards others can arise in the heart.

4. "The path of the Holy Ones, more exactly, worthy ones, Arahats, 'in which the saint becomes free from (6, 7) desire for material or immaterial existence; from (8, 9, 10) pride and self-righteousness and ignorance.'

"He is now free from all sin; he sees and estimates all things in this life at their true value; evil desires of all kinds being rooted up from his mind, he only experiences right desires for himself, and tender pity and regard and exalted spiritual love for others."¹

The Path is not an easy one. Ten sins or evil states of mind are to be conquered, namely: —

1. Delusion of self (Sakkaya-ditthi).
2. Doubt (Vicikiccha).
3. Dependence on rites (Silabbata-paramasa).
4. Sensuality, bodily passions (Kama).
5. Hatred, ill-feeling (Patigha).
6. Love of life on earth (Ru paraga).
7. Desire for life in heaven (Aruparaga).
8. Pride (Mano).
9. Self-righteousness (Uddhacca).
10. Ignorance (Avijja).²

As helps to the observance of a pure moral life, precepts are also given of a general and special character as to parents and children, to pupils and teachers, to husband and wife, to friends and companions, to masters and servants, to laymen and those devoted to religion. These rules were enlarged and carried out by the followers of Gautama into a mass of details till they became the merest puerilities, and stupidities quite in the style of the nice distinctions of the Jewish Rabbis.

¹ Rhys Davids's *Buddhism*, pp. 168, 169, abridged.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 110.

The final result, when the man becomes perfect according to the Buddhist faith, is Nirvana, a state in which all sin and sorrow, all care and anxiety of every sort, have become extinct, and given place to perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom, a moral condition possible to be reached here in this world and in this life. It is not claimed, however, by the Buddhists generally that this condition has actually been reached save in three or four instances; but by entering on the Noble Path and persistence in well-doing, the Buddhist is certain of reaching the goal in some future existence under more favorable conditions. At death he who has attained to Nirvana ceases to be. Death, utter death, with no life to follow, is the grand result, the glory of the Buddhist system. Its moral code so elaborate, so complete, so admirable, has this as its supreme end; life is not worth living, and the end of all human effort and achievement is to be free from the evils of existence.

There is some uncertainty as to the exact meaning of Gautama in his representations of Nirvana, whether really attainable in this life or not until after death; but extracts from some of the earlier works, which were accepted as a part of the Buddhist Canon, will confirm the position above taken. In a poetical tract entitled "The Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness," the "Blessed One" as he is termed, in addressing the five disciples who, after sharing with him the austerities of his former life, accepted him as the Buddha, speaks of the Noble Eightfold Path as "the Path which opens the eyes and bestows understanding, which leads to peace of mind, to the higher wisdom, to full enlightenment, to Nirvana."¹ In "The Book of the Great Decease," the author in referring to the last disciple made by Gautama before his death, says: "Ere long he attained to that supreme goal of the higher life, for the sake of which men go out from all and every household gain and comfort to become houseless wanderers—yea, that supreme goal did he, by himself, and while in this visible world bring himself to the knowledge of, and continue to realize, and to see face to face. And he became conscious that birth was at an end, that the higher life had been fulfilled, that all that should be done had been accomplished, and that after this present life there would be no beyond."² This last expression seems to be conclusive as to the position taken by Gautama himself. It was not long considered satisfactory, and other views

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xi. p. 147.

² *S. B. E.*, vol. xi. p. 110.

were taken up so as to throw doubt over the whole subject. For instance :¹ "When the Northern Buddhists, long afterwards, had smothered the simple teaching of the founder of their religion under the subtleties of theological and metaphysical speculation, and had forgotten all about the Noble Path, their goal was no longer a change of heart in the Arahatsip to be reached on earth, but a life of happiness under a change of outward condition, in a heaven of bliss beyond the skies. One of the most popular books among the Buddhists of China and Japan is a description of this heavenly paradise of theirs called the 'Book of the Happy Country.'" The work already referred to, "The Great Decease," gathers up the teachings of Gautama during the last months of his life, a work likened to the gospels of the New Testament, or better perhaps to the Apology of Socrates. In an elaborate statement, repeated in what may be termed farewell visits to places where he had formerly labored, we have the summary of what he evidently regarded as the substance of his doctrines. It is given in the following passage, which is at once a description of his method as well as of his teaching : "He held that comprehensive religious talk with the brethren on the nature of upright conduct and of earnest contemplation and of intelligence. Great is the fruit, great the advantage of earnest contemplation when set around with upright conduct. Great is the fruit, great the advantage of intellect when set round with earnest contemplation. The mind set round with intelligence is freed from the great evils, — that is to say, from sensuality, from individuality, from delusion, and from ignorance."² It is evident, as remarked by Rhys Davids, that the word rendered earnest contemplation occupies much the same position that faith does in the New Testament, and is remarkably like the Christian doctrine of faith and works.

In regard to these main truths as above given, Gautama again and again declares that they originated with him, as in the following passage. After citing again the items embraced in the Eightfold Path, he says : "That this was the noble truth concerning sorrow was not among the doctrines handed down, but there arose within me the eye to perceive it, there arose the knowledge of its nature, there arose the understanding of its cause, there arose the wisdom to guide in the path of tranquillity, there arose the light to dispel darkness from day."³ In a re-statement of the same truth he says : "That I should comprehend that this was

¹ Rhys Davids, *S. B. E.*, vol. ii. p. 245.

² *S. B. E.*, vol. xi. p. 28.

³ *S. B. E.*, vol. xi. p. 150.

the noble truth concerning sorrow, though it was not among the doctrines handed down, there arose within me the eye, there arose the knowledge, there arose the understanding, there arose the wisdom, there arose the light."

Quite in keeping with the above, and not unworthy of Gautama, at least in his spirit, is a volume entitled "The Path of Virtue," consisting of 423 aphorisms. They are simple, free from all extravagance, plain, moral suggestions, much in the style of the Book of Proverbs, as may be inferred from a few instances here given, translated by Max Müller.¹

1. "All that we are is the result of what we have thought; it is founded on our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him like a shadow that never leaves him."

21. "Reflection is the path of immortality, thoughtlessness the path of death. Those who reflect do not die, those who are thoughtless are as if dead already."

51. "But, like a beautiful flower, full of color and full of scent, are the fine and fruitful words of him who acts accordingly."

103. "If one man conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and if another conquer himself, he is the greatest of conquerors."

169. "Follow the law of virtue; do not follow that of sin. The virtuous live happily in this world and in the next."

Scattered through the "Book of the Great Decease" are found many similar maxims, such as Gautama's charge to Ananda, one of his favorite disciples: "Be earnest, be zealous, be intent on your own good." A special charge to his disciples who had adopted the vows of celibacy is given in the following terms, in reply to Ananda's question, "How are we to conduct ourselves, Lord, with regard to Womankind?" "Don't see them, Ananda." "But if we should see them, what are we to do?" "Abstain from speech, Ananda." "But if they should speak to us, Lord, what are we to do?" "Keep wide awake, Ananda."²

In the treatises cited above so free from legends and of undoubted early date we have the substance of Gautama's teaching, the secret of its power over thoughtful minds.

It is not strange that a system of moral philosophy like this — we can hardly call it a religion — a system so far in advance of anything known at the time, so true in many respects to the

¹ See his volume on *Science of Religion*.

² *S. B. E.*, vol. xi. p. 91.

moral nature of man, and so in contrast with the corrupt practices of the priesthood and the burdens of idolatrous worship, should have awakened profound interest and even an enthusiasm among the better classes of the people. "Never," as is remarked by one of the most eminent students of Buddhism,¹ "never in the history of the world had a scheme of salvation been put forth so simple in its nature, so free from any superhuman agency, so independent of, so even antagonistic to, the belief in a soul, the belief in God, and the hope for a future life. And we must not allow our estimate of the importance of the event to be influenced by our disagreement from the opinions put forth. Whether these be right or wrong, it was a turning point in the religious history of man when a reformer, full of the most earnest moral purpose, and trained in all the intellectual culture of his time, put forth deliberately, and with a knowledge of the opposing views the doctrine of a salvation to be found here, in this life in an inward change of heart, to be brought about by perseverance in a mere system of self-culture and of self-control."

The object of this paper, as already intimated, is to give a view of Buddhism as taught by Gautama, as matured and developed by him during the annual periods given to the private instruction of his disciples. By constant repetition it was thoroughly committed to memory. Shortly after his death a council was called to secure the aid of those most intimate with him to settle some differences that had arisen; another a hundred years later for the same purpose; and a third by King or Emperor Asoka in the year 250 B. C., which formally settled the Canon of Buddhist Scriptures, and committed them to writing, but not without an evident mixture of myth and legend. This Asoka was the Constantine of Buddhism. Through his influence and patronage it spread over India and became for nearly 800 years the dominant religion, till it broke down under the burden of extraneous accretions, and was supplanted by Hinduism in its narrower sense.

It would be an interesting subject of inquiry to ascertain whether Gautama was really indebted to any source outside of the Vedas and his own meditations for his elaborate code of morals. The striking similarity of many of his precepts to those to be found in the moralists of Greece and Rome, notably in the Laws of Plato, might suggest a common origin; but there seems to have been little if any intercourse between Greece and India prior to the invasion of Alexander, near the middle of the fourth century

¹ *S. B. E.*, vol. xi. p. 142.

before Christ. No theory of occult science, of esoteric wisdom known to the initiated of different countries, will account for this similarity. The Eleusinian mysteries are shown by Mr. Grote to have related only to beliefs touching questions of Greek thought and worship. The common origin of primal truths in morals and religion may rather be ascribed to the remains of the primitive revelation which held its place through the centuries because true to the moral nature of man. Aristotle, as quoted by Jowett, ascribes these truths to the wise men who lived near the beginning of things. Some of these truths are to be found in the Vedas, and though lost sight of in the pantheism and the moral degradation of his time, could not fail to have enlisted the thoughtful regard of a mind so keen in its moral perceptions as that of Gautama. Indeed, Gautama's own testimony may well be taken in proof that he was not indebted to any outside sources.

What is of more interest to us at this day is his formal rejection of any esoteric doctrines for an elect few. There was no privacy in his instructions even for those whom he organized as an order, only certain stricter rules of living as became men devoted to the work of making known his instructions to others. Esoteric Buddhism, of which we hear so much in these later times, is purely an after-thought. When the Buddhism of Gautama had declined from its first estate it compromised with Brahmanism, accepting some of its speculations, among the rest, the Yoga system of occult knowledge, and gave in exchange its Buddha to occupy a place in the Hindu pantheon as an incarnation of Krishna. The instances recorded in which supernatural power is claimed for Gautama in the earlier books are so rare and so out of keeping with their general tenor as to be fairly accounted for as interpolations of a later day, to give increased dignity to his character; unless we suppose that in his old age, like Mohammed or even Keshub Chunder Sen of our time, he may have yielded to his flatterers and accepted their ascriptions of extraordinary power.

So once for all we may clear our way of all the fancies of esoteric Buddhism, seeing in its claims not the teachings of Gautama, but the accretions of the popular legends of a credulous and superstitious age, reinforced on the one hand by the speculations of an oriental imagination, and on the other by the jugglery and legerdemain of the devotees of occult science. This is all we can make out of Mr. Sinnetts' Esoteric Buddhism, notwithstanding his claim to have received permission to publish its secrets from

certain Buddhist priests, kindly considerate of the welfare of mankind and of his credulity. This, too, is rather more than we can make out of Colonel Olcott and his Buddhist Catechism, and we are not surprised at the failure of his mission to Japan.

When we read the speculations on Cosmogony, in which so cultured and well balanced a mind as Plato could indulge, we need not be surprised at the vagaries of the Orientals, however much we may wonder at their acceptance in these later times by men of the Anglo-Saxon race. As to the occult science of esoteric Buddhism much need not be said. The exposure of its lying pretensions and of the deceit practiced to pass off tricks of the trained juggler for miraculous effects, has added but little to the knowledge of the possibilities of human credulity. In a curious work called "Apokatastasis, or Progress Backward," by a late professor in one of our New England colleges, we have numerous citations from Latin authors of the first centuries of our era, from which it appears that occult science has made but little, if any, progress through the discoveries of these later times.

Whatever powers are now ascribed to Gautama, it is an interesting fact that he never claimed to have attained to any other powers than were possible to any other man capable of the same sublime abstraction of mind.

The one great thought of Buddhism, observes Sir Monier-Williams, is intellectual enlightenment such as man can acquire "through his own intellectual faculties and through his own inner consciousness, instincts, and intuitions, unaided by any extraordinary or supernatural revelation of any kind."

For the first time in the history of mankind was proclaimed "A salvation which each man could gain for himself and by himself in this world during this life without the least reference to God or to gods, either great or small."¹

Gautama makes no attempt to account for the origin of things, rather he deprecates all such inquiry as idle and useless. He accepts from Brahmanism, as the ultimate fact, the existence of the material world and of conscious beings living in it, but the practical side was enough to absorb his thought and effort, and he left to others the privilege of speculation.

In the foregoing presentation only incidentally is any reference made to the sanctions of the moral system taught by Buddha. On the one hand he held up his doctrine of the Nirvana as the reward of fidelity to him and his doctrines — rest for the weary,

¹ Rhys Davids's *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 29.

for all burdened with sin and doubt and earthly trials, rest and then the end. On the other hand, he held up the doctrine of transmigration from one state of being to another according to character, till the end is reached, though millions of years be spent in the process.

That which passed from one stage to another under the transmigration process is not the soul, as taught by Brahmanism and by Greek and Egyptian philosophy, but the net result in thought and sentiment of all former experiences, an unconscious force called Dharma, attaining to consciousness in each successive stage of experience, on reaching a sufficiently high grade of being. "Buddhism sees no distinction of any fundamental character, no difference, except an accidental or phenomenal difference between gods, men, plants, animals, and things. All are the product of causes that have been acting through the unmeasurable ages of the past ; and all will be dissolved. Of sentient beings nothing will survive save the result of their actions ; and he who believes, who hopes in anything else, will be blinded, hindered, hampered in his religious growth by the most fatal of delusions."¹

Buddhism thus approaches the modern religion of humanity. Progress is made or lost in accordance with unchanging laws, and the elevation of the race as a whole is due to the aggregate of good over evil in the life of each succeeding generation. The one thing to be striven for is knowledge. The evil, the suffering in the world, is due to ignorance ; men do wrong because of ignorance. There is no such thing as an evil will ; no such thing as sin, because there is no higher spiritual being to whom men are responsible. Indeed, there is no proper spiritual being at all, as understood in Western thought. No future rewards, only the Dharma to complete its course, and then to be dissolved.

In Buddhism we start, therefore, with an order of things already existing ; coming, we know not whence, beginning, we know not when or where ; with material forces working on in endless change, as a mechanism complete in itself. With beings inorganic and organic, the latter in their higher forms attaining to consciousness ; yet in the highest forms to the consciousness of suffering, of sorrow, of misery, having a life whose ideal state is attained in the suppression of all desire, affection, or emotion, in a dreamy unconsciousness and then final extinction. . . . "In short," remarks Sir Monier-Williams in his last work, "the constant revolving of the wheel of life in one eternal circle, according

¹ Rhys Davids's *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 214.

to fixed and immutable laws, is perhaps after all the sum and substance of the philosophy of Buddhism " (p. 122).

The most popular verses in the Pali-Buddhist books are said to be these : —

" How transient are all component things,
Growth is their nature and decay ;
They are produced, they are dissolved again :
And then is best, when they are sunk to rest."

Such is Buddhism as set forth by its founder, — a protest, a rationalistic protest against the prevailing systems of his day. Not inaptly has its relation to Brahmanism been likened to that of Protestantism to Romanism twenty centuries later, with this difference, that Buddhism is not properly a religion at all. It is a philosophy, the last result of unaided human thought on the great problems of life. It is a confession of human misery ; a recognition of life as a scene of conflict between the lower and the higher nature ; of the appetites, desires, passions, and cravings, that inspire and animate the material nature, with the intellectual and spiritual forces that make up the man. It is the old problem of the thoughtful of all ages, but in no instance has there been so complete a rejection of everything distinctly spiritual or supernatural. The supreme object of human endeavor is to extinguish all life, all sentiment, all feeling, all consciousness. When the object is attained, life may be continued up to the moment of physical death to be sure, but as bare existence only, and then victory is swallowed up in death !

In Buddhism, therefore, there is no Creator, no Divine Providence, no infinite love and sympathy, no Father in Heaven, no plan for the redemption of a fallen spiritual being, no final triumph of truth and righteousness, no eternity of blessedness to redeemed souls ; no first chapter of Genesis, no first chapter of John, no story of the Christ, and none of the New Jerusalem.

The Light of Asia is not the Light of the World !

N. G. Clark.

BOSTON, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

THE CHARACTER OF PRESIDENT WOOLSEY.

THE death of Yale's senior ex-president has revived the memory of his important services, and so doubtless secured the production in due season of fitting memorials of his work as an educator and a teacher. These, we believe, will place him high among the intellectual forces of his generation. Dr. Leonard Bacon (no mean judge of men and well acquainted with Dr. Woolsey) once declared him to be the most gifted and accomplished man who had up to his time been President of Yale, and certainly no one doubts that of the talents intrusted to him all were put to good account. The length of his presidency, the relative prominence of the college which he efficiently governed and led, and the excellence, amount, and variety of his contributions to literature, will, we are confident, put him high in the front rank of American college presidents.

Discussion of the value of so long and laborious a career obviously requires special and thorough study of its fruits. It is pleasant to reflect that death in such cases only lifts the life to view and calls attention to its abiding worth.

In respect to the moral qualities displayed by a man long in prominent service, this reason for delay does not exist; so far at least as the impression carried by his contemporaries is the source of knowledge, and it is perhaps better that what is to be said should be spoken while recollection is fresh.

We will try to give some account of President Woolsey's personality as it appeared to those of his pupils who knew him in his riper years.

The first of the deeper impressions received was that of force. Young men did not meet their President many times before finding out that he was a man of resolute and commanding nature. Not that he had an imposing presence. On the contrary, the spare, bent figure, the small though shapely head, the rather high-pitched voice, the absolutely unstudied and undemonstrative utterance, suggested the man of books, and of books only; one too much absorbed in ideas to be capable of dealing effectively with men. But a powerful will can express itself through any physical organs whatever, and President Woolsey's pupils soon felt his manful and masterful nature. His quick movement, his brilliant eye, his terse, direct utterance, his calm intensity of tone, all suggested power. If occasion arose for the display of authority, such, for example, as a display of boyish turbulence, the spirit of the man went out in strength. One of the absolutely unquestioned facts of college life was the majesty of the President's authority. No legend attributed weakness to him. On the contrary, the legendary tales of which he was the hero represented him as dominating not only students, but Faculty.

The undergraduates, whether they believed those stories or not, felt that their President was the true head of the college. As he went in and out among their Professors, some of whom were brilliant and famous men, they knew that he was preëminent among them, because the strongest spirit of them all. The hiding of his strength in his scholarly mien and unpretentious manner probably heightened their reverence for his force. They felt that there was enough of it to dispense with the usual accessories of presence and bearing.

Resting upon and blending with President Woolsey's strength of will was an extraordinary energy of moral feeling. This we believe to have been the quality of his nature which especially distinguished him from other men. He was made for moral greatness. His love of righteousness and his hatred of unrighteousness, especially in its meaner and baser forms, we believe to have been as intense as those felt by any man of his generation. Although he did not teach ethics, and during a large part of his presidential service did not preach regularly to the students, he made all his pupils aware that his moral feeling was a steady if hidden fire. The writer recollects his taking occasion of some breach of truthfulness to say in chapel that he would rather have the grosser vices prevalent in college than lying, and counts the revelation of moral vigor given in the intense words as one of the precious lessons of his life. But he only came into a more vivid apprehension of a character already known. The President's historical teaching had shown it. He could not describe to his pupils the forces at work in the modern world without making them aware of his hatred of the base ones among them.

Such native strength of moral feeling and power of will would have given any man governed by right principles a high character, but might, if he were subjected to less happy influences in early life than those which Woolsey felt, have produced an unsymmetrical one, marred by narrowness or fanaticism. But he was given from his youth all opportunities and incentives to self-cultivation, taking the word in its broadest sense. His strong sense of duty took possession of this ideal and made it the ruling principle of his life. So he strenuously sought from early years moral completeness. His intellectual culture was subordinated to this aim and coöperated with it. He pursued knowledge not for its own sake, but for the residuum of moral truth it contained and the capacity for usefulness it gave. He sought it by rigidly honest methods, strenuously applied, and made its acquisition a moral discipline. When it was gained it was so faithfully put to its higher uses, so diligently used in the discovery of moral truth and the cultivation of moral feeling, that it became a spiritual possession.

Thus this scholar's life gave harmonious moral as well as intellectual development. When the character came into full maturity, and showed the effects of heavy sorrows and weighty cares and ripe Christian experience as well as of unremitted self-culture, it wore a beauty, a blending of strength and refinement, a delicacy of moral feeling, which were rare.

The eminent Divine who spoke in behalf of the Yale Corporation at Woolsey's inauguration as President intimated that the favorable circumstances of his early years had helped him to a character fitted to the duties of an academic life, but not robust enough to endure the struggle and strain of a professional career. The speaker would have owned, we are sure, twenty years afterward that Woolsey had shown in administering the college as much firmness and force as the duties of at least any ordinary professional career demand; and that his power of character was softened into a moral beauty which showed the indispensable value of early culture, rightly used, in making a complete man.

The refinement of Dr. Woolsey's moral nature was especially apparent in his love of justice. His studies after he became President led him to constant reflection upon the relations of men to each other as expressed and guarded by laws and institutions; and upon society as a product of man's jural claims. One can easily see how a mind so ethical and so highly trained came into a keen appreciation of the complexity of human relations and the delicacy of the virtue which finds its function in giving each its due recognition. Certainly one learned from his criticism of life to appreciate the refined and comprehensive excellence of a just character, and to honor the strenuous moral culture by which alone it can be obtained.

Woolsey's love of justice inevitably found its highest expression in his religious life. He had adoring delight in the existence of a just God. That which was best and truest in the rectoral conceptions of the New England theology, the Almighty's recognition of the moral needs and claims of his creatures, his seeking ends of goodness for each in the ordering of a common moral life, deeply fascinated him, but not so deeply as to make him forget that God's justice is the servant of his love.

When one remembers the period in the nation's history in which his presidency fell; when one recollects that it was given him during the quarter century ending with the reconstruction of the Union to help young men to their conceptions of civil society, one sees how great the service he rendered American society. To the moral sentiment which made temperate but firm opposition to the aggressions of slavery, and which, in its assurance of righteousness, endured the suffering and anxiety of the war, and which used victory when it came with wise moderation, he surely made large contribution.

Woolsey's moral culture found, perhaps, its finest expression in the truthfulness of his life. He evidently had a naturally frank and ingenuous spirit. His artless manner and open face showed a disposition to self-expression. But insincerity may use frankness as a mask, and will, sometimes at any rate, do so in all but highly disciplined spirits. Woolsey's natural love of truth became a determination that his life should be one absolutely devoid of falsehood. It was evidently his purpose to

eliminate by constant endeavor all pretenses, however slight, from his speech and conduct. Sometimes the high purpose was almost ruthlessly carried out. He had to make memorial addresses when his colleagues died, and insisted upon telling their defects as well as their virtues; in some cases with a rather painful fidelity. Yet the result nobly vindicated the endeavor. The impression of sincerity, of absolute loyalty to truth which his utterances made was certainly rare. One felt always on hearing him that he could not under any inducement be false; that to disbelieve him was to disbelieve the naked truth. Such a man's testimony to a Christian experience was the most convincing of Christian evidences.

His style, in its bareness of ornament, in its straightforward simplicity, in its frequent downrightness of statement, was the expression of a man who was bent on seeing things as they are and describing them as he saw them. A more elaborate manner, a commendation of truth by attractiveness of form, would not have comported with his simple trust in the truth's own value.

A characterization of President Woolsey's intellect hardly falls within our scope. It was always given to the scholar's tasks, and an estimate of its power implies a judgment of the quality of its products, a work which, as we said at the outset, it is not for us now to undertake. We may, however, give our impression of its leading traits in a word: it was a calm, comprehensive, facile, though not a brilliant mind. It had not the fascination which a great imagination wields; nor can profound originality be claimed for it. Its claim to distinction is not the impartation of new truth, or the splendid presentation of truth already known. But it was a mind very full of noble wisdom. Its great stores of knowledge respecting history, institutions, and literature, its penetrating insight into the operation of moral forces, its admirable training, made it a well-spring of truth. Whether its native endowments were great or not, in its power to read history aright and draw from it lessons of inspiration and warning, it was truly great.

We have to say, in closing, that the character whose salient features we have tried to draw was manifestly that of a Christian, that is, one who gets both his moral ideals and his power to realize them from Christianity. Few men have more continually realized and acknowledged their moral dependence upon God. To a nature so intensely ethical, Christianity would come first of all as a means of moral recovery, and then as an inspiration to moral endeavor. That President Woolsey had found it to be both of these, and rejoiced in it as such, all might know. His religious life was a humble confession of need and glad thanksgiving for help. He made all who knew him feel that to him virtue was the indwelling life of God, and the struggle for it was the search for the Father. And in his artless confessions and praises he unconsciously taught even his less mature and thoughtful pupils, that the heart of a strong, wise, and accomplished man could be as the heart of a little child.

SOCIALISM UNDER DEMOCRACY.

SOCIALISM has been termed "the economic side of Democracy." If this definition is true, it will soon be made evident that socialistic principles are better adapted to, and can be more easily adopted into, the political life of America, or even of England, than, for example, into that of Germany. At present the formal showing of Socialism is far greater in Germany. Nearly one million of voters, or one in ten of the voters in that empire, cast their ballots for socialistic candidates. But the spread of ideas cannot be measured by their formulation in a political party. Political organization may register the force of resistance, as well as the amount of sympathetic opinion. There is now no socialistic movement in England of like proportion with Chartism, for the reason that English statesmen have learned to recognize and incorporate into the political system popular demands which might otherwise have taken shape in a political party. Thus of the six original "points" of Chartism one half have already been incorporated into the constitutional system, namely, manhood suffrage, vote by ballot, and the abolition of the property qualification for election to Parliament. And of the present immediate demands of English socialists, whether in the direction of further amendment of the political machinery, or of the revision of taxation, or of educational reform, or of the extension of the Factory Acts, it will be found upon investigation that they are all proper subjects of Parliamentary action. Indeed the political questions of England are so largely social and economic that it is quite impossible to analyze the political situation and give a distinct place to socialistic issues.¹

In this country, on the other hand, political rights and privileges have been so fully attained, that the economic issue so far as expressed in Socialism can be separately and clearly set forth. And it should be said in passing, that a certain stage of progress in any movement has been reached when its object can be broadly and intelligibly stated. It is not necessary that the movement should be defined in its exact details or in its certain issue, but its object must be clearly set forth if it is to have a hearing. This has now been done by the advocates of socialistic principles in this country. They have stated the object of their endeavor to be "The Nationalization of Industry," or national control of all industrial forces, as opposed, on the one hand, to the whole industrial system founded on competition, and, on the other, to the system of combinations, or "trusts," which, though in themselves opposed to the method of competition, put the profits of industry into the hands of the great capitalists rather than into the hands of the people.²

¹ For the statement of the immediate demands of the socialistic party in England, see the "Programme for London" published in the (*London*) *Star* for August 8, 1888, and quoted in the Publications of the American Economic Association, vol. iv. No. 2, pp. 70-72.

² For a complete statement of the aim of "Nationalism," see the Declara-

Socialism, according to the object thus declared, may seem to have peculiar advantages for working itself out under a democracy. That which is in intention so clearly in the interest of the people may expect candid and considerate attention from them. And it is to be said that Socialism of this constructive type is now receiving the careful attention of the American people. The popularity of such a book as "Looking Backward" cannot otherwise be explained.¹ Mr. Bellamy is, by his own naive confession, an *amateur* socialist. His book was not the product of painful or protracted thought, nor of a burning personal experience. "I had at the outset," he says, "no idea of attempting a serious contribution to the movement of social reform. The idea was of a mere literary fantasy, a fairy tale of social felicity." The genius of the writer lay in the discovery and use of the analogy between a military and an industrial army. If a community could protect itself by a self-enforced system of service, why might it not maintain itself by a similarly self-enforced system? The reception accorded to a book which owes its success as its origin to a happy analogy, rather than to a deep personal experience or sense of wrong, shows the readiness of the public mind to consider the principles which it advocates. "Looking Backward" has stimulated many thoughtful readers to study the works of more serious American writers like Henry George or Laurence Gronlund, to investigate more thoroughly the principles of different schools of socialists abroad, and in some cases to form clubs for the more active advancement of social reforms.

We wish to call attention to some of the changes which illustrate, and in part explain, the increasing acceptance and use of socialistic principles in this country, and afterwards to suggest some of the more serious difficulties in the way of the complete application of them to the national life.

In estimating the advance of socialistic principles, very much account must be made here as elsewhere of the philosophical change from the individualistic to the more socialistic conception of life. Philosophical thought is the leaven which, working secretly, effects the changes which appear in popular movements. No one can understand the history of the religious or political or economic movements of the past three centuries without assuming individualism as the working force. It is this which explains Protestantism, which explains modern liberty, which explains the prosperity of the industrial states. The world, as we know it, is the product of the development of the idea of personality. As Miss Wedgwood says² — "To the modern world the starting-point of thought

tion of Principles printed in current numbers of *The Nationalist*; and for a statement of the aims of "Christian Socialism," see a like Declaration in more detail in current numbers of *The Dawn*, — both published in Boston.

¹ It is reported that the present weekly sales of *Looking Backward* are from one thousand to fifteen hundred copies.

² *The Moral Ideal*, p. 392.

has been the individual man. Perhaps no greater revolution ever moved the world of thought than that which effected this change in its moral unit: it has needed nearly two thousand years to work out its consequences, and exhibit the morality of the 'self,' as the classic world exhibited the morality of the citizen." But as the same writer had just before said,¹ taking note of the change to which we refer — "It seems at times as if the epoch of individualism, which began with the modern world, were at last at an end. We are apparently returning towards the ideal of antique life, according to which the unit of moral thought was not the individual but the group. Modern Democracy with its bias towards Socialism, its deference towards 'the masses,' appears to revive the classical reverence for the State at the expense of the individual." We doubt the reversion of modern society to the classic models, but we believe that the inevitable drift of thought which has related in every possible way the individual to all that has gone before him and to all that is about him, will more and more carry over the "self" into the "citizen." By common consent the doctrine of individual rights is for the time giving place to the doctrine of social duties. Something of this tendency is due to the sharp necessities of the economic and moral situation. Society is learning what St. Paul means when he says that "if one member suffers all the members suffer with it." The individual who seems to have least need of others may at any moment become the greatest sufferer from any serious corruption or disturbance of the social system. Neglect of social obligations is seen to be sure to entail some loss of personal advantage or personal freedom. And we are not unwilling to believe that the change in thought has been influenced by moral considerations. The instinct of self-interest is not the only instinct of which human nature is capable. Patriotism is a recognized form of interest in the common good. And Christianity is continually enlarging the opportunity for the play of the wider instincts. "Education, habit, and the cultivation of the sentiments," John Stuart Mill says, "may yet make a common man dig or weave for his country as readily as fight for his country."

The philosophical change toward more socialistic theories is comparatively recent, though it has not been sudden. But there is a change in the same direction now going on in the economic life of the country which is sudden and startling. We refer, of course, to the exchange of the principle of competition for that of the combination or trust. And the exchange is going on with such rapidity as to suggest to the superficial observer the absolute and complete abandonment of the principle by which the industries of the nation have been developed. Competition is the individualistic way of doing business; the combination, or trust, is the socialistic way of doing business. Each trust formed is a concession to Socialism in its working principle. It is more than a

¹ *The Moral Ideal*, p. 390.

concession ; it is a confession. Socialism charges great wastes upon the competitive system. More goods are manufactured than are needed, and at greater cost, for want of concentration. Combine the productive forces in a given industry and you lessen the cost of production, while you control the market. There is no waste, because there are no goods unsold. The formation of a trust is an admission of the justice of this charge ; or it is an admission of the charge that profits are gained out of proportion to the capital actually at work. The Distillers' and Cattle-Feeders' Trust, known as the Whiskey Trust, is made up of eighty distilleries ; but, according to the New York "Times" of June 29, it was operating only thirteen of them. The conclusion from such a course is inevitable, — either there had been immense waste in production, or the profit had been such as to allow a fair interest on the idle capital represented by the closed distilleries, making reasonable allowance for a certain enlargement of those kept in operation.

Every trust, we repeat, represents the working principle of Socialism, however contemptuous the makers of it may be toward any avowed socialistic method, or however indifferent they may be toward the moral motives of Socialism. The trust puts Socialism at work for the capitalist rather than for the laborer ; that is, it uses the principle, while it violates the motive and defeats the object of current Socialism. The trust calls public attention to the practicability of socialistic principles. Without doubt the principle of Socialism is far in advance of the sentiment. Socialism, as a moral issue, has made comparatively little progress in this country, owing chiefly to the immense resources of the nation, so many of which are yet undeveloped ; but in no country have its principles been so quickly and easily applied to business life, as seen in the developments just referred to.

Still another change showing the same socialistic tendency appears in the growing interference of the state in purely economic affairs. The old principle of *laissez faire* is no longer respected. The government does much in various ways to regulate the industries of the nation. Apart from the effect of the tariff, the industrial life of the people is subject to constant legislation on the part of the States and of the nation. Nothing has yet been suggested of such detailed application to the laboring classes as the recent insurance bill of Count Bismarck, passed by the Reichstag, which practically affects no less than eleven millions of persons, granting for one item an invalid pension, from a compulsory insurance fund, of which the minimum is \$15 a year, and the maximum about \$91.¹ Nor

¹ The London *Times* describes the new government socialistic project as follows : —

"The new measure includes within its scope almost the whole working population of Germany. It secures for the wage-earning classes of the country a fair maintenance in the event of sickness and of disabling accident, and a pension in old age. These benefits are granted in return for compulsory weekly payments, varying in amount according to the wages earned by the

has any such extended provision been made in this country as in England,¹ chiefly through the municipalities, for the relief or diversion or improvement of the masses. But the state is becoming a very practical power amongst us in respect to the regulation of industry and in the assumption of what had been regarded as private or corporate functions. Many would be surprised to know how much a single State, like Massachusetts, attempts and accomplishes in the regulation of its industries, not only through direct legislation, but by its advisory commissions. And many, we presume, would be surprised to know how much they are in sympathy with those who favor the increasing transfer of corporate functions to the government, municipal, state, or national. Colonel Higginson is, doubtless, right in the statement which he makes in a recent letter to "The Nation": —

"There are a good many persons, I take it, who have reached just this point of conviction — namely, to hold that, if the government carries on the post-office fairly well, as it certainly does, it may well undertake the telegraph also, as in England; that if it can conduct a bankrupt railroad, through a 'receiver,' it could also carry on a successful one; that if a city can supply its inhabitants with water, it might as well try the experiment, of supplying them with gas. How far this tendency is to go, such persons do not undertake to say — and here they stop short of Mr. Bellamy and his thorough supporters; but in the meantime they are willing and glad to put themselves on record as looking in that same direction. They find themselves confronted with a situation which has nowhere been better stated than by a strong opponent of State Socialism, Professor A. T. Hadley of Yale University. He says, in the 'Political Science Quarterly' for December, 1888: 'Modern life demands organized business action. There are two great organizations, either one of which can manage it — organized capital, or organized government.' If this be the real alternative, there is certainly an increasing number of persons who would prefer to trust the government. This is, at any rate, the present writer's inclination."

contributors. The higher the previous payment the greater will be the benefit obtained, but the payments and benefits do not exactly correspond, some advantage being allowed to the poorer sections among the contributors. The insurance fund, if we may so term it, is further swelled by payments exacted from the employers, and the state finally comes in and augments by a fixed sum the allowance or pension in each separate case. The administration is under provincial boards, consisting of representatives of the workmen and of their employers, and subject to imperial control. It is intended to be a self-supporting scheme, except as regards the added contributions from the state, which are in the nature of a free bonus. But it is not clear on what principle it has been framed in order to secure this, or whether the contributions made to it will be large enough to be a fair equivalent for such portion of the benefits as they are to purchase. It is a bold step in any case, and all the bolder because it has been taken somewhat in the dark. The promised contributions from the state are the most safe part of the whole, but they may prove by and by a very heavy tax on the public purse, and will press severely on a community not lightly burdened already, and on a state which has *inter alia* the enormous cost of German armaments to support. It is this part of the scheme, however, which most distinctly gives it a socialistic character."

¹ See article, by William Clark, on Socialism in English Politics, in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1888, pp. 559, 560.

In view of these changes in the direction of Socialism, and in view of the hospitality of the public mind towards socialistic ideas, and of the readiness in business circles to adopt socialistic principles, may we not expect the gradual transfer of industry from corporations to the government; may we not expect the ultimate transformation of the Republic into a socialistic state? No wise man will predict what will not be. And the improbability or impracticability of a socialistic state is inherently no greater than of a democratic state. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that democracy is not the final settlement of the social problem. Political equality is in no sense the equivalent of social equality. Individual freedom, without those material gains which might be expected to accrue from it in a prosperous community, is a barren possession. "The social problem of the future," Mr. Mill says,¹ "we consider to be how to unite individual liberty of action with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor."

One difficulty of the social problem above that of the political problem lies in the want of room for experimenting on a grand scale. The political problem was solved through the discovery and occupation of the New World. American democracy was a growth, not a transformation, and the conditions of its growth determined, in large degree, its success. If the socialistic state had a new world awaiting it, as the democratic state had, in which it might *grow* according to its principles, furnished and equipped as it would be with the appliances of the modern world, we have no doubt that it would succeed, and in its success produce as great an impression upon existing forms of society as the American democracy has produced upon existing forms of government. But Socialism has no sufficient place in which to try its experiment with a view to general influence. The ground is occupied by opposing institutions. It must, therefore, establish itself by revolution, or by the transformation of existing institutions to its uses. Revolution is practically out of the question in a democracy. Transformation is the only method, and the process of transformation in this country would be attended, as we have intimated, with some peculiar difficulties.

To begin with, the transfer of the industries from the corporations to the government would bear most heavily upon the government at its weakest point, namely, in its municipal functions. If the new social system, after Mr. Bellamy's invention, could be set in motion at once, the strain would fall equally upon all parts. But as the change must be gradual, there must be a starting place, and that place must be the municipality. The first changes would consist in the extension of the functions of the city. Instead of providing water, and in some cases light, as now, the city would control the horse railways and other distributing agencies, and from the control of these would advance to the control of the pro-

¹ *Autobiography*, p. 232.

ductive industries. Indeed, a well ordered city is the nearest approach among existing institutions to the socialistic ideal. But a well ordered city of great size is the exception, not the rule. Municipal politics in this country are proverbially corrupt. The saloon is a far more influential factor in the government of cities than any or all workingmen's clubs. And the interests already intrusted to the city are the sources of corruption. Increase these interests, as cities are now governed, and you increase the sources of corruption. Taxation would soon become unbearable. But, it is said, the proposed social system takes away the motives to corruption. Under its workings it is no longer of personal advantage to any one to be dishonest. We grant that there is much truth in this answer. But we reply that the social system is not at work, — the whole problem being how to put it at work. The difficulty is how to make a beginning if the very agency to be used is confessedly corrupt. Socialism can safely proceed with the "municipalization" of industry only when it has succeeded in purifying the municipal organization. It must first show itself a political force of sufficient power and purity to recover and control its proper agencies. This difficulty may not be insurmountable — we welcome the endeavor to overcome it — but no power has yet been able to make our municipal governments as honest, and for that reason as economical for public uses, as the average corporation.

Another difficulty peculiar to this country, which may be said to be territorial rather than political, lies in the immense diversity, if not divergence, of its industries, and of the industrial habits of its people. Socialism draws its illustrations chiefly from the factory system. But the manufacturing interest in this country has never been in agreement with other productive interests. It has been the ceaseless problem of politics to bring the conflicting interests of national industry into sufficient agreement for the material development of the nation. The capitalists of the East are not at one with those of the West and South. Not because they are capitalists, but because they represent the industries of their sections of the country. Put labor, or the people, in the place of capital, and the problem is not simplified. And more account still must be made of the great divergence in the industrial habits of the peoples of different parts of the country. Socialism must rely more upon the workable unity of human nature than upon unity of material interests. But the peoples of the North and of the South, for example, are constitutionally unlike in all their views and methods of labor. The differences in this respect are far greater than between Englishmen and Irishmen. To secure such uniformity in work as would satisfy the sense of fairness on the part of those who are constitutional *workers*, would be wellnigh impossible. We should like to see the work of the typical Yankee of New England and that of the typical "poor white" of the South reduced to common terms either in time, quality, or amount. Socialism can manage what is individual in human

nature better than that which is provincial. The social system must be very elastic which can cover different types which are the product of different natural, social, and political forces.

But the greatest hindrance to the socialistic transformation of the social and political institutions of this country lies, we say it in friendliness, but in the utmost frankness, in the character of the current Socialism. The current Socialism is unmoral, not in the sense that it is immoral, but materialistic. We make exception, of course, in behalf of that Socialism which is thoroughly Christian in fact as well as in name, and we recognize the absolute dissociation of all genuine socialists from anarchists of every type. But the ideal of the current Socialism is materialistic rather than moral, and the remedy for existing abuses and inequalities is also materialistic in too large proportion to the moral. By far too little account is made of the place of individual morality in the new social system. Banish poverty, remove inequalities, and you assure the wellbeing of society. Does any one believe that? Does any one believe, for example, that poverty is altogether or the chief cause of the social vices, or that they would cease or even grow less under the equal distribution of the general wealth? We have allowed that the new social order, if once at work, would take away many of the motives to dishonesty; we also allow that it would remove many of the occasions for crime for which we now build prisons. But what of the vices for which we do not build prisons? What of the corruption which under the highest social development eats at the heart of society? The motto on the title-page of "*The Nationalist*" runs — The Nationalization of Industry and the Promotion of the Brotherhood of Humanity. So far, so good, in its moral bearings. But the promotion of the brotherhood of humanity is not the only morality. There is an individual morality, which must be included if the social end is to be gained. And if it be said that this is of course assumed, we reply that it is not enough that it be assumed; it must be emphasized in any scheme of social reconstruction. And especially, as we began to say, with any scheme which is to find favor with the American people. The American people are in their convictions and methods profoundly moral. We do not forget, in this assertion, the apparent contradiction in the attitude of the nation toward slavery. But the end proved the truthfulness of the statement. We can understand and sympathize with the present impatience of socialistic thinkers with the apparent indifference in this country to social wrongs and inequalities. Still we repeat the statement that the American people are profoundly moral rather than materialistic in their use of methods, and in their conception of the true wellbeing of society. And in so far as the present aims and methods of Socialism are materialistic rather than moral, they will fail even of their legitimate influence upon the public mind. The Socialism which may prove a reconstructive and transforming force in this country must possess itself of a positive morality in accord with the genius and habit and method

of the American people. Indeed we believe a positive morality to be the great want of Socialism everywhere. And of this view we find confirmation from so unprejudiced an authority as the writer of the article on Political Economy in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Mr. J. K. Ingram, himself, as we understand, a socialistic Positivist. We quote his words: "The solution, indeed, must be at all times largely a moral one: it is the spiritual rather than the temporal power that is the natural agency for redressing or mitigating most of the evils associated with industrial life." To which statement he adds in a foot-note: "The neglect of this consideration, and the consequent undue exaltation of state action, which, though quite legitimate, is altogether insufficient, appears to us the principal danger to which the contemporary German school of Economists is exposed," — and then resumes: "What is now most urgent is not legislative interference on any large scale with the industrial relations, but the formation in both the higher and lower regions of the industrial world, of profound convictions as to social duties, and some more effective mode than at present exists, of diffusing, maintaining, and applying these convictions. This is a subject into which we cannot enter here. But it may at least be said that the only parties in contemporary life which seem rightly to conceive or adequately to appreciate the necessities of the situation are those that aim, on the one hand, at the restoration of the old spiritual power, or, on the other, at the formation of a new one."

The question which we have been discussing is of twofold interest. The endeavor to transform a democratic into a socialistic state is an experiment to which no student of political science can be indifferent. As we have said, there is no more inherent improbability in our time of a socialistic state than there was two centuries ago of a democratic state. But the democratic state having been established, can it not be made to satisfy by its own discriminating use of socialistic principles the true aims of Socialism, or must it in turn give place to a new social order. Of this no one can affirm, but no one can be unobservant of the phenomena which attend the determination of the question.

But the interest in what is a question of political science deepens into the most serious personal and social concern as we consider the occasion which gives rise to this and to like discussions. The inequalities, which are growing upon us out of the present industrial and social order, are becoming too great for the order itself unaided to control and remedy. An order founded on individualism is already doing much to repress and restrict healthy individual development. It may not be true that the poor are growing poorer as the rich are growing richer, but it is true that the richest are growing richer at the expense of society, and in other ways than that of wealth. It is the great middle class that is beginning to feel the pinch. Men of ordinary capital are crowded out of the traditional forms of business life. The loss here is not of

pecuniary estimate alone ; it is greater in its intellectual and social relations. Only the great capitalists, or those who unite in combinations, can preserve the conditions which favor the development of individuality. The real thing at issue is broader than any question of poverty, deep and broad and sensitive as that is. It is the question whether society can continue to develop normally and healthfully in all its parts under present conditions. If not, every true citizen is concerned in effecting so much of change in condition as may be necessary to that end, whether the outward and final form be the democratic or the socialistic state.

DOES THE AMERICAN BOARD PROPOSE TO CONTINUE ITS PROSCRIPTIVE POLICY ?

THE time has come in our judgment to ask this question in the most direct way, with the view to a clear and frank understanding about the attitude of the Board toward candidates for the missionary service. We may be told that we have an unmistakable answer in the resolutions passed at Des Moines and at Springfield. So we had supposed. But the interpretation put upon these resolutions by those who were instrumental in securing their passage is becoming uncertain and contradictory. The semi-official utterances of the Board, especially in invitations to young men, do not accord with its official actions. Evidently the party in the majority is not of one mind in regard to the policy to be pursued, and in this issue the minority have the right to ask for information, in order that they may know how to act in special cases.

The proscriptive policy of the Board has now been in force for three years. What is the situation at the close of the third year ? The well-nigh complete alienation of young men of progressive tendencies in our colleges and seminaries, from the Board under its present management ; a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the large minority of its constituents ; and, as we have intimated, the weakening of not a few of the original supporters of the action of the Board, in regard to the expediency of continuing its intolerant policy. We have good reason to believe that at no time have the most discerning friends of the Board been so anxious about its immediate future as since the meeting at Cleveland. The weakness of the position taken at Des Moines and Springfield has been becoming more and more apparent upon calm reflection. Each year reveals more clearly the anomaly of the place held by the American Board, as now controlled, within the Congregational body. The denomination moves on in its traditional breadth and freedom, a growing democracy of strong, energetic, and earnest churches, but entrusting its whole foreign missionary work to an aristocratic bureau of ultra conservatism. The benefactions of the churches continue to be made, for the churches most at variance with the present management have too much at stake

in the final policy of the Board to withdraw from its financial support. No one proposes to sever his connection with the Board. Those most dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs have trusted much to the effect of time. They have given due weight to the impossibility of the situation. The more moderate among the conservative party have counseled patience. They have said, and are saying, to their aggrieved brethren, "Be patient; influences are at work which will relieve the stricture; we do not agree with you theologically, but we recognize the injustice of denying to suitable candidates the commission of the American Board."

Why do we not wait longer? Why urge the question which we have raised? Because of the interests involved which ought not to be trifled with by further delay. Three seminaries in the Congregational body are now virtually shut out from the American Board as the medium for service in "the cause of Christ in heathen lands." Here and there one from among the students or more recent alumni of these seminaries, who finds himself in sympathy with the theological tests imposed, may be accepted, but the seminaries are no longer represented by those who accept their general teaching and spirit. "We cannot expect any more men from Yale or Bangor under the present condition of affairs," was the recent remark of a conservative man, who spoke from personal knowledge of the public effect of the course pursued at the rooms of the Home Secretary. And his words were evidently uttered in anxiety as to the result of this alienation of young men in the seminaries named upon the prospects of the Board. We do not assume to know what the prospects of the Board are in respect to men, either as to their number or quality. Possibly a supply may be found in the seminaries in sympathy with the present direction of the Board, or in other denominations, or in Canada. Of this matter we have no actual knowledge. But this, we submit, is not the matter at issue. The question is not as to the supply of men, from whatever source they can be drawn, but as to the rights of young men to missionary service under the Board who represent the progressive wing of the Congregational churches. At present they have no acknowledged rights. And the churches which they represent have no rights. These churches would be entirely unrepresented on the mission field were it not for the missionaries already there, many of whom are in open or in unexpressed sympathy with them.

Furthermore, events have occurred since the last meeting of the Board, which make it in every way desirable that there should be an understanding upon the matter in question. If an adjustment of present differences is impracticable, we may at least avoid further differences growing out of a misunderstanding of the situation. The events which have happened since the meeting at Cleveland have an important bearing upon the relation of the Board to the churches and to the missions, and also upon the possible action of the minority in regard to special cases of missionary candidates.

First, it has been demonstrated that the churches will ordain as missionaries those who hold substantially the theological views of candidates who have been rejected by the American Board. There could never have been any reasonable doubt that this would be the fact whenever a test case should arise. The whole course of ordaining councils had been toward this conclusion. No one, to our knowledge, has ever been excluded from the Congregational ministry because of these views. Council after council has passed upon candidates holding them, and always with the same result. It was not to be assumed that an exception would be made whenever a candidate for missionary service of like opinions should present himself before a council. There was no evidence that the churches would accept the fictitious distinction made between the theological rights of pastors and missionaries. The fact to which we have called attention was to have been anticipated, but as an actual fact it has its indisputable significance.

Secondly, it has been shown that the friends of missions in the membership of the Congregational churches will support, if necessary, those thus ordained whose support the Board declines to assume. Here, again, there was little room to question the disposition of very many in the constituency of the Board. But the response, when the occasion offered, was prompt and generous to an unexpected degree. Care was taken that no public appeal for money should be made. Contributions were solicited in the most private ways, yet within a week enough was raised to support a missionary and his wife for five years. The readiness shown in response to private solicitation is very suggestive of what might be expected from a public appeal.

And thirdly, it has been made evident that men thus ordained and sent out will be welcomed to their work by missionaries of the American Board. It was hardly credible that any other reception would be accorded to them, notwithstanding many intimations and assertions to the contrary. But the reception of Mr. and Mrs. Noyes by the Japanese mission, unanimous, immediate, and hearty, the spirit of coöperation shown in so many ways, the virtual assignment of them to their field of labor, reveal and illustrate the spirit of the missionaries. Possibly not every mission would have shown a like spirit, though we should be very unwilling to allow such a possibility. Certainly there are fields in abundance pleading for work, where genuine hospitality and coöperation might be expected if any should be called to go out as solitary workers. The spirit abroad is no less tolerant and generous than that at home.

These are some of the facts which will confront the Board at its next annual meeting. *The Board by its proscriptive policy has created an alternative to its own method.* It has opened a direct way from the door of the churches into the mission fields. Nothing is wanting to the method thus created. Councils will ordain, the friends of missions will support, and the missionaries will welcome and coöperate with the

rejected candidates of the American Board. We speak with confidence, for when, as in the present matter, the issue is a moral one, one example is as good as twenty. It reveals the situation all round. Consecration, if it be true and honorable, and persisted in, cannot fail of its end. Who will take the responsibility of thwarting a truly consecrated man in his purpose? What church would refuse to aid and encourage one of its members, if in all ways qualified, in his determination to preach Christ to those who know Him not, what council would refuse to ordain, who would forbid his support, what missionary would withhold the right hand of fellowship? There is but one way in which the proscriptive policy of the Board can be made effective, and that is by the suppression of the missionary spirit among the young men and women whom it would reject from its service. Whoever ought to be, and wishes to be, a missionary will have the opportunity to be one by the providence of God working through the heart and will of the churches.

We ask the question, therefore, which we have proposed in the light of the alternative which presents itself. And we ask the question in good faith that we may know, in common with others, what advice to give in particular cases. Very much depends upon the practical answer which will be given at the meeting to be held in New York, for in the nature of the case an answer will be made by some action or by inaction. We offer a single suggestion — not in the way of advice, for the responsibility now rests upon the majority — in the interest of frankness and sincerity. If any action is proposed looking toward a change of policy, let it be made explicit. The resolutions of the Board embodying its proscriptive policy were explicit, the vote retaining the Home Secretary was explicit, the decision of the Prudential Committee in rejecting Mr. Noyes was explicit. In the face of such action no merely conciliatory words of a general character can be of avail. Conciliation of this kind has been tried and has signally failed. The letter of the President of the Board, in which, after weeks of deliberation, he accepted the office to which he had been elected, was evidently written in a conciliatory spirit. But of what use has it proved as a basis of agreement, or as a means of bringing young men into honorable relations to the Board? What has it accomplished, what could it accomplish, to heal the breach? Who among young men has been persuaded by it to offer himself to the Board? The time is past for all words which cannot be made good in official acts. Invitations which do not insure a generous reception are no longer deceptive, but they are worthless. If the Board is not ready to open its doors to the young men from the more liberal seminaries of the denomination, but shall continue to treat them with suspicion, and refuse to receive them on a theological basis as catholic as that which exists among Congregational churches and ministers, it will in every way be better that they should meanwhile make their appeal directly to the churches.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY.

FOR the full outline, and for general authorities to be used under Section I, see January number, pp. 85, 86.

SECTION I. THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF LABOR.

Topic 8. *American Labor as affected by Slavery and Immigration.*

SUB-TOPICS WITH NOTES.

1. The importation of Africans the first disturbing effect from without upon American labor. Its continuous effects.

"The tradition of Slavery dishonors the race, and the peculiarity of the race perpetuates the tradition of Slavery. No African has ever voluntarily emigrated to the shores of the New World, whence it follows that all the blacks who are now found there are either slaves or freedmen. Thus the negro transmits the eternal mark of his ignominy to all his descendants, and although the law may abolish slavery, God alone can obliterate the traces of its existence." — *De Tocqueville*, "Democracy in America," vol. ii. p. 458.

The growth of the negro population prior to the first census, according to Bancroft, was as follows:—

1714 . . .	58,850	1760 . . .	310,000
1727 . . .	78,000	1770 . . .	462,000
1750 . . .	220,000	1774 . . .	500,000
1754 . . .	260,000	1780 . . .	562,000

For growth since — from 757,208 in 1790 to 6,580,793 in 1880 — see Census of 1880.

2. The intrenchment of Slavery in the industrial life of the country at the adoption of the Constitution.

"The compromises on the slavery question, inserted in the Constitution, were among the essential conditions upon which the Federal government was organized. If the African slave trade had not been permitted to continue for twenty years, if it had not been conceded that three fifths of the slaves should be counted in the apportionment of representatives in Congress, if it had not been agreed that fugitives from service should be returned to their owner, the Thirteen States would not have been able in 1787 'to form a more perfect union.' " — *Blaine*, "Twenty Years in Congress," vol. i. p. 1.

Contrast, however, the sentiment in regard to the slave trade, as shown by the following petition of the legislature of the colony of Virginia to the King in 1772:—

"The importation of slaves into the colonies from the coast of Africa hath long been considered as a trade of great inhumanity; and, under its present encouragement, we have too much reason to fear, will endanger the very existence of your Majesty's American dominions. We are sensible that some of your Majesty's subjects in Great Britain may reap emoluments from this sort of traffic, but when we consider that it greatly retards the settlement of the colonies with more useful inhabitants, and may in time have the most destructive influence, we presume to hope that the interest of a few will be disregarded, when placed in competition with the security and happiness of such numbers of your Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects. Deeply impressed with these sentiments, we most humbly beseech your Majesty to remove all those restraints on your Majesty's governors of this colony which inhibit their as-

senting to such laws as might check so very pernicious a commerce." — *Bancroft*, "History of the United States," vol. vi. pp. 414, 415.

It should be said in explanation of the above extract that Southern feeling was not the same in regard to the slave trade and in regard to Slavery, and that the newer Southern states at the adoption of the Constitution were urgent for the continuance of the slave trade till they should be stocked with laborers.¹

3. The economic contrast between the free and slave states.²

4. The economic effect of the political supremacy of the slaveholding states through the generation preceding the rebellion.

5. The effect of immigration in counteracting the industrial results of slavery, especially in transferring political supremacy to the non-slaveholding states.

"It is well known that two influences, neither of which could have been foreseen, have changed these conditions and brought the whole continent under the subjection of sixty millions people. These two things are railroads and foreign immigration on a large scale. Railroads began to be built in 1830; and the foreign immigration which began to be considerable as early as 1820, acquired immense proportions in the forties and fifties. These two things have given us the labor-force necessary to subdue the wilderness and the means of placing this labor-force exactly where it is most needed and most profitable. Both of them have been necessary, and without them it is utterly improbable that we could have attained the place we now hold. We owe our position as one of the great nations of the world to these two things, and to immigration as much as to railroads. It would be easy also to point out what an important influence this immigration of free laborers, coming as they did overwhelmingly to the Northern States, has had on our internal politics, especially in settling the question of slavery." — *Professor Richmond M. Smith* in "Political Science Quarterly," March, 1888, p. 48.

The three papers on The Control of Immigration, contributed by Professor Smith, in the March, June, and September numbers of the "Political Science Quarterly" for 1888, are of the highest value in the current discussions of Immigration.

6. The rate of immigration as affecting the relative proportion between the native and foreign population. Study at this point is valuable in showing the bearing of immigration upon subsistence and employment.³

7. The character of immigration as affecting the labor market. Statistics of the United States show that three fourths of the immigrants are unskilled laborers. Immigration from 1873–1886, classified by occupation, is as follows: Professional, 31,803; Skilled, 587,349; Miscellaneous, 2,052,294; occupation not stated, 128,782; without occupation, 2,596,188. Evidently the total of "miscellaneous" is to be added to that of "without occupation." The absence of skilled labor in any large degree leaves the trades comparatively unaffected. The amount of unskilled labor cheapens the lower grades of labor.⁴

8. The effect of immigration on pauperism and crime.⁵

¹ Curtis, *History of Constitution of United States*, vol. ii. pp. 285–290.

² Von Holst, *Constitutional History of the United States*, vol. i., chaps. 9, 10. Congressional Debates on Missouri Compromise and on Annexation of Texas.

³ See article by Dr. Edward Jarvis in *The Atlantic*, April, 1872, on Immigration.

⁴ See Reports of the Special Committee of the House of Representatives on Immigration, — Mr. Ford, chairman.

⁵ See Report of Fourteenth National Conference of Charities and Correction.

9. The relation of artisans trained abroad to the development of home industries, and to the organization of trades-unions.¹

10. Is immigration necessary to the further development of the resources and industries of the country?

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William Jewett Tucker.
 ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

FREEDOM OF MIND IN WILLING, or Every Being that Wills a Creative First Cause. 8vo, pp. xxxvi, 468. 1889. — CAUSATION AND FREEDOM IN WILLING, together with Man a Creative First Cause, and Kindred Papers. 8vo, pp. v, 375. 1889. — ESSAY ON LANGUAGE, and other Essays and Addresses. 8vo, pp. xiii, 400. 1889. — ECONOMICS AND POLITICS, a series of papers upon Public Questions, written on Various Occasions from 1840 to 1885. 8vo, pp. iv, 405. 1889. By ROWLAND GIBSON HAZARD, LL. D. Edited by his Granddaughter, CAROLINE HAZARD. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$2.00 each.

The collected writings of the late Rowland G. Hazard have a double interest. They are valuable contributions to the discussion of various subjects, and they are the prolific literary labors of a man who all his life was actively engaged in business. Two of the four volumes are devoted to theories of freedom and causation in human action, and are a careful re-edition of previously published works on that subject. Mr. Hazard's high reputation as a metaphysician rested on the elaborate and profound arguments which are collected in these volumes. A careful estimate of his theory of freedom was prepared for this REVIEW by the late Professor George I. Chace and printed in one of the early numbers. The other two volumes are a collection of miscellaneous essays and addresses on various subjects in literature, politics and economics. Temperance, the Fugitive Slave Law, the Tariff, the Currency, Manufactures, Lan-

¹ See Massachusetts Reports of Bureau of Statistics of Labor, — Carroll D. Wright.

guage, the Bible are among the topics which drew out his original thoughts. One of the most noteworthy chapters is that on the Bible. It was written more than forty years ago, but was never published till now. The occasion of it was the sermon of Theodore Parker on "The Permanent and the Transient in Christianity" which created so great a stir. Mr. Hazard then wrote out, apparently for his own satisfaction, some of his candid opinions about the origin and authority of the books of the Bible, and at several points anticipated some of the recent results of Biblical criticism. The paper, if it had been composed recently, would be received as the intelligent and rather advanced thought of an evangelical believer. If it had been published at the time of its composition, it would have been regarded by many as thoroughly inimical to Christianity. Several of the essays have, indeed, this distinct value that they indicate the contrast between the current beliefs of the present and a former time. They carry us into the opinions and modes of thought of the preceding generation, while they anticipate many changes of opinion which were subsequently wrought out.

The style is of that periodic structure, sustained and elaborate, which reminds one of English writers of the last century.

The sketch of the author's life and of his habits of action and thought is extremely well drawn by Miss Caroline Hazard, his granddaughter, by whom the four volumes are edited. He lived somewhat apart from men as to direct intercourse. He was seldom seen walking the streets or going back and forth in the train chatting with a companion, but was almost always alone. Yet few men live so urgently as he did in the activity and development of their own times. Few are so alive to the great moral and intellectual issues of society. Few exhibit a broader patriotism and philanthropy.

George Harris.

AMERICAN STATESMEN. GEORGE WASHINGTON. By HENRY CABOT LODGE. Vol. I., pp. vi, 341. Vol. II., pp. 388. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$2.50.

Mr. Lodge, in this biography, sometimes strains more in his style than is quite agreeable. It is hardly a reproach against him that he is not always quite *au niveau* of such a subject. But as respects his two main objects, he has well accomplished his purpose. One is, to show that Washington was far from being such a desiccated Cromwell as Carlyle is willing to imagine, but was a youth, and a man, full of red blood, of warm, intense feelings, of love, friendship, and patriotism, for which he has never yet had worthy credit on account of his almost unexampled, almost excessive habit, indeed, of self-control. The other end proposed is, to bring out how, from 1775 until 1789, to say nothing of his presidency, the quiet but incessant activity of Washington was the thread of unity, first in our military, and then in our civil history, without which it bade fair to tumble apart into irredeemable incoherency. Mr. John Fiske has lately brought this out for the time of civil anarchy; Mr. Lodge brings out with thorough success Washington's silent energy throughout the war. The comparison of Washington with Fabius has overclouded his just reputation, for Washington was Cunctator in the main only because Congress and the States tied up his hands from any other policy. The true man is seen in the Jersey campaign and in the Yorktown cam-

paign. Frederick the Great knew how to do full justice to the former. And Mr. Lodge has given the great *momenta* of the war with so sustained a distinctness, that the present writer, confessing to an almost absolutely unmilitary head, is able to boast that now he sees the whole of it. History as we are beginning to have it written, resting on a digested development of amply ascertained facts, is pulling down the reputations of the little and exalting the reputations of the great, and Washington seems to be profiting to the full by this happy law of historical retribution.

The author brings out with quite novel distinctness the unremitting enginery of expostulation with which Washington had to besiege Congress. Though not an author, he might fairly have claimed that he had found the pen almost as mighty as the sword. The spiteful remark attributed to John Adams, that Washington "had made his fortune by holding his tongue," is only true in the baldly literal sense that he was no orator, for he was a most indefatigable letter-writer. The country at last was absolutely pervaded by his correspondence. This formed the mellow soil in which the speculatively grounded thoughts of others, who were greater thinkers but lesser men, could germinate. This biography thoroughly vindicates to Washington the power of initiative. Mr. Lodge treats with due contempt the notion that Washington was a great character but a commonplace mind. It is enough to say that such a combination is blankly impossible. When analyzed, it is seen to be a mere contradiction in terms.

Mr. Lodge dwells at length, with justifiable pride, on the steady largeness of national apprehension to which Washington attains, almost with a bound, from the very first of the difficulties with England. Even Patrick Henry had to clear himself, so to speak, by a great oratorical outburst, from the entanglements of his Virginianism, and can hardly be said to have always remained on this high level. But Washington seems to have needed no effort either to attain it or to maintain it. It is true, the continental and even European reputation which he had gained in the Old French war, made this the easier for him. Some splenetic outbursts against the New Englanders, in the first desperations of his command, signify little. He made ample amends afterwards. The author remarks that wherever complaints of Washington's inaccessibility were heard, they were never heard from the people, and that he never withdrew his confidence from them. The stately dignity of his manner, and of his style of living, did not repel them, for that bastard counterpart of true republicanism, "the so-called Jeffersonian simplicity, leading straight to Jacksonian vulgarity," had not yet put forth its poisonous growth.

Mr. Lodge calls attention to the fact that Washington appears to have had a strong underlying vein of sentiment in his nature. He is hardly so successful in finding much humor in his composition. But he well observes, that though his youth shows him to have had a cheerful and hearty interest in the various sides of life, the stress of after years made any great efflorescence of humor improbable. But a certain touch of the sage seems necessary for much humor, and Washington had little in him of either the sage or the saint. The latter fact Mr. Lodge rather glories in, which is foolish. Saintliness is not any the less a divine thing because Washington did not have it. *Non omnes omnia* in this mundane range of things. Mr. Lodge goes so far as to stigmatize Lady Huntington as

"notorious," as if a pronounced interest in vital religion were something of one sort with thimblerrigging. He should have contented himself with calling the excellent countess a proser, as Washington certainly found her. But the author justly remarks that his hero's virtues rested upon a simple but unmoved substructure of Christian faith.

The biographer remarks on Washington's unbounded and almost pathetic reverence for the richer attainments of education, which his opportunities had denied him. All great things naturally drew him, because he was great. Before Sydney Smith had asked, "Who reads an American book?" Washington, in a free conversation with the English actor Bernard, asked with much animation, whether a young country, not out of the forest, had not already done very respectably by furnishing to the world the writings of Franklin, Rush, Rittenhouse, and Jonathan Edwards, as well as of Jefferson and Adams. Mr. Lodge remarks that, little pretension as Washington had to literature, the literary and historical allusions in his writings are those of a man who had an adequate furniture of both.

The biographer, admitting that Washington's anxiety, both to give and have his pecuniary dues, reached to the extent of a foible, is well warranted in being surprised that he should have been accused of hardness because he reclaimed an overcharge of fifteen shillings, not, as pathetically described, from the widow of the overcharging mason, but from her second husband, who had advertised that he wished to meet all claims! The people must have been hard up that manufactured an accusation out of that. But more harm has been done by the priggish and bombastic fictions of the absolutely untrustworthy Weems, who, having been refused ordination in England, persisted in calling himself a rector when he was not even a clergyman. The Washington of our childhood is about as much a fiction in detail as William Tell.

The Introduction eloquently vindicates the infallibility of the verdict of mankind as to the majestic greatness of Washington. It marshals with great skill and convincing force the various and independent expressions of this feeling in various countries. The bitterness with which he was assailed towards the close of his administration by countrymen of his own, inspired by Jefferson, was inevitable for a man who, American to the heart, was therefore of necessity a lover not of the England that then was, but of

"Freedom in her regal seat
Of England,"

and a hater of the French Madness, which he was none the more bound to love because it was the inevitable fruit of the old French Tyranny.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

THE BEGINNINGS OF NEW ENGLAND, or The Puritan Theocracy in its Relations to Civil and Religious Liberty. By JOHN FISKE. "The Lord Christ intends to achieve greater matters by this little handful than the world is aware of." (Edward Johnson.) "Wonder-Working Providence of Zion's Saviour in New England." 1654. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. Pp. xvii, 296. \$2.00.

Mr. Fiske represents the settlement of New England as a part of the gradual shifting of primacy from the men who spoke Latin to the men

who spoke English. He remarks that England, though much less purely Teutonic in blood than Germany, had kept far more fully the old Teutonic institutions. The Teutons in Britain had made such clean work, with everything but the mere bodies of the Britons, that their old liberties were involved in fewer complications than ultimately at home, where the Holy Roman Empire came to overshadow everything. He distinguishes three methods of nation-making: the Oriental, Conquest without Incorporation; the Roman, Conquest with Incorporation, but without Representation; and the English, Incorporation with Representation. The latter is the only form of absorption which the future will recognize.

Mr. Fiske remarks that indirectly the Roman method came near ending in the Oriental. The break-up of the Empire averted this, and the Roman Church cured the resulting anarchy:—

“Out of the interaction between these two mighty agents has come the political system of the modern world. The moment when this interaction might have seemed on the point of reaching a complete and harmonious result was the glorious thirteenth century, the culminating moment of the Holy Roman Empire. Then, as in the times of Cæsar or Trajan, there might have seemed to be a union of civilized men, in which the separate life of individuals and localities was not submerged. In that golden age alike of feudal system, of empire, and of church, there were to be seen the greatest monarchs, in fullest sympathy with their peoples, that Christendom has known, an Edward I., a St. Louis, a Frederick II. Then when in the pontificates of Innocent III. and his successors the Roman church reached its apogee, the religious yearnings of men sought expression in the sublimest architecture the world has seen. Then Aquinas summed up in his profound speculations the substance of Catholic theology, and while the morning twilight of modern science might be discovered in the treatises of Roger Bacon, while wandering minstrelsy revealed the treasures of modern speech, soon to be wrought under the hands of Dante and Chaucer into forms of exquisite beauty, the sacred fervor of the apostolic ages found itself renewed in the tender and mystic piety of St. Francis of Assisi. It was a wonderful time, but, after all, less memorable as the culmination of mediæval empire and mediæval church than as the dawning of the new era in which we live to-day, and in which the development of human society proceeds in accordance with more potent methods than those devised by the genius of pagan or Christian Rome.”

As Mr. Fiske and Mr. Doyle both point out, it is in accordance with the place of New England in this Teutonic expansion of race and impulse, that her settlement should have proceeded mainly from East Anglia. All the fooleries of Grant Allen can never make out that, if Celticism could reassert itself in either country, it would not be chaos come again, of which, indeed, we seem to be having a fair foretaste in both countries. Let the Celt quicken and refine; but control—! It is very significant that Mr. Savage computes that in 1800 ninety-eight per cent. of the New Englanders were of English blood, excluding even Wales.

Mr. Fiske holds that, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Lollardism had deeply leavened England down to Henry VIII., and certainly this assumption agrees with the strength of Puritanism. And it was happy for the genuineness of New England that the schemes of Gorges and of Merrymount were overwhelmed.

Mr. Fiske allows a certain possible security from intrusiveness in the restrictions of the Massachusetts theocracy, but does not pretend that they were justifiable. Evidently Hooker and his company did not think

them so. As to the persecution of the Quakers: "In Massachusetts the opposition was very strong indeed, and its character shows how wide the divergence had already become between the upper stratum of society and the people in general." Mr. Fiske evidently thinks that in 1689 the time had come for Massachusetts to begin her course of training under royal governors, which at the last put her side by side with Virginia.

The author's remarks on the fictitious explanation of the long Indian peace in Pennsylvania show that Penn has had a credit and New England a discredit, which belongs to neither of them. So long as the mighty Iroquois were English, Pennsylvania was at peace. When Indian politics changed, no colony suffered more than Pennsylvania. On the other hand, Mr. Fiske accredits the Puritans with a genuine sense of justice and friendliness towards the Indians, but remarks that the savage could not understand the civilized man, and that the result was inevitable.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS. By the Rev. Professor G. G. FINDLAY, B. A. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son.

The Expositor's Bible, to which this volume belongs, consists of a series of popular commentaries whose aim seems to be to utilize the established results of modern Biblical criticism, while guarding against its extravagances. Professor Findlay has given us thirty expository lectures upon the Galatians, which exhibit very well the advantages and difficulties attending the effort to combine Biblical interpretation and preaching. In the main, the text is as well divided as it can be for such purposes, the central thought of each section is clearly apprehended, and exegesis is kept in proper subjection to practical hortatory purposes. On the other hand, the attempt to apply the words of the apostle to modern social and religious conditions tends to break the continuity of thought in the epistle and sometimes, perhaps, to warp the exegesis. Indeed, the influence of the hortatory spirit imparts to these lectures a certain intensity of style not quite consistent with the spirit of the critic and interpreter. One cannot avoid the feeling that his teacher is not in the right frame for sober and discriminating criticism when he begins his lecture in such terms as the following:—

"Here the Epistle begins in its main purport. . . . The sharp, stern sentences of vv. 6-10 are like the roll of artillery that ushers in the battle, the mists rise from the field, we see the combatants arrayed on either side, in due order and in cool self-command the Apostle proceeds to marshal and deploy his forces," etc. (p. 53).

Certainly the strength of one's own position is not increased when the views of opponents are spoken of as "a strangely jaundiced and small-minded sort of criticism" (p. 95), or as "simply one of the mare's nests of a supersubtle and suspicious criticism" (p. 127). Still, these are examples of imperfections which do nothing worse than to mar what is, on the whole, a very good piece of work.

The author follows Lightfoot in holding that the epistle was written in Macedonia and not at Ephesus, and that it followed First and Second Corinthians. He treats the Old Testament with more freedom than some would approve; for example, "Although in substance [Mosaism

was] 'holy and just and good,' it was by no means purely Divine. It was not the absolute religion. Not only was it defective; it contained, in the judgment of Christ, positive elements of wrong, precepts given 'for the hardness of men's hearts'" (p. 219). Again: "Judaism was rudimentary throughout. A religion so largely ritualistic could not but be spiritually and morally defective. . . . Its ethical code, moreover, was faulty" (p. 265). He seems to hold that Gal. iv. 8-11 abrogates the command to keep the Sabbath, adding, "We may not place even the Lord's Day upon this footing," affirming that its observance must be an "unforced and grateful celebration" (p. 269).

At the same time he holds that Paul's inspiration did not necessarily save him from chronological errors (p. 204), or from a mistake concerning the time of the Parousia (p. 451). He is confident, however, that Paul was always wholly right, and Peter, James, and Barnabas were in error or in sin, when they differed from him (pp. 60, 100, 133).

The aim of the book does not permit much discussion of critical points, but Professor Findlay gives his own conclusions upon them. He maintains that the visit to Jerusalem referred to in ii. 1-5 was at the time of the Council of Acts xv. (p. 101), and thinks that Paul's rebuke to Peter covers the whole of ii. 14-21 (p. 138). He holds that the three years in Arabia followed Acts ix. 21, and that Luke was acquainted with this fact, and that his silence is intentional. He defends Paul's argument founded upon his distinction between "seed" and "seeds," holding that the singular distinguishes Isaac and his descendants from other children of Abraham, and that Christ is the complete realization of this choice of one *seed*.

A few careless errors in proofreading have been noted, for example, pages 157, 227, 302, 363.

W. H. Ryder.

פירקי אבות. Die Sprüche der Väter, ein ethischer Mischna-Traktat. Herausgegeben und erklärt von Prof. Dr. HERM. L. STRACK. Zweite wesentlich verbesserte Auflage. 8vo, pp. 66. Berlin: H. Reuther's Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1888.

In the former edition of the Pirke Aboth, Strack merely reprinted the current text as it is found in modern editions of the Prayer-book. He has now given us a text corrected in many points by comparison with manuscripts of the Mishna and Prayer-book, the *editio princeps* of the Mishna, and the Cambridge edition of the Palestinian recension of the Mishna. For a critical edition we must still wait. The text is vowelled, and accompanied by explanatory notes which give all necessary aid to the beginner, not only in the language, but in matters of history and biography. The bibliographical references in these notes, of less use to the learner, will be valued by teachers. An index to the notes serves instead of a glossary. It is to be hoped that this cheap and convenient edition may lead many who have some knowledge of Biblical Hebrew to carry their studies on into the language of the Mishna. The Aboth is in two ways a good tract to begin with: it is easy and interesting as a collection of sentences; and it introduces us to the names of the principal Tanaim. But it gives no idea of what the Mishna is, and those who have read it should by all means follow it with some specimen of real Mishna, such as Strack's Jomâ or 'Abodâ Zarâ, in the same series.

EXERCISES FOR TRANSLATION INTO THE HEBREW LANGUAGE. By HERMANN L. STRACK, D. D., Ph. D., Professor extraord. of Theology in Berlin. Translated from the German by ARCHD. R. S. KENNEDY, B. D., Professor of Oriental Languages, Univ. of Aberdeen. Pp. 48. Berlin: H. Reuther's Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1888.

These exercises were prepared to accompany the author's excellent Hebrew Grammar in the series: *Porta Linguarum Orientalium* (2d ed., 1885; English ed., 1886). The material, taken from the Old Testament, is well chosen and well arranged. Almost from the outset, sentences, rather than single forms, are given; a feature which makes a great difference in the interest of the learner. The paragraphs are provided with references not only to the author's own grammar, but to Gesenius-Mitchell, and to Davidson, and are so arranged as to give considerable latitude to teachers' preferences as regards the order in which the topics should be taken up. A glossary (references to Strack's Grammar) completes a very useful supplement to any grammar. The translation of such a work is a matter of unusual difficulty, and it is not surprising that the English edition is not as satisfactory as the original. In class-room use the most serious fault I have to find with it is that it does not distinguish between nominal and verbal sentences—a distinction very carefully made in the German, and indispensable for the beginner. "Gehört hat Jahwè die Stimme der Hagar" can hardly be mistranslated; "Jahweh heard the voice of Hagar" will as certainly be rendered wrong. Where the English will not tolerate the inversion, an arbitrary sign of some kind might be employed; but in some way the distinction must be made. A number of words are missing in the glossary; and in some others the translation does not preserve distinctions intended by the author.

George F. Moore.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, New York and London. The Geography of Marriage, or, Legal Perplexities of Wedlock in the United States. By William L. Snyder. Pp. vi, 334. 1889. \$1.50; — English History by Contemporary Writers. The Crusade of Richard I. 1189-92. Selected and arranged by T. A. Archer, B. A. Pp. xi, 395. 1889. \$1.25; — Papers of the American Society of Church History. Vol. I. Report and Papers of the First Annual Meeting, held in the City of Washington, December 28, 1888. Edited by Rev. Samuel Macauley Jackson, M. A., Secretary. 8vo, pp. xxx, 271. 1889. \$3.00. [For sale by Estes & Lauriat, Boston.]

Scribner & Welford, New York. The Prophecies of Isaiah. Expounded by Dr. C. Von Orelli, Basel, author of "Old Testament Prophecy." Translated by Rev. J. S. Banks, Headingley College, Leeds. 8vo, pp. xi, 350. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1889. \$3.00.

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The Troy Press Company, Printers, Albany. Annual Report of the State Board of Charities for the Year 1888. Transmitted to the Legislature January 30, 1889. 8vo, pp. 607. 1889.

Hunt & Eaton [Methodist Book Concern], New York; Cranston & Stowe, Cincinnati. Christian Manliness and other Sermons. By John Rhey Thompson, D. D., of the New York Conference. Pp. 303. 1889. \$1.00; — The Tests of the various kinds of Truth, being a Treatise of Applied Logic. Lectures delivered before the Ohio Wesleyan University, on the Merrick Foundation. By James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., D. L., Ex-President of Princeton College, N. J. Second Series. 16mo, pp. 132. 1889. 70 cents; — Christian Education. Five Lectures delivered before the Ohio Wesleyan University on the Foundation of Rev. Frederick Merrick. By Daniel Curry, LL. D. First Series. 16mo, pp. 131. 1889. 70 cents; — The Man of Galilee. By Atticus G. Haygood. 16mo, pp. 156. 1889. 80 cents.

Phillips & Hunt, New York; Cranston & Stowe, Cincinnati. Romanism vs. The Public School System. By Daniel Dorchester, D. D. 16mo, pp. 351. 1888. \$1.25.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The Human Moral Problem. An Inquiry into some of the Dark Points connected with the Human Necessities for a Supernatural Saviour. By R. R. Coun. Pp. 69. 1889. 75 cents. [For sale by Estes & Lauriat.]

Publication Agency of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. An Introduction to the Local Constitutional History of the United States. By George E. Howard, Professor of History in the University of Nebraska. Vol. I. Development of the Township, Hundred, and Shire. 8vo, pp. xv, 526. 1889. [Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Herbert B. Adams, Editor. Extra Volume, IV.]

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Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago. Current Discussions in Theology. By the Professors of Chicago Theological Seminary. Vol. VI. Pp. x, 473. [1889.]

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston. The Beginnings of New England; or The Puritan Theocracy in its Relation to Civil and Religious Liberty. By John Fiske. Crown 8vo, pp. vii, 296. 1889. \$2.00; — George Washington. By Henry Cabot Lodge. In two volumes. Vol. I. — 16mo, pp. vi, 341. Vol. II. — pp. 399. 1889. \$2.50.

W. F. Draper, Andover. A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians. By Charles J. Ellicott, D. D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. 8vo, pp. 342. 1889. \$2.75.

Leach, Shewell & Sanborn, Boston and New York. Outlines of Bible Study. A Four-Years' Course for Schools and Colleges. By G. M. Steele, D. D., Principal of Wesleyan Academy, Wilbraham, Mass. 8vo, pp. v, 183. 1889.

Ginn & Company, Boston, U. S. A., and London. College Series of Greek Authors. Edited under the Supervision of John Williams White and Thomas D. Seymour. Plato; Protagoras. With the Commentary of Hermann Sauppe. Translated with Additions, by James A. Towle, Principal of the Robbins School. Pp. 179. 1889. \$1.50.

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
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

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WHAT IS REALITY?

PART IV. THE THING-IN-ITSELF.

It has, perhaps, occurred to the reader, that the argument used in the preceding number of this series bears a strong resemblance to that too familiar form of moral justification sometimes called "leveling down." When a man finds himself utterly without excuse for his own conduct, it is still possible for him to demonstrate that his neighbor is no better than himself. We have labored to show that modern science abounds in assumptions that are as irreconcilable in their conflict as any of those forced upon us by practical experience. How, it may be asked, does this help matters? We entered upon our inquiry with the hope of finding a rational basis for our higher beliefs; but does not the foregoing argument, instead of bringing us nearer to the desired goal, push us in the opposite direction? Does it not, so far as it proves anything, prove that the reality of things is unknowable?

This is not a question to be lightly passed over. The word agnosticism represents a most powerful current of thought in our day, not the less significant because, in the great majority of cases, it is of the nature of an undertow. The rapidity of our progress in knowledge is, of itself, most unsettling. The necessity of continually changing our ideas gradually begets in us the feeling that all things are subject to change,—that the reality of to-day may at any moment pass into the illusion of to-morrow. The history of science in the past is prophetic of its future. Looking

back from the vantage ground that we occupy we can see that the exploded theories of the present generation were the verities of the one before it; and when we ask ourselves the question, has science now reached a resting-place? we have to answer that it was never farther from it; that it is advancing with a greater rapidity than ever before; that hypotheses are shorter-lived than they used to be, less confidently held, more quickly modified, more easily superseded.

Under such circumstances it does not require any deep philosophy of the abstract sort to incline a man, who enters into the thought of his time, to skepticism. We may even say that, so far as science itself is concerned, skepticism is the normal and necessary attitude of mind. To be receptive is to be, in a measure, skeptical. But a tendency of this kind, emanating from science, may be strongly reinforced and accentuated by an abstract philosophy; and it so happens that we have just this combination to contend with in our time. Kant's philosophy, as we have already seen, has worked mainly as a leaven of agnosticism. His positive reconstructions of belief have remained almost a dead letter, while his destructive criticism has been abundantly fruitful.

As a result, we have two leading schools of skepticism, — the English half-way school, represented by Mr. Spencer, and the thorough-going pessimistic school of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann. The former is optimistic, simply because it is inconsistent, — because it refuses to apply to *all* our knowledge the criticism that it finds so effective for the demolition of one half of it. We have shown, in the second article of this series, that such discrimination is purely arbitrary, that it is without foundation either in experience or in reason. But this does not appear to its advocates. They call themselves *realists*; and while speaking much about the proneness of the human mind to illusions, and the falseness of some of its fundamental conceptions, they at the same time proclaim to the world a great philosophical discovery. Reality, they seem to say, which, in the light of science, is rapidly disappearing from much of our knowledge, may yet be retained and set upon a sure basis by limiting it to one class of our ideas. But we have only to cross the Channel to find a skepticism of a very different sort, — more thorough-going, more consistent, and, it is unnecessary to say, more disheartening.

The assumption made by a universally destructive skepticism is this. Whenever it can be shown that a belief does not represent *absolute* and *final* truth it is proved thereby to be an illusion.

Working on this assumption, the pessimistic philosophers reduce the whole world of sensible appearances, as well as all man's convictions about his own personality, to illusions. Consciousness is a perpetual fountain of lies,—a generator of ever-varying, but never-ceasing hallucinations which keep man forever on the painful treadmill of striving, in the hope of a happiness that he can never achieve. The desire to live and to become is therefore the great evil of the world; and the one hope of humanity is to escape from consciousness, and so from all the painful experiences that it entails.

An easy descent into this logical, uncompromising form of skepticism may seem to have been prepared by our argument. For if this is sound, does it not prove that our knowledge is unstable, that it is relative, that it is fragmentary? But the conclusions of skepticism, let us observe, are not the necessary outcome of these premises. Agnosticism is based upon an assumption that stands quite by itself,—the assumption, namely, that because our knowledge is modifiable, relative, and fragmentary, it is therefore useless as a guide to transcendent realities. This position I am prepared to contest; and in what follows I shall try to show that our knowledge is sufficiently stable, sufficiently positive, and sufficiently homogeneous to enable us to construct a reasonable and effective theory of the meaning of the world and of the value of our lives in it.

First, then, let us consider it as *unstable*. It may be said, in criticism of our four fundamental postulates of reality, that they have reference only to the least mutable elements of an exceedingly mutable class of things. Any structure that we may build upon them, therefore, will not be founded on the everlasting rock, but only on the most permanent or least variable part of an ever-shifting sand-bank. Their unsatisfactory nature appears the moment we attempt to adjust particular things to them. It is easy to affirm with confidence the reality of the *things* of the external world; but when it comes to saying in what the reality of this or that object consists, we are at a loss for an answer. We simply enumerate different relations which it sustains to ourselves or to other objects, and when we come to the end of our list we have to add a mental *et cetera*. We know that we have not exhausted the subject, and we know, further, that the discovery of new relations frequently modifies and sometimes even reverses the ideas of the object hitherto held. So also we affirm without hesitation that the mind has the power of modifying the natural

course of events. But it is impossible for us to say in regard to any given action just what part of it may be ascribed to purposiveness or free-will, and how much must be set down to the agency of external influences. Science has constantly worked for the limitation of our belief in free-agency; and the area within which it exercises control seems very much larger to some men than to others.

All this is very true. Our propositions do not accurately define where reality leaves off and where illusion begins in anything. They affirm an element of reality in certain great classes of our experiences, without denying that in each of these there has been a deposit of error accompanying the deposit of truth; and that a progressive elimination of this error is possible. But our knowledge is not nearly so unstable as the above criticism implies. Experience itself testifies to its possession of certain invariable, universal, and permanent elements as distinctly as it does to the inconstancy or transitional character of other elements. *Why* there should be such a difference in these, as that one should appear to be an essential and vital part of experience, and another not so, is a pertinent question; and though the situation would not be in the least altered if no answer to it could be given, yet it is a great intellectual advance when our faith in that which appears as necessary is supplemented by a reason, even though that reason should be little more than an analogy.

The question asked in such a case usually takes this form, — Is the difference, which is said to exist between the so-called permanent elements of experience and the great mass that is transitional, a difference of *kind* or only a difference of *degree*? We may safely say that it is both; for differences of kind, all the world over, seem to be based upon differences of degree, and often the former emerge from the latter by such gradations as to make it impossible for us to designate the exact point at which kind number one ceases, and kind number two begins. Human experience is ranged on a finely graduated scale. It varies in its breadth and value from the novel, uninterpreted, unclassified sensation of the present hour to the substratum of common, universally accepted fact, upon which the human race has been building from its first beginnings.

We might illustrate it to the eye by a pyramid, each successive step of which carries us higher, but at the same time lands us on a plane of diminished area. Or, better still, while our attention is turned to degrees of permanence may we refer to the illustration

of a tree, the trunk and main roots of which represent the essential stable members of experience, while the smaller branches, leaves, and rootlets correspond to all that is changeable and transitional. And as in the tree the permanence of certain parts has been determined by conflict with environment, so also in experience there is a never-ending conflict, by means of which all that is of temporary value is either destroyed or transformed, while those members that are essential to the maintenance of life and growth become fixed in their general form and characteristics.

The four propositions which I have likened to the woody stem and main roots of the tree of human experience are at the same time the oldest and most permanent members of it, just because human experience could neither begin nor continue without them. They sprung into existence almost simultaneously as the result of conscious human effort in a world where to live is to act; and the conviction of their truth and immutability has become more firmly integrated in human consciousness by every subsequent action and reaction between man and his environment.

We may even carry our analogy one step farther without straining it. For as the trunk of the tree is made up of a multitude of hardened cells that were once plastic, so these general abstract propositions of ours are the result of innumerable separate convictions that have sprung up in connection with particular things. And these particular convictions, though ranged, as has been said, on a finely graduated scale, may yet be divided into two classes, one of which is continually passing into the other just as growing cells become transformed into rigid ones. The one class we may call the convictions of persuasion, the other the convictions of coercion. It is not always easy to say where persuasion ends and coercion begins; but the latter word expresses a characteristic of many of our beliefs with regard to particular things that may be treated as final, while the former describes a still larger number that are not final but tentative. But many of this class are almost as firmly ensconced in our organized beliefs as those which from the beginning have been coercive.

So much for differences of kind and degree. Now let us turn our attention to another aspect of the charge of *instability*. It grows out of the assumption that what we call our established knowledge is radically changed by the constant accessions that it receives. The impression that it is so, easily obtains a hold upon the imagination because our minds are much more alive to the novel elements of experience than they are to the old familiar

ones. But, as matter of fact, the new knowledge rarely displaces or even essentially disturbs the old, but ranges itself peacefully alongside. This may seem a rash statement to make in view of all the revolutions signalized by modern thought. But it will require, I think, only a little reflection to be convinced that the number of discoveries that necessitate any great readjustment of our thought bears a very small proportion to the innumerable multitude that fall naturally into place, amplifying and illuminating the knowledge we already possess.

The science of chemistry, for instance, is founded on the analysis of substances that appear to our ordinary experience as final realities. It separates these, in some cases, into a great number of diverse realities; but this discovery of complexity and diversity of elements does not change the reality of the original substance, as known to our uses. Chemistry now treats something over seventy substances as final; yet it knows that any day some of these may be analyzed and their names erased from the chemical peerage. But if this should happen, the substance analyzed would continue to be the same reality that it has always been; we know something more about it, but the new knowledge does not displace the old. As Professor Cook remarks: "Were a process discovered to-morrow by which a new substance was produced from the material of sulphur, we should hail at once the discovery of a new element, and sulphur would be banished forever from the list of elementary substances. Yet the qualities of sulphur would not be changed thereby. It would still be used for making sulphuric acid and bleaching old bonnets, as if nothing had happened."

It is not otherwise when the process is from the relatively simple to the complex. The substance glycerine, first known to science as a softening and soothing principle, is subsequently discovered to be capable of being transformed, by combination with other elements, into a highly explosive and most destructive principle. But the milder moods of our old friend are not made thereby less real or less acceptable. Even in cases where there is a complete revolution in our conception of natural processes, our old knowledge is affected far less than it appears to be.

Let us take, for instance, the discovery that the planet upon which we live revolves about the sun, and not, as was for ages believed, the sun about it. This reversal of our scientific prepossessions did not in the least disarrange our former practical beliefs with regard to the relations which the sun sustains to us

and to our world. Notwithstanding our new knowledge the sun still rises and sets for us, and we order all our lives with relation to it in the same way as formerly. That is to say, our unscientific, experimentally formed ideas with regard to the sun were substantially true. They represented very real relations. Even astronomy itself was affected far less than has been generally supposed. The Ptolemaic system was just as correct as a basis for astronomical calculations as the more truthful and simple one that superseded it; and the reason why it was so is to be found in the fact that the relations upon which it was based were *real* relations.

This brings us to a very important consideration, — one that we shall have occasion to emphasize at a subsequent point in our argument, namely, that most of the revolutions in our thought occur in the region of scientific hypotheses. They are not, therefore, worthy the name of revolutions. They are rather transformations, the changing phases of beliefs that are in the formative state. It is only our short-sightedness that ever regards these hypotheses as established and final; and their remoteness, for the most part, from our ordinary experimental living renders their actual modifying influence on accepted reality far less than it appears, to our wonder-loving imaginations, to be. In opposition, then, to the criticism that our knowledge is too unstable to afford a foundation for reality, we affirm that there is a permanent and reliable substratum to our knowledge, and that reality, of a progressive and modifiable kind, is within our reach.

But now we have to enter on the defense of our knowledge from a more subtle kind of attack. It is said that all our knowledge is *relative*, and therefore of no use as a guide to reality. This objection is radical; and, furthermore, it requires our careful attention, because it carries with it a most imposing weight of authority and respectability. The greatest names in philosophy are associated with it, and the consensus of generations of eminent thinkers has, in the past, made its non-reception stand as a sure sign of metaphysical incapacity. But metaphysics, though often disrespectfully alluded to in these days as a dead science, is attesting its vitality, if in no other way, by rising up to overthrow this tyrant of its own imposing. Let us see what the doctrine is, and how it may be met. We will take the least abstruse statement of it first.

Man, it is said, represents only one special kind of intelligence; the degree and the quality of his knowledge are dependent upon

his physical organization. He has certain faculties, more or less perfectly developed by his conflict with environment; but these faculties might have been other than they are. Individual men are so different from each other that they may be said to live in different worlds; and we know from the examination both of the structure and of the behavior of other animals that they possess faculties very different from ours. However useful our knowledge of the world may be to us, therefore, it is not the *real* thing. It is not the knowledge of the world that a mind having faculties coextensive with all the modes of being in the universe would possess. As Kant has said, man can know nothing more of the nature of objects than his own mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to himself.

The reply to this is, that completeness of knowledge is not claimed for man by any one, least of all by those who worship a God of infinite attributes. All that we affirm is that our understanding of things is correct as far as it goes, — that it presents us with realities as related to our present state of being. Since we are progressive beings, our knowledge must necessarily be subject to modification and amplification; but there is no reason to anticipate that the fundamental assumptions by which we live will ever be overthrown. There is every reason, on the contrary, to believe that all our direct knowledge of relations is true. Are we not ourselves a part of that universe that we seek to know? If that universe is a connected and orderly whole, as we believe, if it is governed by laws, how should it come about that our responses to environment should result in falsehood?

When I know one single relation which a part of this universe sustains to my intelligence, I am certainly acquainted with one reality; and when I know how two or more of these parts are related to each other in my intelligence, I become possessed of another reality more complex than the first. As I continue to add to the number and complexity of these relations, my knowledge, as a whole, becomes greatly enlarged and modified; but the modification consists in the discovery that what I had taken to be the whole expression of reality was only a partial expression of it. My knowledge, regarded as complete, has been discredited, but it has not altogether disappeared. Most of our illusions are the result of treating a single relation, or a given set of relations, as if they were the final expression of reality.

But the disciple of Kant may return to the controversy with the reminder that the deliverances of the human understanding,

based upon experience, contradict each other, and thereby *demonstrate* their falseness as representations of a world assumed to be an orderly whole, without flaws and without contradictions.

It is just at this point that the difference between our way of accounting for the contrarieties of reason and Kant's way can be clearly set forth. It may have seemed to the reader that we had wholly gone over to Kant when, in the third number of this series, it was said, "We may confidently affirm that the thing of our imaginations is never the *absolutely* real thing." But there is a wide difference between holding, as Kant does, that our knowledge must ever remain "*toto coslo* different from the cognition of an object in itself," and holding, as we do, that our knowledge is only a partial expression of reality, but true as far as it goes. It can hardly be questioned, I think, that the latter account of the matter is all-sufficient to account for the contrarieties of experience. The history of science presents us with a multitude of instances in which supposed contradictions have been reconciled by the discovery of new relations. I will cite only one.

When Copernicus astonished the world with the announcement of his apparently wild hypothesis that the earth revolves daily upon its own axis, and that the dwellers on the other side of the planet have their feet toward our feet, and their heads pointing in the direction which to us is down, it was a sufficient refutation to say — impossible, for in that case there would be no dwellers on the earth. To the imagination of that day it was clear that every movable thing on the upper side of the planet must necessarily fall off on reaching the under side. It was only when the conception was grasped that all our notions of up and down are not absolute, not an exhaustive expression of reality, but wholly relative to the centre of the earth, that the impossible was seen to be possible. Then it became clear that what had seemed to be absolutely *up* was just as really, from another point of view, absolutely *down*, there being, in fact, no reference in the affirmation to absolute space, but only the expression of our relation to one point in it.

Extending the idea of up and down, we are forced to the conclusion that *up*, as related to the centre of our planet, must be *down* to one contemplating the earth from the sun; and in view of a more remote centre, about which our solar system revolves, we must again reverse the application of the terms.

Just so it seems to me with regard to the contradiction that exists between the relations made known to our subjective expe-

rience and those which appear to us to exist between things independently of us. Cosmic laws come to us as radiations from some remote centre, not directly made known to our experience; relations, they seem to be, that embrace and include everything within themselves. But for all that there is no reason for concluding, as Kant does, that the relations that radiate in an opposite direction from the known centre of the self-conscious ego are false. The centre of the ego is not *the* centre of the universe, but it is *a* centre — a centre of reality and power. It cannot be removed from the realm of actualities by the truth of cosmic laws any more than the fact of the attracting power of the earth can be wiped out by the fact of the attracting power of the sun. The harmony of the universe is maintained by the interaction of different centres.

But now, if all we have claimed under this head be granted, we have met only one of the objections that may be urged against our knowledge on the score of its relativity. Suppose, it may be said, we do know relations truthfully, the *relations* of things are not *things*. Kant and Sir William Hamilton agree in saying that the very act of knowing is a drawing of things out of their absolute reality into relation to the subject knowing them. The essential being of things must, therefore, be eternally hid from us. We cannot know anything *as it is in itself*.

The impossibility here spoken of, let us observe, is one that does not attach specially to the *human* understanding, as limited. It is an imperfection that belongs to the process of knowing as knowing. This is explicitly stated by Hamilton in the following passage: "We may suppose existence to have a thousand modes; but these thousand modes are all to us as zero, unless we possess faculties accommodated to their apprehension. But were the number of our faculties coextensive with the modes of being, — had we for each of these thousand modes a separate organ competent to make it known to us, — still would our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, only of the relative. Of existence absolutely and in itself we should then be as ignorant as we are now."¹

When we have reached this point, it is natural that we should try hard to form some notion of the value of these "things in themselves," — things that exist forever apart from all intelligence. It is a pertinent question to ask, Are they worth knowing? Are they of any account in the great universe of reality?

¹ *Metaphysics*, i. p. 153.

Our respect is ordinarily accorded to things only as they make themselves felt, or as they are deemed capable of making themselves felt. But in the case of these absolute existences that can never reach us any more than we can reach them, what ground can there be for abasing ourselves and despising our knowledge in view of them? They are, if they are, for us as if they had no existence. We cannot love them, we cannot hate them, we cannot obey or disobey them; nor can we be moved to humility, or to reverence, or to religion in our contemplation of them. May we not, then, venture to ask the question, Are they, or is it — the thing-in-itself — anything?

There are more ways than one of looking at this fundamental question. From one point of view, that of an outside spectator, it seems easy enough to answer it in the negative. A time-honored ontological maxim tells us that "the reality of things can be ascertained only by divesting them of their relations." According to this view, essence or substance was conceived of as existing at the centre of each group of phenomena; and this, the metaphysician held, could be discovered in no other way than by finding a residuum when all phenomena, or existence-in-relation, had been analyzed away. Now, as no residuum is ever discoverable at the end of such a process, the inference is that the thing-in-itself is a mere creature of the imagination. May we not, with Hegel, affirm that "pure being is pure nothing"? — that this idea of a distinct reality, different from the manifestations of reality, is simply an idea? Things, we will say, are really groups of relations which we are able to regard as real entities only by postulating a centre to which each of the separate relations is referred; but this centre is, like the mathematical point, nothing more than a convenience of thought.

With this understanding, then, let us reinvest the term *essential being*, and use it to signify the sum of the real relations of anything. In this sense the thing-in-itself is not the antithesis of the knowable or of that which exists in relations. It is, on the contrary, the fullness of all things in the unity of all their relations. It is the final synthesis instead of being the last result of analysis. It is the completeness of knowledge; and therefore unattainable by us, because our knowledge is ever incomplete, though ever progressive.

A similar view of the case as related to the words *noumenon* and *phenomenon* is very clearly stated by the author of "Scottish Philosophy."¹ "It is true," he says, "that we do not know the

¹ Page 173.

whole nature of anything; and the term noumenon is useful, therefore, as contrasting the object, in all the completeness of the qualities which really belong to it, with the comparatively imperfect knowledge of its qualities which we have yet attained. The noumenon is the object from the point of view of the universe; the phenomenon is the same object from the point of view of human knowledge. The noumenon embraces in this way the qualities yet to be discovered as well as those already known; while the term phenomenon is necessarily limited to what we actually know. But if, *ex hypothesi*, a thing were completely to phenomenalize itself to us — that is, if we had an exhaustive knowledge of the qualities of any single thing — then the knowledge of the phenomenon would be, in that case, in the strictest sense the knowledge of the noumenon. The noumenon is nothing but the manifold and different qualities reflected into unity."

But at this point we again encounter a serious difficulty. Our knowledge is *fragmentary*. The object of our search, be it remembered, is not simply to find certain constituents or members of reality, but more especially to discover if these, when found, can be so organized as to afford a basis for our higher beliefs. But the conclusion we have reached seems to pluck the very heart out of those beliefs. The vital centre of religion is the conception of a noumenon, a thing-in-itself, a *being* that sustains vital and special relations to all phenomena. When, therefore, we reduce the world to a mere aggregate of qualities or relations, and say the noumenon is this aggregate and nothing more, do we not, in our reaction from agnosticism, commit ourselves to a very positive form of atheism? — namely, to the denial that there is any such thing as a soul either in man or in the great complex that we call the universe? To say that the soul is a mere aggregate of relations reflected into unity is the same as to say that the distinctive characteristic of soul, its *efficiency*, is an illusion. The conception *real being* has lost all its meaning unless it continues to represent the constitutive and sustaining centre of a group of manifold relations that would in its absence be disunited.

While apparently traveling away from skepticism, our path has unexpectedly opened upon an aggravated form of it. We must, therefore, retrace our steps to the point from whence we began to answer the question as to the existence of a distinctive thing-in-itself.

At that point we intimated that there were more ways than one of looking at this question; and then we selected one which was

characterized as that of an outside spectator. The only conclusion reached then is, that, so long as we confine ourselves to this view, regarding the world as an aggregate of things foreign to us, and related only to each other, so long we must adhere to the position that the noumenon is unknowable, and that we can discover no evidence of its existence. We may return to Sir William Hamilton and agree with him that even if the number of our faculties were coextensive with the modes of being, so that all of those modes should be exhaustively known to us, still would our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, only of the relative. Of existence absolutely and in itself we should then be as ignorant as we are now. In other words, the mere extension of our knowledge could never advance us one step toward an inward understanding of things. Always we should be grasping the qualities, the characteristics of things, never that which makes the multiplicity of qualities a unity.

Now, then, for another point of view. Surely the conviction that there is a real centre or essence of being, of which all the qualities or aspects of being are the emanations, must have some origin. It is hard to believe that a conception of which we are so tenacious has never been represented in actual experience, — that we have not, somewhere or at some time, known a thing-in-itself. If, when looking at the world from the outside, we said, "The noumenon is nothing but the manifold and different qualities reflected into unity," we must now ask what is it that reflects, and from whence comes the unity?

Does it not come from that very element of reality that the outside view excludes? Is not the self-conscious soul of man a thing-in-itself, known directly as a peculiar and vital element of all experiences? If we make this hypothesis, we must throw aside our transformed conception of the noumenon, and return to the more familiar one. We must abandon the thought that the thing-in-itself is to be known only from the point of view of the universe. We must maintain that it is not necessary to grasp *all* the relations of a thing in order to know its essential being; but, on the contrary, that the inmost reality of one thing, at least, is made known to us in every self-conscious act.

This is not the same as to say that the real being of anything is *exhaustively* known by us. It is not to deny that an *absolute* knowledge of the noumenon, the central being of the universe, is unattainable except from the standpoint of universal knowledge. Neither is it the same as to say that the reality of being may be

known in the absence of all relations. Knowledge arises only through relations, but it is not *confined* to relations. The notion that it is so confined arises only in our abstract reasoning. It does not correspond to experience. When, by an outside stimulus, I am made aware of a relation existing between myself and something else, I am, at the same time, made aware of *myself*, — of myself as related, it may be, but, anyhow, of myself. And this knowledge of myself is something over and above my knowledge of the relation.

If urged to explain what this something is, I would say, it is a *consciousness of being*, pure and simple. This consciousness, distinct from all relations, abides through all experiences. And it is because it so abides, because it is a party to every relation of experience, and the centre of all relations, that the idea of unity in multiplicity first springs up, and then becomes the constructive principle in our judgment of all things.

But it may be urged, this distinctive unity of the ego is only an *appearance*. It is the result of introspection. The ego looking upon itself, as if from the position of outside spectator, *seems* to itself to be a unity; but this seeming, constituting as it does a particular, exceptional, unclassifiable experience, ought not to be regarded as a reality.

This objection is only a particular application of a view of things already considered at some length; and it might seem a sufficient answer to refer to our general proposition that any affirmation of experience that we are constantly obliged not only to think, but to live, must be regarded as true. But as the point under discussion is the very keystone of our philosophy, I would further point out that the situation indicated by this objection does not correspond to the facts. It is not true that the idea of the unity of self has its origin in a certain aspect or appearance which subjective phenomena assume to us as spectators. The idea in question is not the result of reflection, it is a direct consciousness of self. At the same time I maintain that, though it does not arise in reflection, it is indorsed by it, — that the logic of subjective experiences, from an analytical point of view, compels the very same belief that comes, without reasoning, from the deliverances of consciousness.

The great argument of Kant's "Critique," known as the *transcendental deduction of the unity of apperception*, seems to me to be unanswerable. Notwithstanding its formidable name, it admits of a fairly simple statement. It takes its departure from expe-

rience. Experience is itself a complex unity. It is made up of parts, but these parts are, somehow, bound together as a whole. This, Kant argues, would be impossible, a contradiction of reason, in the *absence* of a permanent unifying subject. Without such a subject, experience could be nothing other than a succession of absolutely isolated phenomena, without continuity and without intelligibility. Lotze expresses very much the same thought when he says: "Our belief in the soul's unity rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, but on our being able to appear to ourselves *at all*. . . . If a being can appear anyhow to itself, or other things to it, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature."¹

Again, the consideration that the unifying subject thus presented to consciousness and reason is *unique* and *unclassifiable* does not count against its reality; for it is just such a reality that we are looking for, just such a reality that we need to explain a world that is otherwise inexplicable.

But it may be asked, of what value is the knowledge of a noumenon that is nothing more than the consciousness of being, — the unity that persists through all diversity? Small, indeed, if it were this and nothing more. But the mystery of being is not the only one elucidated by a reference to self-consciousness. Having found the reality of being, we are able to solve some other riddles of philosophy. The concepts *intelligence* and *cause* have, equally with that of the unity of consciousness, baffled all attempts at explanation, as resultants from a plurality of elements. The analysis of any number of intelligent acts throws no light on the origin of intelligence itself. It is an ultimate, undecomposable attribute of being, known directly, and only, to self-consciousness. The knowledge of it, like that of being, comes, it is true, only *through* relations, through intelligent acts; but it is something other than the sum of all these relations. It is an essential faculty or activity of being that is a party to all intelligent acts: and it sustains a vital relation to each one of these acts, different to the relations which they sustain to each other.

It is the same with the idea of *cause*. No effort of philosophy has proved more abortive than that which attempts to deduce the concept *cause* from the relations which things sustain to each other. In other words, physical causation, from the purely mechanical point of view, is not causation at all. It is instrumentality. We can deduce nothing from our study of the external

¹ *Microcosmus*, vol. i. p. 157.

world other than a chain of sequences; and with these the idea of cause has nothing whatever to do, save as it is introduced from some other source. The essential meaning of the word cause is origination. And, no matter how widely our science of external phenomena extends itself, the *origin* of things is that which it can never touch. The universe presents itself to it only as an eternal round of sequences without beginning and without end; and the idea of *origin* could never have been suggested by its contemplation were not the contemplator a self-conscious being, capable of supplying from his own inner experience a phase of reality otherwise unknowable. In other words, we have the idea of origination, and we seek to discover the origin of things, because we directly know ourselves as originators.

To sum up our knowledge, then, we will say that our thing-in-itself is known to us as the *unity of being*, as *intelligence*, and as *cause*.

Have we, then, after all, swung round to idealism? By no means. Our self-conscious ego is not the unclothed, isolated abstraction of the subjective philosophy. It is not the compound subject-object ego of Fichte. It is the complex, embodied ego of experience, — the ego plus all the relations which it sustains to other objects. It is the ego as related to its body of organized animal tissues, the ego as related to the whole external realm of its own creation; and, furthermore, it is the ego as related to other real beings, known to it through analogy and experience. By the assistance of all these three classes of relations we hope to be able to climb from the knowledge of *one* finite reality, man, to a true, though limited, knowledge of the Being that is the soul of the great sum of things.

The method we shall employ is nothing new. It is the method by the use of which all the conquests of science have been achieved. It is, in short, the method of *analogy*. The word is a familiar one; but the *value* of the process called analogical is not very well defined. I shall, therefore, devote the next article of this series to an examination of the worth of the results reached when we essay to climb from inner-reality, discovered at one point in the universe, to a conception of the inner-reality of the whole.

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THE CONGREGATIONAL POLITY.

ORGANIZATION and government are good things in themselves ; no one can doubt, or at least ought to doubt, that. So completely are all well-regulated people convinced of this, that even in cases where government goes beyond its rights, and usurps the province of individual life, so that it becomes a tyranny, more or less reflection persuades them that even this is better than the absence of all government. It was of such a rule as this that St. Paul wrote : " Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers : for there is no power but of God ; and the powers that be are ordained of God." That is, government is not simply a matter of human convenience and device, but of divine ordinance. It is a matter of conscience to be subject to it. The failure to remember this begets misapprehension and evil of two kinds. If the ruler forgets it, he ignores the obligation on his part to rule well and justly, which alone justifies his particular claim to rule at all. The divine sanction is given to government as a minister of God to men for good, and is not therefore of that arbitrary kind that it can be claimed for any government of whatsoever character. And if the subjects forget it, and come to think of government as a mere human convention, the sanctity and dignity, if not the authority, of government are taken away, and the obligation of obedience sits lightly upon the subjects. At the same time, it is recognized that the sphere of government is limited, and the instinct of every free community prompts it to be jealous of any undue extension of its authority beyond its province.

This jealousy of individual rights is especially strong in certain matters. And in religion more than anywhere else men claim the privilege of individual action, and are slow to merge any part of this in a body ; to substitute associated action for that of the individual. Or if the social instinct, which is the complement of the individual, does lead to associated action, it is apt to be regarded as a mere convention, and the idea of authority is dissociated from it as far as possible. The history of the church as a society, or polity, is largely that of the development, conflict, and adjustment of these complementary principles ; of the swaying of the body back and forth between the individual instinct on the one side and the social instinct on the other. And we may anticipate all that is to follow by saying now, that disaster has always resulted sooner or later, and is sure to follow, whenever the church

fails to pursue the *via media*, which consists in the proper adjustment and combination of these two principles, and pays exclusive or exaggerated attention to either of them. The history of the church up to the time of the Reformation was that of the slow growth of the governmental and corporate idea, combined with an assumption of political and civil authority, until the church became one of the great world-powers, and the rights of the individual were lost and forgotten. As far as the relations of the church within itself were concerned, that power, which had become tyranny, reached its climax in the attempt of the church to legislate in regard to its dogmatic beliefs, and to enforce these by spiritual and civil penalties. We must not judge too harshly of these things; they were the growths of the times: there was no conception of government except as an arbitrary and absolute power; and there is no advance of humanity, nor even of Christianity, except as it learns the lessons of its failures. Since the Reformation, the growth has been equally sure in the opposite direction towards mere individualism and disintegration, until to-day the spectacle of a divided Christendom is almost as alarming to the thoughtful believer as that of the Papacy. At first the Reformation was a protest only against the usurpations of churchly power, while the churchly principle was retained. And many of the reformed churches have remained in this safe place. But many of them have gone further, and set up the principle of individualism as the ruling idea, with the inevitable result of disintegration. Let us thank God that the equally sure result in his church is reaction, and that this is to-day the hopeful attitude of our American Christianity. The church is evidently in a period of transition; she is casting about for the elements of a safer and larger future. And now is the time for wise men to utter the words of wisdom, and to speak in her ear the warning which the two great epochs of the church have been slowly formulating, that Christianity is preëminently the combination of the two principles of individual rights and of the social sentiments, and that to emphasize either to the exclusion of the other is sure disaster.

But it is to one special form of this pseudo-Protestant idea that I wish to call attention now. Independency is that special form of opposition to the churchly idea which carries the principle of association only the first step, and stops with the organization of the local church. Everything beyond that it considers, in the first place, unauthorized by the practice of the New Testament churches, and, in the second place, dangerous to religious liberty.

We do not wish to discuss the supposed authority of the New Testament for this form of church organization; but two brief statements about this aspect of it will not be out of order. In the first place, as a matter of fact, there is no one form of church government in the apostolic churches. Everything there is in a formative and developing condition, in which one thing after another is adopted from the synagogue, and from other forms and ideas of organization, in order to meet various exigencies as they arose in the evolution of the church's life. Persons with a denominational bias may find there the counterpart of their church polity; but scholars generally will discourage the attempt. And, in the second place, even those who find such a complete and authoritative system there do not pretend that it is revealed as a matter of prescription, but that it was developed in the natural way that we have stated, only so under the guidance of the Holy Spirit that it finally emerged a complete thing, needing no addition nor changes, any more than the Book from which it was taken. That first age, it is contended, brought things to a final shape, and we have to look within its records and teachings for the norm of church doctrine and organization. But, in this matter of church polity, is it not evident that there could have been no such complete development, that there was no time for it; and, above all, that there were not the circumstances and occasions to give rise to it? Is it not the very assumption in such a development, that changes and additions shall be made as circumstances demand them, and that it is impossible that all these developing occasions should be crowded into so short a space of time? And, as a matter of fact, since that early period, the church has entered upon one after another new set of circumstances, for which there could have been no provision in the quite different conditions of those early times.

But, laying aside this question of the authority of Independence, and coming now to the principle underlying it, is it not a little strange that it should stop just where it does in the work of organization, with the formation and government of the local church, and even deprecate as dangerous all attempts to go beyond this? Is it not, on the other hand, the flaw in Congregationalism that it does not recognize any organized church larger than the local and individual church? What is the acknowledged principle everywhere else? Civilized society has come to recognize certain natural groups of population. These are the family, the municipality, and the nation. There may be others in some in-

stances, as in the United States ; but these are the general groups. And there may be something yet beyond these, by which the relations of different nations to each other shall yet be determined in a peaceful and orderly way ; but, so far, the nation is the ultimate form of organization. And the reasons for these organizations are equally obvious and authoritative. The nation, like the family, has divine sanctions ; and the city, and in some cases the state, are the natural centres of a local and independent management that are the proper offsets to a centralized government. What is the reason that religion should ignore all these natural tendencies of men to come together in certain well-defined groups, and adopt as its limit of organization a body that has no counterpart anywhere, and which exaggerates the principle of independency to its narrowest form ? Certainly it cannot be said that there is no work for the larger bodies in the kingdom of God, or that this work does not call for organization and direction. In fact, all these bodies that profess independency do organize ; they have to organize for state work, for national work, and for foreign missions. But these organizations are simply confederations of independent churches, voluntary associations for the doing of certain work which these bodies recognize that they cannot do so well separately. They have no authority even in their own sphere. They simply serve to show the necessity for association and organization, even where it is formally disallowed, and the makeshifts to which in these circumstances the Congregational polity is reduced. But the point is the necessity to which they call attention, and the proof afforded by them that the city, the state, and the nation are natural lines and limits of organization, even in religious matters.

What is the *raison d'être* of Congregationalism, then ? It is the individualism of which we have taken account already, the jealousy of anything like authority in religious matters, which in the old days of religious tyranny had something noble in it, but which in these times is merely traditional and unreasoning, and misses a real good because of the evils born of troublous times, and not of the dreaded thing itself. I say that the idea of Congregationalism is individualism. But how is individualism characteristic of this any more than of those bodies that carry the principle of association further, and organize along larger and more natural lines ? Is not the idea of association recognized in both alike, and why is one more individualistic than the rest ? Because in independency the individual is the starting-point, and the community in any

real, pregnant, sacred sense does not enter into its constitutive principle. This seems a serious statement; but let us look a little further and see its truth. A church in this system is a purely voluntary association of men who think alike in regard to religious beliefs. In the growth of Christianity there have been developed a great variety of views about its meaning and constitution, and these opinions are constantly receiving fresh additions. The idea of Congregationalism is that the individual exercise his freedom of choice among these differing views, and that those who hold similar opinions in any locality associate together in what they call a church. In the growth of the man, especially in a time like this, it may easily happen that his views will change, and then the purely voluntary ties that he has assumed are thrown off, and he joins another body associated in the same loose way. Nay, he may without any difficulty find himself holding opinions of a mixed and eclectic character, that leave him outside of church or denominational lines altogether, and then the principle of individualism has a chance to bear its ripened fruit: in spite of his faith, the man may find himself without any church to which he can attach himself. His chance of finding one will depend on his discovery of a sufficient number whose views happen to be like his own. But, aside from any extremity to which the theory may be pushed, this conception of the church as a purely voluntary association of men of similar views is the constructive principle of Congregationalism. And the refusal to carry out the principle of association any further arises from the fear that the larger body might legislate in such a way as to interfere with the freedom of the local church.

And, as we have seen, the original reason of this separative idea was a valid one. There was a tendency in the church to regulate everything, even to the belief of its members, and it used compulsions instead of reasons to produce this conformity. Moreover, these beliefs themselves, the creeds and rituals ordained by the church, were not of the kind to win assent. They emphasized just the things that have been the bane of religion from the beginning, and which have made it the synonym of superstition. Men could not assent to these, and so the only way open to them was the way out; a way that the church itself pointed to with emphasis. But the way proved full of dangers; the freedom that they claimed for themselves they had reluctantly to yield to others, and these to others still, until finally freedom has proved to be the cause of disintegration, and of an exaggerated indi-

vidualism. Is it not time to stop and consider? And is not the question for consideration this: Whether the evil which caused this other necessary evil is not now at an end, and whether it is not time therefore to go all the way back from this individualism to the idea of the church and its unity? Is there any longer a sufficient reason for limiting the notion of the church to this local and sectarian body, and will there not be, on the other hand, a great gain in enlarging our conception of the church, so that it shall approach at least to the Catholic idea? Let us look at this for a little.

In the first place, then, it is a very pertinent question if the very freedom which independency seeks is not obtained better within the bodies that hold to the Catholic idea of the church. We need to define our position carefully, or we shall answer this question according to names and appearances rather than reality. A church is not catholic in any true sense which organizes on the basis of a creed; that is, of a defining and dogmatic creed. The Roman Church claims to be catholic, but it enforces superstitions and obnoxious beliefs, and so is sectarian. It denounces schism, but it renders schism necessary. In this case, the fears of organization on any large scale which gave rise to independency are realized. In any case in which such organization is accompanied by a dogmatic creed the combination is dangerous. The Congregational body is freer than the Presbyterian with the same creed. But, after all, the Congregational body is not free. It is not organization that suppresses freedom, but organization on the basis of a creed. And Congregationalism, in retaining this as the ground of even its modicum of organization, kept the larger part of the evil that it wished to avoid. To be sure, these churches say that they do not wish to enforce their opinions upon others, nor to exercise any compulsion, only to enforce their own standards. If any man ceases to agree with them he has freedom to go out, and either unite with some other body or form one for himself. But this, alas! is a privilege that men do not prize. They have been brought up in certain valued associations and companionships; and these no one changes without pain. He has not grown out of sympathy with these, in spite of his change of views, and he would gladly sacrifice a little, and even conform in unessential things, if he may only retain his religious home and friends. He would like a little chance for friendly discussion of the points of difference. But no; he has only one kind of freedom, the freedom to go out. Moreover, there is considerable room for doubt in

many of these bodies as to the meaning of denominational conformity in any particular case, and many of them are to-day the scene of controversy between the broad and strict constructionists, with all the charges and criminations and ill feelings that naturally spring from such a debate. But now suppose a church that consistently carries out the idea of church unity. The necessary accompaniment of such unity is comprehension, and any church setting out honestly to realize that idea will come sooner or later to unite the two. The one church must be the broad church, and this is the only possible basis of freedom. All other attempts to attain liberty will fail in the nature of things. History vindicates this statement. The Church of England and its daughter, the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country, profess catholicity and unity, and their history has been that of slow progress from the attempts of one school after another to gain possession of the church and control it, to the recognition of the equal rights of all. By the slow pressure of its own constructive idea it has been brought to this inevitable issue, and has become a broad church. It is a most instructive and significant history. The Independents went out to gain freedom; they organized in the only way possible to secure it at the time; and yet in the slow evolution of events their polity has proved repressive, while that which oppressed them has surely gravitated towards freedom. Nor is the reason far to seek; the dogmatic basis is necessarily repressive.

In the second place, the larger conception of the church is more favorable to efficient work. The work of Christianity in our cities and states, and in the world, does not flourish in the best way when it is left to emergencies and impulses, but only when it is organized and put under wise direction. We can see one very instructive example of this principle of merely voluntary organization, which characterizes Congregationalism in all its larger work, in the present condition of the American Board. In any body which gathered all its followers in the nation into a church, with its proper officers and committees, the foreign missionary work of the church would be provided for in an orderly way, which would represent the entire body. But in the absence of any such representative government, the Congregationalists allowed this work to drift into the hands of a self-electing Board of Commissioners, which answered the purpose very well so long as there were no questions on hand causing division of opinions, but which became partisan and arbitrary the moment that difference of views gave opportunity for such an attitude. The most impor-

tant work of the denomination in the hands of a non-representative body — and this as the result of the absence of well-defined principles of organization and government — is an impressive lesson as to the consequences of letting the larger work of a denomination shape itself according to circumstances. As another instance of the same kind, take the mutual relations of the home and foreign mission societies, and other benevolent organizations, of another denomination, which is Congregational in its polity. If the church itself had a national organization and consistency, the work of these different societies would be related to it and each other in the proper way. But being independent and voluntary associations, each with its own headquarters and board of officers, they have come to occupy another attitude than that of representation of the general body to which they belong, and are more or less rivals of each other, competing for their share of the interest and funds of the denomination. All these things are of one piece; they are parts of the individualistic and *laissez faire* principle applied to the work of the church. These affairs ought instead to be under wise direction, in which the whole church through its representatives shall look after all its interests and work, with a large insight of all needs, and foresight of all emergencies.

This is the evil, looking simply at Congregationalism as a system of organization. But we have to remember that we are dealing not only with a polity, but with the sectarianism that originated it. If it were simply a question of polity, of the independence of the local church, we should still doubt the wisdom of this restricted and narrow basis of association. But this had its origin in the desire to maintain without let or hindrance a certain set of opinions, and in the conviction that these would flourish best in a body organized specially for this purpose. And this, which was the only thing which justified the system at first, is now the cause of its principal danger. The attempt to make Christians of a certain name and opinion interferes with the work of making and training Christians. Competition may be a very good thing in trade, though even there its wisdom is beginning to be doubted seriously; but in religion it is too much opposed to the very essence of Christianity itself to be anything but misfortune and a hindrance. This evil is best illustrated in the religious state of our cities and country towns. Everybody admits that there is here a great and crying evil, and a few recognize the cause of it; but the remedy, which is not far to seek, is very

far from application. The difficulty with the Congregational idea of the church, even as a local body, is that it has no roots in the soil, no definite *locale* committed to its care. It is a body not separated from others by any definite boundaries, but so sharing with others the same location that there is no proper division of responsibility among them. There ought to be in the cities the one church, which should direct all the work done in them, and see to it that the religious interests of every part of them are cared for. And every congregation should have, not its scattered members, but a parish, forming a distinct part of the city, to be its share of the work. But as things are, there are and can be no parishes, because no church can say that a certain part of the city belongs to it. The members of the different churches are scattered in every part of the city, and the outsiders are nobody's care. And in the country towns and villages, the denominational principle has multiplied churches, and made adequate support of them impossible ; it has broken up these small communities into cliques, and aggravated all the evils to which such places of limited population are subject.

But the third and final consideration is the most important. The Congregational notion of the church is unsatisfactory because it is not large enough to embody the idea of the church as the body of Christ. Its basis is a creed, a set of notions about Christ, and not Christ himself. The idea of Christ is evidently to unite all men in himself. The idea of Congregationalism, and in fact of all bodies having a sectarian basis, is to introduce into this very principle of unity divisions and separations. There is something grand in the idea of the Catholic Church ; there is, on the other hand, something depressing and narrow in that of a body existing only to divide that which is properly indivisible. The kingdom of God, the kingdom of righteousness in the world, set over against that of evil in an eternal opposition, is a great fact, the great fact in the world's life ; but a body which can justify its existence only by the assertion that the Christ who is the bond of unity in this kingdom is not a sufficient basis for a true unity, lacks just the organic principle of the church, and in fact of Christianity itself, and so misses the largeness and nobility of conception that belong to these institutions.

But neither is the local any more than the sectarian church large enough to fill out this true conception of the church as the body of Christ. One finds himself, in his study of the ideas and principles of Christianity, in the presence of a system as wide as

humanity, and gathering into itself all its life, its varied occupations and institutions. And when he inquires of the Congregational polity what is the institution corresponding to this worldwide idea, he finds that it is the small body of believers organized on the purely voluntary principle, and having no necessary or organic connection with any other similar body. In fact, this is the only authorized society of believers; nothing larger has any right to call itself a church. The authority for this restricted notion is the supposed practice of the apostolic churches; but the principle on which it is assumed that the guiding Spirit restrained the early churches from going any further in the work of organization was the dread of human nature, even when sanctified, owing to its propensity to misuse power. Organization implies government, and the danger to individualism from a great society, being foreseen by the Holy Spirit, caused him to reduce that danger to a minimum. This fear, as it was developed in the origin of Congregationalism, was the result of centuries of misrule. But who does not see that, the whole theory of government having changed meantime, and democratic or constitutional ideas having taken the place of the arbitrary systems that had been in vogue, all this danger is now passed, and the way is opened for the church to avail itself of the benefits of association on a large scale, corresponding to its Catholic essence? The limits of such organization are already marked out in the body politic. The city, the state, the nation, are not mere conveniences of association and government; they are the embodiment of divine ideas, so much so, that all attempts to ignore them on the part of the Congregational bodies have failed, and they have been forced to organize for work along these lines. But the frank recognition of the fact that the church is nothing more than a renewed humanity, and that the forms of associated life natural and even necessary to man are therefore natural to the church, and the necessary expression of its life, would place the church on its proper basis, and give men a chance for all the enthusiasm that belongs to these institutions. The noblest feelings belonging to man are those called out by these words, "country" and "fatherland," and we may hope that eventually "humanity" will take its place by the side of these. But meantime the church in this country lacks that largeness of idea, and so that power to awaken enthusiasm. What the church needs to-day is, not the revival of the hierarchy, which is the ignoble form of the churchly idea, but a church catholic in its scope, self-governing, making its own laws, and executing these

laws through its proper representatives. The American Christian Church is that to which the thoughts, and prayers, and plannings of all American Christians ought to aspire.

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"CENTRALIZATION IN CONGREGATIONALISM."

I DO not discuss this subject as a doctrinaire, nor shall I speak with an advocate's seeming bias, as if I had a pet theory, the adoption of which I deemed all-important. I am simply desirous, of presenting for candid consideration the question of how to make our polity practically more effective.

We are living in the evangelistic epoch of the church's history, and it is of immense moment to Congregationalists, as well as to the world, to learn how we may become more aggressive, how develop greater propagative power. It is not to be presumed that we cannot make any changes for the better, or that our past experience has taught us nothing. More than this, — we are now sharing the common work with other branches of the church, and each is challenged to do its best. The opportunities are boundless, and the emulation in good works is of a nature calculated to stimulate each household of faith to undertake the utmost for the sake of Christ and the world. Our growth as a denomination is not, on the whole, flattering, especially when it is remembered that we started with an uncommon prestige, had the lead in numbers, and now are surpassed by the Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, Campbellites, and Lutherans. Certainly there must have been circumstances which limited our growth, and, whether our errors or misfortunes occasioned this failure to hold our own or not, the thing we want to know is, how to amend our methods, and what to do, to bring our churches into greater organic unity, and to combine them for more effective field-work. I believe a great denomination like ours, with its splendid history, and its contagious, inspiring spirit, may be modified and improved in some of its working principles. In church polity, as in Christianity, a distinction between the essential and circumstantial is imperative; for that is practically the distinction between the spirit and the body; the building and the scaffolding; the warfare and the weapons; the end and the means. A church polity which in the past gave new enthusiasm to life, new wings

to faith, a new domain to liberty, must ever command our respect. But it would be a mistake to canonize forms of church life and government, which the expediency of special circumstances suggested and developed, as the only ones compatible with spiritual life and work. The past can never become the measure of the future, and while there are "things behind" worthy of historical remembrance, they are practically to be forgotten in the "reaching forth unto those things which are before." It may be taken for granted that the future will be with that church which has in it the greatest moral forces; and the greatest moral forces are those confessedly which most powerfully affect the conscience and the religious life of men. The true test of all theologies is, Do they provide fully for the spiritual necessities of men. There cannot, either, be any divorce between theology and practical religion. The former, whenever at variance with the deepest instincts and necessities of human nature, will ultimately fail. Truth alone is nutritive, error is the mother of death. No life can grow or continue save as it is fed by truth, and so there can be no religious life save as there is theological truth. But our inquiry to-day is rather as to applied Christianity, it relates to our methods of work, our principles of coöperation, and the question is, Should we encourage the tendency to centralization within our denomination? and if so, why? for the challenge that meets us is *cui bono*.

1. To start with, then, we name the need of a stronger government, which centralization would secure to us. We have been too largely in the past simply a collection of churches acting independently of each other. An *esprit de corps* has been impossible where this atomic sort of existence has prevailed. With common burdens, with imperative tasks, with the need of concerted and concentrated action, there is a call for a compacter organization and a closer denominational union. We suffer somewhat by comparison with sister denominations. They get the momentum which is supplied by simultaneous effort. Behind every movement of an evangelistic or charitable nature is the strength of the combined churches. Greater coherency gives greater force. We have been, seemingly, most afraid of all power of a centralized sort. Emphasizing the bond of union supplied in the fellowship of the churches, we have been reluctant to favor aught looking towards a quasi organic connection of the same. Strong churches may not feel the need of union with any others, but our weaker churches do. It is their independency and isolation, their lack of

connection with an organized body, charged with some sort of official interest in and responsibility for them, that makes them feeble and lonely. Then in the prosecution of evangelistic and missionary undertakings there is strength and unity of design according as the churches are consolidated and massed with their resources, spiritual and material. Our missionary societies have been too largely independent of the churches they are presumed to represent. We have been proud of what has always been an element of weakness, namely, that we were undenominational. We have been, therefore, always willing to build up other households of faith; creditable enough if it was not done, as it certainly has been, at the expense of the churches of our own name we were under every rightful obligation to help. There has been a sort of largess about us Congregationalists, because of which we have been givers to every appealing object or missionary society. Generous to a fault to applicants often having no claim upon us, we have in doing for others neglected our own vineyards. Now, as we find every other denomination doing whatever of the Master's work is possible along its own lines in its own way, is it not time that we operated yet more in the same fashion, seeking to combine the strength of all our churches, and to consolidate and focus all our own denominational strength. We cannot longer appear in the field, crowded with emulous combatants well organized, simply as a friendly knight, an ally any may secure, and ready to coöperate equally with any or all. We are not wanted in that guise, nor can we effect much if that be our rôle. What we do now and hereafter we must do as a distinct army corps, well officered and eager to vie with other corps in fighting under the great Captain of our common salvation.

2. Changed circumstances and new opportunities of service are stimulating this tendency to centralization. Evidently the ecclesiastical platforms and methods of our fathers were, as we now study them, excessively provincial. They were devised for a narrow home use; were adapted to a homogeneous population, covering but a limited area of country. Gradually, and with difficulty, have we outgrown our traditionary fear of any centralized authority. At first there was opposition to even ministerial district associations, and state associations were of a still later birth. Our great missionary societies, the American Board and the American Home Missionary Society, started as undenominational, and to-day have become, strictly speaking, Congregational organizations by the logic of events rather than by any

choice of our own. Now and then we hear a protest breathing the old-time and outgrown spirit, that neither agency is denominational, while practically the constituency of both has been for years, and is increasingly so with every passing twelvemonth, Congregational. Frankly we must acknowledge that the system we inherited was poorly equipped for anything beyond parish work amid the conditions which obtained in the New England of our forefathers. Now the whole outlook has altered. We find ourselves in the presence of rival church polities, having the confessed advantage of completer organization for aggressive movement under unity of management, and with a watchful vigilance which is quick to utilize every opening. Slowly we have been yielding to the pressure of circumstances, and have sought to modify and improve our own methods, and come into touch with the new conditions of service. We have discovered methods of religious coöperation and organized fellowship quite consonant with the genius of our Congregational polity. We are feeling this tendency of things in the direction of a compacter organization and greater unity of purpose in the formally suggested plan of consolidating our various missionary periodicals; in the voice of some of our Western churches, making its plea heard at the last National Council, to transfer ministerial standing to the district Conferences, and suggesting that the latter be the only constituent bodies of the State Conferences or Associations, and these, in turn, the constituencies of the Triennial Council. Also, we note another sign of the same trend of things in the call for the reorganization of the American Board; and in the effort of other national societies to come into closer formal relations with the churches; as well as in the very proper and timely proposal to observe Forefathers' Day, and use all its inspiring memories to awaken a new sense of responsibility, and kindle a new zeal for all kinds of evangelistic ventures in the home and foreign fields. And last, but greatest of all, this recent stream of tendency announces itself in the organization of the Triennial Council, now become a fixed fact of our polity, and a possible instrumentality of vast benefit to us as a denomination. Not at all because it has any authority beyond what is moral, but because it can formulate the consensus of opinion and belief in our churches; can discuss grave questions of denominational importance; can impress and shape the religious life of the country by its deliverances on matters of national moment in the domain of ethics and religion. It can greatly quicken the Christian activity and thought of our

adherents, as does the Episcopal Congress and the other great denominational bodies whose periodical assemblies attract so much attention. It is a tendency which thus far in this form has disappointed the fears of not a few alarmists, and has fulfilled the hopes of its most sanguine friends. We need not be afraid of this outcome of a closer, compacter denominational organization. It means augmented power for all kinds of practical work in all the fields into which we are challenged to enter. It brings the promise of a more helpful fellowship, with all its stimulating and supplementing ministries. It will in the long run rid us of the fear of being what we must become more and more, if we are to hold any influential place among the various Christian bodies of the land — a denomination, with common traditions, substantial agreement in belief, and aspirations likely to quicken us for the broadest and bravest evangelistic undertakings. Already this tendency for union and coöperation on a yet larger scale expresses itself in the proposal for a Pan-Congregational Council or Conference, which our British brethren have recently made. The air is full of what I am describing, — a tendency towards greater organic union, a concentration and coöperation which is prophetic of far larger influence and usefulness than we have ever yet had. Our place in America must become increasingly prominent and effective. Have we not, as a body, an honorable if not foremost place in the religious life and work of our beloved land; in its political and social problems; in the educational ventures which lend such lustre to our times?

Independency and fellowship, the two tap-roots of American Congregationalism, are blending in the centripetal influence all religious bodies are now feeling. The work to be done is so vast, and withal so urgent, that only a well-knitted clan of believers, loyal to their distinctive symbols, proud of their past achievements, yet saluting as their leader the one great Captain of the sacramental host of God's elect, can accomplish what seems possible and imperative. We cannot stand apart in these days when coöperation is the solution to so many of our gravest problems. We need not fear to follow our own national experience in seeking some closer tie than mere confederation of the loosest kind. We are more than a mere congeries of churches, and we ought not to be afraid of our destiny, nor hesitate to accept the mission that only churches organically united can accomplish. Our compact of union is found in the beliefs, the energies, the ideas and convictions, common to the churches of our order. Justice, trustee-

ship, and love determine our relations to each other as churches, and as churches our relations to the great outside world. We cannot do our work without larger aims. Life is keyless to the selfish. Independency is but one remove from isolation, coldness, weakness. We cannot stand with our scented robes about us and refuse to touch and be touched, or to lock arms and join hands with those akin to us, that we may more widely scatter our benedictions. Every denomination — ours surely as much as any — ought to be a drilled body of crusaders, a brotherhood for mutual help, and for largest service to the human race. I have spoken, after all, of what is but a tendency. Started by no clique or party, it cannot be ridiculed or sneered at. Like all great historic movements, occasioned by the necessities or aspirations of the age, it deserves respectful attention and tolerant treatment. The reaching out for a richer and more varied worship; the growing popularity of responsive reading from the Psalter, of the use of "the Gloria Patri," and historic hymns in favor with the early church, — cannot be charged up to "discontent," or be dismissed as "the fad of the hour" in certain church circles. The impersonal thought of any age, which becomes widespread and dominant, is greater than the conceits and theories of those who resist all change and try to hold things as they are. A tendency such as we describe is as a gulf-stream through the else currentless ocean of thought. I have profound respect for new intellectual and spiritual movements; they oftentimes are the forerunners of a broader, better life. As no one person can be held accountable for their genesis, so no one person can hope successfully to oppose them. It is surely not revolutionary to approve of what our circumstances and the nature of our Christian work seem to have necessitated. In the new States there is manifestly a call for something besides the old New England independency. Even sanctified individualism is not as promotive of genuine and general growth as consecrated coöperation, the union of all forces in mutual fellowship and toil. It is not ecclesiasticism that is the resultant of the tendency we describe and welcome; it is completer organization, in a day and field where the best organized bodies are the most effective for all sorts of gospel effort. We are lacking in fealty to our own standards, and not responsive to our own sacred obligations, when churches of our order stand aloof in selfish isolation, and do nothing for those societies which we have formed and commissioned to do the religious work falling upon us as Congregational Christians. Something is lacking when individualism thus

runs to seed, and disowns all the opportunities and obligations which spring out of coöperative service. We are now no longer excluded from the South, and as a denomination are as national and widespread geographically as any other; and where so much depends upon sympathy, systematic beneficence, and practical fellowship, we must acknowledge and promote closer organic relations. Our mission is one not of polemics but irenics, and we never before had such promising possibilities as at the present time. While we are Congregational churches, there is a sense, as there is a call, in which we may be said to be *the Congregational Church*. We compromise in no respect our freedom and independence as separate households of faith by yielding to this tendency. Our great policy is self-instruction; our weapons are ideas. We are called to a vast evangelism, and our national societies must therefore become more distinctively the representatives and servants of the churches. We can now appear in every field where service for God and man is possible, with generous and explicit self-assertion. Nor need we blush, whether we go West or South, to say with emphasis, as we meet Christians of other names and from other communions with fresh pride in their strength and achievements, "We are Congregationalists." Man in his sharply defined and selfish individualism is being superseded by man in coöperative communion and brotherhoods of help. The air rings with the proof that social problems are supreme. Questions of social economics take first rank, not in the market only, but in the school and the sanctuary. We are engaged in quarrying new stones, reshaping old ones, to bring to completer finish and larger influence our Congregational heritage. In union there is strength; in a centralized yet free church-life are the potencies we need to grasp.

The basis of our spiritual order is laid in the sacrifice of Christ. Our greatest comfort, as workers together in the vanguard of our Lord, comes from the sense that we are not alone, but belong to one another. We are one in purpose; we are not guerrillas, fighting where and as we choose. Rather let us remember that we are a body of believers, moving with one spirit, knowing our part and loyally performing it. Whether we are weak or strong, large or small, we make the one marching, militant Pilgrim church; the same that our fathers instituted and yet different, conjuring by the same great name, yet owning the charm of an ever closer fellowship, and the spell of an ever deeper blending life.

Malcolm McG. Dana.

MATTHEW ARNOLD'S INFLUENCE ON LITERATURE.

MATTHEW ARNOLD's influence in the field of literature has proved one of much more comprehensive scope than it has been the fashion of the general mind to admit. I think it is true that common judgment has attributed to him a very partial range of study, and a very defined outlook, or, at least, that he possessed a mind whose ideas have radiated from certain fixed tenets of artistic and literary belief, and, having so radiated, have succeeded in enlightening only a certain range of intellectual area. But this conception of Mr. Arnold would do him injustice. Perhaps, on the contrary, the criticism would be entertained by his more professional readers, that if he had concentrated his finely trained mind on a less number of subjects, he might have produced a more efficacious and lasting body of commentary, and have avoided fields wherein he was not altogether master.

It is a very common fault with gifted minds, that a studious ambition tempts to the review of a multitude of questions, and Mr. Arnold did not lack this stimulus; his equipment and schooling, for the foundations of which he was especially indebted to a thorough master (his own father), and his subsequent university life as scholar and teacher, led him, naturally, to make various excursions in these fields of research, and aroused his fertile mind to persistent work. His earlier career as a student was fortunate in opening to him an intimate personal association with Wordsworth, for whom he acquired a feeling of reverent love, which he retained to the last, and with whom he was admitted to an intellectual and personal sympathy which determined, perhaps, more than any other one event the tendency of his subsequent aspirations. He became imbued with the Wordsworthian temper, the calm elevation of his thought, the high and pure atmosphere of his genius, and the austere simplicity of his poetic diction, feeling, and inspiration. How beneficent such personal contact, of a young, absorbing soul, with one so exceptional and unique as the great poet, is well attested in the clear aim and ideals of Mr. Arnold; it plainly exercised marked influence in forming the standards of Mr. Arnold's ideals, — more ample than any other associations of that time, if not of any time in his career.

As I have intimated, Mr. Arnold's work is manifold: he first, at the age of twenty-one years, won the Newdigate prize for English verse at Oxford; at twenty-five, after graduating, he was

elected Fellow of Oriel College, just thirty years after his father's election to the same fellowship in the same college; thus far he had followed closely the relationship and the course of his father, then so famous in the field of English scholarship and tuition.

With a mind so sturdy and diligent, so receptive in scholarly attainment, with the conspicuous life of his father's fame, and the pure radiance of Wordsworth's poetic lustre leading him, it is not singular that he felt their spirit and power, and bent himself persistently to achieve something that should make him worthy to bear the name of so eminent a sire, and to merit the friendship of the great laureate. Mr. Arnold's early resolution to enter the literary field was never — then or after — challenged by any competing inclination. It is much to the good-fortune of a young man when congeniality and circumstances can meet, unhindered, in his selection of a career; and doubly advantageous when, in such selection, he is endowed with especially fitting gifts to meet the demands awaiting him. The prestige of his father was not without its service in rendering these endowments available, but the fact that these conditions were supplemented by an enthusiasm and an industry quite equal to his surroundings was, after all, the commanding one.

His poetic and critical careers, after a few years, went hand in hand. He early advanced a theory, and a curriculum of study, peculiarly stimulating to his mind, a course which harmonized with his nature, and did much to formulate his ideals, namely, that Greek art and poetry should model our own. With him the Greek spirit, art, motive, and expression, in every form, so clear and definite, and so perfect in culture, were our hope in the development of our own. The world of art and letters, he believed, had no higher standards; the Western mind, during many centuries, had hardly succeeded in evolving anything in the realms of art and intellectual culture to compare, in beauty and elevation, with that of the Greek genius; this had, thus far, proved its supremacy. He said, "that the Greeks, at any rate, knew what they wanted in Art, and we do not."

The trend of Mr. Arnold's mind conformed to the conditions of the ancient Greek standards; their general effects, their subjection of parts to the perfection of the whole, their ideals — chaste, stately, unimpassioned, and wrought with marvelous finish — captivated his orderly mind and imagination, which were alien to the conditions of a vast, transitional civilization.

Mr. Arnold's mind and methods were always under the domin-

ion of an ideal purpose, aiming to accomplish a definite result, than of the irregular, unshaped workings of an overmastering and immeasurable impulse. The Greek spirit thus entering his earlier life as a guide became a continuous and enduring resource with him, not in classic form, illustration, or diction, such as entered so effectively into Milton's great epics as to give to his Christian ideals a pagan setting, but as an infusion, an essence, imparting its calm spirit and motive, and keeping him imperturbed against the temptations that met and urged him to join the bewildering and uncertain excursions in modern art and feeling. Most young, intellectual, and scholarly aspirants start out with these same Greek restraints, but the pressure and passion for popular favor, the flood of romantic feeling, and the restive, impulsive modern thought, tend soon to overmaster their maiden resolutions, and to evaporate any distinctive classic enthusiasm. And, as I have said, the fact which accounts for Mr. Arnold's sturdy adherence to his first devotion exists in the native trend of his taste and imagination, which, from first to last, bore the stamp of its classic seal. Yet while Mr. Arnold was consistent with the spirit of his mind and training, in this direction, he saw the unwisdom of subservience to a purely classic manner. Latin verses and Greek odes are not in demand, and are not considered as essential to happiness in our time; and while he was peculiarly and actively endowed on the side of Hellenic ideals, he thought of these only as they would serve him in ennobling and elevating the standards of the more advanced and complex presentation of modern ideas. Yet the Ancients were no affectation with him; every faculty of his mind responded to them; he delighted in reviewing their harmonious beauty from every point, was partial to every suggestion which they could make; his choice vocabulary, the subordination of imagery, the absence of redundancy and ornateness, the severity of manner, the restraint of feeling, the large and easy dignity of his style, were in unison with, and approved by, his classic tuition, and appeared to him the correct and preëminently admissible standards. If this responsive loyalty to classic training had its advantage, it also had its disadvantage; for however subjective he might assume to make it, it held a certain repressive dominion over such sympathy and feeling as he was capable of expressing, and led him to accentuate the cold, crystallized, and more markedly intellectual side, and to slight the profounder tones of sentiment and religion, which the Western mind entertains, in its relation to the presentations of life and thought, and

as they deal with "conduct and beauty," of which Mr. Arnold has so abundantly written.

He felt the aristocratic exclusiveness of the Greek standard, that it was intellectual, not spiritual, and that its passion for the beautiful was, primarily, of art culture, or, at least, art inheritance, a religion of art, rather than of soul; and he purposed supplementing English conduct and conscience, that moral beauty which is, perhaps, more English, in literature, than French or German — with this ancient spirit, or form of beauty, in letters, art, and culture, thus reviving as a setting or supplement only that which was once a vital spirit and condition; introducing, as accessory, an outward semblance, which was once a supreme motive. How far Mr. Arnold went astray in magnifying the virtue of this classic *régime*, if, indeed, he did go astray, may not be accounted here; but his devotion thereto made it appear as if he somewhat lightly estimated that which our Christian civilization prizes as intrinsic and enduring. Yet, at heart, Mr. Arnold was a loyal Englishman of the best and most progressive type, and felt keenly the moral worth, in both state and individual, in art, education, and life.

If, when the time may come, and it must soon come, when one must write of Tennyson from the standpoint of his completed work, he will have no difficulty in defining his presiding genius. When Wordsworth had finished, the world, by common impulse, wreathed the laurel of the poet about his memory; none other belonged there; and, in either case, all the eminence and beauty of the life have flowered through poetic inspiration. This cannot be said of Mr. Arnold. There was no such singleness of aim or enthusiasm with him. Poetry is sensitive of rivalry; it would have its minstrel consecrated; it would have him borne apart from the realism of affairs to epic heights. Mr. Arnold did not attain to this exclusiveness or exaltation. He has left an enviable name as critic; he was one who wrote of, and for, a wider constituency than that of his own nationality. It has been justly said, that the English mind is not, thus far, up to the French or German in criticism; it is certain that the record of the eighteenth century furnishes little of preëminent value in English literary criticism, — indeed, until the latter part of our own century, the Englishman was peculiarly insular and narrow. Strong in prejudice, in local feeling, and local pride, it appeared difficult for broad unconventional commentary, based on independent ideas, to gain a fair hearing with him. The typical English nature is

not natively hospitable towards, nor equipped for, subtle distinctions, broad analysis, or fine acumen, as the French is, nor for speculative or philosophical generalization and investigation, as is the German, but it has the creative faculty, based on a moral element of character, and on a persistent intellectual energy and application. For downright will, and vigor of work, and for practical sanity, the English mind is, perhaps, unrivaled. In a certain rugged, straightforward understanding it leads the way; it is concrete, Baconian, and morally superior; a solid enough foundation, indeed, for the national genius to build on, and one on which much of English letters is founded to-day; but, although this same literature has made its way over the world, and stands for more and more in each succeeding generation, it is as yet accepted as expressing only partially international ideas; in this condition it falls short—is not wide enough; the cosmopolitan demands more than it gives; for him, English thought is hedged about by tradition.

Mr. Arnold, as a critic, has seen traced and defined these English limitations beyond any other English critic; he had the equipment, the faculty, and the temper which fitted him for a close and patient critic, and he had the wide scholarship, and the wise culture, which served him in the entertainment of ideas, and in making a general, catholic, and judicial survey of art and literature, of history, society, and politics, from a philosophical and ethical, and, as well, from an æsthetic and an artistic elevation. This is saying much for him, but I have yet to find a thorough reader of Arnold, and a student, in international tendencies, conditions, and history, who will not assign to his critical essays a very high standard and a very broad range.

Arnold was as disinterested and as ideal as he well could be, and escape abstractions, and with a view to tangible effect; these did not prevent him from working for results; like many idealists, he did not write in the air. Unlike Emerson,—so unlike that he did not wholly sympathize with, though he saw, Emerson's impulse,—he did not aim to move, so much as to educate; that is, he aimed to cultivate rather than stimulate; he was a master by virtue of his orderly arrangement and structure of ideas; he did not play with his imagination, but laid siege, if possible, to reach and enlighten, by ideas and understanding; his strength was certainly not due to any magnetic or unique personality, or to any brilliant ingenuity of language, or conscious charm of words; primarily, it lay in an equitable purpose to reach a fair, just con-

clusion by a fair employment of language. His emotional nature was not easily touched; there were no stirs of feeling, struggling, almost vainly, as in Carlyle, to find vent; no deep undertones or tumults, nor mountain tempests of thought sweeping through his mind; but few strenuous utterances fighting their way through the narrow crannies of words, muttering at the impotency of human language. Carlyle might feel all this, but not Arnold; that which he had to say, if he could, he clarified and made sense of, through the lucidity and training of his mind and style; he had confidence to rest his case on his own fortified, orderly statements, and never suggests, by a succession of synonyms, a straining to realize some veiled or mysterious meaning; he was quite a master of expression, and was endowed with, or acquired, a style as select, symmetric, and unlabored, as any contemporaneous English writer of prose; his words were, as near as possible, the things meant, bearing easily their ample burden of ideas.

Admitting what is, I think, most frequently and most discriminatingly accorded to Mr. Arnold by his professional and personal friends, that his marked distinction rests on his critical work, — first, can we find in his methods and intellectual capacity the secret of this distinction?

General criticism, with Mr. Arnold at least, as I have said, is not of the literature of power, that is, an appeal to enthusiasm or fervor of moral feeling; nor, distinctively, of the literature of specific knowledge. It is, rather, as I have intimated, an analytical interpretation of various conditions in society, in nationalities, in history, in politics, in literature, in art, and in education; and our more advanced criticism in these different fields — by the philosophical tendency of thought employed, and through the suggestions of new ideas — is fast winning for itself the character of creativeness. To interpret a poet, for instance, to enter into the spirit and personality of his genius, to penetrate his feeling, and to discover and qualify his motive and mechanism, as Mr. Arnold has beautifully and appreciatively done in so many cases, indicates the possession of fine poetic qualities in the critic, and also of the seer's skill to unfold through his own sympathy the nature and quality of his author. Criticism is a gift of insight and an art of adequate and candid expression of that insight united, and it is the more remarkable when found both in a technical sense and also in a more philosophical and generalizing sense residing in a single critic.

Mr. Arnold's peculiar vantage-ground rested in his principle of

uniformity, which gave him balance and steadiness; he tried to divest his reasons of bias; there is in what he says, and in the way he says it, a freedom from marked mannerisms and idiosyncrasies, which so often point conceit alike in the author and the individual; you feel, at least, the sincerity of his convictions; he is continually crossing the grain of his personal relations and environment in reaching them.

In his paper on Emerson, he well knew that a simple eulogy would, in return, command a more generous and general eulogium for himself, yet his critical conscience puts him under restraint, so he pays the higher tribute of presenting an estimate as unbiased as a conscientious study could make it, and he had the sturdy courage—a quality that seldom deserted him—to say before a New England audience, that Emerson had not the true literary style, nor was he a poet or philosopher; and to give a frank exposition of the reasons for thinking as he did.

Mr. Arnold had the virtue of honesty, and he frequently exhibited it in the garb of as plain speech as the best English would allow. He was a poor diplomatist, and could not juggle with words; he professed to admire the Frenchman's art of presentation, but he had little of his adroitness in repartee or rapier-thrust; he loved ideas, not theories, sophistries, or advantages; he could use large weapons better than side-arms; discussions were valuable to him chiefly as they educated; an equitable temper of speech was his habit, which gained in strength and efficacy as he ripened in intellectual breadth. Mr. Arnold was an extensive scholar, but never a microscopic pedant; and if he ever was severe in his strictures, it was not from any narrow exclusive spirit, or from any superciliousness of manner, but because of his impatience with the Philistinism of the English common mind, as he characterized the complacent narrow-mindedness and commonplace of his own countrymen.

While Mr. Arnold was held captive to the artistic definiteness and eminence of the ancient standards, he eagerly undertook the problems of modern society, and of modern intellectual life; he studied the antagonisms between natural science and human letters, and set himself to compose the differences in the way of a common fellowship between the leading thinkers on all sides, and it is not to be charged against his sagacity that he did not greatly succeed. It has been said that "the British public likes to set limits to every universal inquiry;" it is probably more true of that people than of most any other, that they are not favorably disposed to

speculative excursions, and that, rather than cherish the somewhat broad and bold range of German ideas, they prefer the habits of a purely dogmatic or defined scholarship. Goethe first, and Matthew Arnold next, have, perhaps, done more than any other writers to bridge, somewhat, this alienism, and to foster a growing kinship of feeling between the intellectual workers in the English and European fields. Mr. Arnold, himself confessedly no devotee to the strictly scientific methods, and confessedly, too, not a close student either in exact or approximate natural science, contended that a thorough knowledge of human letters — as he termed history, poetry, and philosophy — in the average general student, besides embracing a wide acquaintance of literature and art, required also some acquaintance with the general advancement in scientific research, whereas a strictly scientific curriculum demanded little or no corresponding acquaintance with the more comprehensive range of art, ideas, and human letters. Mr. Arnold has advanced his views repeatedly on this subject of specialized knowledge, and has approached it from various points, and with great reasoning force. He was a disciple of culture, but of that sort of culture which advances fresh currents of ideas; he indorsed that noble rule of Wordsworth's, "Plain living and high thinking," and equally lamented with him its present absence in general English life; in one of his famous passages he declares that in England "the upper classes have become materialized, the middle classes vulgarized, and the lower classes brutalized." Mr. Arnold was an intellectual aristocrat of the strenuous sort, insisting that men should be eager to know the "best that has been thought and uttered in the world," and in urging this he was quite fearless. Addison has said, — and after some experience, as the volumes of "The Spectator" will testify, — "that it is an ill business trying to make the public think less of itself than it thought before." Whatever Mr. Arnold may have felt on this score, it is creditable to his courage and fidelity that he never flattered, but spoke his mind with exceeding bluntness and power, against the social barbarisms and the intellectual blindness and paucity of that "dear public" which Goethe so unjustly said, (that is, unjustly as respects women), "must be treated like a woman, it must be told only what it likes to hear."

England, that is, the English mind, sets itself too much to the settlement of great questions of political, social, and religious import, through the medium and machinery of conference, convention, and parliament, — questions, too, that must pass through the

fires of profound and searching inquiry and criticism, and be tried by years of investigation, before any possible just solution can result. It is into such perfunctory and superficial judgments that England's practical turn is constantly leading her, and we of America are perpetuating this temporizing way, deluding ourselves continually with the belief that we have set at rest age-long problems by the simple method of ayes and nays. Against vanity of this sort Mr. Arnold acts as a sharp and bitter tonic. Truth finds its way against all such phantom odds; the methods of truth can never be diverted by arbitrary means; men must forever delve and dig for gold; public bodies cannot legislate value into common dust, nor can they vote a truth, until the mind and spirit have indicted error on the highest testimony attainable.

Many questions must forever find their chief congress in the realm of the human reason and intellect, in the broad world of thought, or in the individual conscience. No better advocate of the emancipation and freedom of thought, or of a "free play of ideas," as he tells us, can be found in modern criticism than Mr. Arnold. It is not strange that he, in some of his laments over the strained and prescribed methods of dogmatic and polemic discussion, asks, somewhere, "whether it is possible, under the circumstances amid which we live, to think clearly, to feel nobly, and to delineate firmly." There was an impartiality of spirit, a sanity of taste, a largeness of knowledge, an entertainment of ideas, and an elevation of conscience in Mr. Arnold that sustained him in an independent attitude, and invested him with a certain critical judicature that commanded the attention, and frequently the indorsement, if not the admiration, of even the English, whom he never hesitated to assail if he felt that they deserved it. This hindrance to the growth of the true critical spirit in England, it must be observed, acts equally as a hindrance to the artistic endowment, and prevents in various directions the full blossom of the art-spirit in the English genius, which is so apt to assume a gauge of conventional limitations beyond which it hesitates to explore.

The readiness with which Mr. Arnold has essayed to speak on European themes, ideas, and men, clearly advances him beyond these insular English limitations, and gives him an enviable fellowship as critic with the cosmopolitan minds of the world.

In his "Literature and Dogma," however, he has under-estimated the weight and power of the supernatural element in the

character and history of Christ, and does not apprehend the vital influence which this element wields in the sum total of Christian teachings and Christian civilization; his attempts to predict, or reason out, the eventual elimination of this condition from the Christ-life as it is now heralded, therefore, do not appear to him so impossible a task as they do to the religious world, but the feebleness and inadequacy of this volume in its aim to weaken the hold of these doctrines must have impressed itself on him during his latter life. Mr. Arnold met with little or no success as a distinctive advocate for the modification of religious beliefs; indeed, he had none of the characteristics of a religious polemic, nor any distinctly marked spiritual apprehension, to aid him in a controversy against so deeply established and progressive a spiritual faith.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Arnold did not return in his later life to the pursuit of a pure literary criticism, since it is in this line that his trained and tuitional mind seemed peculiarly gifted. That he fell short in impressing himself vigorously, either on the political or religious mind, so as to become a recognized, immediate power in the arena, was perhaps due, incidentally, somewhat to his more scholarly and cloistral breeding, and thus to the fact that he was not engaged in the broad channels of controversy. He was primarily a generalizer, engaged in tentative research; he was a lover of investigation, and, like Emerson, scorned all rigidity of consistent intellectual courses, welcoming new lights and new manifestations. In style Mr. Arnold studiously avoided hindrances to a rational elucidation of ideas; there is in him an habitual urbanity of tone, partly deliberate and partly native, which serves to heighten and accentuate the lucidity and force of his literary gifts. As an original or philosophical thinker, pure and simple, Mr. Arnold is obviously neither a power nor an inspiration; but the distinguished literary qualifications which are awarded him, and which enabled him, through their felicity and art, to render his critical faculty such signal service, will preserve his writings long, as of the best expressions that the English language contains of purely critical analysis and interpretation. To disparage this remarkable endowment is to underprize a correct and noble attainment in the use of words and sentences to communicate meaning and ideas. It is not necessary to dispraise a fine style in order to praise the thought of a writer; other things being equal, a true literary style will preserve a precious work infinitely longer than a turgid or ill-balanced one, and will

more adequately convey the value of that work to the mind, imparting a pleasure and charm wholly wanting in crude or colorless phrasing.

Much can be said in behalf of the catholicity and temper of Mr. Arnold's writings; they afford an enlightened example, in the strained and exacting conditions of our age, of a mind determined to a calm and disinterested purpose, estranged from partisanship, and elevated to a dispassionate overlook of the tendencies and possibilities of civilization, and especially as relating to educational studies and educational accomplishments.

The general reader, it may be, has missed the interior quality in Mr. Arnold's poetry. A poet who, like Mr. Arnold, devotes much of his time to other and more realistic work, imparts to his poetry, unconsciously, certain superficial and atmospheric effects that belong legitimately to prose; not only restraint of feeling, — which is a negative effect, — but a form of words and expression, which is positive, and which may go far to obscure the essential worth of his poetry. At the heart of Mr. Arnold's poetry is found much that suggests Wordsworth. Arnold's poetry has never been overmuch read; his first American edition of poems went mostly to market for waste paper, but then, this of itself argues little or nothing. The poetry that is greatly read at first usually bears the form only, not the essence of poetry. Whether certain poetry will have a high place can be judged only after many years of test, and in many cases after the author is gone.

Yet there are characteristics that are common in great poetry for which we instinctively look; and one is, native blending of matter and spirit, homogeneousness of thought and language; there is a poetic language, and the poet — he who is inevitably one — employs it, and with it a rhythmic strain or cadence that flows as water in a rivulet. I think Arnold, with all his art-perfectness, missed this spontaneity. His poetry reads like prose sometimes, save that he had a certain epic elevation instilled with his Greek tuition, but as poetry, we are at times constrained to say "how halting, how wanting in impulse;" there is largeness and frequently great nobleness inborn of Mr. Arnold's reflective moods, such as we find in "Thyrsis" and in his "Scholar Gypsy." In some respects the former is equal to Shelley's "Adonais," without the powerful imagination of Shelley, however, or the intense undertone of spiritual feeling; there is, too, an absence of climax and of articulate distinction in most of his poetry; he avoids, in poetry as in prose, particular effects, rather aiming at a

general wholeness of effect after the classic or Greek order. We feel this repose in Mr. Arnold's diction, but without the luminousness, and without the kindling impulse or the wing, which gives to poetry height of feeling and emotional depth. His definition of poetry — "that it is a criticism of life," is, perhaps, analytically true, but not poetically true. Botany is a valuable science, but it does not take account of the aroma of the rose; and when we strain poetry to find out and classify its relations to life, we lose its perfume or atmosphere; if it contains such criticism, we had rather find it out without a search-warrant, either by our intuitive impulses or heart-throbbings; by such insight poetry comes to us laden with much more real significance than this definition permits. There was an aim at classic workmanship in Arnold's poetic style which forbids absorbing enthusiasm by the reader, unless it be the enthusiasm of the scholar or the artist; yet he frequently keenly interests by the persistent devotion of a thoroughbred to his method and motive; the poetic impulse never masters him, but he continually suggests a deliberate purpose on his part to master it, and the result of this is, that the relation of his expression to his matter is not a vital or inevitable one; the heat has not been sufficient to weld them into one.

There is no question but that he has the elements of a poetic nature within him, but they find breath only after a fashion, and through many rules and regulations; the mechanism is there, and we discover his mannerisms and slow processes when we would find and feel his mood. If it is true that poets "learn in suffering what they teach in song," as Shelley tells us, then poetry is quite unlike the marble statue, however beautiful the form, for the one has vital life and breath in it, while the other is confessedly only an effigy.

Arnold is at his best in his elegies. His commemorations are exalted and in a noble strain; he sustains to the end with easy dignity the idealization which properly characterizes a subject worthy of commemoration in poetry. Examples are not wanting to distinguish his excellence in this field, though we have no room to quote. Voltaire has said that "No nation has treated, in poetry, moral ideas with more energy and depth than the English nation;" and he added, "There, it seems to me, is the great merit of the English poets." Since Voltaire's time, as well as before it, the English genius has exhibited surpassing moral power in its poetry. Let us accept Voltaire's judgment, and let us give to Mr. Arnold a high place among the poets who have exemplified

this truth, for it is due him ; the purity and serenity of his spirit are not more pronounced than the ethical tone in his poetry, not so much in any moral declaiming, as in the serious strain and atmosphere of his thought ; in this he is — like Wordsworth or Tennyson — beyond criticism. As between style and motive Mr. Arnold illustrates the value of motive by quoting from Epictetus, who likens literary form and finish as the inns which entertain us on our way home to the master motive of the work ; and in Mr. Arnold's writings you will always notice how tenacious he is in holding fast to the prime aim and motive of his thought, whether in poetry or prose. The one thing wanting in his poetry is the one thing which Wordsworth has in his great poems (to use a word of his own), "inevitableness." Wordsworth's real poems are the outcome of his nature as surely as the flower is from the seed ; but not so with Mr. Arnold. Emerson's saying about the poet that "he speaks adequately only when he speaks somewhat wildly," has no adaptation to Mr. Arnold the poet, who never releases the reins of his imagination from a firm grasp, and who guides his poetic steeds in a safe and wide course.

Ardency, ecstasy, rapture, — these are never on exhibition ; if you feel them in him, they are under constraint sobered and subdued by the corrective of a reserve which waits on his classic vein. The compensating temper of the critic, too, follows him in his poetry, and he sees, always, that the counterbalancing weight is in the opposing scale to check the upward turn. The effect of Mr. Arnold's poetry on the reader corresponds somewhat to his definition of poetry "as a criticism of life" ; — criticism bears a judicial stamp ; it is first an intellectual process, and Mr. Arnold's poetry is of the intellect rather than of feeling or emotion. Even though he select for subject a traditional theme, steeped with passion or deep with pathos, he will curb or lessen rather than heighten these in the telling ; there is a pleasant though mild regret, a charming memorial softness or light veil of meditative feeling in his elegies, "that resemble sorrow as the mist resembles the rain," so equitably diffused that all poignancy is dissipated, leaving but its shadowy semblance, which lacks the power to compel a mood, though it may serve one. Mr. Arnold's partiality for subjects drawn from mythological personages and incidents is best illustrated in his poem "Balder Dead," which is one of the finest specimens of its kind. It does not enter into the immanent life of this great world of ours, and therefore affects us only as a dream, exciting a traditional love for the antiquities of Norse lit-

erature, it may be, but giving no fresh impulse to modern feeling or wings to the eager imagination.

I cannot believe that Mr. Arnold ever experienced what Wordsworth calls "poetic pains which only the poets know." The sedate measure of his lines, the uniformity of his moods, and the calm premeditation of his composition, while suggesting a certain strength, are lacking in that spontaneous touch which makes "music of thought, and music of language," as some one has said.

It is a passion of the composite author to pray that if his name is to be enshrined in memory, it shall be through his poetic creation. I question whether Mr. Arnold entertained at the last a just appreciation of the real greatness of his critical faculty, which seems to have insured for him a lasting name, — if we may judge of its value by the almost universal tributes paid it; but, without question, he had a serene faith that there was a quality in his poetry which would preserve it and him in the thought of men; it may be —, who would say nay — that such a faith foreshadowed a reality.

In the mean time no student can afford to miss the training and tendency to which Mr. Arnold's work invites, in its entertainment of ideas, and no lover of that "sweetness and light" which he so admirably and persistently pointed to, in the intellectual and artistic realm, can turn away from his thought without absorbing something from his wealth of cultivation and his purity of aim which shall make life better worth the living.

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THE SABBATH IN RELATION TO CIVILIZATION.

Is the Sabbath a factor in civilization? and to what extent?

It would be a legitimate inference, from what has been said on the economic and moral aspects of the question, that the Sabbath is an efficient force in modern civilization, since whatever is promotive of individual well-being may be fairly supposed to be equally promotive of well-being in man's collective capacity. Without the Sabbath, ideal life would be an unattainable goal, the realization of perfect society an impossibility. No civilization can come to its highest and fullest fruition that does not give the

Sabbath the place it is entitled to in the physical and moral constitution of man.

Christian civilization differs from the civilizations of antiquity, not merely in degree but in character. Has the Sabbath been a force in producing this difference? and what has been its momentum?

The Sabbath, both as an economic and religious institute, is essential to the material and moral well-being of man. Its institution at a time — even if it be admitted to be no older than the age of Moses — when the physical necessities of man were not so well understood, and when his religious nature was less powerfully and intelligently emphasized in the thoughts and aims of rulers, is a demonstration of its divine origin and authority. For, to repeat the argument of Proudhon, no merely human foresight, no statesmanship, no philanthropy, could at that age have devised an arrangement which so perfectly meets the wants of man both in his physical and in his moral necessities.

It is justly insisted upon that the Sabbath is absolutely necessary for the efficient advancement of true religion. The success of Christianity, unless directed and sustained by supernatural agencies only, hinges upon this support. This was the view of a distinguished French statesman: "Without the Sabbath there can be no worship, without worship no religion."¹ And it was the confession of Voltaire that Christianity could not be destroyed whilst the Sabbath remains. Its author might as well have published it into empty space, in the hope of morally revolutionizing man, as to send it forth into the world without the aid of the Sabbath. A day of rest, therefore, devoted to the immediate service of religion, is the first external requirement of Christianity.

Now then, what was the relation of the Sabbath to civilization? Civilization may be defined as the progress which society makes in government, arts, science, education, religious life. What were the civilizations of antiquity? What, in all the more historic of these civilizations, was the overmastering element? Was it religion, education, or material grandeur? In Egypt, unquestionably, the material element was the crowning force. Her monuments, broken and fragmentary, lining the banks of the Nile in vast reaches, testify, after the tread of centuries, to the grandeur and extent of her material resources and progress. Her religion was conspicuous but not a supremely controlling element in her

¹ Montalembert.

life. Her real character is expressed in her vast monuments and territorial aggrandizement.

The civilization of the Euphrates reveals the same fact. Its chief development was in the line of physical energy and achievement. The immense structures and temples of Assyria, though connected with religion, were monuments in commemoration of the warlike exploits of her kings. The scenes which her artists wrought in marble were either scenes of marches and battles, of sieges, of sacking of cities, of the treatment of prisoners; or were scenes of hunting, — the chase of the lion, the wild bull, the wild ass. The massive slabs lining her public halls were covered with minute descriptions of campaigns and conquests. Battle-scenes and carnage obtrude themselves upon the antiquary wherever he uncovers the long-lost monuments of Mesopotamia. The Assyrians were skilled in the moulding of vases, jars, and drinking-cups, in the carving of ivory, in gem-engraving, glass blowing and coloring, so that in material civilization and art they did not fall very much behind the Greeks. However, "combined with this progress in luxury and refinement, and this high perfection of the principal arts that embellish and beautify life, their sculptures and their records reveal much which revolts and disgusts, — savage punishments, brutalizing war customs, a debasing religion, a cruel treatment of prisoners, a contempt for women, a puerile and degrading superstitiousness; teaching the lesson, which the present age would do well to lay seriously to heart, that material progress, skill in manufactures and in arts, even refined taste and real artistic excellence, are no sure indications of that civilization which is alone of real value, — the civilization of the heart, a condition involving not merely polished manners, but gentleness, tenderness, self-restraint, purity, elevation of mind and soul, devotion of the thoughts and life to better things than comfort or luxury, or the cultivation of the æsthetic faculties." ¹

The same authority, speaking of Indian civilization, notes its chief characteristic: "Indian civilization is, in the main, intellectual, not material. . . . The Indians occupy themselves with the inward, not with the outward world." ²

The distinguishing feature of Greek civilization was its marked advancement in art and refined culture. These the Greeks carried to a perfection never surpassed, if indeed ever equalled in any age. Her artists, poets, orators, historians, are the admiration

¹ Rawlinson, *Origin of Nations*, pp. 95, 96.

² *Origin of Nations*, pp. 108, 109.

and study of all times. And what was the ruling characteristic of Roman civilization, whose influence and power were extended upon a wider arena than that of all other civilizations combined? — Rome, the only truly Universal Empire of the world, under whose sway “the distributive forces of nations gathered themselves into a mighty aggregate.”

Now what did these civilizations achieve to meet the deep spiritual requirements of man? What provision did they make for his moral and religious elevation? Directing attention only to the civilization of Rome, and what is the answer to these questions? Read the picture which St. Paul draws of society in Rome, — not of the purlieus only of the Imperial City, but of her educated and governing classes, — and is the picture not one of the most revolting and debasing that the human mind was ever asked to dwell upon? *This*, too, in the zenith of her intellectual splendor and imperial dominion, when, next to Athens, Rome was the most magnificent city in the world, in the superb richness and variety of her architectural display. What did her noble literature, what did her splendid art, what did her civic strength do, yea, what *could* they do, all combined into one immense momentum, to save her people from such a terrible moral doom? Rich beyond other civilizations in the amplitude of her resources, in her vast dominion over the world, in giving law to almost every part of the civilized globe, Rome was absolutely without power to lift man upon a higher moral and religious plane.

Now it was out of the depth of such a civilization, deficient in a pure and elevating spiritual faith, that the moral monsters sprung, as by a natural birth, some of whom sat upon her imperial throne. Hardly any atrocity was enormous enough to abash even the most cultivated and eminent of her citizens. Without shock to public conscience, Nero imbrued his hands in the blood of his mother, and the senate, composed of the trained and educated minds of the state, decreed thanksgiving for the bloody crime. Caligula on one occasion, when two consuls were sitting with him at the imperial table, burst forth into sudden and profuse laughter, and, being courteously asked by his distinguished guests what witty and rare conceit might be the occasion of his royal mirth, frankly confessed that he was laughing at the pleasant thought of seeing both their throats cut without the slightest inconvenience to himself. At another time, laying his hand upon the polished throat of his wife, whom strangely enough he seems to have loved,

he insinuates a doubt whether he should caress it, a pleasure which he might often repeat, or whether he should cut it, a gratification which could be experienced but once.¹

Such diabolical exhibitions of moral debasement were not sporadic or extreme. They were of common occurrence, "the summit of a pyramid whose broad base was in the life of the nation."² Rome was the common asylum which received and protected whatever was impure and atrocious.³ Vice no longer hid itself, but stalked forth before all eyes. Iniquity flamed up in all hearts, and innocence had ceased to exist.⁴ Immorality was so common that it was no longer talked of as a scandal.⁵ "Could we have seen depicted," says Jewett, "the inner life of this brilliant period of the Republic, we should have turned away from the sight with loathing and detestation."⁶ People flocked from all parts of the Empire to the Imperial City for speculation, for intrigue, for accomplishment in crime.⁷ Debauchery of every sort became so systematic and aggravated that it found its professors, who earned a livelihood by serving as instructors of the youth of quality in the theory and practice of crime.⁸ Nowhere was life less secure than in the capital, where murder was followed as a profession by trained bands.⁹ Women from aristocratic families exercised the art of lewd dancing;¹⁰ and "it came to pass that ladies of high birth had themselves enrolled in the police register of common prostitutes, in order that they might abandon themselves entirely to the most wanton excesses."¹¹ Poverty alone was considered a disgrace, for many women of the first social standing surrendered their persons, and the highest officials their influence; whilst perjury was so universal that a false oath was called "the plaster of debts."¹²

This was Rome morally in the noonday splendor of her art, her poetry, her oratory, her aggrandizement, her civil power. Meanwhile Rome and the provincial cities everywhere were full of temples and shrines, to which thousands flocked daily to perform their vows and sacrifices.

With this picture contrast the moral condition of the Jews.

¹ De Quincey's *The Cæsars*, pp. 86, 87.

² Uhlhorn's *Conflict of Christianity with Heathendom*, p. 96.

³ Gibbon's *Decline*, etc., p. 601.

⁴ Uhlhorn, quoting Seneca, p. 95.

⁵ Mommsen, vol. v. p. 618.

⁶ *Epistle of St. Paul*.

⁷ Mommsen, vol. iv. p. 596.

⁸ Mommsen, vol. iv. p. 614.

⁹ Mommsen, vol. iv. p. 599.

¹⁰ Mommsen, vol. iv. p. 618.

¹¹ Uhlhorn, vol. iv. p. 101.

¹² Mommsen, vol. iv. p. 616.

They had, indeed, an advantage in being the chosen channel for receiving, preserving, and imparting to other nations of antiquity that pure and unclouded conception of God which the whole heathen world had lost. The central fact of that conception was the holy character of God, and man's obligation to a realization of it in his own life and experience. "Ye shall be holy; for I, the Lord your God, am holy."¹ On this was built the moral and religious character of the Jews. Often, indeed, there were departures from the true ways of Jehovah, as their long history from Moses to Christ abundantly shows, but at no period in that history was there such a total fall into the gross errors of life as those which distinguished the cultured² nations around them.

Now, whilst the primacy of the Jews must always be kept in view in any consideration of their moral and religious condition, it will hardly be disputed that their pure and lofty conception of God, and the means by which it was constantly pressed upon their attention, were powerful agencies in preserving them in a pure moral life, and of exempting them from the debasement and immoralities which characterized the most cultivated peoples of antiquity. The Sabbath was conspicuous. On that day of universal rest from the ordinary pursuits of life, with the impressive services of the tabernacle, increased on the Sabbath and rendered more impressive by that fact, the Chosen People were profoundly penetrated with a sense of the character of God and their obligation of loyalty to him. Under such usage and discipline, with a consciousness of their responsibility to God, there would naturally be developed a religious strength of life and character that would not readily yield to temptations which swept other peoples, who were without such means of spiritual and religious culture, into the vortex of moral debasement, such as disfigure life in the most refined eras of Greek and Roman society.

Aside from their moral and religious supremacy, the Jews were less generally distinguished for advancement in civilization than the great historic nations of antiquity. The literature of the Chosen People, found mainly in the Bible, is not especially noteworthy for artistic excellence of composition. The most conspicuous display of Jewish achievement in art and architecture was Solomon's Temple, which, however, was the work, at least in part, of foreign genius and skill.³ Nothing has come down from them, either in science or in philosophy, which will bear comparison with Greek or

¹ Lev. xi. 45.

² This term is used to indicate their civilizations.

³ 2 Chron. ii. 14.

Roman attainments in these studies. Moses was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," an eminence, however, which was probably entirely exceptional; whilst the "schools of the prophets" were not seats of general culture, but in them the law and its interpretation, combined with music and poetry, were the main subjects of study. Moral development was the pronounced feature of Jewish history. In commercial dealings strict rules of morality were laid down, and just weights and balances were carefully enjoined.¹ Humaneness was a conspicuous characteristic of their civilization; kindness and justice to the poor, to the widow, and to orphans were most positively commanded;² and even their domestic animals were regarded with tender care, and shared in the rest and provision of the Sabbath.³

Here is a civilization sharply distinguished from those of contemporaneous development, with results of a marked and unique character, with elements and forces largely diverse from those of any other social order, and raises the question of moral forces in the progress of civilization.

The bold proposition has been laid down that the progress of society is owing chiefly to intellectual forces, and very little, if at all, to moral forces. Moral forces, it is claimed, are stationary, unprogressive; intellectual forces are active and changeable. The achievements of the intellect are carefully treasured up and transmitted from generation to generation, whilst the results of moral forces are less easily transmissible. The ideas and dogmas of moral systems have undergone little change. "The system of morals propounded in the New Testament contained no maxim which had not previously been enunciated."⁴

There are two things in regard to the influence of moral and religious ideas, one of which this position entirely overlooks, the other it denies. First, no account seems to be made of the fact that the Christian religion is a force, not of ordinary moral education, but of creative spiritual energy. It acts independently often of mental culture, upon man's most central nature, his will and affections, and gives new direction and impulse to these, so that moral results are secured which otherwise could not be secured by all the agencies of mere intellectual culture known to society. Secondly, the denial that moral ideas or forces are transmissible

¹ Dent. xxv. 13-16; Lev. xix. 35, 36.

² Ex. xxii. 21-23.

³ Ex. xx. 10.

⁴ Buckle's *History of Civilization*, vol. i., p. 129, note.

may be true in one sense. It is not held that the good transmit their moral traits in any such sense that their descendants come into possession of these traits by virtue of their ancestors' religious status. But it is claimed, or the doctrine of heredity must be entirely abandoned in all its phases, that the moral goodness which belongs to one generation forms the basis, by whatever law of relationship, for its more easy reappearance in the next, so that religion, as far as it has made itself felt in the lives of men in one generation, will transmit a residuary moral momentum to the generation succeeding. This subtle and occult force, together with the new creative power of Christianity, has done more for the advancement of society since the Christian era began than all other forces combined.

Unfortunate for such depreciation of religion, as an efficient factor in the development of modern society, is the incontestable fact of the difference between the civilizations of antiquity and that of the Christian era. This difference is not one merely of stages in a development in which the forces at work act under diverse conditions, but is one subject to an entirely new force, unknown to the civilizations of pre-Christian times, so that it certainly cannot be claimed as chiefly due to more efficient intellectual causes.

Notwithstanding the bold and unfounded denial that Christianity has added anything new in morals to what was known previous to its advent, society to-day is powerfully impressed and affected with moral and social ideas which the Christian religion alone gave birth to. The higher and nobler position of woman; the enlarged doctrine of brotherly love, new even to Jewish thought; the essential equality of all men; the larger and deeper charity of the Christian world, broadening and deepening as the Christian ages roll on; and the fuller realization of the divine idea in man, — are forces of civilization which were entirely unknown to antiquity, and which distinguish modern from ancient society.

The proposition will not bear scrutiny, in the light of Greek and Roman civilization, that the superiority of modern society is due chiefly to intellectual forces, or to their greater efficiency. No age has ever surpassed that of Pericles and Augustus in culture and refinement. Two thousand years have rolled on, and nothing has yet been produced more perfect and beautiful than the literary works of those periods. Homer, Plato, Euripides bravely hold their place in our halls of learning against all comers; Virgil, Cicero, Cæsar betray no diminution of lustre in com-

parison with the best intellectual products of modern times, and seem in no danger of being displaced by them. It is not these transmitted intellectual treasures of a remote age which have produced the civilization of the nineteenth century. They failed two thousand years ago, in the peninsulas of Greece and Italy, to give healthful moral tone and life to society. They are equally impotent now. Is it put in plea that education then was exceptional, now universal? Technically, the masses of Greece and Rome were not educated in the modern sense of the term; but dispute aside, a people cannot justly be said to be ignorant and intellectually stolid, who thronged the theatres to applaud Æschylus and Sophocles, and who listened with keen appreciation to Demosthenes and Cicero when they delivered their most famous speeches. It may be doubted whether even in boastful America, with her schoolhouses scattered thick as autumn leaves, King Lear or Othello would not be forced from the stage at the end of a week, or at most a fortnight.¹

The improvement of modern society must be sought in other than in intellectual conditions chiefly. The improvement is in the main moral, and the causes are to that extent moral. Foremost amongst these is the Sabbath as the indispensable organ of religion, through which it speaks, and by which it is maintained as a social power. Paley pleads eloquently for the day as a civilizing factor in society. The duty of maintaining it is imposed on all who are friends of human wellbeing. Especially is the happiness and civilization of the laboring classes, which constitute so large a majority of the people, promoted by Sabbatical institutions.² In a similar vein Addison also has recorded his appreciation of the great worth of the day as a social force in the betterment of the masses. In describing a country Sabbath he speaks of his pleasure at such a day, and thinks, if the observance of the Sabbath were only a human contrivance, "it would be the best method that could be thought of for the polishing and the civilizing of mankind." Without such a stimulus and uplifting agency, the common people would soon degenerate into savage and barbarous life. The frequent return of stated times when villages and

¹ As a hint of general culture amongst the Athenians, it is related that when Demosthenes, as a rhetorical fetch, pronounced purposely the Greek word *hireling* with improper accent, the whole audience broke forth in correction.

² *Moral and Political Philosophy*, book v., chap. vi.

neighborhoods meet together in their best faces, and in their cleanest habits, to exchange words and thoughts and kindnesses, to hear their duties explained, and to join in the worship of the Supreme Being, are accounted forces of vast moment in the right social life of the masses.¹

The subordinate classes possess an advantage in the Sabbath exclusive of its religious advantages. Indeed, the form of civilization which is most to be desired and aimed at, is one that secures the advancement of the great body of the people. The Sabbath as an economic arrangement might perhaps be dispensed with in regard to the leisurely classes; and even as a religious arrangement it might not be absolutely necessary under some conditions of life; but in order that the requirements of mankind at large may be most completely satisfied, the day is indispensable in both respects. Its observance merely as a means of imparting instruction is a prolific force in civilization. Remembering the wonderful power of the rostrum and the theatre in Greece and Rome in advancing their populations in civil life, in intellectual activity, in those refinements and courtesies which are born of social intercourse, is it a matter of surprise that the Sabbath should have exerted a similar power in the destinies of modern social life? or that such would be the estimation of it by the great students of social economy? "The keeping one day in seven holy as a time of relaxation and refinement, as well as of public worship, is of admirable service to a state considered merely as a civil institution."²

Its influence on the stability of nations and on the order and tranquillity of society is very marked. These are powerfully promoted by the contentment and happiness of a people. A spirit of moroseness was observed in the lower orders of France during the period when the Sabbath was suspended. A people who are doomed to unremitting toil, and denied those means of improvement and recreation to which they are entitled, which their instincts crave, which are so essential to their wellbeing, and which the Sabbath so admirably provides, would cherish only feelings of resentment toward those whom they might happen to hold responsible for such a burdensome condition of things. No Christian state with wise regard to its own wellbeing would willingly disregard the reasonable cravings of its people, and engender in them a moody and discontented spirit, by refusing them the enjoyments

¹ *The Spectator*, Essay on Roger de Coverley.

² Blackstone, vol. 4, ch. 4.

and reliefs of the Sabbath. And the care with which modern nations have cherished the day may be regarded as an indication of its worth in the estimation of rulers, as a promoter of order, civil advancement, and social happiness. A more thoughtful consideration of capital for the large numbers whom it forces into its service on the Sabbath, to which they are entitled by the law of God and by the necessities of their nature, may yet be found to be a wise step in averting an impending conflict. The stability and order of society rest largely upon the contentment of the masses, and their sense of fair treatment.

If now to these physical ministrations of the day be added the massing of the great majority of the people for religious service, when men of every rank and station in society meet upon a common level, in the consciousness of common wants, with an awakened sense of a common destiny, *this* in itself is a factor of vast magnitude in its relation to the moral and social progress of communities. A day of rest once a week, when the thoughts of all classes are withdrawn from the depressing demands of life, even if only for an hour of the public religious service, and turned into new, inviting, and elevating channels, is a force in human advancement which was entirely unknown to ancient society, and the want of which in connection with a pure and elevating religious faith made Greek and Roman civilization such conspicuous failures in noble moral fruitage. It may not be a presumptuous conjecture that God suffered these wonderful civilizations to culminate in their greatest splendor and brilliancy, as a historic illustration of the utter incompetency of mere intellectual and artistic culture, social and refined tastes, to elevate a people in moral life and purity.

Mr. Spencer has pointed out that when society is developed to an extreme through the intellect, it loses the power of reproduction.¹ Our intense educational ambition, with its peculiar high-pressure methods, is producing a type of men and women of unusual nerve-activity, but which is deficient in physical stamina. A gentleman on examination at one of our higher grades of schools was asked by the head-master, as the school was assembled for morning devotions, how it looked to him. The reply was that the school looked jaded and physically exhausted. Amongst the three hundred pupils there was hardly a score of fresh-skinned and ruddy faces, — many fine heads on slender bodies, with flat, con-

¹ *Biology*, vol. 2, pt. iv., chaps. 12 and 13.

tracted chests, which showed too painfully that the development and stimulus of mind had been going on through several generations at excessive cost of physical strength.

Such a civilization may have attractions for its apparently refined and spiritual aspect, but of real and permanent worth it is totally deficient for the battle of life. When the race is developed in the line of education, until it becomes brain and nerve chiefly, it will be in danger of extinction from physical exhaustion, — an intellectual extension will take place, until the physical basis of life becomes too weak for self-support, and a social collapse will occur, as now in individual cases the family collapses and becomes extinct, too feeble to reproduce itself.

A result equally undesirable, if not so disastrous, would occur if man were developed exclusively through his physical nature. He would be little more than an animal, with low grade of intellect, such as he is found in his wild and savage state. Nor would the result be much more hopeful if it were possible to develop him chiefly in the line of his religious nature. Society would become either a mass of degraded superstitionists, or religious monomaniacs and enthusiasts, moral dreamers and ecstasies like frenzied Mohammedan dervishes.

The striking fact of history is the instability of nations and of society, empires and civilizations rising and falling like the waves of the sea. Professor Seeley remarks : " There was once a Greater Spain, a Greater Portugal, a Greater Holland, a Greater France, but from various causes these empires have either perished or have become insignificant." ¹ This fact is paralleled in all the great empires of antiquity. They rose to magnificent proportions, and then either collapsed or passed into infirm states.

Are we to expect greater stability and permanency in the future than in the past? If the positive force in these decays of empires and civilizations was chiefly physical extension and progress, and the negative force a want of moral power to avert such destructive development, the physical and economic basis of the Sabbath is yet to play a more important part in future society than even the most thoughtful publicist or philanthropist has allowed. There is now, and has been for a generation past, especially true of our country, a headlong precipitancy of energy and activity going on, which is fast exhausting men's physical strength, and which is comparatively little influenced by the nominal observ-

¹ *Extension of England.*

ance of the Sabbath as a rest-time. The breach of the day by the demands of business, and the increased denial of rest to multitudes of toilers who have no control over their time except at the loss of place often, and the voluntary foregoing of rest every seventh day of multitudes more who are goaded on by insatiable greed or devouring ambition, should remind us of the plunges into which other forms of society were precipitated through physical exhaustion. The economic law of the Sabbath cannot be disregarded in its relation to the permanency of civilization. But admitting the rest as a necessary factor to the highest type of permanent social order, we must add to this the moral purposes of the Sabbath, without which civilization would still lose its chief conserving power and source of stability. In this view of the case the Sabbath is not merely a convenient and happy device for our pleasure, but an institution of the highest necessity for our attainment to the best social life and for its perpetuation.

The wonderful stability of Chinese civilization, continuing through an almost fabulous age, may seem, at first view, to furnish an exception to the general fact noted. But the exception is more apparent than real. 1. Although the early history of China is marked by many external and internal wars, with changes of dynasties, and even revolutions, the national life was not poured out through these channels with such a fierce and intense spirit as that of Egypt and Assyria was. 2. "The reason," says Dr. Elkins of Peking, "why the Chinese remain so much what they have been, is to be looked for in national character and seclusion." 3. Their progress has been slow and unenergetic, with a minimum of physical exhaustion. Indeed, the waste attending their progress may be likened to life in a state of repose. The maxim of Confucius — "Walk in the trodden paths" — sums up her social development. Consequently, the history of China presents a case of the realization of extreme stability, because the national forces have not gone out in any one direction so violently as to exhaust the social fabric.

And one fact in her history may be noted as at least suggestive. No people have been more thoroughly educated in, and none have more religiously obeyed the precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee."

The best and most stable forms of society are those which realize in the fullest degree the progress of man in his total nature. They are essentially Christian, since the aim of Christianity is

the deliverance of man from an abnormal state. All the changes of civilization, whether by silent forces or through the violent throes of revolution, are instinctive endeavors of society to readjust itself to new conditions. When man's whole nature is symmetrically trained, and his legitimate wants amply provided for, ideal society will be inaugurated. Man will be perfect. This is the goal at which Christian civilization is aiming. All progress, through his physical and intellectual natures alone, must in the end be only a partial success. The ages are full of social catastrophes on this account. The training of body and mind must be supplemented by religious training, pure, spiritual, living, as the needed factor in the rescue and protection of man. Christianity in what it has already done, imperfect as these results may seem in our limited view of their character, has given a hopeful pledge of its vaster and nobler achievements. Its fruitage to-day is fuller and sweeter and mellowed. The light which it sheds is stronger. Its truths, breaking the bounds of traditional and technical limitations, are gaining a firmer hold in men's deeper thoughts, and working itself out in more perfect forms of civil and social progress. As in multitudes of individual cases it has reached perfect realization, or nearly so, so in the ongoing ages it will mould masses of men into its own beautiful and divine image, until ideal society is realized as its normal goal, — *the New Jerusalem come down out of heaven.*

This faith, however, is yet far from realization even in the best Christian thought, a striking illustration of which is seen in the confidence and zeal with which, in some quarters, intellectual training is championed as a safety against the evils of society. Perhaps the corruptions and vices which are thrusting themselves upon public attention, at which men stand appalled, have led reflecting persons to ask, What can be done to check and correct these fearful threatenings? And, strangely enough, in their deep anxiety to provide a remedy for these evils, they have seized upon education as the way of escape. Education, it is said, will give a pure and reputable civil service. Education will transform the mass of ignorant and vicious voters into honest and safe custodians of our civil heritage. Alas! that we are blind to the fact that culture does not stop the stream of defaulters, or lessen the number of criminals, often conspicuous for their social and educational standing. Do not the trained classes contribute their full percentum, according to their numbers, to the list of lawbreakers?

If not in the lower and grosser forms of crime, yet surely in those of subtler character, and for this reason more dangerous to the safety and purity of society. Indeed, open assaults upon social order are less to be feared than those secret forces of evil which, under the garb of refinement and culture, are eating at the vitals of virtue, and blunting the edge of conscience. Alas! that we do not see, with all our assumed light, that our distresses do not spring from lack of knowledge, but from lack of virtue. Alas! that even Christian thinkers should be blind to the truth which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, — that the knowledge of sensible things cannot give us a knowledge of the absolutely good and true.¹

Even Mr. Spencer, speaking of the forces which are to contribute to the further evolution and higher life of man, puts the moral force as most likely the largest. "Right conduct is usually come short of more from defect of will than defect of knowledge."²

The difficulty with the world is not ignorance, but sin. Not the six days' school of the week is going to save a nation from the perils that environ its social life,³ but the renovating, purifying truths of the Gospel, taught a people upon God's day which He blessed and sanctified. All human devices which spring from imperfect human nature must be a failure. They have been tried, as has been seen, on the most magnificent scale. Greece and Rome were resplendent with a richness and profusion of art and culture, never repeated in the history of the world, at the very moment when their educated and ruling classes were debauched by the most shocking immoralities and corruptions. If mankind is to be made better in the advancing ages, to be purified and lifted up in its moral life, to be put in possession once again of the divine image lost in Eden, *these* must come through a religion having the power to recreate in man a new spirit and a moral purpose.

Meantime, in the process of history, spiritual forces are shaping Christian nations to a fuller realization of moral order and the consummation of ideal society. Christian or ideal society is the goal of history. The kingdom of God in earth is the realization of society in moral purpose and righteousness. And in that work, it may be safely claimed, the Sabbath will have an increasingly conspicuous and glorious part. Its prime importance as a neces-

¹ *Phaedo*, "Republic."

² *Biology*, vol. ii. p. 495.

³ The Blair Educational bill has underlying it this fallacy.

sary factor will be more profoundly appreciated, and the Christian consciousness will demand its rightful place in the play of forces in the realization of the kingdom of God in earth.¹

J. Q. Bittinger.

HAVERHILL, N. H.

¹ "The process of history is a development in the realization of the moral order of the world. . . . The nation is not of itself a righteous power, but the realization of its being through its vocation in a moral order is in righteousness; not only the law of its being, but the condition of the realization of its being, is in righteousness. In its necessary being it moves toward this end."
— Mulford, *The Nation*, p. 355.

EDITORIAL.

TENNYSON'S SPIRITUAL SERVICE TO HIS GENERATION.

TENNYSON's eightieth birthday, which came last month, has called out many appreciative words regarding his poetry. These find their appropriateness in the fact that, although not addressed to the aged poet, they are spoken as it were in his presence, and audible to him so far as it pleases him to have them so. This makes them an informal acknowledgment of moral help and intellectual pleasure received from the work of the long career now closing. Each sincere and hearty word may be regarded as expressing in some true sense the feeling of many of Tennyson's readers, and to reveal the personal relation in which they stand towards the poet who has touched their life with the fire of his own. "He gave the people of his best," is his own account of the work he was called to do. It is for the people to say before he leaves them, that they appreciate the gift.

We wish to take such part in this pleasant service of acknowledgment as belongs to us, and believe that we speak for many of our readers when we express our sense of the value of Tennyson's work in one of its functions, in our view its highest one, its enlarging and quickening influence upon the spiritual life of his generation.

Every true poet does a spiritual work of some sort and is a benefactor in doing it. The kindled imagination, the clearer perception of ends higher than carnal ones, the more vivid sense of an ideal world which poetry always gives those who feel its influence, make the spirit richer. But poetry has nobler benefits than these to confer. It can lend itself to moral forces, and so become a factor in the renovation and perfection of character. It can do this by vividly presenting moral and spiritual truth to the imagination, thus teaching by object-lesson the beauty and the controlling power of goodness. The greatest poetry has thus taught religion and morals. God's being and the moral order seem more real to men since Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton have written. Right motives have more power in the world than if the *Inferno*, *Macbeth*, and *Paradise Lost* had not been.

Poetry may also help moral forces (unless the poet's gift be the dramatic one and that of the supreme order) by the poet's sympathy with and rapt utterance of the highest ethical truths. It is true that his work and that of the preacher are distinct. Poetry is more than the inculcation of religion and morals in glowing verse. The Hebrew prophets may perhaps be called great poets. But it is not as prophets that they are called so. A prosaic mind *might* prophesy. Poetry is art. Its immediate end is not persuasion but representation.

The poet professes, not to persuade men to do or to be something, but to help them see something. He puts his story into music to remind those

who read it that it addresses, not the executive faculties with which men earn their bread, but the imagination. Nevertheless the story which he tells may contain ethical facts, and he may show in telling it such sympathy with goodness as shall make it seem winsome. Milton's "Comus," for example, is exquisite poetry, and poetry aglow with moral feeling. The delight which a healthy mind feels in its imaginative beauty must be accompanied with sympathy with the moral feeling it breathes. The Spirit's closing words —

"Mortals, that would follow me,
Love virtue ; she alone is free ;
She can teach you how to climb
Higher than the sphery chime ;
Or, if virtue feeble were,
Heav'n itself would stoop to her,"

are perceived to be the noblest truth in being recognized as the highest poetry.

Tennyson is entitled to a place among those poets whose work is directly linked with moral and spiritual forces. His imagination is like Spenser's in its elevation and purity, although, of course, not comparable in wealth and force to that of the "poet's poet." Its home is among spiritual things. Its congenial task is that of clothing truth and beauty with shining form. When its artistic purpose requires it to set forth wickedness, it gives it its proper blackness. The "Idylls of the King" is an exquisite work of art, and it is also a high moral achievement. King Arthur's purity and tenderness set off against the foil of Guinevere's sin is a contribution to English manhood as well as to English literature. We do not say that Tennyson takes a higher rank among poets from the fact that his genius allies itself so readily to ethical truth. It is perhaps true that a greater imagination obeying a more earthly spirit would write greater poetry than his. It is certainly true that Tennyson's genius has, because of its moral elevation, served ends higher than those of art, high as these are, and that this nobler usefulness does not lessen at all its artistic value.

We have to point out another and yet more valuable spiritual service which a poet may render to his age, and to give our reason for thinking that this, too, has been given by the English Laureate. The poet may help the spiritual life of his time by giving expression to its truest thought and its deepest feeling. He may feel in his heart that truth which God has given it to express, he may live in it and by it until it fully possesses him, and demands expression. Then he may let it command his poetic faculty for its fit utterance, and so give it, clothed in artistic beauty, to the world. So he will interpret to the best life of his time the movement of God's Spirit in it. He will help it come more quickly and fully into the lesson which this movement gives, and do better the work for which the divine teaching is a preparation. If an age has a

poet doing this work for it, some of his words will link themselves to its questioning as though expressing its perplexity and yearning, and others of them will seem to announce its spiritual discoveries, and to carry, too, the joy those discoveries brought. We think that Tennyson did this service to his generation in his "In Memoriam." This is of all his poems that which has most deeply impressed the English and American mind. Competent observers of contemporaneous intellectual life believe that it did more than any of them to make him famous. Mr. Gladstone said in the "Quarterly Review" in 1859: "By the time 'In Memoriam' had sunk into the public mind, Mr. Tennyson had taken his rank as our then first living poet." Another writer said in the same Review in 1884: "There is no question that Lord Tennyson first earned his great fame by his 'In Memoriam.'"

It cannot be justly said that the poet's subsequent works have added nothing to his fame, for they have illustrated other phases of his genius and so enlarged the public conception of it. But it is certain that none of them, not even the "Idylls of the King," has been as warmly received as was "In Memoriam." Nor has any penetrated the mind of our time so deeply. A sufficient proof of this may be found in the comparative number of extracts from it in any good dictionary of quotations, and especially in the character of these extracts. They greatly outnumber those from any other poem, and have a still greater superiority in weight. The thoughts which the poet has put into the mind of his time are chiefly found here.

These quotations remind us that it was by its thought that "In Memoriam" won the poet's renown. His gifts had been fully revealed in his earlier works. "Dora," "Locksley Hall," "The Dream of Fair Women," "The Death of King Arthur," "The Princess," are worthy of him. The melody of his verse, his power to see and show the beauty and suggestiveness of nature, his lyric emotion, his historic imagination, are all adequately represented in them. One would not be very rash in saying that some of these poems are more perfect art and more likely to be read in the next century than "In Memoriam." Evidently the greater fame of the latter is due to the greater interest its content had for the mind of the time. We find it explained in these words, which Frederick Robertson (a critic rarely competent to say what literature touched the better thought of his day) wrote about it soon after it appeared: "It is the most precious work published this century — written in memory of his friend Arthur Hallam, and exhibiting the manifold phases through which the spirit passes, of rebellion, darkness, doubt, through the awful questions about personal identity hereafter, reunion, and the uncertainty whether Love be indeed the law of the universe, on to placid trust, even cheerfulness, and the deep conviction — all is well. . . . To me it has been the richest treasure I have ever had."

Plainly it was the meaning of the poem which gave it its surpassing

power. Men read it and loved it, because it met a deep spiritual want. To see how it did this we must see the underlying truth which the poem expresses. Its teachings blend in the declaration that the heart of man finds a revelation of God in its deepest experiences. The poet's great sorrow is lifted out of egotism by being set forth in its larger aspects. His intellectual force and artistic skill unite in making all those experiences of pain and doubt and conflict which he presents seem to be not so much revelations of what came to him, as, to use Robertson's words, "phases through which the spirit passes." It is the very voice of human sorrow which says, —

"That loss is common would not make
My own less bitter, rather more :
Too common ! Never morning wore
To evening, but some heart did break."

Trust struggling with the doubt which sorrow brings finds expression in the familiar words, —

"I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope."

Faith purified and strengthened by sorrow finds expression in the prayer, —

"O living will that shall endure
When all that seems shall suffer shock,
Rise in the spiritual rock,
Flow through our deeds and make them pure,

"That we may lift from out the dust
A voice as unto him that hears,
A cry above the conquered years
To one that with us works, and trust,

"With faith that comes of self-control,
The truths that never can be proved
Until we close with all we loved,
And all we flow from, soul in soul."

A prominent feature of the experience thus delineated is the consciousness it awakes in the soul of its own dignity, and a yearning for assurance that life is ordered to match that consciousness. Love is a mockery, if it be a thing of to-day. It promises immortality every moment of its life, and if immortality be a dream its life is one long lie. A world so made as to vindicate the right of love in its nobler forms to be and to rule is a world shaped by goodness for ends whose worthiness a future life will reveal. So when love is broken, the soul must ask what life is and whether there be a God. If its question be such as an unselfish affection begets, a love that found and chiefly cared for goodness in

that which is lost, it will find God answering it. Sooner or later the conviction will come that the soul's conscious greatness was God's declaration that it was made for immortality. The deep sorrow which caused it to ask after God will appear to have been the earthquake and the storm, preceding and predicting God's own voice in the soul. This deeper phase of the experience which bereavement begets has its due place in the representation given in the "In Memoriam." We are made to feel always that the great grief endured is teaching the soul to find itself and God. At the beginning of the sorrow comes the question, —

"Who shall so forecast the years
Or find in loss a gain to match?
Or reach a hand through time to catch
The far-off interest of tears."

When the first numbness of grief has passed, the craving for immortality and permanence of love awakens.

"My own dim life should teach me this,
That life shall live forevermore,
Else earth is darkness at the core,
And dust and ashes all that is.

"What then were God to such as I?
'T were hardly worth my while to choose
Of things all mortal, or to use
A little patience ere I die."

The distressing doubt of a future life speaks in the passionate words:

"No more? A monster then, a dream,
A discord. Dragons of the prime,
That tare each other in their slime,
Were mellow music matched with him."

The moral strength which belief in the friend's immortality of friendship gives, —

"I count it crime
To mourn for any over much;
I the divided half of such
A friendship as had mastered Time;

"Which masters Time indeed, and is
Eternal, separate from fears."

At last the deep sense of God's presence in the heart, forever banishing the doubt begotten of sorrow, —

"A warmth within the breast would melt
The freezing reason's colder part,
And like a man in wrath the heart
Stood up and answered, I have felt.

"No, like a child in doubt and fear:
But that blind clamor made me wise;

Then was I as a child that cries,
But, crying, knows his father near."

And growing out of this new faith in God the peaceful trust that love rules all. I —

"hear at times a sentinel
Who moves about from place to place,
And whispers to the worlds of space,
In the deep night, that all is well."

So the poet shows us the soul awakened by sorrow to hear God's voice in its heart, and to know itself immortal. The burden of the poem is that the heart of man receives a personal disclosure of the divine life. Its especial power over the mind of the time is due to the inherent attractiveness of this truth. Men have found the conviction into which life was leading them expressed in it, with noble beauty. So they have pondered it, until the music of its verse became the music of their faith. They have given its author a better tribute than praise — the gratitude and reverence due to one both poet and prophet.

THE EPISCOPAL HYMNAL REVISED.

THE hymns of the churches in England and America are the strongest bond of Christian union. This could not have been said fifty years ago, when metrical versions of the Psalms and a few stilted hymns constituted the staple of material for singing in public worship. Now half the hymns which are favorites in any denomination are familiar in all the great communions, and there is general agreement in the adoption of new hymns for devotional uses. The appearance of every new hymnal is interesting, because it indicates some of the lines of this most important development. The appearance of a hymnal for use in the Episcopal Church is especially interesting, because worship occupies so prominent a place in its public services, and because that Church is conservative in respect to all proposed changes. The General Convention of 1886 appointed a committee to report what changes are to be desired in the Hymnal. This committee has presented a preliminary report in the shape of a pamphlet containing 688 hymns, which they have agreed to present for consideration. It is not unlikely, as they themselves intimate, that, in the light of discussion, the final report to the Convention will exclude some of these hymns and restore others which have been omitted; but such modifications will probably be slight. It is not our purpose to make a critical examination of this collection, but only to consider it as an indication of the development of hymnology which is going on in all the churches.

A very significant fact is the omission of 320 of the 532 hymns in the collection adopted only fifteen years ago. Either the judgment of the committee and convention of 1874 was greatly at fault, or a rapid change

has been going on in this respect. And nearly all of these omitted hymns are now universally disused. A few are favorites, and will doubtless be retained in the final report; such as, —

“A mountain fastness is our God.”
 “Arm these thy soldiers, mighty Lord.”
 “By cool Siloam’s shady rill.”
 “Calm on the listening ear of night.”
 “Christian, dost thou see them?”
 “Hark, hark, my soul, angelic songs are swelling.”
 “How firm a foundation.”
 “It came upon the midnight clear.”
 “Jesus, I my cross have taken.”
 “Look ye, saints, the sight is glorious.”
 “My God, how wonderful thou art.”
 “Ye Christian heralds go proclaim.”
 “From every stormy wind that blows.”
 “My God, permit me not to be.”
 “The Lord my pasture shall prepare.”

And yet it is not likely that there will be any desire to retain more than 75 of the 320 hymns which have been omitted. That is to say, by general consent, nearly if not quite half of the hymnal of 1874 has become useless. It may be that some of the hymns which are now unhesitatingly rejected were retained only doubtfully in 1874, and were passing out of use even then, but this cannot have been true of the great majority of them. Examples of rejections about which there will be no disagreement are: —

“Ah, not like erring man is God.”
 “As o’er the past my memory strays.”
 “Be still my heart, these anxious cares.”
 “Great God, this sacred day of thine.”
 “Hasten sinner to be wise.”
 “High on the bending willows hung.”
 “How oft, alas! this wretched heart.”
 “I ’ll wash my hands in innocence.”
 “Oh, where shall rest be found.”
 “Peace, troubled soul whose plaintive moan.”
 “This life’s a dream, an empty show.”

The most numerous omissions are paraphrases of psalms and hymns of Isaac Watts. What may be called theological hymns are felt to be unsuitable to public worship, and have been omitted. A single example may suffice: —

“Ah, not like erring man is God
 That men to answer him should dare;
 Condemned, and into silence awed,
 They helpless stand before his bar.
 “There must a Mediator plead,
 Who, God and man, may both embrace;

With God for man to intercede,
And offer man the purchased grace.

"And lo! the Son of God is slain
To be this Mediator crowned;
In him, my soul, be cleansed from stain,
In him thy righteousness be found."

For the same reason, probably, the hymn beginning "There is a fountain filled with blood" is omitted. It has a mixed figure; but so has "Rock of Ages," which is retained. Hymns of exhortation and instruction are greatly reduced in number. None remain which are addressed to sinners and to Christians. Some calls to worship are retained, as, —

"Come, my soul, thou must be waking."
"Come pure hearts in sweetest measures."
"Oh, bless the Lord my soul."
"Oh worship the King."
"Soldiers of Christ, arise."

So far, then, as the omissions of this trial-hymnal indicate the direction of devotional culture, it appears that hymns destitute of poetry are no longer regarded for the sake of the soundness of their theology or their familiarity with a former generation, that didactic and hortatory hymns are going out of use, and in general that hymns which may be called subjective are giving place to hymns of worship addressed to Father, Son, and Spirit, and to hymns of consecration to the kingdom of Christ. The compilers have not been entirely consistent in applying these tests, but the tendency is unmistakable. Thus, under the heading of "The Christian Life," where subjective hymns would be looked for, only 42 are included, nearly all of which are in the first rank, and to be found in the books of every denomination.

When the additions are examined the same tendencies are seen. Of the 688 hymns 368 are new, that is, are not found in the hymnal now in use. Some of these were not known in 1874. Many of them are already in use in English churches of all orders, and are found in recent American collections of hymns. Although some are of doubtful value, the greater part are a fine enrichment of worship, and will become indispensable. As many of them are not familiar in this country they would not be recognized by citation of the first lines, but a few are well enough known to be mentioned: —

"Angel voices ever singing."
"At even when the sun was set."
"Beneath the cross of Jesus."
"Brightly gleams our banner."
"Christ above all glory seated."
"Uplift the banner, let it float."
"Go forward, Christian soldier."
"God eternal, mighty King."

"He leadeth me, O blessed thought."
 "I lay my sins on Jesus."
 "I need thee precious Jesus."
 "I'm but a stranger here."
 "Jesus came; the heavens adoring."
 "Jesus, meek and gentle."
 "Light's abode, celestial Salem."
 "Lord of all being, throned afar."
 "Now the day is over."
 "Now the laborer's task is o'er."
 "O God the Rock of Ages."
 "O holy Saviour, friend unseen."
 "O Jesus, I have promised."
 "O Jesus King most wonderful."
 "O Love divine that stooped to share."
 "O Thou the contrite sinner's friend."
 "O very God of very God."
 "Oh, happy band of pilgrims."
 "Ten thousand times ten thousand."
 "The roseate hues of early dawn."
 "Thou art coming, O my Saviour."
 "Thou didst leave thy throne and thy kingly crown."
 "Welcome, happy morning."
 "Who are these like stars appearing."

The criticism is offered by the "Churchman" that the department of missions is "debilitated by a great body of verses that belong to the Moody and Sankey world, and that can only lower the tone of a sound religious experience, while excessively offensive to a healthy and well-bred literary culture." We have searched the book carefully to find these hymns, and have found only six that could be considered to belong to "camp-meeting and revivalistic effusions." They are as follows:—

"Call them in, the poor and wretched."
 "He leadeth me, O blessed thought."
 "I could not do without thee."
 "Lord, I hear of showers of blessing."
 "Thy life was given for me."
 "Work, for the night is coming."

Only two of these have the characteristic mark of so-called Moody and Sankey hymns, the refrain or chorus, namely, —

"He leadeth me, O blessed thought,"
 and —
 "Lord, I hear of showers of blessing."

A few hymns long familiar in American churches, but which are not found even in the hymnal of 1874, appear in the new collection. Such as:—

"Blow ye the trumpet, blow"

(an almost inexplicable restoration).

"Go labor on, spend and be spent."
 "God is love ; his mercy brightens."
 "Jesus, the very thought of thee."
 "Jesus, thou joy of loving hearts."
 "Prince of peace, control my will."
 "Stand up, stand up for Jesus."

Neither this hymnal nor its predecessor of 1874 contain certain fine hymns which are in common use both in England and America. Such as : —

"Come, O Creator, Spirit blest."
 "From the cross uplifted high."
 "Gently, Lord, O gently lead us."
 "Give to the winds thy fears."
 "I worship thee, sweet will of God."
 "If through unruffled seas."
 "Lord of every land and nation."
 "Majestic sweetness sits enthroned."
 "My dear Redeemer and my Lord."
 "Oh mean may seem this house of clay."
 "Oh where is he that trod the sea."
 "One there is above all others."
 "Soon may the last glad song arise."
 "Christian, dost thou see them."
 "Come, said Jesus' sacred voice."
 "Depth of mercy can there be."
 "Did Christ o'er sinners weep."
 "Fairest Lord Jesus."
 "Far down the ages now."
 "Hark the heaven's sweet melody."
 "O Bread to pilgrims given."
 "Oh where are kings and empires now."
 "Peace, perfect peace, in this dark world of sin."
 "Was there ever kindest Shepherd."

One object of the collection is to provide hymns suitable to the peculiar needs of the Episcopal Church. It therefore includes hymns in honor of the apostles and evangelists, which for the most part are little better than machine poetry, and sadly mar the general excellence of the book. Here is a stanza from the hymn for St. Matthew : —

"Lord, whose guiding finger ruled
 In the casting of the lot,
 That thy church might fill the throne
 Of the lost Iscariot ;
 In our trouble ever thus
 Stand, good Master, nigh to us."

Here are some of the lines to St. Mark : —

"The saint, who left his comrades,
 And turned back from the fight,

Behold at last victorious
In thy prevailing might.

"Thy love thy saint hath numbered
Among the blessed Four,
And all the world rejoiceth
To learn his gospel lore."

The tradition that John was banished to Patmos, which has scarcely any authority, is unhesitatingly adopted in the hymn beginning —

"An exile for the faith
Of his incarnate Lord."

Paul's missionary success is heralded in this startling doggerel : —

"To thee, O God, we Gentiles pay
Our thanks, on our Apostle's day ;
Whose doctrine, like the thunder, sounds
Throughout the wide world's farthest bounds.

"The Word's blest seed around he flings,
And straight a mighty harvest springs ;
And fruits of holy deeds supply
God's everlasting granary."

Of Andrew it is said, and perhaps can be sung : —

"From the Galilean waters
At thy word he follows thee,
Fisher's net and craft exchanging
For the Apostle's dignity !
Strengthened by thy Whitsun largess,
Armed with the Spirit's sword,
Forth he goes to preach the gospel,
Herald of the incarnate Word."

Doubtless the other well-known hymn to Andrew will usually be sung, beginning, —

"Jesus calls us, o'er the tumult
Of our life's wild, restless sea ;
Day by day his sweet voice soundeth,
Saying, 'Christian, follow me.'"

Not all the hymns to the saints are as wooden as those quoted above, but, as a whole, they are far below the level of the catholic hymns which make the body of the book.

As we remarked at the outset, it is not our purpose to make up a judgment on this trial-hymnal, but only to notice the indication it gives of the lines along which devotional culture is advancing. When that which is intended for denominational use is left out of sight, the remainder presents a noble collection of poetry which is well adapted to express sentiments of reverence, penitence, faith, adoration, and consecration. The progress made in the Episcopal Church since 1874 is all the more grati-

fying because the singing of hymns is a less important feature of public worship than in other denominations.

It is, we think, a mistake to print some of the hymns without the Amen. The omission is justified on the ground that the Amen should follow petitions and ascriptions of praise only. But the singing of every hymn is an act of worship, and congregations will be confused by lack of uniformity.

Several hymns are injured by substituting plural pronouns for singular. It is almost as bad to sing —

“Sweet the moments rich in blessing
Which before the cross *we* spend,”

as it would be to sing —

“When *we* survey the wondrous cross
On which the Prince of glory died.”

And in general an excessive freedom has been taken in departing from the original and accustomed form of many hymns.

We shall be pardoned the observation that “Hymns of the Faith,” compiled recently by two of our editorial board, contains about 300 of the hymns which are included in this collection, that is, one half of the number in each book are the same hymns. The other half of the Episcopal collection is largely made up of hymns for special and denominational use. The other half of “Hymns of the Faith” contains hymns of a catholic character, many of which deserve a place in the trial-hymnal of our Episcopal brethren. It is a pleasant coincidence that hymnals prepared independently of each other at about the same time should be so largely made up of the same hymns, and we mention the fact as a confirmation of the remark with which we began, that the hymns of the churches in England and America are the strongest bond of Christian union.

Since these comments were written a supplemental report has been made by the committee, restoring 21 hymns from the present hymnal and omitting 48 hymns which were included in the first report. Our prediction concerning restorations is verified in only three cases, viz. : —

“Calm on the listening ear of night.”
“It came upon the midnight clear.”
“My God, permit me not to be.”

The other restored hymns are of only ordinary merit.

The omissions will be generally justified, with the exception of some or all of the following : —

“Beneath the cross of Jesus.”
“Come, Lord, and tarry not.”
“Jerusalem on high.”
“God eternal, mighty King.”
“Praise to the holiest in the height.”

The hymn beginning,

“There is a fountain filled with blood”
is restored.

It was voted not to print “Amen,” which probably means that no distinction is to be made in this respect.

ORGANIZATION BY SELF-GOVERNING CHURCHES FOR MISSIONARY WORK.

THE two articles of faith which first attracted and absorbed the thought of Christian believers were the Person of Christ and the Church. It is natural and profoundly suggestive that when again the first of these doctrines becomes ascendant the other should also start into prominence.

We publish in this issue of the REVIEW two papers from men trained in denominations which have limited the conception of the organized and self-governing church to the local society of believers. Their contributions express a growing conviction that the doctrine of the church, as it has been practically apprehended in the communions to which we have referred, needs revision and expansion both on its theoretical and executive sides. It is not our custom to review editorially the opinions of our contributors. We do not propose to do so now. Yet because of our agreement with the main direction and contention of these papers, and because we would second their appeal in behalf of more efficient church organization for Christian work, we permit ourselves a few comments upon some of their statements which seem to us liable, if unqualified, to prejudice the issue which we all alike desire.

The penetrating criticism of Dr. Gould on the inability of Congregationalism to embrace in its conception of the church the social as well as the individual principle we accept as truer empirically than theoretically, and as only partially correct where it is best warranted. In principle Congregationalism is not Independency, nor has it in development, however serious its deficiencies, been oblivious of catholicity. Especially do we object to the statement that its idea of the church is that of “a purely voluntary association of men who think alike in regard to religious beliefs.” That there has been at times, and under certain conditions, a misuse of creeds, confusion of their different ends, violation of true church principles in their construction, we frankly acknowledge and deeply deplore. But the abuse is due to other causes than to a conception of the church which reduces it to the rank of a theological club. Our fathers sought for a pure church. Revolting from institutional holiness, they emphasized personal piety. The church is a fellowship of believers. Confession of faith is a revelation of faith, an outward sign helpful in determining who are believers. The idea that the church is a merely voluntary association of men who agree in religious belief was foreign to the thought of the early Congregationalists. The church was to them a

divine institution, even as to its particular form. Membership in it was a sacred obligation. The qualifications for admission were repentance and faith. The covenant was the formative act, not acceptance of a creed. The individualism of the movement was rooted in its conception of religion as personal, and of Christianity as vital faith, — a conception which is essential to a true doctrine of the church, and which should be controlling in all schemes of organization for Christian work.

That we may not appear to be giving a mere opinion, we would call attention to a few authorities.

The Cambridge Platform thus defines : —

"A congregational church is by the institution of Christ a part of the militant visible church, consisting of a company of saints by calling united into one body by an holy covenant, for the public worship of God, and the mutual edification one of another, in the fellowship of the Lord Jesus."

Following the logical method of the time, a church is further defined by its matter and form. The members are "saints," that is (1) believers who give evidence sufficient to "satisfy rational charity" of the reality of their faith, "the weakest measure" of which must be accepted, so that "the weakest Christian, if sincere, may not be excluded nor discouraged;" and (2) the children of such believers. The form of the church — that is, the principle and act by which it comes into distinct expression and being — is a voluntary agreement or covenant, explicit or implicit, "to meet constantly together in one congregation, for the public worship of God and their mutual edification." "All believers ought, as God giveth them opportunity thereunto, to endeavor to join themselves unto a particular church, and that in respect of the honor of Jesus Christ, in his example and institution," for the good of Christian fellowship, for protection and recovery, and for the perpetuation of the society. Evidently the authors of such statements thought of the church as a divine institution, universal in its claim upon all Christian people.

The Platform of 1865 follows the same lines. "A particular or local church is a definite and organized part of the Visible Church Catholic." It "consists of those who visibly belonging to Christ are separated from the ungodly world and united in a holy fellowship." Its matter and form are treated as in the earlier document. "It is not needful that the profession of repentance and faith should be always in the same form of words." "Neither Christ nor his apostles prescribed any form of words to be imposed on disciples or on churches for the confession of their faith." "However explicit the covenant may be, it can rightfully express nothing more than a mutual agreement to observe all Christ's laws and ordinances as one church of Christ." "No church has any rightful power to make itself other than simply a church of Christ, in which his mind, as made known in the Scriptures, shall be the only rule of faith and practice."

These are organic principles of Congregationalism. They exclude the

conception of the church as a mere voluntary association of men who may agree in religious thought.

Nor does Congregationalism, any more really than other Protestant communions, Lutheran or Reformed, organize "on the basis of a creed." It has creeds, as do all churches springing directly from the Reformation. It has, especially in one portion of its history, emphasized these creeds in the reception of church-members. We are not now defending this particular practice, but looking at principles. And from this point of view we deny that Congregationalism, any more than other evangelical denominations, or at all, makes a creed the foundation of a church. Each local society is a church of Christ. He is the one foundation, and not dogmatic formulas, even though Christ is their subject. Justification of this claim for Congregationalism is given in the citations from the Platforms already made. Church-members are those who "visibly belong to Christ," not those who simply think alike about Him. The creed question for Congregationalists in respect to church organization, as for all churches of the Reformation, arises in connection with the distinction between the church invisible and the church visible, and in determining the notes or signs of the latter. There is no difference in principle here between Congregationalists and the other communions to which allusion is made.

The stress of our contributor's criticism falls, therefore, on the refusal of Congregationalism to extend the conception of the visible and organized church beyond local societies. Here the Platforms come to his support. The Boston Platform (1865) says : —

"As the notion of a visibly organized and governed Catholic Church has no warrant from the Scriptures ; so the notion of a national church having jurisdiction over the particular churches in a nation is equally unwarranted. Under the gospel the visibly governed church is not ecumenical, nor national, nor provincial, nor diocesan, but only local or parochial, — a congregation of believers dwelling together in one city, town, or convenient neighborhood."

Unquestionably Congregationalism has thus far declined to call its churches a church with any implication of a government of the local societies by the whole body. Yet, no less beyond question has it, from the beginning, advanced the idea of a body of which local churches are members, and with reference to which all their duties are to be determined. The Cambridge Platform affirms that the communion of churches is *obligatory*, and it grounds the duty in their common relation to Christ as their "political Head." The language is worth quoting in full : —

"Although churches be distinct, and therefore may not be confounded one with another, and equal; and therefore have not dominion one over another, yet all the churches ought to preserve church communion one with another, because they are all united unto Christ, not only as a mystical, but as a political head, whence is derived a communion suitable thereunto."

The later Platform is equally clear in principle and more explicit in

statement. It recognizes a "*Visible Church Catholic*," though it denies "a visibly organized and governed Catholic Church." It says that "all the churches ought to preserve church communion one with another, because they are all united to Christ as integral parts of his one Catholic Church, Militant against the evil that is in the world, and Visible in the profession of the Christian faith, in the observance of the Christian sacraments, in the manifestation of the Christian life, and in the worship of the one God of our salvation, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." On the basis of this principle, — which, it should be observed, recognizes the whole body of believers, a visible, catholic church, and is constructive, — Congregationalism has developed a system of church councils and associations coextensive with county, state, and national lines.

Whether or not it shall call itself the Congregational Church of the United States, or of some other country, is a question of definition. It regards itself in its totality as a part of the one visible church of Christ. If the word church describes a communion of churches, Congregationalism can appropriate the term. If the word signifies a body invested with governing power, it cannot appropriate it, provided this governing power necessarily conflicts with local autonomy. It is, however, to say the least, an open question whether a representative government springing directly from self-governing churches is necessarily antagonistic to local autonomy. At present, however, by its traditions and customs, if not by its permanent principles, Congregationalism admits of no governmental unity of churches. Beyond the point of association in the local church it refuses to carry the notion of government. It does, however, as we have seen, most emphatically affirm the idea of union. It makes this an obligation and a formative principle. It limits, or as we believe to be a truer conception, it completes the conception of the local church by bringing in the conception of the Church as a body. Every particular church is bound to govern itself as a part of the whole. In every act it is to regard itself as united, with all other churches, to Christ, the Head.

The only questions of importance at this point, therefore, between Congregationalism and communions which admit governmental unity, are, whether it is lawful, and if lawful expedient, to secure union in the things that are common and for ends that are common, in a governmental way, or solely in a moral way. To our apprehension these two questions will reduce themselves to one. The real issue is one of effectiveness in Christian work — an effectiveness measured not by immediate or partial results, but by the purity and power with which Christianity is propagated and maintained. If the Congregational polity is not as adequate to this end as some other, it is thereby judged, nor can any theory built upon the use of the word church in the New Testament be deemed conclusive against results which express, and principles which are founded in, the nature of Christianity.

For the present we distrust the alleged necessity of a governmental

unity. The Congregational principle includes and emphasizes unity, but makes the bond ethical and spiritual. It seeks to secure efficiency in Christian organization by fostering self-governing societies, and by using this developed individualism in free combination under the obligations of Christian fellowship and service. It has the advantage of making service the common and principal aim. One contributor rightly calls attention to the changed conception of government which has arisen since our Congregational fathers framed their system of church polity. This change is essentially a higher ethical conception of government. It involves an increasing recognition and gradual elevation of the moral bond of society. Congregationalism emphasizes the spiritual bond of union. So far as government resolves itself into moral influence it admits government on the largest scale. It prefers, however, until human nature in the Church is more controlled by the Christian spirit, to emphasize everywhere the spiritual bond of union, and to reduce governmental action, through human agents, to a minimum. The progress of society may make this latter species of action more and more pure, and its abuses less and less probable. But when government in the Church becomes perfectly safe, because it is a reflection of the mind of Christ, the difference between governmental and spiritual unity may become unimportant. Christ will reign by his truth and Spirit.

However this may be, it is evident that Congregationalism, if it is to maintain and approve itself in these strenuous, searching, and sifting times, must show that it has the energies and agencies of a great Christian communion. It must carry out its own principles on their catholic as well as individualistic side. It must think of itself rigorously, thoroughly, and constantly as a representative part of the one true Church of Christ, and as bound to maintain itself in the purity and breadth and freedom of such a Church. It may and should embrace many schools of thought. It violates its charter and name if it becomes in any wise a private association, or a combination of private associations, for scientific or philanthropic ends. Very plainly is it called upon to manifest its competency for aggressive Christian work, and for such organization as is requisite to its accomplishment. Here we are in full agreement with our contributors. There is a common and indescribably great work to be done by our churches on missionary lines, both at home and abroad. They are not engaged in it, or in contact with it, at all as they should be. One main difficulty, we are persuaded, lies in their having no opportunity to take that part in it which most awakens interest and stimulates effort. They are appealed to, constantly and impressively, to aid in it by prayers and contributions. Their individual relation to it as churches, still more the personal relation to it of the immense majority of church-members, is not made otherwise apparent, and cannot be made so, to any adequate degree, on present methods. The consequence is that our benevolent societies — whose management

we are now not in the least criticising — work over and over the same soil, use substantially from year to year the same constituency, enlarge but little the number of their supporters, and draw from far too small a section of the communities to which they appeal. Something is needed which will carry home to the general membership of the churches a sense of responsibility and awaken personal interest. The sense of responsibility cannot be separated from realization of power. Interest depends much upon participation. If the members of our churches are to be enlisted in the support of missionary work they must be made part-takers in the work. To some extent this exists already by offerings and prayers. But these will be increased, if accompanied by practical contact with the work in its actual management and execution. At present all this is committed mainly to societies to which the churches, as such, sustain the relation of mere contributors by gifts of money and other offerings. We have no missionary societies which spring from the churches, and no general societies, apart from those developing by the female members of these churches, which have their root in local constituencies of church-members. Practically we have laid aside our Polity when we come to the chief work for which it exists. This is a bad showing for the Polity. Is it an evil in itself? We believe it to be a very serious one, not because of Congregationalism mainly, but for the work's sake. The method leaves unemployed the principle which is most essential to success — that of interest awakened, sustained, and developed through personal participation in the conduct of missionary operations.

No such successful missionary organization has arisen in the history of Congregationalism as the Woman's Board, and its success is due to its use of the principle we have named, and which no one of our national societies embodies. It is from bottom to top a representative organization. It carries down to each auxiliary, and to each member of one, the sense of partnership in the common work. The same principle is illustrated in the remarkable growth of the Christian Endeavor Society. Every member is given something to do, and has responsibility put upon him and developed by his joining in the common endeavor. In our colleges government by the authorities is rendered almost unnecessary through the admission of all to personal share in it. There needs to be a development throughout the entire membership of the Congregational churches of a missionary consciousness. It exists in principle and potentially. It wants air, exercise, use. It will grow through action. It will be sturdier and more intense the more it is entrusted with responsibility. Responsibility and Representation are the watchwords of the hour, the open sesame to a true and great progress.

The organization should be from the local churches or circles up. We can think of nothing which would more enliven and invigorate our county conferences or associations of churches than their being entrusted with the supervision of missionary work, each within its own

borders and in appropriate relation to the larger missionary district defined by state lines, and beyond by those of our common country. The county Home Missionary Society would spring from the churches of the county; each county could in the same way be represented at the annual State Conference; and so by delegation yet higher circles be formed, ending in a truly national and representative Home Missionary Society. In the same way could be formed a national Foreign Missionary Board. The meetings of our National Council would then become occasions of the deepest practical interest, and be relieved of that rather inquiring and timid turn which is now somewhat apparent and quite natural. Most of all, the churches would be brought face to face with their work, and grow in the conviction of its obligation and in the joy of its performance.

COMMENT ON CURRENT DISCUSSION.

REVISION OF THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.

THE "New York Evangelist," whose columns since the meeting of the Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian Church have contained much interesting discussion of Revision, says that "The subject has grown upon the mind of the Church even since the rising of the Assembly, and bids fair to take on larger dimensions than . . . the Assembly contemplated."

The need of revision or some readjustment is sufficiently set forth in a single sentence by Rev. Henry J. Van Dyke, D. D. : —

"It is a sad fact and a grief to many hearts besides my own, that our Confession does not contain one declaration of the infinite love of God to men, nor one declaration of what every Presbyterian, Old School or New, devoutly believes, that Christ's sacrifice for sin is sufficient for all, adapted to all, and offered to all."

The same argument was prominent in the Presbyterian discussions which led to the recent action on Revision by the Assembly of the Free Church, Scotland. Quoting and, as we understand, indorsing Dr. Van Dyke's statement, the "Evangelist" puts this question to those who are satisfied with the Confession as it is: "Is it not possible to make some slight improvement on a Confession so destitute of the very core of the Gospel as this?"

The argument is conclusive enough as to an urgent need of a revision of the relation of the Presbyterian Church to the Confession. The creed no longer adequately expresses the church's faith. But the reasoning is not equally decisive as to the method of relief. The need is immense — the Confession does not contain "the core of the Gospel"; a revision of the Confession which will supply such a lack cannot be "slight." The Confession is written from a particular point of view. The demand for revision requires that it be written from a very different point of view. This cannot be done by a little change of phraseology here and there, by an easy verbal omission or addition. In a word, the call for revision involves a conviction which requires for its satisfaction a new creed.

The English Presbyterians are following this course, and a committee has reported a symbol. But the Presbyterian Church in this country is not so well prepared for such a method. What discussion may accomplish we cannot say; but at present many conservatives and liberals, to some degree from opposite reasons, are alike opposed to an attempt to construct a new formula.

Two other methods of adjustment are discussed: a declaratory act, and a relaxation of the terms of subscription. The United Presbyterian Church of Scotland has been in the peaceful and happy enjoyment for some ten years of an excellent Declaration which was printed in the last April number of this REVIEW. It seems to be questioned by influential Presbyterians in this country whether their Church could agree at present on such an act, or is any better prepared to construct a declaration than to make a new creed. It will be interesting to watch the progress of discussion on this point.

If a new creed is out of the question, and revision of the old one is also undesirable or impracticable from the logical structure, consistency, and homogeneity of the Confession, a declaratory act is the next resort for those who desire to secure a testimony from the church to the truths it now holds. A mere change in subscription attests that the existing creed is indefinitely relaxed; it does not promote the end of testimony to the truth. Probably laymen are more likely to favor either a new creed or a declaration than clergymen. Both may see and desire the same end; but laymen are more likely to follow simple and direct processes, partly because they do not see so many difficulties in the way as do clergymen. The positive advantage of a declaratory act is, that it does something toward a confession of present faith, without requiring a degree of general progress in doctrinal enlightenment necessary for a new and elaborate creed. Such an act should go no further in positive statement than what expresses the common conviction. Beyond this it should aim simply at relief from what is found to be too restrictive or liable to serious misapprehension.

In the matter of terms of subscription the American Presbyterian Church already has a comparatively liberal formula. The Adopting Act of 1729 indorsed the Westminster standards "as being in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine." The promise or "subscription" required of church officers pledges allegiance to the Confession only "as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." Professor Briggs maintains that the phrase "system of doctrine" must be understood to embrace solely "essential and necessary articles." It is proposed by some to make this formula of subscription still more liberal, but no specific emendation, so far as we have observed, has been as yet offered. Such a method, as we have intimated, is simply one of relief. The broader the subscription, the less in force is the creed which is subscribed. It would seem to

be more advantageous as a measure of relief to drop subscription altogether — a method which is suggested by a letter from one of the foremost of the framers of the Westminster standards, Dr. Anthony Tuckney. Writing to Dr. Whichcote he says : —

“For matter of imposing upon, I am not guilty. In the Assembly I gave my vote with others, that the Confession of faith, put out with authority, *should not be required to be either sworn or subscribed to*¹ (we having been burned in the hand in that kind before), but so as not to be publicly preached or written against.”

On the whole, in view of the discussion thus far and of the difficulties of the situation, from the Presbyterian point of view, we should suppose that the most practical method and a necessary preliminary, would be first to determine the proper scope and ends of church confessions. A thorough discussion of this subject, and a consequent intelligent general agreement upon it, would do much to smooth the path to a satisfactory settlement of the grave difficulties which have arisen with the present standards. Much is gained when a church realizes its duty to conform its creed to the progress of truth. A serious effort of this sort is a provisional relief. Time is all on the side of those who seek readjustment, and of the most thorough and effective method.

FATHER DAMIEN AND THE LEPER SETTLEMENT ON MOLOKAI.

The eulogies which have been passed upon Father Damien for his noble work have been often attended by misrepresentations of the Leper Settlement, which have naturally awakened the resentment of the Hawaiian government. Among many like statements in regard to the condition of the lepers the following have been published : —

“The brutal indifference of the Hawaiian government had thrust these poor creatures away upon a barren peninsula.”

“The government had adopted the barbarous theory that the lepers could sustain themselves.”

“Father Damien took up first the question of sufficient food, and as a result of his importunities the Hawaiian government arranged that food supplies should be sent at regular intervals to the island.”

“Through his representation and personal direction, the government has comfortably housed the colony, Father Damien himself having built many of the houses.”

Commenting on these statements, “The (Honolulu) Friend” of July, 1889, makes the following quotations from the government reports in reference to the settlement, just before the coming of Father Damien : —

“We now quote from the Biennial Report of the Board of Health to the Legislature, dated April 1, 1874, about the time of Damien’s arrival at the settlement. This report is signed by Hon. H. A. Widemann, then President of the Board of Health, a gentleman of high standing, a Catholic, a vigorous critic

¹ Italics ours.

of administrative faults, and his party having just come into office, quite at liberty to denounce any neglect of the late Protestant Minister of Interior, E. O. Hall. Mr. Widemann asserts that 'in a material point of view these people are better off on Molokai than most natives of these Islands, and also better off, with few exceptions, than they ever were in their own homes.' A 'large number of kuleanas' 'with numerous good houses' had recently been purchased to meet the wants of the increasing population. (Kuleanas are small private pieces of land.) Six thousand feet of water pipe had been laid. 'Mr. W. P. Ragsdale, who some months ago gave a remarkable example of self-sacrifice in going of his own accord to Molokai, is the present superintendent of the asylum. A more active and efficient man could hardly be found.' The lepers 'have been made in all respects as comfortable as possible.'

"Turn back two years to the report of Dr. F. W. Hutchinson in 1872. 'The food ration is a large one, and exceeds that supplied to the soldiers of the best supplied European and American armies.' 'The Board can fairly assert that these people are better supplied than they ever were in their own homes — a proof of the assertion may be found in the fact that many of the people living at the landing place at Kalaupapa have been anxious to make themselves lepers.' 'We repeat again, that these people are well taken care of, and not unhappy.'

"The tone of defense of this report betokens the fact that the treatment of the lepers was then as always the subject of jealous scrutiny by the Hawaiian public.

"At that time thatched houses were the common abodes of the people in all the country districts. These were often more comfortable and more healthy than their present wooden cottages. For many years our pioneer missionaries lived in grass houses. One writer complains that the lepers did not get milk. The natives are not used to have milk at home. What they want is *poi*, and *poi* was always a chief part of the leper's rations.

"This report of 1872 describes the commodious house of the keeper, two hospitals for the sick, and separate houses for those lepers needing special care. There are described 'separate houses built for boys and girls, with a special building for a school room,' the teacher being a leper. 'A number of milch cows furnish plenty of milk' for the patients, 'and the food is prepared by a Chinese cook.'

"A little distance from this central place, nearer the seaside, a little church has been built, where every Sunday a native minister, a leper himself, holds a service. . . . It is well attended by the poor people for whose benefit it has been specially erected.'

"This last testimony of Dr. Hutchinson will have the more force with those who remember how entirely out of sympathy he was with the Protestant missionaries.

"Molokai was in many respects the most thoroughly and successfully worked missionary field in the group. Mr. and Mrs. Hitchcock were at the head of the work from 1832 to 1857. They were peculiarly devoted and efficient, and had excellent missionaries associated with them. There were no traders in their field, and their influence was less impeded than on the other islands. Nearly every man and woman on the island came to own their powerful moral and spiritual sway. Father Hitchcock was a first-class example of a devoted, hard-working missionary hero, whom the people both loved and feared,

and we had plenty more like him. About the time of his death the count showed an excess of births over deaths on Molokai. This was the one solitary instance of the kind in this kingdom. It evinced the superior moral condition of that island. After this, for eleven years, Rev. A. O. Forbes carried on the work ably and devotedly, periodically visiting and ministering to the lepers after they came there in 1865, organizing the Siloam church, and installing their first pastor.

"A considerable proportion of the lepers were members of Protestant churches, many deacons and some ministers. Their spiritual wants were well supplied by church and Sabbath schools, and have always been the object of solicitous care from the other churches and the Hawaiian Board."

It is due to the Hawaiian government, to the residents upon the Islands, and to the Christian natives, that the exaggerations and misrepresentations, which perhaps naturally accompanied the early accounts of Father Damien's work, should be corrected, and that the corrections should have general notice. The corrections are made in simple justice to those who were concerned with the lepers before and since Father Damien's work among them. They are made in no spirit of detraction, but rather in a spirit of hearty appreciation of Father Damien's heroism. The friend who has sent us the corrections which we have quoted, himself a resident of the Islands, writes: "No one questions the motive of Father Damien in going to the leper settlement, nor would any of our Protestant Christians detract from the work he did, or deny that he died a martyr to his self-sacrifice. But granting all this, the representations made in American and English papers and magazines are unfair and unjust to those who have put forth earnest effort to do all that was possible for these poor people."

The peculiar charm in Father Damien's character lay in what "The Spectator" calls the "moral detachment" of his mind. This was manifest in childhood, and as he made the successive choices of his life it became more and more evident that it was the ruling factor in his religious consecration. So that when the occasion called for the mission, under the auspices of his church, to the lepers, he responded with the naturalness and promptness of one who had never made account of the ordinary ties even of the Catholic priesthood. The scene of his departure for his work is thus sketched by his biographer:—

"At a meeting that was held to celebrate the dedication of a chapel just completed by a Father Leonor at Wailuku in the Island Maui, Father Damien chanced to be present, together with the Bishop of Honolulu and others of his clergy. Among them were present some young priests of the Congregation, who had just arrived at Honolulu to supply the increasing needs of the mission. During the conversation Mgr. Maigret expressed deep regret that owing to the scarcity of his missionaries he was unable to do anything for the poor lepers of Molokai, and especially did he regret that he was unable to provide them with a fixed pastor. Already his lordship had from time to time

sent one of the missionaries to confess and administer the sacraments to the dying ; but this only happened rarely, and there was no guarantee of its being continued. Hearing the Bishop's lament, Father Damien took in the situation at a glance, and eagerly offered himself to supply the long-felt necessity. 'Monseigneur,' said he, 'here are four new missionaries ; one of them could take my district, and if you will be kind enough to allow it, I will go to Molokai and labor for the poor lepers, whose wretched state of bodily and spiritual misfortune has often made my heart bleed within me.' This generous offer was gladly accepted, and that very day, without even saying 'Good-by!' to his friends, he embarked with the Bishop on a vessel that was just leaving the harbor of Honolulu with a consignment of fifty lepers."

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

IV. SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE French Protestant brethren connected with the Paris Society have a flourishing mission in southeastern Africa, in the British possessions, but extending beyond them. They have some 6000 communicants, all of the Caffre or Zulu race, that vigorous branch of the vigorous Bantu family which fills the greater part of Central and Southern Africa, until in the extreme south it abuts upon the peculiarly modified Hottentot race, which by some unexplained mystery speaks a language allied to the Egyptian.

Christian Frenchmen are born to be missionaries. It seems to be almost a pity that a few millions more of them could not, by a friendly reversal of the dragonnades, be forced back into Protestantism, in order to furnish more Protestant missionaries. We know that they are at once the most numerous, the most zealous, and the most effective of the Roman Catholic missionaries. One illustrious name and example will come up before every mind. He was not, indeed, a Frenchman in allegiance, but French in training, and probably largely in race. The sympathy and gayety of the French temperament, and the absence in it of the stiff British pride of race, have always made the French loved by inferior races, even when they have done much less for their advantage than the English. And, as Mrs. Stowe justly says, there is something in the French character which, when it receives Christ in very truth, reproduces his image in almost unique beauty. It may be that only a remnant will be saved of a republic which ages of superstitious tyranny have driven, almost or quite irrecoverably, into malignant atheism. But that remnant, Protestant, Jansenist, or Romanist, will assuredly have a seat very near the throne of Messiah the King. It is impossible to read the simple reports of the "*Journal des Missions Évangéliques*" without feeling a peculiar spirit of encouragement for the work of the Lord among the nations breathing from them.

The work of evangelizing the heathen villages within the range of the French mission is carried on entirely by native evangelists and private members, male and female. These evangelists are supported entirely by

the people. This has been a growing burden for years, as money has, for some reason or other, been getting scarcer and scarcer. Thus far, however, the evangelists seem to have continued at their work, whether they received less or more, and of late, happily, the tide of prosperity seems to be returning. Within a year or two there has been a remarkable revival, less among the Christians than among the heathen, and large additions to the classes of inquirers and catechumens. The interest around each Christian village, it is remarked, corresponds almost exactly to the degree in which it has given a worthy example. Polygamy is a great barrier, especially with the chiefs and principal men, and so also is the refusal of the missionaries to compromise with the practice of selling daughters for wives. "Our daughters are our bank," they say, and they resist an interference with their bank account as warmly as if they were white men.

The French brethren have established an isolated mission on the banks of the great river Zambesi. This has as yet made scarcely any converts, but is establishing an influence, amid extreme privations and monotonous miseries. The native king, Lewanika, is a thorough heathen, and a jealous, sanguinary tyrant, but is wonderfully proud that he enjoys the illustrious dignity of having white missionaries settled in his kingdom. Like the barbarian German kings who were breaking up the Roman empire, but valued themselves immensely on receiving some title or badge from the Emperor, this African tyrant contemns the law of God from morning till night, but thinks he is sure of a blessing now that he has God's messengers with him. After one of his massacres, he with all his chiefs had to listen to a sermon from the missionary on the guilt of murder. They showed great uneasiness, and from the king down sent or came, each one to excuse himself from the guilt, and to put the blame on somebody else. And when Lewanika next wanted to do a deed of murder, he merely administered poison to his victims, and putting them ashore on an island in the river, left them to die, representing afterwards to the missionary that these people had come to their deaths, he hardly knew how, but that he had been guilty of no bloodshedding! He was as pious over it as the tyrant Tiberius when he made known to the Senate, concerning the deaths of certain descendants of Augustus, that he had not been guilty of shedding the blood of the divine Julius; he had merely starved the young princes to death.

Lewanika, however, is very desirous of frequent conferences with the missionaries, and allows them unrestricted freedom of speech, or rather, unlike some pious rulers of Christendom, seems to assume that this is an inherent attribute of God's prophets. And his conscience does seem at last to have been so far affected that he put an energetic veto on the scheme of a murdering and plundering foray against a weaker tribe, and only gave way when tumultuously overborne by his chiefs and people, who declared that in such a time of scarcity it was a simple necessity. An African king appears to have despotic power over individuals, but very little power as against the will of his tribe, and sometimes very little against that of his council.

Unpromising as these beginnings of the Zambesi Mission may appear, they show a readiness to be convinced of sin, though not as yet to depart from it, far greater than appeared in the beginning among some other Caffre tribes, which now number hundreds, or even thousands, of sincere Christians.

The Protestant churches of French Switzerland have an interesting mission in the Transvaal Republic, extending down to the coast, and to the Portuguese town of Lourenço-Marques. But a law of the jealous Boers now forbids more than five native families to reside on one plantation. This has already broken up several mission-stations, and may break up all in the Republic. Some murmur that the recognition of Transvaal independence was a doubtful good, if it means added power to tyrannize over the natives. But if the sacred principle of nationality implies an obligation to give over Ulster to the tender mercies of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, who are the black Caffres that they should ask for better measure than is to be dealt out to white Scotchmen?

The Boers of South Africa, of whom the most are within the Cape Colony, are there, I believe, guilty of no intrigues against their British allegiance, to which, indeed, they have no great temptation under a power which is both Teutonic and Protestant, which allows them ample openings to a great career in other parts of the world, and which grants them wide powers of self-government at home. But in nationality, though they have a large admixture of Huguenot French blood, they still remain obstinately, or I should rather say perseveringly, Dutch. When the wealthier young men receive a university course, it is still taken in the Netherlands. I have seen it represented that Cape Colony is not a whit nearer being Anglicized than it was seventy years ago. And that peculiar harshness and insolence towards subject races, which has been remarked as distinguishing all branches of the Teutonic race, is more pronounced among the Boers of South Africa than even in our own South, although it is restrained from proceeding to brutal outrage by the ingrained sense of justice which Niebuhr has remarked as distinguishing the Dutch, and also by the firm hand of British authority. The Boers are intensely religious, and even pietistic. Not only the church, but the prayer-meeting is an undisputed power among them. No one, it is said, has any hope of social or political preëminence among them who is not supposed to be eminent in the spiritual life. Indeed, as has been sarcastically remarked by some unecclesiastical Englishman, the arms of the Colony ought to be a kirk rampant. But for a long time they were very unwilling to act as if the natives had any souls to be saved. The first Moravian missionary, George Schmidt, aroused such indignation by presuming to baptize some Hottentots, that he was banished back to Europe. For fifty years the Brethren were kept away from the Cape.

Finally, however, the Boers have advanced so far as to allow that the inferior races are capable of an inferior salvation. They have provided them, or allowed them to provide themselves, or both, with spacious churches. They furnish them with regularly educated white pastors; but no exchange of pulpits is ever permitted, it is said, between these and the clergy of the Boers themselves. One extraordinary fusion of services, however, has been known to occur. An aged Caffre had died, whose reputation for piety was so uncontested and eminent, that the congregation of the white church attended his funeral in a body. To check all presumptuousness, however, into which the natives might have been betrayed by seeing the gods come down to do honor to one of themselves, it was insisted that the body of the aged saint should be deposited in an outbuilding, and should be buried on the open heath.

They have still, however, remained jealous of missionary undertakings

among the yet unevangelized tribes. But at last one of their Synods has, to the general astonishment, recognized in all form its obligations to this work, and has made provision for commencing it. So while our Northern Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Methodists, working in the South, are suspected, and our Southern Episcopalians are much more than suspected, of retroceding from Christianity in their dealings with the rights of the colored members of the Church of God, the Presbyterian Boers appear to be slowly and painfully climbing up towards it. There is reason to hope that in due time the native races of South Africa, and even the Boers themselves, may be Christianized.

The established Lutheran Church of Finland, the head of which is the Archbishop of Abo, has a mission, now some twenty years old, in King William's Land, in Southwestern Africa. The number of converts is small, some two hundred, but they are much encouraged that, after having in twelve years baptized their first convert, they then increased to one hundred, and within a year have just doubled their number. The heir to the throne of the native kingdom within which their work is done, who exercises an independent jurisdiction over a part of it, has lately been dealing so tyrannically with them that they have been fain to flee into the immediate territory of the king. The Christians, having to choose between their possessions and their religion, have almost unanimously chosen the latter, and have followed their teachers.

The "Missionary Herald" for January, 1888, says: "The Portuguese government has received from Mozambique a telegram announcing that the famous Bonga of the Zambesi has been beaten by Portuguese troops, and his thirty-six villages, defended by palisades, have been destroyed. The security of commerce upon the Zambesi is now assured." This important service of the Portuguese may be so far set off against their intermeddling on the Shiré. — In the Zulu Mission of the American Board, Mr. Harris, of Ifumi, reports that during the Week of Prayer in 1888, thirty made a public profession of faith at Ifumi, and as many at Ahmahlongwa. Mr. Ireland, of Amanzimtote, reports that: "The evangelist Rev. David Russell has made another useful visit to this station. For three days and a half we had two services each day, from Monday afternoon to Thursday evening. Including some twenty-five to thirty catechumens, who had met in class once a week for several months, more than fifty professed to come out on the Lord's side before the meetings came to a close. We had large, earnest congregations, of some four hundred, twice each day, and the services were solemn and interesting." — Rev. E. H. Richards, of the East Central African Mission of the American Board, reports some of the prayer-meeting expressions of his people. As the "Herald" remarks, the plain strength of religious feeling clothed in the unhackneyed language of these Africans is likely to be found refreshing. Temba, twenty-three years old, prays: "We thank thee, O God. Thou hast helped us to-day; thou hast helped us many days in many ways. Put thy truth in our ears; remember us surely. Give us good hearts, Father, to hear thy truth. Take us out of the weeds and off from the rocks. Help everybody and teach them. Thou art able to send the missionaries, let them come in plenty. We worship thee; we serve thee; wash our hearts, all of us; make us to understand thy truth; do not forget us; lead us in thy pleasant paths. Help all people to understand and obey thy words. We thank thee in Christ's name. Amen." Mahkalule, twenty years old, prays: "We are in thy house, O God.

Thou art the King of all lands and all peoples. Let down thy strength among us to save us. Abide with us ; we love thee. Put good thoughts into our hearts and mouths ; save her and make her well who is sick [Mrs. Richards]. Help her much. Show us thy path, for we stay in the forest like animals. Keep us ; save us from within and without. Wash us thoroughly with strong soap ; we love thee, care for us. We ask it earnestly in Christ's name. Amen." Perengi, twenty-five years old, says : " I have often left the King, but I have eaten bitter fruit. I have often stayed well in my heart. I am happy now. I am now the King's. I love his word and his law. I will not again leave him."

At Umtwalume, in the Zulu Mission, Mr. Wilder reported, April 2, 1888, that 116 inquirers had announced themselves within a few months. They have dedicated a new church, into which they will be able to crowd six hundred people. At the dedication thirty-nine were received on confession of faith, many of them parents, two were restored, and thirteen infants were baptized. — Mr. Wilder and Mr. Bates, of the East Central African Mission, had, June 15, 1888, reached the island of Chiloan, on their expedition to Umzila's country. " It is sad to learn that the Portuguese steamer which landed these brethren on their missionary errand landed also hundreds of cases of gin. Half of the porters who brought the cargo ashore were women, many of them with babes on their backs, who were driven to their task by an Arab, horsewhip in hand. These women marched into the water up to their waists, received their loads from the side of the dhow, and carried them to the house of the Portuguese governor. No food was given these porters from morning to night, but in the afternoon whiskey was dealt out to all. Will not Christendom make its voice heard so that these atrocities shall cease ? "

The last Annual Report of the American Board says of Africa : —

" The three missions of the Board in this great continent are well placed, and have a wide and effectual door open before them. The older mission among the Zulus in Natal has suffered a serious depletion of its forces, and calls loudly for immediate reinforcement. The four veteran missionaries, who have been nearly or quite forty years in service, are all either absent from the field on furlough, or laid aside by serious illness. Two of the remaining seven are also temporarily withdrawn from the field. In spite of these discouragements we have good reports from all parts of the work, and a better outlook for the future than in many years past. The churches have been revived and enriched in numbers and Christian devotion. The schools have especially shared in the Christian awakening, and thus there is the prospect that this blessing will be felt for long years to come. Two native helpers have gone from the Umzumbé to Matabele Land, to coöperate with the laborers of the London Missionary Society there ; a beginning of that work in behalf of kindred people which is opening before the churches of this mission throughout a vast territory northward to the Zambesi. An exploration is now making by members of this mission in the Gaza country, where new fields for missionary labor, it is hoped, may be found and entered at once.

" It is an extremely interesting fact to find the Zulu language so widely diffused, and the regions occupied by those who use this tongue so accessible. Nothing can give a greater value to the missionary work in Natal, or react more powerfully upon the religious life of the native churches, than this providential call to bear the gospel far beyond their own borders to kindred peoples and tribes, and thus to take their part in Christianizing the heart of Africa.

" The East African Central Mission, though few in numbers, makes a good report for the year in schools and evangelistic work, and in the translation

of the Scriptures. The Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke are already translated and in the hands of the natives, and other books for schools are in preparation. A goodly number at each station give evidence of penitence and faith in Christ, and are under careful instruction to prepare them for baptism and church organization. Miss Jones, of Fisk University, the first unmarried colored woman to be commissioned by the Board, is proving herself well fitted for her work as a teacher here."

Messrs. Bates and Wilder have at last succeeded in securing the consent of Gungunyana, king of the Gaza country, in southeast Africa, to admit them to an audience. There are such rumors of gold mines, that he has been afraid to give any encouragement to white men to visit him. He is familiar with the Portuguese, but he calls them women, in contrast with the virile and aggressive Anglo-Saxons and Germans. The explorers are very much pleased to have their expectations fully confirmed, that Zulu would be found a language in general use. The king seems to make it a part of his policy to enforce the teaching of it. There are two other great languages, the Isi Senji, spoken from the Buzi to the Sabi, and the Isi Nhlwenga, from south of the Sabi. This, Mr. Wilder thinks, is probably the Sheitswa of Mr. Ousley. There are a few minor languages, and north of the Buzi and Punge to the Zambesi the Senna language is spoken by a tributary nation who only occasionally speak the Zulu. The Isi Nhlwenga is closely allied to the Zulu.

The kingdom of Gungunyana "practically extends from the Zambesi to the Limpopo, and from the sea to Matabele Land. The centres of the pure Zulu-speaking population are at the King's about the headwaters of the Buzi, and at Baleni on the Limpopo, not very far from Delagoa Bay. So far as we have come in contact with the natives outside of Portuguese influence we find them very cordial and eager to have missionaries among them. We have no definite idea as yet about the population of the kingdom, but if we can judge by that along the Buzi it is very great. The banks here are one continuous garden, with villages every few rods, but not extending far into the plain. The soil is very rich, and would support an immense population. Although we have been for six weeks in what is called the unhealthy portion of the country, we have so far escaped any touch of fever." They have been careful to use all precautions. The Gaza people, it seems, are not mainly of Zulu race, but are more and more inclined to use the Zulu language. The result of this attempt to settle among them will be seen below.

The "Missionary Herald" for December, while justly remarking that some of the measures proposed by Cardinal Lavigerie for the repression of the slave-trade are inadequate, and others fantastic, cordially acknowledges the good service done by the Archbishop of Algiers in arousing the conscience of Christendom, and in pouring a flood of accusing light upon the inherent complicity of Mohammedanism with this abomination. It seems that the Turkish minister at Brussels, Cathareorody Effendi, acknowledging the guilt of Mohammedans in this matter, protested that the Cardinal ought not to make Mohammedanism itself responsible. But Mgr. Lavigerie, who has been in constant intercourse with Mohammedans for thirty years, gives a crushing reply. He says, that he does not know in all Africa a Moslem state, great or small, whose sovereign does not permit, and more commonly practice, slave-hunting; that it is only Mohammedans who now organize these hunts; that where restrained by Christian law, Moslems universally refuse their moral concurrence

with this ; that slave-marts, tolerated by the Turkish authorities, are found in a large number of places in Africa and Asia, belonging to the Ottoman Empire. The Cardinal says, moreover, that he has never known a *cadi* who gave a judgment respecting slavery or the slave-trade in which he did not assume, as of course, that it is sanctioned by the Koran ; and that he has never known any theological teacher of the Mohammedans who failed to recognize them as sanctioned by the Koran for true believers as against infidels.

Whether this Cathareorody Effendi is a Moslem or not, I do not know. Turkey prefers as her envoys to Christian powers a class of nominally Christian Greeks, who, as Mr. Freeman says, have been among the most unscrupulously servile instruments of Turkish brutality and Moslem fanaticism. The truth is : as Christianity is the true development of Israel, Islam, as Ewald says, is Israelism perverted into hopeless moral corruption. When shall we be willing to recognize that there are cancerous growths in religion, which it is the duty of the world to cut out ? The profession of Mohammedanism no one thinks of forbidding, but of abating its abominations.

The "Herald" for December extracts from the "Free Church Monthly" a more particular account of the evidence referred to above, that the gospel is practically laying hold of the Boers in their relations to the blacks.

"Three years ago a religious awakening began among these Boers in the northern part of Natal, and the genuineness of this interest was shown by their desire to reach the Zulus, whom they had regarded as little better than animals. There are now fifteen preaching places where the gospel is proclaimed, and which Mr. Scott says are simply the farmhouses of the Boers. He speaks of seeing eighty Boers and three or four hundred Zulus gather together for worship. The Zulus come from kraals and villages, both old and young, some clothed, but most of them heathen in their blankets. Over one hundred in Greytown have been formed into a native church in connection with the Dutch church. This work is now being carried forward under the direction of a committee of the Dutch farmers, employing three native evangelists. One of these evangelists is the son of the Zulu warrior who in 1836, at the signal from Dingaan, the cruel tyrant, fell upon the Dutch leader Retief, and his party of about seventy men, murdering them all in cold blood. This father still lives, and is a member of the Christian Church, and listens gladly to his son as he preaches the gospel of peace."

After everything had appeared so hopeful for extending missionary work into Gungunyanu's kingdom, the final interview with the king dashed all these hopes. A single school, of thirty scholars, had been opened by the Portuguese, and on the ground of this they claimed to have a mission already established in the kingdom, although there had been no religious instruction whatever given. The king's sentence was : "Tell those who sent you, your feet have delayed too long ; had you been the first here to mourn the death of my father, yours would be the place now occupied by the Portuguese. They first came to mourn the death of my father. They are my teachers, and the teachers of my people. I cannot manage two sets of teachers at one and the same time." French or German Catholics might have been expected to take hold of the work in earnest, but who can trust the Portuguese ? They are not likely to be anything else than mere dogs in the manger. It does not appear that they have a single priest in the kingdom.

The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel has missions in South

Africa, and so have the Wesleyans, that is the English Methodists. But both are accused of somewhat reckless encroachments upon other churches: the English High Churchmen, of course, from their well-known disdain of all other missionaries in British territory, as both schismatics and dissenters; the Wesleyans, from the disposition which they have brought with them from the circumstances of their origin to look doubtfully upon the Christianity of others, but especially upon that of the German Lutherans, who have a good many missionaries in South Africa. It may be that the people of both the High Churchmen and the Wesleyans are genuine gains from heathenism. But a taint of suspicion resting upon their results makes us less inclined to inquire into them, and more inclined to reserve our inquiries into their labors for fields of which they have the prior occupancy, and in which, therefore, they have the best right. As respects the High Churchmen, — or Anglo-Catholics, if that is what we are to call them, — the broad fraternity of the Universities' Mission shows how entirely practicable it is for them to avoid schismatical intrusions under the name of opposition to schism upon other men's line of things made ready to their hand. Bishop Selwyn, too, when in New Zealand, although he represented this school of Churchmanship, or something not far from it, declared that St. Paul's principle, of proclaiming the gospel only where Christ had not been proclaimed before, was one which he had religiously made his own. Better proof this of his being in the apostolic succession than if he could have established an unbroken line of ordinations up to St. Paul himself, which Cardinal Newman concedes to be something impossible without a miracle. For, as Origen says, "He that has Peter's virtues has Peter's keys." High Churchmanship and Low Churchmanship are both very good things, but only within the limits of Christianity.

THE CONGO FREE STATE.

The English Baptists have twenty-two missionaries and one female school-teacher on the Upper Congo. These, of course, are as yet principally doing pioneer work. They have, in their little steamer *The Peace*, done a good deal of exploring work. One of them, Mr. Grenfell, in a speech made in England in 1887, put the amount of navigable waterway on the Congo and its branches at not less than 6,000 miles. He says: "What we know concerning the Congo and its tributaries proves it to be one of the most wonderful systems of natural canals on the face of the globe. If we take a quarter of a million of square miles, occupying the central portion of the basin of the Congo, we can find no place within that area more than fifty miles away from one of the navigable arteries. If we extend that area to half a million square miles, we cannot reach any point more than a hundred miles away from one of the navigable channels in communication with Stanley Pool. These channels are the routes by which commerce and civilization and Christianity — and we must take care that Christianity is not the least of the trio — have access to the Southern Soudan, to the Egyptian Soudan, to the Empire of Uganda, to Tanganyika, and the Albert Nyanza, and to the Empire of Muatayambo in the South."

Mr. Grenfell protests energetically against the shallow notion that anybody will do for a missionary to the negroes. An inferior man will not do for a missionary anywhere. Only a strong personality can break through the narrowness of imagining his tribal peculiarities to be iden-

tical with human nature. A missionary to the negroes need not always be what is specifically called intellectual. But a strong will and strong good sense he must have, for strong good sense is almost specifically a negro characteristic. "Uncle Remus" is a true type of the negro. Wherever a pious weakling may be in place, it certainly is not in Africa. And, as Mr. Grenfell suggests, the negroes are not, as some call the Indians, "an evening race." They seem to be rather a morning race. Africa belongs to them in the future as in the present. Men of a master-instinct for laying foundations will find enough to engage them to the full in the Dark Continent.

Banza Manteka is one of the stations of the American Baptists. Mr. Grenfell says of it: "When I last past through Banza Manteka, three years ago, it was the stronghold of many gross forms of superstition. It seemed the most unpromising place on the whole route, and one of the last places to give us any hope of a harvest. It seemed as though the Lord had chosen the most unpromising places to reveal Himself in might and power, and to encourage us to go forward. As we neared the town, before entering into it, we encountered a band of native evangelists 'going forth,' constrained alone by their loyalty to their Lord. They had not been sent by the missionary; he did not know anything about it till we told him we had met the men. When we got inside the town we found ourselves in quite a native Christian atmosphere, — people had forsaken their old state, they had burnt their idols, and were earnest and attentive to all the outward observances of Christianity." — The "heavy and bewildering losses" of European missionaries on the Congo have been a great drawback. How far acclimatization is possible and what is to be done in view of its limitations are very grave questions. The case of Mr. Shindler, one of the English Baptist missionaries, seems at least to show that it ought to be treated as a very grave offense in a white man on the Congo to walk where he can be carried. Americans, used to torrid summer heats, will probably endure better than Englishmen. — The following is a little touch of description: "Presently we came to daylight, and emerged on a narrow ridge. On one side a steep forest slope, on the other a grand sight — a gorge 900 feet deep and half a mile wide, extending far into the plateau; the blackest forest everywhere in it and on its sides, except a cliff of gleaming white sand of about 200 feet in height, commencing from about 500 feet up. In front lay the beautiful valley of the Ntsele, flanked on either side by the plateau, 1,100 feet above the river."

A convert of the Baptists, named Nlemvo, had "learnt that his uncle was dead, and that he was once more chief of his town, and a noble of Congo, having the style and title of Ngudi-ankama Tulante. But he made up his mind to have nothing to do with it, for he had already found that to be chief he must follow country custom, and authorize, indeed instigate, witch palavers. His people would not have him as a Christian, and he would not sell his soul for the chieftainship of an African village." — Nlemvo's mother had just died, and he gave her an honorable funeral, which is thus described: "The body was brought out of the house wrapped in leaves and twenty-four yards of cloth as the first wrapping. Then they spread on the ground Nlemvo's part of the shroud, one hundred and fifty yards of cloth; with this the body was enshrouded, and then outside of all came my gift of six yards of cream satin, fastened with scarlet braid. The firing of guns had announced to

the neighborhood that the funeral was in progress. The women folk wailed loudly, and we formed the funeral procession."

After the burial, the Rev. Mr. Bentley, with prayer, addressed the people on the meaning of death, and the hope and way of life. "Every one must have felt that Nlemvo, with all these new strange Christian ideas and customs, at least gave his mother an honorable and worthy burial, and his white man came himself to show his respect. The funeral is a most important matter in a Kongo's mind; for this he trades and toils and sins. A great man will have a number of sheep and goats and pigs, not to eat at any near time, but for the feast at his funeral. The bundles of cloth wrapped in skins, and so carefully stored in his house, are for his shroud and towards the funeral expenses; if some part is used in trade, it is only that the pile may be increased, and that for the one great purpose. But for this, what incentive would there be to work and energy in this land where so little is needed? Nlemvo's presence and respect in this matter, and the proper fulfilment of the native customs, was very important, and would go far towards removing the prejudice against these too new customs and religious ideas which seem to them so subversive of all proprieties."

Mr. Grenfell, in a letter written from Stanley Pool, November 30, 1888, says: "The steamer Stanley is just down with news of Mr. Stanley having returned to a point within a few days of the Falls, and of his having communicated with Tippoo Tib. It is said no letters have come down from him. The loads left by the late Major Bartellot's expedition are now in Stanley's hands on their way to Emin, with whom Stanley had left his white men, while he himself came back for the second detachment. This is good news for Central Africa, and is full of promise for the future. The Congo is now more conclusively than ever the great water-way to the very heart of Africa, and I pray that Christ's messengers may speedily recognize it, and in no stinted measure take advantage of it."

The "Baptist Missionary Magazine" for February, 1888, speaking of various appearances of providential opportuneness in the establishment of the Congo Free State, says: "The Free State was formed at a time when, in equatorial Africa, there was *one great race with one language*. The Congo basin — indeed, all that vast territory which stretches (roughly speaking) from six degrees north latitude to Cape Colony — is inhabited by the Bantus, who are the typical negroes and the greatest of African races. To be sure, there are among this people many tribes, with their various linguistic differences. But the dialects spoken are cognate, and belong to 'one great language or family of languages.' Mr. R. N. Cust, of the Royal Asiatic Society, is quoted as saying that 'The Bantu languages are soft, pliant, and flexible to an almost unlimited extent. Their grammatical principles are founded on the most systematic and philosophical basis, and the number of words may be multiplied to an almost indefinite extent. They are capable of expressing all the nicer shades of thought and feeling, and perhaps no other languages of the world are capable of more definiteness and precision of expression.' What a wonderful provision is this for the translation of God's Word, and for the easy acquisition of the vernacular by the Christian missionary! We are reminded forcibly of the providential preparation of the world for the coming of Christ, by the spread of the Greek language in its Hellenistic form."

The number of converts in the Congo Mission of the American Baptists is stated at 1,060, of whom about 200 have already been baptized. Three Christians have lately been put to death by the heathen. — The "Baptist Magazine" has a very good summary of Central African Protestant missions. "Looking at a map of equatorial Africa, and casting our eye down the West Coast, we see a number of older stations, each separated from the other by a distance of from two to four hundred miles, — the Baptist Missionary Society at the Cameruns, the American Presbyterians at the Gabun, the American Baptist Missionary Union at the mouth of the Congo, the American Methodist Episcopal Mission at the Coanza, and near Benguela are missionaries of the American Board. From different points along the West Coast missions are being pushed into the interior. But at present the centre of attraction seems to be the Congo and its newly discovered fields, so full of rich promise. On the lower course of the river we find the Swedish Missionary Society with its station in the cataract region. Bishop Taylor of the Methodist Church is zealously prosecuting his work at Stanley Pool, and is reaching out into the regions beyond. The American and English Baptists have already eleven stations on the Congo, and are endeavoring to stretch their chain of missions from the Atlantic Ocean to Stanley Falls. Passing across the continent to the eastern coast, we find the Church Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, the United Methodists, the Universities' Mission, and the Scotch Missions (of both the Free and the Established Church). These societies have been extending their labor westward, till some of them, by the heroism of such men as Bishop Hannington, have reached the Great Lakes; and already the London Missionary Society has established itself on the upper waters of the Congo." The comparison is made, and may well be made, with the workmen in the Mont Cenis Tunnel, and it might be made with those ancient workmen of Siloam, who, in the Hebrew of their recovered inscription, boast how, at the two ends of the sacred channel, "workmen lifted up tool against tool," till they met in the middle. "We may believe that in the very near future these laborers of Christ will meet and join hands in the centre of the Continent."

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

CHURCH INCORPORATION.

ABOUT two years ago the legislature of Massachusetts passed an act authorizing the incorporation of ecclesiastical bodies, and allowing them to assume the entire management of their temporal affairs. Many churches have taken advantage of this opportunity to dispense with the services of a "society"; and others undoubtedly would, were they aware of the simplicity of the necessary steps. The order of procedure is as follows: Some member of the church must post, in a conspicuous place near one of the main entrances of their place of worship, at least fifteen entire days before the appointed time, a notice to the members of the church that a meeting is to be held for the purpose of organizing a church corporation.

On assembling at the appointed hour and place, a temporary clerk should be elected by ballot; all resident members of the church, of twenty-one years of age and over, without distinction of sex, and none others, having the privilege of voting and holding office.

After the oath has been administered to the clerk by a justice of the peace, or some other duly authorized official, the election by ballot of a moderator is in order. An affirmative majority vote, of those present and voting, in favor of incorporation is sufficient. This having been secured, some person or committee may present a series of by-laws for the proposed corporation, which, after discussion, should be voted upon article by article.

Then follows the election, by ballot, of the officers, including a "Standing Committee" of not less than three nor more than seven members, and any others required by the by-laws, the oath being administered to the permanent clerk.

The call for the meeting (with the sworn statement of the subscriber that the legal requirements had been fulfilled), the records of the meeting, including the by-laws adopted and the officers elected (with the sworn statements of the temporary clerk and of the permanent clerk as to their accuracy), and a formal application for incorporation, signed by a majority of the "Standing Committee" elected by the corporation, should be sent to the Commissioner of Corporations in Boston, with five dollars. In due time the papers of incorporation will be forwarded.

The church can become a corporation without any action on the part of the "society," even against the wish of the "society," but cannot possess itself of the property nor assume the society's privileges and obligations, until the latter by a three-fourths vote of those present and voting at a duly called meeting has sanctioned the transfer. One church was quietly incorporated, and in about a year the "society" voluntarily gave place to it; and another incorporated church now is waiting patiently and expectantly for the "society" to abdicate, that the church may become the temporal and spiritual sovereign in her own domain.

Unless by-laws specifically state restrictions and conditions of membership, all resident church-members of twenty-one years of age and upward are, in virtue of that membership, members of the corporation; and though not present at the meeting, share all the privileges and responsibilities of the corporation. The property of the corporation alone, and not that of its members, is liable for its financial obligations.

All papers, for some of which there are blank forms, should be drawn and all steps taken under the direction of legal counsel.

Most churches, thus far, under this act, have incorporated the ecclesiastical body, thereby making all its acts corporate. This method presents serious objections. A corporation should have certain technical restrictions which would embarrass a church. Every corporation meeting, for example, should be announced one week previous by a posted written notice. A church, however, should be free to transact business at any of its regular gatherings. How often invitations to councils and other such matters present themselves and demand immediate action! A corporation allowing the transaction of business on all such occasions, without previous notice, would be sadly defective; but a church, restricted as a corporation should be, often would be hampered.

But another more serious objection presents itself. If the church is thus incorporated, all church-members under twenty-one are excluded from voting in the calling of a pastor, the election of spiritual officers, and in the settlement of every ecclesiastical as well as financial question.

If any limitation in church suffrage is necessary, spiritual qualifications rather than age should be made the test.

How many earnest consecrated Christians, some now efficient officers, some faithful teachers, would be excluded from active participation in deciding the action of the church! Such exclusion is inexpedient, unfair, and fortunately not necessary.

The Eastern Avenue Church of Springfield, being without a "society," desired incorporation, but objected to such restrictions.

Counsel having been consulted, it was found that all the advantages of incorporation without these disadvantages could be secured by the following plan. The ecclesiastical organization is left intact, as in any church having a "society," with its customary privileges and responsibilities, and with its own officers, by-laws, and records.

As in the other plan of securing incorporation, a meeting is called of resident church-members of twenty-one years of age and upward. They vote however not that the church shall be incorporated; but that a corporation shall be formed with its own by-laws, officers, and records; that its membership shall consist of all resident members, of twenty-one years of age and upward, of that particular church; that its object shall be to hold the property and manage the temporal affairs of that church; and that it shall have only such powers as the church intrusts to it. The result is, an ecclesiastical church and a corporate church, which really are identical — the former transacting all ecclesiastical business according to customary methods and allowing all church-members full privileges, the latter managing the financial affairs according to legal requirements and withholding the ballot from minors.

No confusion need arise, even in daily conversation, the one being termed the church and the other the corporation. Nor is this plan, whereby the same individuals act both as an unincorporated ecclesiastical body and as an incorporated financial company, without precedent. In one case in Springfield it has worked satisfactorily several years without friction or confusion.

Thus all the advantages of church incorporation can be secured without these disadvantages, and the law proves to be eminently satisfactory.

Edwin H. Byington.

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

NOTE. — Since writing the above I came across the following, which shows that the plan under consideration is not new, but falls in the line of the development of Congregational polity. Rev. H. M. Dexter in the "Congregational Quarterly" of October, 1864, in an article on the Church and Parish, says: "There are three methods under which the ordinary work of an ecclesiastical organization in any given locality may be performed, its offices sustained, and its labors upon the world around managed. . . .

I. The Church, simple and alone. This is the New Testament plan. . . .

II. The Church, for all secular purposes acting as a parish. This would involve the existence of a legally formed "society" or parish, whose constitution should identify its membership with that of the church. The result would be that the same individuals would constitute both the Church and Society, and when acting in one form and under one set of by-laws would be the church, and when acting in another form and another set of by-laws would be the parish. . . .

III. The Church and Parish, the common method of the present time."

E. H. B.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

THE religious element affects two great questions in British politics, — our national education, and the Church of England as a political institution established by law. Both of these questions have been prominent lately. The position of the national education question is in brief this: that the schools and colleges under the control of Anglican clergymen demand additional money grants from the Government, which the House of Commons is unwilling to allow unless the education given is more efficient, or unless popular control takes the place of the management of the clergy. The Government some months ago introduced for the approval of Parliament a new Education Code, regulating afresh the requirements expected of schools entitled to state aid: this code was generally admitted to be a great advance from an educational point of view; but it was unsatisfactory to the clergy, because it demanded better instruction, better schools, and wider range of subjects, without giving what they considered an adequate increase of grant. The result is that this new code has been withdrawn, and educationalists must be still content with a lower standard of instruction till the quarrel between the parties of clerical and popular control can be settled, or the government of the day is strong and determined enough to displease one or both of them. In like manner, a bill introduced into Parliament to promote technical education has failed to become law, chiefly owing to this same rivalry between the clerical and popular parties. It is certainly a deplorable fact that national ends of admitted utility and value are sacrificed to ecclesiastical jealousy of the people or popular jealousy of the church.

The constitutional aspect of the religious problem, the question of retaining a state church, was prominent at the general election of 1885, since which it has retreated into the background. But it is now beginning again to excite attention. This is partly due to a motion in favor of the disestablishment of the church in Wales having been brought forward in the House of Commons: the motion, though lost by fifty-three votes, was supported by the official members of the Liberal party, which is now pledged to carry out this reform when it again attains to power. It is true that Mr. Gladstone, the great Liberal leader, took no part in the debate nor in the voting, but he has since explained his action, and his adhesion to disestablishment for Wales has been given. At the same time Mr. Gladstone spoke of the claim of the Scotch to the disestablishment of their Kirk, which he considers an easier, if not a more desirable, object. He even referred to the disestablishment of the church in England with qualified approval, but viewing this as an event which would not be in his lifetime.

Though the disestablishment of the Church of England may not be at present within the range of practical politics, it is not far outside that range, and it might easily be brought within it. The trial of the Bishop of Lincoln for ritualistic practices, to which reference has been made in previous "*Notes from England*," continues to progress very slowly; but the progress made during the last three months gives encouragement to those whose sympathies are with the prosecution: the Court of the Archbishop decided that it had jurisdiction to try him, and decided against the plea that a bishop is not included in the word "minister," a plea

which if established would have succeeded in preventing his condemnation. If, as seems quite possible, the Bishop be finally condemned and commanded to desist from these ritualistic ceremonies in question, the position of the Church of England may become very critical. The Bishop has the sympathy of a majority of the clergy, and of a large number of very vigorous and enthusiastic laymen, who desire to have freedom, as their leader, Lord Halifax, lately said, "to celebrate the Holy Communion, the Mass in English, in the old traditional way." This party claims that "it is impossible to dissociate ritual from doctrine." Consequently, if the Bishop of Lincoln is condemned for celebrating the "Mass" in the way which he deems absolutely essential, one cannot say how the position of the disestablishment question may not be altered or improved, possibly even by a large number of churchmen favoring freedom from state control as their only means of attaining what they consider essential truth.

Another question, semi-political and semi-ecclesiastical, which is a constant bone of contention, is the question of tithes. There is at present before Parliament a bill which aims at making the collection of tithes more easy for the clergy and other possessors of tithes. The bill is likely to be dropped before long; but discussion upon it has shown what a complicated and dangerous subject this is. Tithes are paid in England on the value of land at a rate varying with the average price of corn; in some places the land is tithe free; but in most parishes, especially in agricultural parts, it is a serious burden. Generally the tithes go to the clergyman of the parish, and in these cases the payment may be a grievance if the people are dissatisfied with their clergyman, or the tithepayer is not a member of the Established Church. In some parts the tithes go to persons or corporate bodies at a distance; for instance, some parishes in Wales pay their tithes to colleges of Oxford University, from which they derive no benefit whatever, or a very distant and uncertain benefit: here tithes are felt to be intolerable, and the demand is for a radical reform which shall hand over the tithes to local objects, such as educational institutions or relief of local taxation. The whole question is one of extraordinary complexity and difficulty, and time alone will decide whether it can be satisfactorily handled apart from, or in conjunction with, the disestablishment of the church.

During the last month a social event has excited interest among all classes, — the betrothal and marriage of the eldest daughter of the Prince of Wales to the Earl (now the Duke) of Fife. Of course any event of this kind gives endless opportunities for gossip and rumor, and is a godsend to the illustrated papers. But it has also roused a political controversy, as the announcement of the betrothal was accompanied by a message from her Majesty the Queen to the House of Commons requesting that provision be made for the eldest son and eldest daughter of the heir-apparent. As the total cost of the royal family is nearly one million sterling per annum, some members of Parliament have been unwilling to sanction any further grant to the royal family, and considerably over one hundred members were willing to undergo the unpleasant reproach of want of loyalty by voting against any further grant. This is taken to show that, if at the beginning of another reign the Liberal party are in power, the present method of paying the royal family will be altered.

A large sum is now voted from the Consolidated Fund for what is called the Civil List, which provides for the cost of the court officials, the maintenance of the royal palaces, parks, yachts, etc. Besides this, the Queen has sixty thousand pounds (300,000 dollars) annually for her own privy purse, and sums over from the Civil List are transferred to the privy purse of the Crown. Owing largely to the comparative retirement in which Queen Victoria has lived for several years, large sums are known to have been so handed over to her privy purse, and it has been stated, and not denied, that her private savings amount to upwards of three millions. The secrecy which shrouds the actual truth, and the suggestions and suspicions thereby aroused, are no doubt unfortunate, and the cause of some discontent. This feeling has been aggravated by the fact that a number of the daughters and granddaughters of the Queen have married German princes, more or less impecunious, and have received through them allowances or dowries, which have come from the English tax-payer's pocket. All this may possibly be altered at the beginning of a new reign, when the money arrangements for the maintenance of the royal dignity are revised and determined afresh. Any objection to our monarchy on the mere ground of its expense is felt by all serious politicians to be of very little weight; but in a democracy, such as Britain is now more and more becoming, such objections may have a sinister influence. Open republican ideas are rarely expressed among us; and it is felt that a monarchical constitution is well adapted to preserve the sense of unity and solidarity, which is not readily understood in all parts of a vast empire on which the sun never sets, and which contains so many differences of climate, language, race, religion, and institutions.

Mention may be made of two books, which are both hopeful signs of the times, and which show the desire to understand the historical and political development of other countries as well as of our own. "The Swiss Confederation," by Sir F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham (London, Macmillan, 1889), describes the growth of the Swiss Republic and its present political and social life. An Englishman reading it longs for his own country to learn from the Swiss how the public services may be economically as well as efficiently carried out, and the lesson of a simple, harmonious, and most thorough system of national education. The study of Swiss politics ought to be of value to our statesmen, and the recent Swiss experiment of making the liquor traffic a Government monopoly, which is only just noted in this book, may be productive of very good results. Americans ought to find this work of value, if only because it contains a chapter on the comparison of Swiss and United States political institutions.

Dr. Sophie Bryant's "Celtic Ireland" (London, Kegan Paul, 1889) is a study of the Celtic racial element in the history and customs of the "sister isle," and indirectly suggests that a solution of the Irish Question in politics must start by recognizing the national sentiment of the Irish people. The book does not lay claim to original research, but is remarkable in connecting antiquarian and historical learning with the life and problems of to-day: as such it is a type of book not yet sufficiently common.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

Joseph King, Jr.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

DARWINISM : An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection with some of its Applications. By ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1889.

No one could discover from a perusal of this book that Mr. Wallace had come near to anticipating Darwin in the statement of the great theory to which the latter has given his name. Not only is Mr. Wallace silent as to his own part in the matter, but he declares that the whole educated public has come to accept the origin of species from other allied species by the ordinary process of natural birth as unquestionable, and that "this vast, this totally unprecedented change in public opinion has been the result of the work of one man." He maintains enthusiastically that Darwin is "the Newton of Natural History," and that his discovery has not only thrown a flood of light on the process of development of the whole organic world, but has also "established a firm foundation for all future study of nature." Such generous suppression of all personal jealousy under circumstances involving the most illustrious crown of fame that this generation has bestowed, strongly prepossess the reader in Mr. Wallace's favor.

The aim of his work is to restate the theory of the origin of species, supporting it by selections from the enormous mass of evidence that has accumulated since Darwin wrote, and to examine the attempts that have been made — not indeed to overthrow the theory, for that can hardly be said to have been seriously attempted — but to minimize the agency of natural selection and to subordinate it to laws of variation, of use and disuse, of intelligence and of heredity. Although many of the questions considered, such as the effect of isolation, the "swamping" results of intercrossing, the sterility of hybrids, and the extent to which variations exist, are of interest chiefly to professed naturalists, yet the facts that are brought forward as throwing light upon these questions are too striking to be uninteresting to any reader. On the other hand, the evidence for natural selection, as a principle, consists largely of matter with which naturalists are well acquainted, but which has a peculiar fascination for those who are not familiar with the subject, or who have not considered the significance of these facts. No one can read without delight the wonderful instances of adaptation related in the chapters upon "The Origin and Uses of Colour in Animals," and "Warning Coloration and Mimicry." In collections of evidence of this character there is a singular blending of the pleasure arising from the intrinsic charm of the facts with that arising from their aptness as proofs. As modern states rival one another in the assiduity with which they build armored vessels that can resist heavy ordnance, and then invent ordnance that can demolish these vessels, so throughout nature there is an incessant contrivance of defensive and offensive structures and faculties, a never-ending process of adaptation to the requirements of the struggle for existence. Although Mr. Wallace is not gifted with a particularly graphic style, — his style is, indeed, to us nearly indistinguishable from that of Darwin, — yet he develops his argument with such judgment and skill, and with such a wealth of knowledge, that its effect is overwhelming.

We shall select a single instance illustrating the theory of warning colors, which is instructive because the power of predicting what will

happen in a given case is a test of the truth of a theory. Mr. Belt found in Nicaragua a little frog "gorgeously dressed in a livery of red and blue, which did not attempt concealment, and was very abundant, a combination of characters which convinced him that it was uneatable. He therefore took a few specimens home with him, and gave them to his fowls and ducks, but none would touch them. At last, by throwing down pieces of meat, for which there was a great competition among the poultry, he managed to entice a young duck into snatching up one of the little frogs. Instead of swallowing it, however, the duck instantly threw it out of its mouth, and went about jerking its head as if trying to get rid of some unpleasant taste."

On one point Mr. Wallace is more Darwinian than Darwin—the development of male ornament under the influence of female preference. He argues that in the struggle for existence any attempt to select mere ornament would be utterly nugatory, unless the most ornamented always coincide with "the fittest" in every other respect; while, if they do so coincide, then any selection of ornament is altogether superfluous. In fact, as he maintains, ornament is the natural product and direct outcome of superabundant health and vigor, and female selection is a superfluous explanation. We do not clearly see why it should not be at least a co-operating cause, nor how the many cases of unornamented males are to be accounted for; but this is a question for professed naturalists to deal with.

The principal value of this work for most readers lies in its lucid and succinct statements of Darwinian theory, and in its classification of facts according to their availability as evidence. On this account it will be found a convenient manual for the use of those who desire to be informed of the present state of scientific thought upon these important subjects. For a large class of readers, however, its interest will chiefly consist in the emphatic expression of the author's opinions upon certain collateral matters. Many writers have dwelt upon the struggle for existence as presenting so vast an amount of cruelty and pain as to be revolting to our humanity, and as rendering the belief in an all-wise and benevolent Ruler of the universe impossible. The author quotes the language of a brilliant writer, Mr. Winwood Reade:—

"Pain, grief, disease, and death, are these the inventions of a loving God? That no animal shall rise to excellence except by being fatal to the life of others, is this the law of a kind Creator? It is useless to say that pain has its benevolence, that massacre has its mercy. Why is it so ordained that bad should be the raw material of good? Pain is not the less pain because it is useful; murder is not less murder because it is conducive to development. Here is blood upon the hand still, and all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten it."

In opposition to this view, which has been recently advanced by Professor Huxley as fatal to the theory of the benevolent government of the world, Mr. Wallace boldly asserts that there is good reason to believe that the supposed torments and miseries of animals have been greatly exaggerated, being chiefly the reflection of the imagined sensations of cultivated men and women in similar circumstances, and that the amount of suffering caused by the struggle for existence among animals is altogether insignificant. His chief points are the freedom from the anticipation of death enjoyed by animals, resulting probably in the almost perpetual enjoyment of their lives; the absence of pain in cases of death by

violence; and the positive pleasures with which the lives of most animals are filled. For the development of this argument we must refer our readers to the book itself. The conclusion is that the struggle for existence really brings about the maximum of life and the enjoyment of life with the minimum of suffering and pain.

While Mr. Wallace fully accepts the descent of man from some ancestral form common to man and the anthropoid apes, he wholly repudiates the conclusion that the spiritual nature of man has been derived under the same laws of variation and natural selection. He claims that there are a number of mental faculties which either do not exist at all, or exist in a very rudimentary condition in savages, but appear almost suddenly and in perfect development in the higher civilized races. The characteristics of these faculties are inconsistent with the action of the law of natural selection in their production, and some other cause is necessary to account for them. This cause is man's spiritual nature; and to the objection that this is calling in a new cause, the reply is made that there are at least three stages in the development of the organic world when some new cause must have come into operation. These stages are: first, the change from inorganic to organic; second, the introduction of sensation or consciousness; and, third, the appearance of the moral nature in man. This view is summed up in a spirited passage, from which we extract a few sentences:—

"Those who admit my interpretation of the evidence now adduced—strictly scientific evidence in its appeal to facts which are clearly what ought *not* to be on the materialistic theory—will be able to accept the spiritual nature of man as not in any way inconsistent with the theory of evolution, but as dependent on those fundamental laws and causes which furnish the very materials for evolution to work with. They will also be relieved from the crushing mental burthen imposed upon those who—maintaining that we, in common with the rest of nature, are but products of the blind eternal forces of the universe—. . . have to contemplate a not very distant future in which all this glorious earth—which for untold millions of years has been slowly developing forms of life and beauty to culminate at last in man—shall be as if it had never existed; who are compelled to suppose that all the slow growths of our race struggling towards a higher life, all the agony of martyrs, all the groans of victims, all the evil and misery and undeserved suffering of the ages, all the struggles for freedom, all the efforts towards justice, all the aspirations for virtue and the well-being of humanity, shall absolutely vanish, and, 'like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a wrack behind.'"

To Mr. Wallace and those who hold with him, the universe is a grand, consistent whole, adapted in all its parts to the development of spiritual beings capable of indefinite life and perfectibility. What is termed "evil" on the earth may be the most efficient means of this development, for we know that the noblest faculties of man are strengthened and perfected by struggle and effort. The warfare against physical evils in the midst of danger has developed courage and industry; by the battle with moral evil, in all its hydra-headed forms, the nobler qualities of justice and mercy and humanity and self-sacrifice have been steadily increasing in the world. Such having been man's development in the past, he has before him a still higher future.

D. McG. Means.

NEW YORK.

WORD STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By MARVIN R. VINCENT, D. D., Baldwin Professor of Sacred Literature in Union Theological Seminary. Vol. II. The Writings of John; The Gospel, the Epistles, the Apocalypse. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889.

By the publication of the second volume of this excellent work, Dr. Vincent has increased the debt already due him from the Christian public. This public is, doubtless, not so limited as the modest author thinks. For while "the critical student of the Greek Testament will find himself here on familiar, and often on rudimental, ground, and will understand that the book has not been prepared with any design or expectation of instructing him," he will, at the same time, often find here the results of critical research in a convenient form, and the mature judgments of a careful and conservative scholar.

The plan of the work, with its advantages and liabilities, was well discussed by Professor Hincks in his notice of the first volume in the *ANDOVER REVIEW* of January, 1888.

The aim of this volume does not permit any examination into the authorship of these five books of the New Testament, though it is manifest that Dr. Vincent regards them all as the work of the Apostle John. Confidence in his conclusions upon such subjects is, perhaps, slightly weakened by his remark that the author names himself in the Apocalypse and not in the Gospel, because the Gospel is *historical*, and the Apocalypse *prophetic*, and, therefore, in the latter "the name of the author is required as a voucher for the revelations granted him." If that was John's aim in naming himself he has been singularly unsuccessful.

This suggests the danger which besets a work of this nature, to which Professor Hincks has already called attention, namely, of finding reasons for the use, or omission, or choice of words which are not well supported. It is very doubtful whether *ἀνὴρ* is used in John i. 30 of Jesus "with a sense of dignity"; since *ἄνθρωπος* is found in very similar passages — e. g., iv. 29; vii. 46; ix. 11. Is it not pressing a word too far to say that *ἐγένετο* in i. 3 expresses "the passage from nothingness into being," so that, in the words of Westcott, quoted with approval, "this statement sets aside the notions of eternal matter"? Certainly in i. 30 *γένονεν*, referring to Christ, can hardly be used to denote "the passage from nothingness into being." It is remarkable that Dr. Vincent should adopt Trench's distinction between *αἰρέω* and *ἐπαράω* (pp. 202, 259) without referring to Dr. Ezra Abbot's searching monograph upon this distinction, which has, doubtless, convinced the majority of scholars that Trench was in error.

The usefulness of the book is much increased by full indexes. A running head-line, noting the chapters and verses considered on each page, would have added to the ease of reference.

W. H. Ryder.

GESCHICHTE DES VOLKES ISRAEL. Von DR. BERNHARD STADE, Professor an der Universität Giessen. Zweiter Band. I. Geschichte des vorchristlichen Judenthums bis zur griechischen Zeit. Von Dr. Bernhard Stade. II. Das Ende des jüdischen Staatswesens und die Entstehung des Christenthums. Von Lic. theol. Oskar Holtzmann. 8vo, pp. 679. Berlin: Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1888.

The first volume of this work, the history of Israel down to the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B. C., was noticed in the *ANDOVER REVIEW*

for May, 1888; pp. 547 ff. The First Part of the volume now before us, by Professor Stade (pp. 1-269), brings us to the close of the period of Persian domination; the continuation of the history, to the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70 A. D., is written by Oskar Holtzmann.

Professor Stade's work is distinguished by the same qualities which were remarked in the earlier volume. Its greatest merit seems to me to be the insight it shows into the movement of religious thought, and the author's quick discernment of the intrinsic worth, as well as the historical significance, of the individual moments in the development. In the period to which we have now come, the movement of religious thought is the history. The external history of the Jews from the Exile to Alexander the Great would fill but a few dreary and barren pages. But the apprehension, and assimilation into the very flesh and blood of a people, of those religious truths which have become the inheritance and blessing of the world, is a chapter in the history of human thought—to speak of no higher interest—of unsurpassed importance.

In the first chapters Professor Stade sketches the situation of the Jews in Babylonia, which was by no means what the terms Captivity or Exile might lead us to think. Deportation was in fact only a kind of compulsory colonization, and in a material sense there can be no doubt that the most were before long quite as well off as they had been in the old home. But in the overthrow of the national state, and, above all, in the cessation of the worship of Yahwe in the Temple on Mount Zion, it seemed for a moment as if the national religion had received its death blow. The author shows how it came that the religion of Israel overlived this catastrophe, and, on the other hand, how it was transformed by it. The old popular conception of the character of Yahwe, and of Israel's relation to him, was wholly irreconcilable with what had happened. But the prophets had all along foretold this very thing; and now the righteous God they preached had confirmed their words. It was plain that they knew Yahwe. Moreover, in this dark hour they alone had the word of hope, of deliverance. To them the heart of the people turned and recovered faith.

Ezekiel is the man of this crisis. "He becomes the spiritual father and guide of the exiles. The ideas by which the Jewish church was gathered out of the exiles have their root in his theology. He taught his companions in misfortune to see in the destruction of the city the well-deserved punishment of Israel's moral corruption and the sins of its worship, while at the same time he strengthens their trust in God and keeps them from despairing of the better future of Israel. He detaches them from the past and its ideals by setting before them new ends, and showing them the way in which they shall regain the favor of God." It is gratifying to see that Stade knows how to do justice to a prophet who, though his importance has of late been more fully recognized, has found little sympathy or appreciation either among the critics or their opponents. The significance of his hard and mechanical doctrine of individual retribution in that critical hour is brought out with great clearness. It was the specific form which the prophetic preaching of repentance took under the new conditions. In it Ezekiel starts out from the premises of the Deuteronomy. In contrast even to Jeremiah, he condemns the sin of Israel by the standard of a law. Of still greater moment is it that Ezekiel connects this stern doctrine, not merely with the righteousness but with the mercy of God. Its end is correction, not destruction. "For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God:

wherefore turn yourselves, and live." A very interesting chapter is given to the Messianic hope of Ezekiel. The restoration is not for Israel's sake or merit, but for His own holy name's sake, which hath been profaned among the nations. "And the nations shall know that I am the Lord, saith the Lord God, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes." The relation of the prophet's programme for the restoration, in chapters 40 ff., to the Messianic idea, is properly emphasized. Yahwe's return to Zion is the beginning of the new era. But the condition of his dwelling in the midst of his people is that they respect in everything his inviolable holiness. All the new arrangements of city and temple, all the new regulations of life and worship, have one end, — to separate the holy from the profane. The golden age can only come to a holy people; to fulfill the law of holiness is to bring in the Messianic times. It is easy to say that this is the beginning of legalism, that Pharisaism is the final outcome of this way of looking at life, that it is a lamentable falling off from the idealism of the prophets. But it was only through such an education that the ideas of the prophets could become the possession of the masses of the people.

In the light of the new convictions and new ideals which were won in the exile, the whole past of the nation appeared in a new character, and this change could not but leave its impress on the historical tradition itself. The transformation of the national history into theology teaching by example the lesson of God's judgment on Israel's refusal through all the generations to worship Him alone, in the way in which alone He would be worshiped, did not begin in the exile. The sweeping judgment on which it rests was enunciated by Hosea, as the Northern kingdom was hurrying on to its fate. But the Deuteronomic law which made the temple in Jerusalem the one place in which Yahwe might be worshiped, and put all the local sanctuaries, the high places, under the ban, condemned the whole history of Judah, from the building of Solomon's Temple, as one great disobedience. From this point of view the books of Kings were edited. Stade thinks that the Deuteronomic redaction of the books of Samuel and the Judges was later, and in its judgment goes a step beyond that of the Kings. I think we shall one day be able to show that a good deal of what is called the Deuteronomic element in the latter books is older. If we succeed in connecting one of the narratives which run through them with the Ephraimite historian, we should have to trace his judgment of the earlier periods of the history to the direct influence of Hosea. The analysis of these books is, for this and other reasons, one of the most important tasks of criticism just now.

Ezekiel's sketch of the New Jerusalem includes a revised ritual for the Temple. But the cessation of the cultus in the exile made it necessary that the old liturgical tradition of the priests should be reduced to writing, in order to preserve it against the restoration. Hence the extensive collections of ancient usage which we now find incorporated in the so-called Priest's Code.

The other great prophet of the Exile, the author of Isaiah 40–66, also receives a full and appreciative treatment. His lofty and inspiring conception of God, the creator and ruler of the universe; of his world purpose of salvation; and of Israel's prophetic mission to the world, make him the theologian among the prophets. From Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah flow the two main currents of Judaism, — the one exclusive and formal, the other spiritual and universal. Talmudical Judaism may be regarded as the outcome of the one, Christianity of the other. Rather,

they typify two eternal tendencies which may be traced in every age in both religions.

The return of a part of the exiles in 537 B. C., and the attempt to re-establish political and religious institutions in Palestine, in accordance with the convictions which had been gained in Babylon, on the basis of the enlarged Deuteronomic law, is the subject of the Second Book. To the understanding of the situation, it is essential to bear in mind that the leaders and the people were full of the thought that in them the fulfillment of the Messianic hope was already begun. The prophets of the time, Haggai and Zechariah, connect the realization of these expectations with the rebuilding of the Temple. Zechariah sees in Zerubbabel the offshoot of David's house who shall sit and rule upon his throne. These hopes were not fulfilled. As time went on, the contradiction between the ideal and the actual staggered faith and cut the nerve of action. A time of religious and moral decadence succeeded. Godliness had lost its end. The situation of the returned exiles in the midst of the people of the land, that is, the descendants of the Israelite population which had escaped deportation, was one of peculiar peril. By alliance and intermarriage with them, the new religious community was in danger of losing its distinctive character, and with it all the gains of the bitter experience of exile.

The work of Ezra must be regarded from this point of view. At the critical moment he came from Babylon, bringing with him "the law of his God which was in his hand." We have no reason to suppose that he was the author of this law book. "He makes far more the impression of a reformer than a writer." Rather the law was the product of the labors of the priestly circles in Babylon which had long busied themselves, not only with the study of the laws that had been handed down to them, but, after the example of Ezekiel, with new regulations adapted to the new needs. In form the work is as far as possible from being a code of law. It is an account of the origin of the sacred institutions of Israel. And its fundamental theory is, that the blessings which the prophets, Ezekiel included, expect in the Messianic future, were in the actual possession of Israel at the beginning of its history. In accordance with this theory the whole ritual, which Ezekiel had brought into such close connection with the Messianic hope, is ascribed to Moses. In this the authors went beyond the Deuteronomy on the same road. The characteristics of the priestly law are clearly stated, and, as in the case of Ezekiel, Stade deals with the legislative development more justly and in a more historic spirit than most of the critics of the school of Reuss, who sometimes speak of it in terms which savor more of prejudice than of insight.

The Third Book covers the century from Ezra and Nehemiah to Alexander the Great. The external history is almost a blank, and it has been customary to treat the internal history as equally barren. Recent criticism, however, assigns to this period no inconsiderable part of the Old Testament literature. Here belongs the second working-over of the historical tradition represented by the Chronicles. These books show everywhere the influence of the Priest's Code, as the earlier historical books do of the Deuteronomy. To this period, too, Stade ascribes most of the Psalms, which bear the unmistakable impress of post-exilic piety. The guilds of Temple singers cultivated sacred poetry and music, composing in the first instance for the public worship of the Temple. Having this liturgical character, the Psalms are primarily the voice of the worshipping congregation, not of the individual. The author thus

puts himself on the side of Olshausen, Reuss, Cheyne, Smend, and others in a controversy which has not yet closed. In consequence of the false formulation of the much disputed question of prediction and fulfillment, the Messianic element in the Psalter has not, in recent times, been recognized as it should. In reality it is "the most Messianic book of the Old Testament." In the contradiction between what was and what ought to be, the Jewish church sustained itself chiefly by this hope, and there are comparatively few Psalms in which it does not find some expression.

The Messianic hope was nourished by the study of the prophetic writings, which in this period was pursued with much earnestness. The scattered oracles were collected and put together. They had long been revered as sacred Scriptures; they now acquired canonical authority. They are, like the Pentateuch, writings in which the will of God is revealed, and by which his people have to regulate their life. This way of looking at them, while it was not quite just in an historical or religious point of view, had one great advantage. The ethical teaching of the prophets took its place beside the ritual law, supplementing it, and averting the danger that morals should either be completely overshadowed by ceremonial, or degenerate into it. The prophets' wider thought of the world and God's purpose for it was there to correct the exclusiveness of the church. In them the universal significance of the kingdom of God was proclaimed, as well as those demands which God makes, over and above the law, on the heart and conduct of man. The collection of the prophetic writings must have been accompanied by a redaction similar to that which attended the completion, in the same age, of the Pentateuch. The very form in which they had been transmitted made this necessary, still more the character of the writings themselves. The fact and the extent of this redaction has not, Stade thinks, been sufficiently recognized. Strangely enough, many who admit it without question in the case of the Pentateuch, persistently deny it when it comes to the prophets. The pages in which the author illustrates the character of this editorial work, and the changes which have been wrought by it in the text of the prophets, and his description of the "reproductive" prophecy which was one of the results of the revived interest in the older oracles, are among the most instructive in the volume. They open up to the student of prophecy a problem of no less magnitude and difficulty than the much discussed Pentateuch question itself.

At the end, in the chapter on Religion and Morals, the author brings before us, in clear and concise form, the result of the whole religious development thus far. I commend the study of it to the New Testament theologian as well as to the Old. It is a fitting conclusion to a stimulating and instructive book.

Professor Stade has shown that the criticism so often described as "negative" and "destructive," is in reality positive and constructive. He has done more. One of the objections often brought against the school of critics to which he belongs is, that the history of the religion of Israel, as they represent it, is unworthy of the character of the religion. If this were so, it would be a strong argument against the truth of their conclusions. But the objection will not apply to the work we have been reviewing. Whatever other fault may be found with it, it cannot be said that the development it supposes for the religion of the Old Testament is incompatible with its own character, or unworthy of the God whom we learn to know in it.

George F. Moore.

ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. Reprinted from "The Missionary Review of the World" for August, 1889. Pp. 21. New York: Funk and Wagnalls. Price, 20 cents.

We call special attention to this monograph on the relation of Christian Missions to Mohammedanism. The authorship is not acknowledged, but it is unquestionably that of one who has had the twofold advantage of having been a working missionary amongst the Moslems in Syria, and, more recently, the professor of theology in some American missionary seminary, where he has given profound study to Mohammedanism as a spiritual system.

We doubt if there is in existence a more satisfactory exhibition of the inward strength and resources of the Moslem faith. The author does not profess to give an exhaustive treatment of his theme; but within the brief compass of twenty pages he is eminently successful in presenting the duty of Christian missions to the Mohammedans; in showing what special difficulties must be overcome in order to the successful accomplishment of the duty; what should be the aim of missionary effort in meeting the charm and power of Islamism; and in indicating the spirit which should inspire and govern Christians in the proper discharge of their duty in the premises.

The writer is a remarkably clear, forcible, yet temperate and attractive expositor. The reader feels the accent of candor and fairness throughout the luminous and fascinating statement. By the simple art of truth the author persuades the reader into believing with the great Dr. Johnson, that "there are two objects of curiosity — the Christian world and the Mohammedan world; all the rest may be considered as barbarous." When the author reaches the question of method in dealing with this powerful foe of Christianity he is suggestive and practical; and yet, in common with missionaries everywhere, he is open and progressive, still seeking for guidance on this vital point of method, and would be grateful for light. It is to be hoped that every one who is loyal to the missionary enterprise will take pains to become acquainted with this able, interesting, and effective discussion.

J. W. Churchill.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

A. Bastian, Professor an der Universität Berlin. *Die Culturländer des alten Amerika*. Erster Band: *Ein Jahr auf Reisen*. Pp. xviii, 704 u. 3 Karten. Mrk. 18. Zweiter Band: *Beiträge zu geschichtlichen Vorarbeiten auf westlicher Hemisphäre*. Pp. xxxviii, 967 u. 1 Tafel. Mrk. 22. Dritter Band: *Nachträge und Ergänzungen aus den Sammlungen des Ethnologischen Museums*. Pp. 290, mit 6 Tafeln. Mrk. 13. Berlin: Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung. — Professor Bastian is generally regarded as "the greatest living ethnologist." The work which is now completed is of such fullness and erudition that its real value is in danger of being overlooked except by severe specialists. Yet, the book is a mine in which whoever is interested may work with great profit, not only in the facts of American antiquities, but also in the philosophy which anthropology is forming, either as a means or as a result of its in-


vestigations. Dr. Bastian undertook his extensive travels with the conviction that the most important field of anthropology is Central America. These volumes are the fruit of his travels and labors. The first volume contains two parts: first, an account of the author's journeyings in Chili, Peru, Ecuador, the Isthmus, and Guatemala; the second, pages 441-683, two essays, the one on the religion and customs of the ancient Peruvians, the other, a comparative study of the ancient constitutions of the priesthood and the state. In both of these essays it is supposed that religion originates in wonder or astonishment. The second volume is given to historical exposition, so far as it is possible, from the earliest records and chronicles. The subjects which receive special investigation are the Incas in Peru, the Chibchas and the tribes of the Magdalenen and Cauca Valleys, the races of the Isthmus and the Antilles, Guatemala and Yucatan, and the history of ancient Mexico. The parts that deal with Peru and Mexico are of special interest in the prominence given to the religious, social, and political relations of their ancient peoples. The third volume is composed of additions and supplements to the subjects which are treated in the second volume, and furnish much light on comparative anthropology. If we understand the author, his work throughout supports a racial and psychological monism. It is thought if the inductive method is fully carried out in psychology it will lead not to a high latitude transcendentalism, but to a real matter-of-fact foundation. Monism lies in the nature of thought, whether in religion or in philosophy. This view, which is supported by anthropology, in turn becomes a support to the whole sphere of knowledge, and gives signal advantages in every department of science. The effects of nature, the world over, of peoples and of civilizations, taken all together, show unity,—essential harmony. These volumes have the strength and the weakness incident to the method of writing history and making philosophy at the same time.

Friedrich Paulsen, Professor an der Universität Berlin. *System der Ethik, mit einem Umriss der Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre*. Pp. xii, 868. Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz (Besser'sche Buchhandlung). Mrk. 11.—Professor Paulsen's reputation as a lecturer, and as a clear, cautious speculator, finds in this fruit of his labor a full justification. Morality is regarded as a practical matter and of popular concern, having for its task the discovery, investigation, and declaration of these principles of conduct, the practice of which gives form to life and harmony to all its relations. But the practical always rests upon the theoretical, and no department of science can free itself from such a foundation. Theoretical ethics must include anthropology and psychology; in fact, ethics covers all philosophy in origin and aim. The author is not over-concerned to establish a method of ethics or to indorse any current theory, although the rationalistic view of the Kantian school is regarded as erroneous. Ethics is an empirical science in the same sense as is medicine, and moral laws are natural laws and known as natural laws in the same sense in which the rules of dialectic are natural laws, and are recognized as such. After the introduction, in which the nature and task of ethics are regarded, an outline of the history of moral philosophy, pages 23-171, forms the matter of the first book. The Grecian period was naturalistic, and inquired for the highest good. Christianity was supernaturalistic, and asked what are, according to the commands of God, duty and sin. Modern ethics, drawing from both the

Grecian and Christian, are not well-defined. The men of 1789 who sought to destroy the church took their stand on liberty, equality, and fraternity, looking for a kingdom of God on earth. Hobbes is placed at the head of modern moral philosophy, with his favorite idea of self-preservation, which Bacon had suggested but not developed. Dr. Paulsen agrees with V. Gizycki, that "of all English moral systems that of Shaftesbury is the most important," a judgment which we suspect of some rational explanation only because Professor Paulsen makes it. The third and seventh chapters of this book, treating respectively of the conversion of the old world to Christianity, and of Christian and modern moral philosophy, are of special value. The second book, pages 171-369, treats of the fundamental ideas and the principal questions of morals. Good and evil, the highest good, pessimism, duty and conscience, egoism and altruism, virtue and happiness, the relation of morality to religion, and the freedom of the will, indicate the eight chapters of this book. Religion is not to be divorced from morality; rightly understood, there is common ground. If life works upon faith, faith works upon life. Faith in the good, in the world, in God, strengthens courage and supports hope. Quoting Goethe, it is maintained that "periods of faith have always been brilliant, inspiring, and fruitful, not only for their own age, but also for succeeding ages, while all epochs of unbelief are barren and troublesome." The third book, pages 369-577, is divided into two parts: duties to one's self, or the individual virtues, and duties to others, or the social virtues. Under the former are given the nature of virtue, self-rule, the physical life, the economical life, the spiritual life, the honorable life, and self-destruction or suicide; under the latter, sympathy and benevolence, justice, brotherly love, and truthfulness. The fourth and final book, pages 577-861, is in many respects the most important division of the work. The family is regarded as the unit of society, and its dangers are passed in careful review. Associations and friendships, in view of social differences, individual and national, form a very suggestive chapter. The problems which grow out of property and the forms of society are recognized, pages 646-792, and discussed, mainly, from an historical point of view. The work closes with an estimate of the different theories touching the origin, constitution and functions of the State. Professor Paulsen has made a most excellent contribution to sociology. His work shows a moral earnestness. There is a readiness to recognize light from whatever source it may come. He holds that Christianity has stamped upon human consciousness three great truths. First, "suffering is an actual phase of human life;" second, "sin and guilt are real features of human life;" and, third, "the world lives through the disinterested sacrifice of the innocent and the just." Some arrangement, if possible, ought to be made with the author of this work for an English translation.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

WEIMAR, GERMANY.



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
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
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
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
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
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THE

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THE
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THE MINISTER'S STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹

THE minister I have in mind is one who has as much Hebrew as is usually got in a seminary course, and who wants to know more of the Old Testament. The daily duties of his calling, the preparation of sermons, his pastoral and social visiting, and the thousand and one miscellaneous demands on his time and thought, set narrow limits to his studious leisure; yet by wise economy of time, hard work, and patience, the busiest pastor can accomplish a great deal. But his time is too precious to be wasted in misdirected effort, or by working with poor tools. If these suggestions about apparatus and methods, which are the fruit of some experience both as a pastor and as a teacher, help any minister to get more out of his Old Testament study my object will be attained.

I have taken it for granted that this study will be, in part at least, upon the original text. But my assumption will no doubt be met with a question, Is it worth while for the ordinary minister to keep up his Hebrew? Would not the same time given to the study of the Old Testament in translation, with the help of good commentaries, be more profitable? And, for that matter, is it wise to insist on the study of Hebrew in the seminary? Would not the labor now spent in acquiring a meagre knowledge of the language be better spent on the branches of Old Testament study which are too often crowded out by mere grammar grinding?

¹ This paper is the second in a series of articles, designed for this REVIEW, on the Methods and Results of Biblical Science, under the direction of Professors Hincks, Moore, and Ryder. The first article appeared in the June number for the current year under the title, "The Gospel Miracles and Historical Science," and was prepared by Professor Hincks. — Eds.

It is certainly a great defect in our system of education, that the study of Hebrew is begun in the seminary. If students preparing for the ministry took Hebrew in the last two years of their college course, say two hours a week, the seminary being relieved of the drudgery of the elements could do its proper work far more satisfactorily, and perhaps the greatest cause of complaint would be removed. For the rest, the overcrowding of the curriculum, resulting from the multiplication of branches of study, will compel not only a readjustment of the course, but in all probability a modification of the system in the direction of greater freedom of choice on the part of the student. In some form or other the elective system is inevitable, in the professional school as well as in the college, and the experiment is now being tried in more than one of the seminaries.

But these questions raise a larger one. What is the object in studying the Old Testament in the original? What has the minister to gain by it? The answer which our fathers gave was definite and conclusive. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the Word of God, the rule of faith and life. Inspiration, in any proper sense, belongs only to the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek, which by God's singular care and providence have been kept pure in all ages. These alone are authoritative; to them the final appeal must lie. For the common man who seeks in the Scriptures his own instruction and edification, translations are a necessity; but the minister of the Word, whose tremendous commission is to proclaim to his fellow-men, "Thus saith the LORD," to teach them what they must believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of them, must not be dependent on translations and commentaries; he must read the very words which were immediately inspired of God, without the intervention of any human medium. The churches of the Reformation, therefore, with the exception of a few fanatical sects, all insisted that their ministers should know the original languages in which God's revelation was given, not only as a part of their general culture, "because it is highly reproachful to religion and dangerous to the church to entrust the holy ministry to weak and ignorant men," but as a specific requirement of their calling. For those who hold the Protestant doctrine of Scripture and the corresponding conception of the Christian ministry, this answer must still be sufficient. That there should be modern enthusiasts who decry the study of Greek and Hebrew, along with all other learning, as useless or harmful, is not strange; but it is

strange that they should call their attitude to the Scriptures conservative.

But I suppose that there are many ministers who are quite well aware that they do not think of the Bible just as the fathers did. The Word of God in Scripture is to them not so much "the rule of faith and practice," as a revelation of God in Christ which works faith and righteousness. "The words which I have spoken to you are spirit and life." The words in which we find spirit and life are for us inspired and inspiring. Inspiration is not merely an influence on the writers of Scripture, but a property of Scripture itself; it has the Spirit of God in it. Its mark is not freedom from error, but religious power. It belongs to the translations as much as to the original. The Old Testament, as well as the New, contains the Word of God, but the earlier Scriptures are, after all, not Christian Scriptures; it is not to them that we go for the words of eternal life. For those who hold such views, the motives which led the older Protestantism to lay such stress on the study of the original Scriptures have lost much of their force. But there remain reasons enough why the minister should not neglect his Hebrew Bible. He is a teacher of religion. He has not only to preach the gospel, but to show men what is the nature of the salvation in Christ which is offered in the gospel. But Christianity did not flash upon the world out of the blue sky. It is a historic religion which grew in the soil of Judaism and had its roots in the Old Testament. Like any other historical phenomenon it can be understood only historically. There is a sense in which the New Testament is the interpreter of the Old; the outcome of the development enables us to understand many things that were obscure in the development itself. But in a far more important sense the Old Testament is the interpreter of the New. To it we must go not only for the origin of the fundamental religious conceptions which Christianity took as it found them, but for the explanation of that which is new in it. The teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of God, for example, or Paul's doctrine of redemption, can only be understood in the light of the law and the prophets. As a teacher of the Christian religion the minister must, therefore, be a student of the older Scriptures. And such a knowledge of the history of the religion of Israel and of the theology of the Old Testament as he needs can only be got by a diligent study of the Hebrew Bible. The best translation will not alone serve such a purpose. In all critical points the translation itself requires the interpretation of the original. No one

would think that he had a right to speak on the philosophy of Plato, who knew Plato only in Professor Jowett's version; or on the theology of the Qoran, who was dependent on Sale or Palmer. This is eminently true of a literature like the Old Testament, the product of a different race, a remote age, and of ways of thinking and feeling very unlike our own. The study of the language is, in such a case, a preparation for the understanding of the literature in another way, which is not always thought of; it is the best introduction to that race psychology, ignorance of which is the most fruitful source of error, especially in matters of religion.

Not only for the meaning of a book must we go to the original, but still more for its power. A good prose translation may give the sense of Homer well enough, but the power and the charm are gone; only to one who knows the Greek can it even suggest what Homer is. Demosthenes in English is no longer Demosthenes. The directness, the passion, the mastery are gone. It is not otherwise with Job or Isaiah. No labor is better rewarded than that which makes the prophets and poets of the Old Testament speak to us in their own words. Then they live again. And such a knowledge of Hebrew is not beyond the reach of the busy pastor, if it is sought in the right way.

To the apparatus of Old Testament study belong, first of all, grammar and dictionary. No array of commentaries can take their place. I must begin, therefore, with a few words about these tools. Grammars are of two kinds: elementary books for learners, and reference grammars. The former, in accordance with their practical aim, set forth briefly the facts which it is essential for the beginner to know; the latter give not only a fuller presentation of the facts, but the historical or psychological explanation of the phenomena, and register more or less exhaustively the anomalies of form or construction. It is very useful, from time to time, to review connectedly the elements of the language, especially if we are not using it all the time. For this purpose the best book I know is Strack's *Hebrew Grammar*.¹ It is well arranged, and its statements are exact, clear, and concise; the work of an accurate scholar and a skillful and experienced teacher. For a more thorough study of the language a larger work is necessary. I fear sometimes that the multiplication of elementary text-books and the use of them with beginners leads a

¹ H. L. Strack. *Hebräische Grammatik*. 2. Aufl. Berlin, 1885. *Hebrew Grammar*. By H. L. Strack. Berlin, 1886. Mrk. 4.80. May be had of B. Westermann & Co., 838 Broadway, New York.

good many to try to make shift with these instead of a grammar. Waste of time and labor can be the only result. As soon as the study of the Old Testament is taken up, a full and well indexed reference grammar is indispensable. Of works of this sort in English I should give the preference, on the whole, to Gesenius, in the translation of Davies-Mitchell.¹ The syntax is, however, quite inadequate. This defect is to be remedied in the forthcoming (25th) edition of the original, in which this part of the work will be entirely rewritten by Professor Kautzsch. Mitchell's Gesenius may be supplemented by Müller's "Outlines of Hebrew Syntax,"² which is perhaps the best introduction to the subject; or by Green's Grammar,³ the syntax of which has been thoroughly revised, and is, notwithstanding some serious omissions, to be warmly commended. The more advanced student will use with profit Ewald's great work,⁴ and Driver's admirable monograph on the tenses.⁵

The best dictionary in English is still Robinson's Gesenius;⁶ but this work, the greater part of which dates from 1843, and which has appeared unchanged in a whole series of title editions since 1854, is in many ways badly out of date. The student who uses it will do well to disregard the etymologies and all inferences based upon them, and to verify as far as he can the examples cited in illustration of usage. The minister who knows German enough to use a dictionary in that language to advantage should have the tenth edition of Gesenius's *Manual Lexicon*, edited by Mühlau and Volck,⁷ which, though by no means perfect, better represents mod-

¹ Gesenius' *Hebrew Grammar*. Translated by B. Davies, LL. D. Revised and enlarged on the basis of the latest edition of Prof. E. Kautzsch, etc. By E. C. Mitchell, D.D. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1883.

² A. Müller. *Outlines of Hebrew Syntax*. Translated and edited by J. Robertson. Glasgow, 1882. 6s.

³ W. H. Green. *A Grammar of the Hebrew Language*. 4th ed. Pt. II. Syntax. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1889.

⁴ H. Ewald. *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Hebräischen Sprache des Alten Bundes*. 8. Ausg. Göttingen, 1870. The Syntax alone in translation: H. Ewald. *Syntax of the Hebrew Language*. Translated by James Kennedy. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1879.

⁵ S. R. Driver, M. A. *A Treatise on the use of the Tenses in Hebrew, and some other Syntactical Questions*. 2d ed. Oxford, 1881.

⁶ Edward Robinson. *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*. From the Latin of William Gesenius. 5th ed. 1854. Subsequent editions — the one before me bears the title 22d edition — are mere reprints.

⁷ Wilhelm Gesenius' *Hebräisches und Aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament*. 10. verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Von F. Mühlau und W. Volck. Leipzig, 1886.

ern scholarship. Fürst's dictionary, translated by Davidson,¹ is in some ways a useful book, especially on points of late Hebrew usage and rabbinical tradition, which were too much neglected by Gesenius, but it can hardly be recommended as a safe guide. The handy little glossary of Davies² gives too few references to serve the purposes of exegetical study. The great Thesaurus of Gesenius³ is still the standard work of reference in this department, especially in what belongs to the historical side of lexicography.

The later German editions of Gesenius's "Handwörterbuch" serve to some extent the purpose of a concordance, inasmuch as they aim to cite all the passages in which rare words occur. If a complete concordance is needed, Fürst's⁴ is the best we have; B. Baer's,⁵ though in more convenient form to handle, is less accurate, and has the inconvenience of giving its references in Hebrew instead of Arabic numerals. For most of the purposes for which a Hebrew concordance is wanted, the various substitutes known as Englishman's Hebrew Concordances, Hebraist's Vade Mecums, etc., can only be used with considerable loss of time and patience.

The common editions of the Hebrew Bible, almost without exception, give the text of Van der Hooght, Amsterdam and Utrecht, 1705, which has indeed become a kind of Old Testament Textus Receptus. Better editions can, however, easily be picked up at second hand for a small sum. Among these that of Opitz, Kiel, 1709, is esteemed for its accuracy; the type is bold and clear, and may be commended to those who find Hebrew hard on the eyes. One of the best, as it is one of the most beautiful, editions is that of Jablonsky, Berlin, 1699. Copies on large paper, giving a wide margin for notes, are often found. The edition of J. H. Michaelis, Halle, 1720, is, in a critical point of view, more valuable

¹ J. Fürst. *Hebräisches und Chaldäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament.* 3. Aufl., bearbeitet von V. Ryssel. Leipzig, 1876.

S. Davidson. *Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament.* Translated from the German of Fürst. 4th ed. London, 1871.

² B. Davies. *Compendious and complete Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon of the Old Testament.* Revised, etc., by E. C. Mitchell, D. D. Andover: W. F. Draper.

³ *Thesaurus philologicus criticus linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Veteris Testamenti.* 3 tom. Lipsiae, 1835-1853.

⁴ J. Fürst. *Librorum sacrorum Veteris Testamenti concordantiae Hebraicae et Chaldaicae.* Fol. Lipsiae, 1840.

⁵ B. Baer. *Jo. Buxtorfi concordantiae Bibliorum Hebraicae et Chaldaicae.* 4o. Stettin, 1861.

than either of these. Michaelis not only carefully compared the earlier printed editions, but collated some excellent manuscripts, notably the Erfurt codices. The margin is filled by a concise Latin commentary, which contains more matter than many thick books. The references to parallel passages especially are made with rare judgment. Unfortunately the poor paper on which it is printed, and the very small type used in the notes, make it hard reading. There are, however, large paper copies on better paper. For a number of books of the Old Testament we have now the critical editions of S. Baer, which give more accurately than any other the Massoretic text. These handy and cheap little volumes cannot be too highly commended.¹

The story is told, I think, of Hitzig, that he used to address his hearers at the beginning of the Semester on this wise: "Gentlemen, have you a Septuagint? If not, sell all you have and buy a Septuagint." The importance of the LXX to the student of the Bible can hardly be exaggerated. It represents a Hebrew text older than the official Palestinian recension, and often superior to it; it embodies an exegetical tradition from a time when the institutions of Judaism still flourished, and Hebrew was in some sense a living language; it contains a considerable part of the Jewish literature of the last centuries before Christ, a knowledge of which is essential to an understanding of the beginnings of Christianity; by its usage, rather than by that of the Greek classics, the language of the New Testament is to be interpreted; it was the Bible of the early church. Of older editions, that of Lambert Bos² is useful for its select variants, which include the readings of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, as far as then known. The text is that of the Roman edition. Other reprints of the Roman text are the editions of L. van Ess,³ and of Tischendorf.⁴ The critical apparatus of the latter is now supplemented

¹ S. Baer. *Liber Genesis*. Textum masoreticum accuratissime expressit, e fontibus masorae varie illustravit, notis criticis confirmavit. Praefatus est edendi operis adjutor Fr. Delitzsch. Lipsiae, 1869. *Liber Jesaiae*, 1872. *Liber Jobi*, 1875. *Liber duodecim prophetarum*, 1878. *Liber Psalmorum*, 1880. *Liber Proverbiorum*, 1880. *Libri Danielis Ezrae et Nehemiae*, 1882. *Liber Ezechielis*, 1884. *Quinque volumina*, 1886. *Liber Chronicorum*, 1888.

² L. Bos. *Vetus Testamentum ex versione septuaginta interpretum*, 40. Francoer, 1709.

³ L. van Ess. *Vetus Testamentum graece juxta LXX interpretes*. Leipzig, 1887. Reprint of a stereotype edition of 1824, with valuable Prolegomena by Nestle.

⁴ C. v. Tischendorf. *Vetus Testamentum graece, etc.* Ed. VII. Prolegomena recognovit, supplementum auxit E. Nestle. 2 tom. Leipzig, 1887. Stereotype edition of 1850, with Appendix containing Nestle's apparatus.

by the accurate collations of E. Nestle, which are bound in with the sixth and seventh stereotype editions of Tischendorf, as an appendix, but may also be had separately.¹ The new Cambridge edition of the LXX² gives the text of the manuscripts, taking the Vatican codex as a basis, and exhibiting in the apparatus the variants of all the uncials. When completed, this edition will supersede all others. A critical edition of the LXX will, however, still remain to be made.

For the Greek of the LXX the common dictionaries often leave us in the lurch. Sophocles includes all the words found in this version in his lexicon;³ but for the comparison of the Greek with the Hebrew, Schleusner's Thesaurus⁴ will be found very useful.

The Latin translation of Jerome is, after the LXX, the most important of the versions. For text criticism it yields much less than the Alexandrian version,—Jerome read the Hebrew substantially as we do,—but for the interpretation of the Old Testament it is of the greatest value. In making his translation he had the aid of native scholars, and it represents the best learning of his time, Jewish as well as Christian. The modern versions, from Luther down, and the whole current interpretation of the Old Testament, Catholic and Protestant, are dependent upon Jerome to a degree seldom realized. We have, unfortunately, no satisfactory edition. The Roman Vulgate is, in most of the Old Testament, based on Jerome's new translation from the Hebrew, but is by no means identical with it. The edition of Heyse-Tischendorf⁵ gives the Roman text, professedly with a collation of the Codex Amiatinus in Florence. The collation is said to be worthless. A good edition of the Vulgate is that of Vercellone, Rome, 1861.

The Polyglot of Stier and Theile⁶ exhibits the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, with Luther's German, in parallel columns, in a form

¹ E. Nestle. *Veteris Testamenti graeci codices Vaticanus et Sinaiticus cum textu recepto collati.* Leipzig, 1887. This can be used with Van Ess, or the earlier editions of Tischendorf.

² H. B. Swete. *The Old Testament in Greek, according to the Septuagint.* Vol. i. Genesis—iv. Kings. Cambridge, 1887.

³ E. A. Sophocles. *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine periods.*

⁴ J. F. Schleusner. *Novus thesaurus philologico-criticus, sive lexicon in LXX,* etc. 5 Parts. Leipzig, 1820–1821.

⁵ Th. Heyse, C. v. Tischendorf. *Biblia sacra latina veteris testamenti,* etc. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1873.

⁶ R. Stier, K. G. W. Theile. *Polyglotten-Bibel zum praktischen Handgebrauch.* 3 ed. 1864.

convenient for comparison; the LXX text, however, is edited on the most uncritical principles, and must be used with great caution.

In his study of the Hebrew Bible the minister will have two ends in view: first, to add to his knowledge of the language, to enlarge his vocabulary, and to gain greater readiness in the use of it; second, to train the exegetical faculties, to cultivate the accuracy, the methodical procedure, the fine tact, which are indispensable to the interpreter of a difficult text. These ends are naturally to be attained in different ways, the former by rapid and repeated reading of easy passages, the latter by the minute exegetical study of a book under the guidance of a good commentator.

If Hebrew has been long laid aside, it may be best, after a rapid review of the grammar, such as has been suggested above, to read over texts which were studied in the seminary, and to follow these by selections from the patriarchal histories in Genesis; for example, Abraham, Genesis xviii.-xxiv.; Joseph, Genesis xxxvii. ff. In general, for cursory reading, the historical books, Judges, Samuel, Kings, are to be preferred. Let me suppose that the book of Judges is taken up. How should we go about it? The first thing would be to read the book through carefully in the English version of 1885, noting the contents and divisions. When the reading is finished a minute analysis of the book should be made, and thoroughly impressed on the memory. The further study of the book should follow this analysis, and not the chapter divisions. Thus, for example, the first section does not end with chapter i. 36; but with ii. 5. It is a brief account of the conquest of Canaan, and contains a list of cities which Israel was not able to conquer, — Canaanite *enclaves* in the territory of the tribes. The whole, differing as it does very widely from the narrative of the conquest in the book of Joshua, is of the greatest historical value. We read this section in Hebrew with our attention fixed exclusively on the language, holding all questions of criticism, geography, and antiquities in abeyance. As a help to the understanding of the Hebrew, if any is needed, the Revised Version may be used, or, better, the Vulgate, which is in Judges a spirited translation, and not too literal. The use of the dictionary is not to tell us the meaning of common words, which can be learned with far less labor and loss of time from the context with the aid of a translation, but to coördinate the various meanings of a word we already know; to adduce examples cor-

roborative of usage ; to bring together all that can be learned about the meaning of rare and obscure words from usage, exegetical tradition, or etymological combination ; and to register peculiarities or irregularities of form. From the preparatory school on, the lexicon is chiefly used for a purpose for which it is not ordinarily necessary, and not used for the purpose for which it is indispensable. To fix the words in memory by a contextual association, it is a very useful exercise to read the Hebrew over aloud, carrying along the sense of the passage rather than a mental translation. This should be done not only with what we have just read, but with chapters which we have left for some time. Repeated and renewed impressions are the only means of securing what we have learned. Passages in which for any reason we are particularly interested may sometimes be committed to memory. To lay the foundations of a vocabulary, I often have my pupils make for themselves a glossary to a chapter or two, entering, as in a concordance, every occurrence of all words except the commonest particles, and advise them to learn it by heart in the process of making it. The 25th chapter of 1 Samuel is well suited to this purpose, as it contains, with few exceptions, only common words. For those who have made more progress, I know no better exercise than the retranslation of the LXX into Hebrew. On a second reading, geographical, archæological, and historical points may be investigated, and the text compared more closely with the versions. When a larger division of the book has been studied in this way, it should be rapidly reviewed to get the impression of the style by continuous reading ; and when the whole has been finished it should be read through again with especial attention to the light which it throws on the religious beliefs and practices of the people in old Israel, distinguishing, of course, between the stories of the Judges themselves and the later framework in which they are now set.

The Books of Kings might be read in a similar way. Samuel presents greater difficulties, in consequence of the corruption of the Hebrew text, but the minister who would know something of the state of the text and the resources of criticism should by all means attempt it, with his Greek Bible in hand. The German scholar will find Wellhausen's monograph a most useful guide,¹ and an excellent practical introduction to text criticism. Woods' paper² may also be read with profit.

¹ J. Wellhausen. *Der Text der Bücher Samuelis.* Göttingen, 1871.

² F. H. Woods. *The Light thrown by the Septuagint Version on the Books of*

For exegetical study the book of Isaiah might be taken for a beginning, not only on account of its intrinsic interest and importance, but because we are better off for helps on Isaiah than on almost any other part of the Old Testament. Canon Driver's "Isaiah: his Life and Times,"¹ is an admirable introduction to the book. It sets the prophet's work in the light of the history of his times, as we know it from Biblical sources and from the Assyrian monuments, and connects his words, as far as possible, with the occasions which called them forth. The critical questions which are started by the fact that there are a number of prophecies in the book of Isaiah which have no relation to Isaiah's age, but reflect the situation of a much later time, are discussed candidly and clearly. A thorough study of this little volume, with the English Bible in hand, will be the best preparation for the understanding of the prophecies, which, as historical utterances, must be interpreted by history. As a commentary there is none better than Cheyne's.² In it we have a new translation, often representing an emended text; introductions to the several prophecies; and a commentary, packed close with the fruits of a rich and varied learning; to which are appended critical and philological notes, and a series of essays on points connected with the book and its interpretation. The author thinks it wise, in the present state of Biblical scholarship, to separate, as far as possible, exegesis from criticism, and has endeavored in this volume to suppress himself as a critic. His views on critical questions may be learned from an earlier work, "The Book of Isaiah chronologically arranged,"³ and especially from his article "Isaiah," in the "Encyclopædia Britannica." The one drawback to the use of Cheyne's commentary for the end we have in view is, that it does not give the aid in the explanation of difficult words and forms which the student of the Hebrew text often needs. Unfortunately there is no recent English commentary which supplements it in this respect. The minister who reads German will find Delitzsch's excellent commentary⁴ valuable for

Samuel. Studia Biblica. Oxford, 1885. Professor Driver is shortly to publish Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel.

¹ In the Series, "The Men of the Bible." See ANDOVER REVIEW, vol. xi. (1889), 650.

² T. K. Cheyne. *The Prophecies of Isaiah.* 3d ed. New York: Th. Whitaker. 1884.

³ 1870.

⁴ Franz Delitzsch. *Biblischer Commentar über den Prophet Jesaia.* 3. Ausg. 1879. The English translation (T. & T. Clark) is from the 1st edition.

this purpose also. The brief notes in Bredenkamp's "Isaiah"¹ will also do good service. Cheyne's essay on "Isaiah and his Commentators," vol. ii., p. 268 ff, should be consulted by those who wish to know more of the extensive exegetical literature.

I will suppose, now, that the minister has prepared himself for the study of Isaiah by a careful reading of W. R. Smith's "Prophets of Israel,"² and Driver's "Isaiah," how shall he go to work? He will naturally first take up the prophecies whose genuineness is not challenged, since these must furnish the basis of comparison and judgment for the disputed chapters. Suppose, for illustration, that we have the fifth chapter before us. We should first read it through, as we did our historical texts, with the assistance of the Vulgate, the Revised Version, and Cheyne's translation, and make our analysis of the chapter. Then we are ready for the more minute study of the first division of the chapter, the beautiful parable of the vineyard, verses 1-7. We go through this, word by word, with dictionary and grammar, learning all that is to be learned about it in this way. For irregular forms the analytical appendix to the lexicon and the indexes to the grammar are to be used. If these do not suffice, we must have recourse to a commentary, — I have above recommended Delitzsch for this purpose, — or, if the difficulty arise from the state of the text, as is not infrequent, to the Critical and Philological Notes in the second volume of Cheyne. Questions of the latter sort, if of more than usual perplexity, may be reserved for special investigation afterwards. The results as they are worked out should be set down in a note-book, under chapter and verse, with references; and at first every word which has been looked up in grammar or dictionary had better be noted. This will enable us to review what we have studied without doing the work over. If the same word or form occurs again, reference should be made to the passage under which the results of our former investigation are recorded. Beside saving labor, the making of these cross-references cultivates the habit of remembering in what connection we have met a word before, a habit of the greatest value to the exegete. Next, the old versions, especially the Septuagint, are to be carefully compared, and differences of reading or of interpretation to be noted. It is a good plan to make such notes on the margin of the Hebrew Bible, if this is wide enough for the

¹ C. J. Bredenkamp. *Der Prophet Jesaia*. Erlangen, 1887.

² W. R. Smith. *The Prophets of Israel and their Place in History to the close of the Eighth Cent. B. C.* New York, 1882.

purpose ; or an interleaved copy may be used. The meaning of rare words may also profitably be "cribbed" in, not from the next best translation, but from the result of our own study. In this way we should go through the chapter.

Then we may well turn back and read the chapter over at a sitting, with an eye to the literary character of the composition ; the exquisite art of the opening parable, the climactic impression of the sixfold "Woe," the wonderfully vivid picture of the swift resistless oncoming of the Assyrian host. The historical and theological aspects of the prophecy next demand our attention ; the light it throws on the moral and religious state of the times ; the prophet's teaching of the character and will of God, of his hatred of Judah's sin, of the judgment and its instruments. What is learned thus should be compared with other utterances of Isaiah, and with the words of other prophets, especially those of his own century. For this purpose a reference Bible may be used ; the best is, perhaps, the *Variorum Bible*,¹ edited by Cheyne and Driver, which is useful also for the notes on various readings and interpretations. It will be time then to take up the commentaries, comparing them with our own results, and confirming, supplementing, or correcting the latter by them. Cases where the opinion of a good commentator differs from that which we had formed from our own study should be carefully reconsidered, but without undue deference to the "authority" of the book. There is no authority in exegesis but that of good reasons. Every student of the Bible, in however humble a way, should take pains to preserve and cultivate his own independence of judgment ; to make dictionaries and commentaries his advisers and helpers, not his masters. Many ministers, I fear, use commentaries in quite a different way, as a substitute for study rather than an aid in it. If they want to read a chapter, or to take the wise precaution of verifying a text in the Hebrew Bible, the commentary is their first and last resort. With what kind of a conscience an educated man can do that, I do not profess to understand ; equally little how he can give out as his own the mere plunder of a raid on somebody else's learning. I do not, of course, mean to imply that there is no other proper use of a commentary than that which I have described above. On the contrary, it is a very good plan to read with a commentary books which we have not been able to work over for ourselves. But the knowledge

¹ *The Holy Bible, etc., with Various Renderings and Readings.* Published by Eyre & Spottiswoode.

gained in this way, useful as it is, is to be regarded as provisional only.

When we have finished our study of the chapter it will be well to prefix to our notes on each subdivision a short descriptive title, or motto, in which its most distinctive truth or lesson is expressed, and to add to them such practical observations or suggestions for sermons as have occurred to us. The minister who studies a prophetic book in the way I have indicated will find it full of lessons for our own times, as well as of instruction and inspiration for the preacher. He will do wisely to note them down where they can be readily found, and where they will be recalled to him at each re-reading of the passage. But if he wants to preserve his own manliness and self-respect let him eschew homiletic outlines, sermon hints, and whatever else the second-hand ideas may be called which are marketed in preachers' magazines and a certain kind of commentaries. Besides, a man pays much too dear for ready-made sermonic material which he buys at the price of his own originality. It is not, therefore, as a quarry for sermons, or ideas for sermons, that I recommend the minister who is studying Isaiah to add to his exegetical commentaries G. A. Smith's volume on Isaiah in the *Expositor's Bible*,¹ but as an instructive illustration of what a good critic and interpreter can make of the book in the pulpit. If our Protestant laymen are to know anything worth while about the Bible, it must be through a revival of expository preaching; and expository preaching that intelligent men will listen to must be the fruit of faithful and well-directed exegetical study. That this sort of preaching has fallen into general disfavor and disuse, is due chiefly to the fact that ministers were too much in the habit of taking to it when they had not had time to prepare a regular sermon, and either crammed or improvised their material. Well done, it will always be popular. The minister who has studied the Old Testament should preach on it. It will quicken his interest and increase his tact in practical interpretation.

But where, I think I hear some of my readers ask a little impatiently, is time for all this to come from? I should answer that the pastor's difficulty is not ordinarily that he has not time enough, but that he can no longer, as in his student days, command long uninterrupted stretches of time. All his habits of study must be reformed. Many never adjust themselves to these

¹ G. A. Smith. *The Book of Isaiah*. Vol. I. Is. i.-xxxix. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1888.

new conditions, and think that because they cannot sit down for hours together at their books they have no time for study. We have to learn to use the broken bits of time, the intervals of our more exacting occupations. The course of study I have outlined above has been planned with special reference to this fact; that as little as possible may be lost by interruptions. That it can be carried out I know. In the first years of my own ministry I read a large part of the Old Testament in Hebrew on Sunday evenings, after the second service. For a while I devoted Monday morning to exegetical study; afterwards I set apart the first half hour every morning for this work, and found it an excellent preparation for sermonizing. Every one, of course, must fix upon the time which best suits his own circumstances and habits of work. If the time for these studies cannot be found in any other way, there are few who might not save it out of the hours they give to the newspapers, secular and religious, and the popular magazines. Indeed, most ministers would know the Bible very well if they devoted to it half the time they spend on reading as ephemeral as the grass of the field, "which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven." And, really, it is worth while.

George F. Moore.

THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN CITY CHURCH.

No cast-iron rules can be laid down for church work. Success depends often as much upon not doing some things as upon doing other things. The successful minister must be an eclectic, with a large liberty of action, a large knowledge of his church and its environment, and an average stock of sanctified common sense. The traditions of the past, and the experiences of others, are useful to him only so far as he is able to modify and adjust them to the conditions of his own field. Churches differ as individuals differ. The problem which confronts the country church differs from that which confronts the city church, and among the city churches the conditions of success are by no means the same.

There is one question, however, in the solution of which all the churches are vitally interested. It is the burning question of the age: How shall the masses be reached and converted? The problem bristles with difficulties, and to those who stand face to face with the churchless multitudes it seems almost insoluble.

Every attempt to solve it in a practical way is watched with sympathetic interest by all earnest Christians.

Every community, divided according to its relations to this subject, falls into three classes : first, the regular church-goers, who can be depended upon to support the religious institutions of the community under all circumstances ; secondly, the semi-occasional church-goers, who have some conscience concerning their religious obligations, whose hereditary instincts or early associations lead them to send their children to the Sunday-school and to attend themselves an occasional Sunday-school concert or service of worship ; and, thirdly, the non-church-goers, who have absolutely no interest in religious matters, who are never seen in God's house, and who practically do not know that there is such a house in the town. The question of churching and evangelizing the masses relates, of course, to these last two classes : to those who have a slight hold on the church, and to those who are indifferent to or opposed to it. The first class are already within the doors of the sanctuary, and their needs give rise to problems quite different from those which concern the non-church-going community.

Now the query arises, Are we not basing our preaching and our methods of work too exclusively upon the needs of this first class ? Are we not looking through their eyes, and hearing through their ears, and shaping our policy and administration more to suit their tastes and prejudices, than with a view of interesting and attracting these other two classes. Take the case of preaching, for instance. The regular church-goers have fixed, unconsciously perhaps, a certain standard for the proper sermon, which few preachers have the courage to depart from. This standard is usually determined by the tastes and whims of those who have a large influence in the congregation, and any violation of it is sure to arouse a kind of criticism which is exceedingly mortifying to a sensitive nature. Mr. A. is a man of large culture, and is proud of his attainments. He does not like the colloquial style of preaching, and shudders when his minister uses a provincialism, or a phrase which is adapted to catch the ear of the common people. Mr. B. has a horror of anything which savors of the drama. He does not want any acting in the pulpit. Mr. C., whose commercial morality does not quite square with the Decalogue, dislikes a minister who is continually harping on honesty in business, and other secular topics. He wants to hear the simple gospel. While Mr. D. refuses flatly to pay a dollar towards the salary of the man who drags politics or temperance into the pulpit. With these critics

before him the minister is tempted to prune his sermon and his delivery to meet their requirements, and in so doing clips off the very wings which would bear the truth to the hearts of the masses. One of the brightest thinkers in the English pulpit has recently said: "If we have preached badly, as undoubtedly we have, it is partly the fault of our hearers. For they have presented to us the horns of a very awkward dilemma. When we were not interesting, they called us dry; but when we were interesting, they called us irreverent, declared that we were secularizing the pulpit, and described our sermons by the opprobrious epithet of 'lectures.' In order to avoid the second horn of the dilemma, we have thrown ourselves upon the first. It may seem strange, but it is true that, much as society grumbles at the dullness of sermons, it really would not like them to be anything else. For if they were not dull they might be practical, and it would be extremely disagreeable to listen to a man who made one feel that there was anything wrong either with one's opinions or with one's conduct. Society does not want to be disturbed. It desires only the confirmation of its prejudices. In order to preserve itself from interference, and to preserve the pulpit in a state of uselessness, it has laid down a number of rules to which the preacher is expected to conform."

But it is not merely in the matter of preaching that we are catering to the regular church-goer rather than to the unchurched public. Most of our church work is trammelled with the bonds of exclusiveness. It is done for the most part within a narrow ecclesiastical sphere, and for the favored few who happen to be directly or indirectly interested in our denomination. What attractions has the ordinary prayer-meeting for the ordinary sinner? We are surprised when we see him in the prayer-room, and wonder what brought him there. A stranger happening into a country prayer-meeting sets the whole assembly agog, and is liable to be talked about for a week. Should a dozen business men or mechanics from the non-church-going classes invade the Friday evening meeting in some of our city churches, no one would be more startled than the Christians themselves. They would suspect a conspiracy of some kind.

And too often the social life of the church is as exclusive as the devotional life. It is planned and carried on with little reference to the needs of the outsiders. The Christian, instead of attending the social gathering with this question uppermost in his mind, What stranger shall I welcome and entertain to-night? goes with

the feeling that it is somebody's duty to entertain him ; and as a result, when a company of these Christians get together they wonder why everybody is so unsocial ; while the new-comer, feeling very much like an unbidden guest and an intruder, wonders whether he cannot quietly get his hat and slip out unobserved into the more congenial chill of God's greater temple.

It must be remembered that the non-church-goer, as a rule, regards as a bore the very thing which the Christian esteems as a privilege, and that in order to make him change his opinion he must be brought around to a different standpoint, where he can be made to see that the church is interested in the things which interest him. It is all very well to open our church-doors on the Lord's day and say to the masses, Come in. The sad truth is, however, they will not come on any such invitation. Eloquent preaching, fine music, comfortable seats may attract a few of the second class mentioned, — the semi-occasional church-goers, — but the latter class will respond to none of these things. Should those of us who are preachers take a canvass of our congregations for the purpose of finding how many of those who have listened to our preaching the past year were non-church-goers one, two, or five years ago, the result would doubtless surprise us. It is probable that in most of our churches the accessions of this kind are not as numerous as the divisions of the pastor's last sermon on the universal conquest of the gospel. The attendance has been increased, if at all, either at the expense of other congregations, or from the habitually non-church-going classes. Only in rare cases has any serious break been made in that circumambient wall of indifference and worldliness which is pressing hard upon us, and which, like the inclosing walls of the Inquisition prison-cell, is crushing the very life out of some of our churches.

Before a church can succeed very largely in evangelizing a thickly populated district it must, in a sense, put itself in the place of the non-church-goer, look through his eyes, and shape its methods somewhat according to his tastes and prejudices. Not that the church should conform to the world, but that it should be all things to all men in the true Pauline sense, that by all means it may save some. The spirit of selfish exclusiveness must give place to a broad spirit of adaptiveness. The average man of the world is likely to be interested in the church just as soon as he is convinced that the church is interested not merely in his spiritual but in his temporal welfare. So long as he is a natural man he will not and cannot discern spiritual things. They are foolishness

to him. The spiritual truth has no hold upon him. His spiritual nature is dead. In order to get him into an attitude where you can preach effectively to him, you must appeal first to that which is alive within him. That was Christ's method. He healed and fed men, and then He preached to them.

We hear a great deal said about preaching the simple gospel, the implication being that the church has done its whole duty when it has provided for the public a pulpit and a preacher. But what is the gospel? It has been well said, "that many of those who have this word constantly on their lips would be quite incapable of giving any clear account of what they mean by it." The gospel is preaching plus practice, truth plus life. It is truth exemplified in character, expressed in ministration, and materialized into beneficent institutions. It is the word made flesh, the truth working in and through all secular life. The preaching without the life cannot save the world, nor will it have much, if any, effect on the unchurched millions. If Christian life and ministration had been in proportion to Christian preaching the past eighteen hundred years, we should now be well on in the millennium. All through the ages there has been a tendency in the church to base its hopes of transforming the world upon truth declared, rather than upon truth exemplified,—upon doctrine, rather than upon practice, "and what have eighteen centuries to show for it? To-day three fourths of the globe is heathen, or but semi-civilized. After eighteen hundred years of preaching, how far has Christianity gone in the amelioration of the condition of the race? The torpors, the vast retrocessions, the long lethargic periods, and the wide degeneration of Christianity into a kind of formalistic and conventional usage, show very plainly that the past history of Christian preaching is not to be our model."

Christ knew that there would be many upon whom His words would produce little impression, and so He said: "Though ye believe not me, believe the works." "A tree is known by its fruits." "By this shall men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory . . . before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate them one from another. . . . Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come: . . . for I was an hungered, I was thirsty, I was naked, sick, in prison, and ye ministered unto me. Then shall he say also to them on the left hand, Depart: . . . for I was an hungered, I was thirsty, I was a stranger, naked, sick, in prison, and ye ministered not unto me.

Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye did it not unto me." This last passage is the most graphic statement found in the Gospels of the conditions of membership in Christ's earthly and heavenly kingdom. It makes that membership to depend, not upon something believed merely, but upon something done. *Come: for* I was in need and ye ministered unto me. *Depart: for* I was in need and ye ministered not unto me. This seems almost like a startling contradiction of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith, but it is not such. It is a far more comprehensive statement of that doctrine than many of Luther's disciples have been disposed to accept. It implies that kind of faith the *sine qua non* of which is works. The Christian who complies with these requirements, and transmutes his faith into ministration, need have no fears as to his influence over the masses. He becomes a potent magnet, in kind like unto his Lord, who, when lifted up in self-sacrificing love, was to draw all men unto himself. The same is true of the church. It will become attractive to the people when it becomes in the truest sense of the word a ministering church; when it exchanges its selfish exclusiveness for the broad, self-denying spirit of its Great Head. It should be the source and centre of all beneficent ministration. It should allow no other philanthropic or charitable institution, however worthy, to point to its closed doors and folded hands, and say: "What are you doing to relieve the sick, to aid the widow and the fatherless, to feed the hungry, and to raise the fallen?"

In neglecting these its prime duties it loses its influence in a field which legitimately belongs to it, and lets slip some of its grandest prerogatives. This influence and these prerogatives pass over to the outside lodge or association, which, by doing the things that the church ought to be doing, becomes a substitute for it in the interest and affections of the non-church-going public.

But should the church be made an asylum or hospice for the broken-hearted, the broken-willed, and the broken-bodied? Why not? It was designed for this purpose by our Lord, and such it was made by his disciples. The modern church, with its rented pews, closed doors, and six days interregnum of inactivity, can hardly be said to have its prototype in the Church of the Old Jerusalem, or its antitype in the Temple of the New Jerusalem; for the first was certainly organized for "*daily ministration*" (Acts vi. 1); and in the second, "the gates shall not be shut at all by day" (Rev. xxi. 25). It is not the asseverations of the min-

ister on the first of the seven days, but the ministrations of the people during each of the seven days, that make a church aggressive, and in that sense a worthy successor of its apostolic original. Such a church is neither controversial nor apologetic. It does not mistake the cleave-ax of the sectarian for the sword of the Spirit. It refutes error by actualizing the truth. It conquers man by helping him to conquer himself. It defeats the world by blessing it. Such a church, as the body of Christ, filled and inspired by the Spirit of Christ, stands like the voiceful light on the Damascus road, a resplendent contradiction to the taunts and objections of the scoffer.

Fortunately the number of churches of this positive, aggressive type is already sufficiently large to make it impossible for any one to say that the positions taken in this article are visionary, or at best only practicable in exceptional cases. Any one who has read Mr. Loomis's book, "Modern Cities and their Religious Problems," knows that in England the church, as an every-day working organization, is a common thing. In this respect England is far in advance of our own country. We have been making great progress in this direction, however, during the past ten or fifteen years. Churches can be found in almost every American city which have either radically changed their methods of work or are in process of changing them. St. George's Church in New York is a notable example of how an effete organization, when touched and filled by the ministering Spirit, becomes transformed into a many-sided institution that throbs with life and bustles with activity. The interest taken in these new enterprises by clergymen and laymen alike is a sure indication that deep down in the Christian heart there is much dissatisfaction with the results of the past, and a desire for something better.

The churches which are undergoing these changes have many of them been compelled to employ new methods or die. Providence seems to be taking the matter in hand, and forcing the American Christians to do, through dire necessity, what they ought to have done long ago, unconstrained save by the compulsion of love.

The phenomenal growth of our cities has brought into being many "down-town" churches. The family constituency which once supported them has moved away, leaving in the vicinage a fluctuating population made up largely of clerks, young married people with small incomes, and others in moderate circumstances, — the classes from which are to come the future business men of the city.

In the immediate vicinity of one of these down-town churches it is estimated that there are to-day twice as many individuals as there were before the wealthier families moved away. Most of these new-comers are young people, and of Protestant parentage. For such a church to disband because its old methods are ineffective would be to abandon the harvest because the sickles are few and dull. It would be better for Boaz to throw them aside and buy him a modern reaper. There are usually people enough around every such church to fill it. The trouble is, a good many churches seem to regard this particular class of people as of very little account. They look upon them as a certain Western young lady did. A clergyman, who was filling her father's pulpit on a vacation Sunday, said to her after the service: "You have a large summer congregation here." "Oh, yes," she replied, "but these are the stay-at-homes. Our nice people are all out of town."

The "stay-at-homes" constitute the bulk of the so-called masses. They form four fifths of the country's population. They are the class from which the Nazarene himself sprang, the class among whom He labored, and who always heard Him gladly. The church that ignores them can hardly be said to have his spirit. It is with this great middle class that the problem of evangelization is most vitally concerned. If they can be won for Christ the triumph of his church is assured. If they abjure Christianity, then alas for our millennial hopes! Some churches, because of their location and environment, cannot directly reach many of this class, but this makes them no less responsible for the solution of our problem. The very fact that they are thus situated implies that God has so prospered them as to make it incumbent upon them to maintain a double work, that in their own field, and some aggressive work among the masses elsewhere.

It is in this coöperation of the up-town and down-town churches that the ideal church of the future is to be realized; and when it appears it will be an Institutional Church, that is, a church with several pastors and other salaried workers, and many well-organized departments of work. It is impossible for one man to discharge in a satisfactory manner the multiform duties of a city pastorate. There are differences of administrations, and diversities of operations, and there should be workers of differing gifts to carry them on. The aggregate salaries need not much exceed the salary of the star preacher; and a church worked in this way, by men and women of even ordinary ability, will show results that will far exceed any which can come from mere brilliant

preaching. The pulpit is not to be neglected or belittled in this coming church. The preaching is to be earnest, practical, evangelical, and *frequent*. The sermon, however, is not, as is so often the case, to be the only thing which is offered to attract the people to the sanctuary. The chief attraction is to be the worth-ship of God. Music, that potent aid to worship, shall swell from the many-throated organ, and blend with the language of praise on the lips of the congregation, chorus, and choir, or with the voice of the sweet singer in Israel, whose sermon in song may perchance touch the heart which the sermon in prose leaves unaffected. The contribution plate, that other important aid to worship, shall have its place, and shall be laden with the ungrudged offerings of a thankful people. The seats shall be absolutely free, the doors always open; and should the mysterious mendicant, who shared the crust of Sir Launfal, enter them, he would feel at home. This church will recognize the fact that the gospel is concerned with the body, soul, and spirit, — with Sunday and all the rest of the week; and to this end it will emphasize the sacredness of many so-called secular things, knowing that there is not half the danger of secularizing the church that there is of failing to spiritualize the secular life. Just here, perhaps, will come its first serious break with the church of the past, or perhaps I should say, of the present. Many will say: "The church edifice is a sacred place, and ought not to be used for secular purposes." Others will say: "Does the gift desecrate the altar? or does the altar sanctify the gift? Is not the secular pursuit which is devoted to a spiritual end made doubly effective when carried on within the shadow of the church itself?" It is possible to be more solicitous for the sanctity of the church-building than for the salvation of souls.

Here are two edifices. The doors of the one are closed throughout the week. To use the words of a newspaper reporter who made a tour among the churches in August, "The place is a picture of desolation, with dust lying deep upon the step, and dried leaves rustling in the corners. . . . The spiders have free play over the huge pillars. . . . The birds have it all their own way; and if the janitor sweeps off the sidewalk once in a while, that is all that can be expected." The other church has open doors, and is bristling with signs of life. By the central entrance are the words: "Come in, Rest, and Pray." One sign points to the reading-rooms, another to the pastor's offices, and still another to the secular class-rooms. The thresholds are worn by the feet of the hundreds who find fre-

quent rest, sympathy, help, entertainment, and spiritual refreshment within. Every evening the windows are ablaze with light, and if the man of the world looks into them he will see many young men and women, — some engaged in reading, some in conversation, some in innocent games, and others in learning some useful art or handicraft. If it be Friday evening, the lights go out in the class-rooms at precisely half-past seven, and he sees the occupants making their way to the main vestry to participate in the weekly prayer-meeting; the whole scene illustrating in a graphic manner the underlying principle of the church administration, which is to make the secular tend towards and culminate in the spiritual. Few would be willing to say that this second edifice is any less sacred than the first; and none could say that those who worship in it are any less devout, or less active, or less conscious of the scope and meaning of the Christian life, than those who worship in the other. The former building may be located in that part of the city where it is liable to have more sparrows in its steeple than people in its pews, especially in August. Its congregation, though loving humanity as Christ loved it, may have none of the masses around them who can be reached directly by secular means. Let these facts be admitted; but let not the impression prevail that such an edifice is any more sacred because of its isolation from the busy world, and its unbroken week-day quietude.

But to speak more particularly of this secular work. It may be classified under three heads: Relief, Entertainment, and Instruction. Through each of these departments the church can exemplify the gospel spirit and attach itself strongly to the surrounding community.

Take the Relief department. In an ordinary city parish there are a multitude of calls for advice and material aid, which, if properly attended to, would more than occupy the time of one man. These demands for help on the part of the poor and the unfortunate are the cries which mark the crises in not a few lives. They are the golden opportunities for the church to rescue the souls that are about to sink. A perfunctory charity is useless in such cases. To turn the suppliants over to the city organization is to put them perhaps forever beyond the reach of the church influence. What they need is not merely an investigation of their woes and a little material aid, but sympathy, downright sympathy, from a heart that beats in unison with the heart which blessed the leper, the blind man, and the Magdalen. They may be impostors. Some

of them are ; but that makes the need of Christian counsel greater. Christ came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance. Let the church get hold of the impostor and convert him. That is a part of her mission. She may not succeed ; but she will be stronger for the effort. Infinitely patient must she be with the weaknesses and sins of humanity ; tender as a mother ; long-suffering, gentle, forgiving. The duty of the church to tramps, impostors, and other mendicants is possibly, to some, a conception quite absurd. They have been in the habit of tossing a penny to the tramp, or turning him from the door, without a thought of his soul. That was the kind of treatment which the tramp received who lay at Dives' gate. That tramp was found at last, however, in Abraham's bosom ; but it is not at all probable that Dives helped him to get there. If there are any so mean or low that the church has no responsibility concerning them, their case is not mentioned in the Bible. There is something wonderfully impressive to the common sinner in the fact that a great Christian organization, through some sympathetic representative, is reaching out its hand to save him from suffering and wrong. The wife of an infidel appealed for aid to a certain church in Boston last winter, and received it. " Ah," said she, as she returned to her desolate home and sick husband, " the church which you have reviled all your life has proved to be our only friend in our time of need." This was too much for the scoffer. He burst into tears, and has ever since been a regular church attendant and a different man. Let a church once convince a community that its one aim is to make men happier and better in this world as well as in the next, and no day will pass in which it will not have opportunities to help the needy and cheer the despairing. One such church during the past year has had a large number of interesting cases. Among those who have sought sympathy and help within its walls are the mothers and wives of drunkards, young men out of work and almost on the verge of desperation, Catholics looking for the light, victims of fraud and cruelty, and slaves of the cup. Among the latter class was a talented young man, a lawyer, of a good family in England. He was a prodigal in a strange land. He had come to the husks. He wandered into the reading-room of the church, met one of the pastors there, and told his story. He was taken in hand, provided with clerical work, and helped through the struggle of giving up his cups. To-day he is connected with one of the leading firms of the city, clothed and in his right mind. Another of this class, who was

kept under the eye of the church for a time, became a Christian, and is now doing editorial work on a leading suburban journal; and still another was employed in distributing reading matter, and doing other work connected with the relief office. A personal influence was brought to bear upon him. He became a Christian and a member of the church. These men, and others like them, were saved by being kept in touch with the church. They were given something to do, and their board was paid till they were tided over the breakers. They gave back in willing service more than their rescue cost in dollars and cents. To carry on this department has required all the time of one man, and much of the time of other workers. Many of the results are intangible and unrecordable; but the work has told for Christ and the church.

A second department of the secular work relates to entertainment. Some will doubtless demur at this word in this connection. They do not believe that the church should have anything to do with entertainment of any kind. There is an honest difference of opinion, however, on this subject. If it be true that man is the only animal that laughs, it might be inferred that the sense of humor belongs to that part of his nature which is immortal, and should be duly regarded in all efforts to mould and discipline that nature for its heavenly life. It certainly ought to be as worthy of consideration as physical fear, a purely animal instinct, which has played so large a part in the preaching of the orthodox pulpit during the past century. All appeals to the emotional nature are but the preparation for sowing the seed. It matters not whether the soil be upturned by the plow or tickled by the rake, provided only the harvest be assured. Let the heart be deeply stirred by the terrors of the law, or let it be mellowed by a little humor deftly handled, only let the sowing be of solid grain and not of chaff. It is a significant fact that the most successful evangelists and the most popular preachers, as a rule, "do not disdain to distract and divert their audience by an appeal to that peculiarly human faculty, the faculty of laughter." The desire to be entertained is universal; and if the truth were known, many who condemn all kinds of diversion as contrary to the gravity of religion, attend church and estimate the preacher as good, bad, or indifferent solely according to his ability to say something which happens to be diverting to them. There are few churches which do not tolerate amusements of some kind, and yet the whole subject of amusements is handled so gingerly, even by its advocates,

that the young people who engage in them are made to feel like culprits, while the outside world gets the impression that the church is tolerating in practice what it condemns in principle. If it be true that no class of amusements can be made a secular means to reach a spiritual end, then let all amusements be discarded by the church. But if it be true that a large class of people need to be diverted from the world before they can be converted to Christ, then let this subject of diversion have its legitimate and honored place in the administration of the church. Let us not be afraid of it, nor relegate it to the realm of questionable practices. If the boys can be kept from the streets and the saloons by innocent games and pure reading matter provided by the church; if young men can be reached through athletics and manly sports; if worldly men and women can be brought into touch with Christian life and character through the social instincts; then let every church have its reading-rooms, gymnasium, ball ground, and social gathering; but in all of these places let it be made manifest that the church, while it desires to please, desires most of all to develop Christian manhood and womanhood. All effective instruments must be handled with care. The objections urged against church amusements are mainly due to a haphazard policy of managing them. If not held by a strong hand as a means to an end, they are in danger of becoming mere aimless frivolities. If the pastor does not feel that he is master of the situation in this, as in all other departments, it would be wiser for him to leave it out of his scheme of church work.

Diversion as a means of reaching the masses should be carefully studied and experimented with; and the opportunities which it offers should be promptly improved, as in the case of every other agency of the church. For example, one of the most effective methods of reaching non-church-goers has been found to be a first-class series of weekly concerts, lectures, and readings held under the auspices of the church. This method has been elaborately developed the past year, and with good results, in the parish already alluded to. The field was first carefully canvassed, and it was found that of the thirty thousand people in the neighborhood, some five thousand were by their own admission non-church-goers. These five thousand names were placed in a separate book, with the residence, occupation, number of the family, nationality, and other helpful notes against each name. Here was something tangible to work upon, — a field which would test the aggressive agencies of the church to the utmost. A direct appeal

to these people to attend church would do little good. Most of them would resent a personal approach on the subject of religion. They must be reached, if at all, by indirection. The entertainments were free, but the people were admitted by tickets which were previously distributed to them. Marked tickets were sent each week to a certain number of the non-church-goers, and when these marked tickets were presented at the doors it was known approximately who had responded. After the same people had been across the church threshold several times it was deemed that they might safely be visited by some member of the congregation and personally invited to the pastor's reception, or to the Sunday services. While it is impossible to give any exact figures as to the result of this method, it is safe to say that it has been instrumental in interesting more outsiders in the church and its work than many other agencies combined. It has familiarized a large number of irreligious people with the interior of the church, and broken down many of their deep-rooted prejudices. The plan involves much personal oversight and labor, and requires most of the time of a special clerk; but all its difficulties are offset by the single fact that no method has been found more efficacious in creating, in a natural and pleasant way, the first bond of attraction between the church and the indifferent outsider. The plan can easily be made self-supporting through the contributions which are willingly given at the entertainments.

The third division mentioned was that of Instruction. It includes all of those agencies, the object of which is to help people to help themselves. In this kind of work many churches in England have been successfully engaged for many years. One is almost dazed as he looks through the long list of their charitable and industrial departments. This list reveals the fact that in the mother country there is no interest pertaining to man's temporal well-being which is deemed unworthy of the fostering care of the church. Work of this kind is so rare in America that the few pastors who ventured to introduce it were almost regarded at first as dangerous innovators. Had these ministers proposed to become bakers and milliners themselves, some of their people could not have been more dumfounded than they were when it was suggested that a cooking-school and dress-making class be started in the church.

The conventional church architecture of the present day does not admit of the necessary facilities for carrying on efficiently the various branches of this department. There should be several

class-rooms specially furnished for the work. It is one of the signs of the times, however, that several of the churches which have been built within the past five years are provided with these facilities: for example, the Pilgrim Church, in Worcester, which has a fine gymnasium, a carpenter's shop, well furnished with tools, a printing office, and a large number of class-rooms; and the St. George's Church, in New York, which has erected a magnificent structure thoroughly furnished for all kinds of secular instruction. In another church the industrial work is at present directed from two rooms. One is the headquarters of the work for women, and is called the Dorcastry; the other is under the care of the Young Men's Institute, and is called the Corner-Stone room. Both rooms are attractively furnished, and provided with the best reading matter and a variety of games. The superintendent of the Dorcastry, and the director of the Corner-Stone room are present every evening to welcome strangers and supervise the work in general. The former is a Christian lady whose whole time is devoted to the church. Scores of young men and women frequent these rooms and receive instruction in the various classes during the week. There is the class in painting, for example. But should painting be taught in the name of the church? Why not? There are thousands of young women of refined natures and artistic instincts in our great cities, who are obliged to lodge in cheerless attic rooms, and board at restaurants. What higher work of ministration can a church do than to gather some of these young women together in a bright room, under earnest Christian teachers, who shall teach them how to add a touch of beauty to the dull gray of their monotonous work-day life? Then there is the sewing school, where the bright-eyed little misses gather eagerly every Saturday to learn a useful handicraft; and the kitchen garden, where they learn the art of keeping house and waiting on their mothers; and the dress-making class, which saves the pupils a good many long bills from Madame Modiste. Then there are the classes in the history of art, and stenography, and elocution, and penmanship, and arithmetic, and type-writing; and it is proposed another season to add type-setting, carpentry, and wood-carving.

Most of these departments are carried on by the members of the congregation as a labor of love. It goes without saying that they have been greatly blessed while blessing others.

In reviewing what has been said, it appears that the church which honestly tries to adapt these secular means to a spiritual

and accomplishes three things which add much to the solution of the vexed problem of evangelizing the masses. First: It attracts to itself a large number of people who, under the ordinary conditions of our church life, would not be brought within the influence of the gospel. This has invariably been the case whenever the experiment has been tried in this country. Secondly: It confers an actual blessing on the objects of its ministration, and so fulfills the law of Christ. Such a church puts its warm hand, athrill with the heart-beats of the Saviour, into the hand of the distressed, the tempted, and the fallen; and leads them out into a large place. It may be said that this is the duty of the individual Christian, and so it is; but it is also the duty of the church as a church. For, thirdly, in attending to this duty as an organization it will make that impression upon the community without which it must inevitably become effete. It might often seem, to a superficial critic, that there was a larger outlay of time and energy in this kind of work than the results would justify. The mathematical Christian who is forever trying to solve the arithmetic of the Trinity, or presuming to demonstrate the results of church work in terms of the addition table or by the rule of three, might be disappointed with his figuring. The true value of such a work lies not in the material, or even in the spiritual help which may have been given to a few individuals; it lies rather in that indefinite yet potent influence, which like a subtle fragrance pervades the surrounding community, and counteracts the malaria of scorn and doubt which threatens the religious life of our times.

There are two or three objections to the positions taken in this article which call for a word in closing: The financial expense involved in maintaining such a church, the complexity of the organization, and the materialistic tendencies of the plan.

In answer to the first objection, it may be said that the necessary expenses will not seem large when the number of workers and the amount of work done are taken into the account. As a matter of fact, the actual cost of running such an organization is no greater than that incurred by many large city churches where they have but one salaried officer and a choir, and where the church is open but once or twice a week.

As to the objection that there is too much machinery, it may be said that one great lack of the churches is that of system and organization. If there were a more definite aim, and more systematic effort, there would be greater spiritual life. Things are

often left to run themselves, and they either run off the track or not at all. Intelligent business men, who are masters of the intricate machinery of trade and industry, and strict even to scrupulosity in their business transactions, often become parties to disorderly methods in church affairs, which, if employed by a neighbor in the commercial world, would condemn him to the pillory of their ridicule and contempt. The more beautiful the tapestry, the more delicate and intricate must be the machinery. The fabric of a perfected humanity can be woven in no bungling loom. We live in an age of wheels, ay, wheels within wheels, the swift revolutions of which are more dazing than the vision which Ezekiel saw. What is needed in the church is not less machinery, but more steam,—not fewer wheels, but more of the “living creature” within.

Which, perhaps, is the best answer that can be given to the last objection concerning the material and secular phases of this kind of church work. If the impression has been given that the various methods suggested here are in any sense to overshadow or supersede the ordinary means of grace, the pen has unfortunately belied the writer's intent. That intent was to present as clearly and fairly as possible a phase of church work which is just now arousing to an unusual degree the interest of the Christian world. It is true that this phase of work deals with material interests and secular means; but it is taken for granted that back of all, and working through all, is the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit; and that the church should aim first and always to bring the soul of the sinner into vital contact with that Spirit. Whether the material shall be exalted at the expense of the spiritual depends upon the strength and quality of the spiritual. Religion pure and undefiled is not that which remains intact only so long as it is not in contact with the world; but it is that which keeps unspotted in the dust and din of life. Its virtue depends not upon the coddling of the nunnery, nor upon the sanctity of ecclesiastical surroundings. It calls nothing common or unclean which concerns the betterment of humanity; but, if need be, it can shake the walls of Jericho with a ram's horn, open blind eyes with clay, and use the waters of the turbid Jordan to cleanse and cure. If that which was designed to be the only moral antiseptic in a world of sinners has by contact with material things so lost its distinguishing qualities as to be known only by its original trade-mark, then indeed it is good for nothing but to be cast forth and trodden under foot of man. He is a weak Christian who cannot eat and

drink to the glory of God, but who perforce through these material appetites becomes a glutton or a drunkard. That is a weak church, a weak Christianity, which cannot sanctify a secular method to a spiritual end without itself becoming secularized in the attempt. Such a Christianity can hardly hope to influence the everyday life of this busy age, nor can it hope to possess and transform the world.

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ONE ASPECT OF SPENSER'S "FAERIE QUEENE."

I.

It is very nearly three hundred years since the first three books of Spenser's "Faerie Queene" were published at London.

Up to that time the literature of England had been rather a promise than a performance. At the beginning of the last decade of the sixteenth century, England, flushed with the glories of her triumph over the Spanish Armada, and comparatively at peace with herself, occupied an assured and honorable place among the nations of Europe. But as yet England had failed to assert herself in the domain of literature and the arts. She had humbled the pride of Spain, but she still sat as a learner at the feet of the great poets of Italy.

A factor in continental politics, in all the centuries of gradual intellectual growth England had produced few literary works of more than insular importance. Two hundred years before the great Elizabethans, Chaucer stands as a witness to the temper and capability of the English mind, but these two hundred years were well-nigh completed before the promise of Chaucer was fulfilled. In the year 1590, when the first installment of the "Faerie Queene" was entered on the books of the Stationers' Company at London, England was on the verge of an unrivaled period in the growth of her literature. Little as she had done heretofore, the next quarter of a century was to witness the production of works which would entitle the English to rank with the greatest of world-literatures, for the hour of Shakespeare and Bacon and Hooker had fully come. The "Faerie Queene" stands at the very entrance, in point of time, to this imaginative and creative

epoch. The impress of the passionate and aspiring genius of Marlowe was yet fresh upon the drama, and Shakespeare was but just beginning to deliver his message to the world. Closely related as the "*Faerie Queene*" is in point of time to this great awakening of a great literature, born as it is of the same mighty mother, it is not the closeness of its affinity to the intellectual temper of its time and country which impresses us. Viewed as a whole, the great romantic poem of England stands rather in striking isolation apart from the splendid literature to which it belongs. It is separated from the body of English poetry, not merely by the unparalleled magnitude of its unfulfilled design, not merely by the nature of its subject, the unequaled flow of its verse, or by any of the more or less superficial features which readily suggest themselves. Beyond all these there is a difference more vital if less tangible; it is a difference in essence, in tone, in the very atmosphere about the work pervading the whole.

It is hard to confine this subtle difference within the set terms of a definition, but the essential point of contrast between Spenser and the dominant tone of the greatest English poets lies in his aloofness from the ordinary doings and concerns of men, in his lack of a catholic sympathy with the varied phases of human life, in the glamour of unreality, the delight in passing sensation, which are most fully exemplified in his "*Faerie Queene*." This distinctive note is struck at the very beginning of the poem. In the first canto we are led out of the familiar sunshine, and as we read, the world we know seems softly to recede and slip away from our grasp.

"With Pleasure forward led" we take refuge from the tempest without in a strange forest of fantasy. Involved in its twilight labyrinths "of many paths and many turnings seen," we cannot find the way that will lead us back into the vulgar daylight, but

"Wander too and fro in waies unknowne."

An ingenious and plausible commentator might almost persuade us that the line just quoted was intended to express the essential *motif* of the "*Faerie Queene*." What is it but a "wandering to and fro in wayes unknown"? Chaucer's jolly company of pilgrims journey along the common highway to a definite place and with a definite purpose; Spenser's air-drawn creations wander;—they appear and disappear in the pleasant tangle of "waies unknown." The instinct of more than one critic has already contrasted Chaucer and Spenser, that we may understand them better by placing them in opposition. The very thought of

Chaucer helps us to define the subtle nature of that quality which relegates the "Faerie Queene" to a place by itself. Chaucer dwells in the honest, healthy sunlight of substantial England; in the land of roast-beef and broad fun and downright common sense.

Born more than two hundred years before his great successor, Chaucer is nevertheless closer to us by the power of a strong living personality. Shrewd, kindly, portly, good-humored, wholesome, he notes with one quick glance of those keen, twinkling eyes everything about our dress and many things about our souls. His hearty, tender, human sympathy overflows all obstructions of time and circumstance, refusing to be chilled by centuries or altered by change.

It is wellnigh impossible to enter into the same terms of human fellowship with Spenser. It is not that we are in ignorance of the outward events of his life; we know, indeed, more of him than of some other men whose personality is less elusive; the vagueness and remoteness of Spenser seem to be attributable rather to the lack of a strong, living, human sympathy in the man — to that tendency to soften and transform bald facts by enveloping them in the tinted clouds of allegory, which, whatever its professed purpose, is one of the strongest characteristics of his "Faerie Queene." Surely Alexander Smith meant to hint this quality of Spenser's work when he wrote of him with exquisite suggestiveness: "Search ever so diligently, you will not find an English daisy in all his enchanted forests."

II.

If we are impressed at the outset with this broad dissimilarity of the "Faerie Queene" to the genius of English poetry, a closer consideration reveals to us an incongruity even more notable and more pronounced. The "Faerie Queene" seems strikingly at variance with a controlling characteristic in the mental attitude of Spenser's time.

When Spenser's masterpiece was given to the world, the Elizabethan drama had passed its period of experimental probation, and was fairly entered upon the richest era of its development. Marlowe had given the English tragic drama its form, and Shakespeare was just taking up the task that his great forerunner had begun. The life of man on earth was then the supreme fact for men. The fresh spiritual and intellectual impulse of the Renaissance had newly touched the life of England, and the latent and

hitherto unsuspected possibilities of man's earth, man's nature, man's life, stood suddenly revealed. Men were swept by a rush of new sensations, quickened by the sudden knowledge of opportunity; they were strong with a young strength.

"What a piece of work is man" is the prelude to Hamlet's tribute to the greatness of humanity, while the utter numbness of his enjoyment of life is summed up in the reflection that even man delights him not. It was the great drama of man's life in its depths and heights, its interminable contradictions, its burden, and its mystery, that a crowd of young London playwrights were beginning to portray with a fidelity, a power—a poetry and a passion unmatched in the history of men. Spenser himself turns momentarily to the drama, the natural form of expression in his age. Ten years before the publication of the "*Faerie Queene*" he writes nine comedies after the Italian model, and submits them, together with the beginning of his great poem, to the criticism of his friend Gabriel Harvey. We thus see him, with his career before him, standing irresolute at the dividing ways. He takes one step on the path which the greatest poets of his time were taking as by instinct; he is assured by Harvey that his plays are better than his poem, and yet he deliberately turns aside and chooses to tread the other path alone.

We may, perhaps, find reasons for this choice in the outward condition of Spenser's life. We may conjecture why it was that, with his life before him, the refined and scholarly young college graduate, of good birth, of gentle breeding, of dreamy and sensitive nature, did not cast in his lot with the riotous and lawless set of young Bohemians that were moulding the English drama. We can conjecture why the friend of Sidney should not have chosen to become a playwright, but have preferred a more gentlemanly way to advancement, a powerful patron, and the hanging on princes' favors. It may not surprise us, when all things are considered, that Spenser's genius should have elected to express itself through a poem undramatic in form in the midst of a great dramatic period; but we cannot so easily explain the fact that in this poem the vivid reproduction of human life, the strong grasp of fact, which were the marked features of contemporary poetry, are so conspicuously lacking. Our surprise is heightened at Spenser's failure in this respect when we remember the avowed object of his poem. The "general end" of the poem is didactic; it is designed to fashion a gentleman. This is to be done by depicting, in a "darke conceit," the conflict of human nature with

the temptations and evils which assail it from within and from without; by showing the triumph of good over evil, by contrasting the deformity of sin with the beauty of holiness. It aims, in fine, to be the portrayal, in the interests of virtue, of that individual warfare which is the inheritance of every generation. It is only necessary to recall the purpose of the "*Faerie Queene*" to realize how serious are its shortcomings as a didactic poem, intended to deal with the stress of human temptation.

That the "*Faerie Queene*" is a great poem should not prevent us from clearly perceiving wherein its greatness lies.

We should realize that its design demanded, first of all, just that intensity of sympathy with the complex and mixed nature of men and women, just that large natural fidelity, that infinite tenderness, that peculiar tolerance that comes with a genial sense of humor, which Chaucer and Shakespeare possess, and in which Spenser falls short.

That Spenser achieved a phenomenal success by a magic all his own should not blind us to the fact that it is attained largely at the expense of the direct object of his poem. He essays to show us the warfare of men and women with sin, but he presents to us not men and women at all, but embodied qualities. The truth of this assertion must be felt; it cannot be argued here.

But take in illustration one of the most beautiful and familiar incidents in the poem, the story of Una and the Lion. It is made difficult for us to think of Una as a creature of earth. The moment, indeed, we cease to think of her as a glorious vision, an exquisite type, we positively fail to do justice to the peculiar beauty of her story. We begin to reflect, in spite of our better instincts, that Una is not startled into any woman's demonstrations of fear by the sudden appearance of the lion. She stands, indeed, "dreading death," while the beast licks her hands and feet, but soon recovers herself sufficiently to moralize with some metaphorical elaboration. One feels, of course, that such criticism is essentially Philistine. It is a desecration, because it is based on the mistake of applying every-day standards to something which is beyond them. It is only by regarding it as the loveliest of waking dreams, untroubled by the narrow limitations of fact, that the "*Faerie Queene*" can be fully enjoyed. If any one is skeptical about its pervading unfaithfulness to things as they are, let him ponder on that passage in the tenth canto of the sixth book, which describes the encounter of Sir Calidon with the tiger. Let him note that, unlike earthly tigers, the beast does

not spring on his prey, but runs at Pastorella; let him note the convenient deliberateness of the whole proceeding—and the truly astonishing feat of Calidon in felling the tiger senseless to the ground with a shepherd's crook. In spite, then, of Professor Dowden's able presentation of a contrary view, I cannot but feel that the characteristic unreality of the "*Faerie Queene*" extends to the personages of the poem; that Spenser has called up by his spell brave knights, rare types of feminine virtue, or monsters of wickedness, but that the soil of this sordid, fighting world is not on them; that they are not commonplace and contradictory creatures as we are; that they do not "smell of mortality."

Would we learn the lesson that Spenser sets himself to teach, we must learn it in a sterner and a stronger school; we must turn to the turbid tide of humanity in the pages of Shakespeare and his fellows, and sin and suffer and question with them.

Even Milton, who, in some moods, we are disposed to think a more virile Spenser, born into a Puritan, and not a Renaissance England, even Milton has given us, within the very confines of the supernatural, the strong features of a great character. Satan, ruined archangel as he is, towers before us against the lurid background of hell with the sharpness of outline of a positive personality. The god-like defiance, the unconquerable will, the pride, the passion, the intellect, the nobility of the ruined angel fading into the degradation of the perfect devil, all these things are the elements of a great individual conception. Again, if we regard the purpose of the "*Faerie Queene*," it is apparent that the controlling note is battle. The poem is prompted by that very ancient conception of human life which has inspired the hero-myths of the world; it is born of essentially the same spirit as that which brought forth the Greek Hercules, or the Teutonic Beowulf. Spenser undertakes to show us the ideal hero; the man who deems it the proper business of life to fight a man's battle in this world, yet somehow the old Berserker grip, the set teeth, and the hard hitting are grievously lacking in the "*Faerie Queene*." Spenser's warriors are, indeed, sliced to pieces with a protracted elaboration of description; but it does not stir our blood, it seems like cutting a cloud. Notwithstanding its fighting subject, the poem is rather redolent of the æsthetic indolence of the South than alive with the fighting spirit of the Saxon. And as Spenser's hold on humanity is slight, as his battles lack what the old epic calls "the hand-grip of might," so his descriptions of nature do not in general possess that nameless fineness of touch which is the outcome of direct observation.

Take, for example, the following, a not unfavorable specimen of Spenser's manner:—

"It was a chosen plott of fertile land,
Emongst wide waves sett, like a little nest,
As if it had, by natures cunning hand
Bene choycely pickèd out from all the rest,
And laid forth for ensample of the best :
No daintie flowre or herbe that growes on grownd,
No arborett with painted blossomes drest
And smelling sweete, but there it might be fownd,
To bud out faire, and her sweete smels throwe al arownd.

"No tree, whose braunches did not bravely spring ;
No braunch, whereon a fine bird did not sitt.
No bird, but did her shrill notes sweetely sing ;
No song, but did containe a lovely ditt."

Can anything be more consistently artificial? There is not one breath of nature in this plot, picked out and arranged as a sample, from the "painted" blossoms to the fine birds disposed with mechanical and unnatural regularity, one singing on each branch. If any one will take the trouble to examine the numerous descriptions of morning in the "*Faerie Queene*," he will find that Spenser is generally satisfied with repeating the stilted and conventional phrases of a pseudo-classicism. It is surely hard to find the breath of the dawn in such lines as these:—

"At last, the golden oriental gate
Of greatest heaven gan to open fayre ;
An Phœbus, fresh as brydegrome to his mate,
Came dauncing forth, shaking his deawie hayre ;
And hurd his glistring beams through gloomy ayre."

One needs but to compare this with the dawn that overtakes the lingering lovers in *Romeo and Juliet*, the lark's song in the quiet, the brightening streaks of light that lace the parting clouds in the east, to feel its inherent lack of truth. Nor can I think that this defect of Spenser's results from the ideal character of his subject.

The greatest poet of the supernatural is also distinguished for his absolute faithfulness to nature:—

"L'alba vinceva l'ora mattutina
Che fugia innanzi, sì che di lontano
Conobbi il tremolar della marina."¹

¹ Now 'gan the vanquished matin hour to flee ;
And seen from far, as onward came the day
I recognized the trembling of the sea.

Wright's trans., *Purg. I.*

Here Dante makes the scene live again in our imagination, with a few unerring touches. The words have that peculiar virtue, of suggestiveness, they carry the whole atmosphere with them, and we see again the far-off stretch of sea sparkling and trembling in the growing light of the dawn.

Spenser's descriptions of nature often consist of a labored catalogue of objects. In one place he is at great pains to tell us the names of the different trees in a forest; in another a stanza or more is occupied with the enumeration of different kinds of flowers, but it is unprofitable work; the poet who has penetrated into the life of nature and caught her secret, flashes her spirit on us in one inspired phrase.

It would be interesting to pursue this inquiry and compare Spenser's attitude towards nature with that of other great poets, but enough has been said to illustrate the thought that in the "*Faerie Queene*" we find little of that inspired carefulness of observation, that intimate delight in nature, which is so conspicuous in English poetry. We find that it is no more true to nature than to man.

Our reflections, so far, converge towards one conclusion. Much of the peculiar charm of the "*Faerie Queene*" resides in that dreamy unreality which separates it from the greatest English poetry of its time.

In the dim and visionary lights of its enchanted forest, the sharp and uncompromising reality of things seen in the common daylight is softened and refined into a strange and ethereal delusion. We have in the "*Faerie Queene*" neither the sweat and the travail of struggling humanity, nor the living presence of that other world which is the serene background of human life. We are constrained to follow Hazlitt when he says of Spenser in a sudden flash of insight: "The love of beauty, however, and not of truth is the moving principle of his mind; and he is guided in his fantastic delineations by no rule but by the impulse of an inexhaustible imagination. He luxuriates equally in scenes of Eastern magnificence, or the still solitude of the Hermit's cell; in the extremes of sensuality or refinement."¹

III.

We must call to our help in the attempt to understand the individuality of tone in the "*Faerie Queene*" the circumstances and surroundings under which it was written, and, so far as we

¹ *Lectures on the English Poets, Chaucer and Spenser.*

can conceive of him, the man himself who wrote it. The "Faerie Queene" is the work of an exile; of a poet who had been forced, in the flower of his genius, to take part in the relentless and bloody attempt to reduce a turbulent province to subordination. Too little emphasis has been given to this residence of Spenser in the midst of rebellious, sixteenth-century Ireland, during the entire period of his greatest poetical productiveness. For two years, from 1580 to 1582, he is actively engaged at Dublin as secretary to Lord Grey, the new deputy to Ireland.

During the six years following, we find him still at Dublin, having purchased the position of "Clark of the Court of Chancery or Registrar of Chancery for the Faculties" from one "Lodowick Bryskett," who wished to "withdraw to the quietness of study."

In about 1589 he retires to the Castle of Kilcolman, in the county of Cork, just presented to him from the forfeited estate of the Earl of Desmond, and seriously enters upon the writing of his long-projected "Faerie Queene." Let us try to come close to the life of this long dead Edmund Spenser, and understand its relation to his work. His is not an exile like that of Dante, where the terrible secret longing and wrath of the man smouldered in him "until the fire kindled and he spake with his tongue;" it is the forlorn, commonplace exclusion of one of the rarest spirits of England from a living fellowship with the gathering greatness of his time. When Sidney fell at Zutphen, Spenser was poring over court records at Dublin; when England was on fire with the news that the shattered ships of the Armada were driven northward on the rocks of the Hebrides, Spenser looked out through the windows of Kilcolman across the lonely places of colonial Ireland. He is stranded, put aside, while the strong, full current of that adventurous time sweeps on without him. Oft-quoted allusions in his poems reflect only too truly how Spenser's spirit chafed under his surroundings. To him, Ireland is "salvage soil,"

"Which being by long wars left almost waste
With brutish barbarism is overspread."

He speaks of

"My lucklesse lot
That banisht had my selfe, like wight forlore,
Into that waste, where I was quite forgot."

After nine years of this he tries vainly to escape. He bends his lofty nature to become a suitor at the court of a queen as capricious as she was great. Disappointed and forced back again

to his solitary Kilcolman, he pours out his pent-up indignation and contempt in that famous passage in *Mother Hubbard's Tale*, which comes to us to-day in the unblurred freshness of a self-revelation:—

"Full little knowest thou, that hast not tride,
What hell it is, in suing long to bide :
To loose good dayes, that might be better spent ;
To wast long nights in pensive discontent ;
To speed today, to be put back tomorrow ;
To feed on hope, to pine with feare and sorrow ;
To have thy Princes grace, yet want her Peeres ;
To have thy asking, yet waite manie yeeres ;
To fret thy soule with crosses and with cares ;
To eate thy heart through comfortlesse dispaire ;
To fawne, to crowche, to waite, to ride, to ronne,
To spend, to give, to want, to be undonne.
Unhappie wight, borne to desastrous end,
That doth his life in so long tendance spend !"

We are hushed and awed, as in these words this man's soul seems to lie naked before us.

Our instincts tell us that it has taken a deep inward experience to wring such a strong and bitter cry from the lips of the stately and abstracted Spenser. We may conjecture how deeply his Irish banishment had entered into his life from this glimpse of the central fire of that seemingly serene nature, when, after nine years of service, he puts his future to the test and fails. What manner of man was it that was thus isolated in the cruelty, vulgarity, and wretchedness of a disaffected, disorganized society?

It was a man who, possessing much of the purity and high-mindedness of the growing spirit of Puritanism, had nevertheless that ungovernable susceptibility to outward beauty which marked the Italians of the Renaissance.

It was a man who delighted in the lofty idealism of Plato, who saw in Sidney and Raleigh and Lord Grey the very spirit of chivalry alive in the flesh; yet surely it was a man who lacked that breadth of humanity, that ready sympathy for the weakness and shortcomings and stupidity of commonplace men and women, that longing over the many who are unheroic in action and unlovely in aspect, which we call charity. What is to become of such a nature, met at almost every point by Irish brawls and mutinies, by ugly and prosaic squalor? It turns inward on itself. Is it any wonder that the idealist becomes more abstractedly ideal? That he lifts the wrangles and outbreaks of Irish rebels into the serene heights of his spiritual warfare? Is it any wonder that a

man, hedged about by such an uncongenial atmosphere, of sensitive, impressionable nature so delicately poised as to be swayed by every suggestion of beauty, should set his whole soul to dreams, should lose his balance of nature by a too complete surrender to the alien charm of Italy? Spenser's lofty, severe, but exquisitely responsive spirit — isolated as it is — is overwhelmed, drenched, bewildered by the warm flow of Italian beauty. He steeps himself in the richness, the color, the languid beauty of Ariosto and of Tasso; he cannot often touch the shore for the pure delight of sporting in the waves. His greatest poem is hence conspicuously un-English, through it one phase of the Italian Renaissance finds its completest expression in our tongue; the soft Southern sensuous delight of eye and ear flow through his verse into everyday, out-of-doors England. The spirit of Italy is, indeed, tempered and modified by the spirit of England. The pure, high soul of Spenser is truly English in his hatred of wrong-doing, impurity, injustice; he honestly proposes to himself a great moral purpose for his poem.

There are trumpet notes in the "Faerie Queene" that startle us in the midst of the flow of its soft music with a resonance almost Miltonic. But it is true, nevertheless, that the tone of the poem, as a whole, is relaxing and deliciously enervating, rather than bracing and stimulating; that, notwithstanding its ethical purpose, the magic of Italy has prevailed, on the whole, over the Puritanism of England. The "Faerie Queene" is more Pagan than Puritan, it has more of Rubens than of Plato. Spenser escapes from the bower of bliss with as much difficulty as his own Sir Guyon; and, as some one has pointed out, the furious iconoclasm with which he has described its demolition shows how fully he felt its seductive power. He staggers under the shock of the strange young force that has come out of Italy; possessing but little hold on life to counterbalance it, cut off from wholesome contact with the England of his time; in his remoteness he fails to rise up in the integrity of his own genius; he is rather submerged as by a great tide. He pours out in his poem all the first ferment of new impressions and sensations, seething and unsettled, and his soul lives to-day in the "Faerie Queene."

It was not in such a fashion that the genius of Shakespeare was wont to deal with the influence that streamed from Italy into Elizabethan England; he dominated his materials. Idealist as he is in the highest sense, Shakespeare is too close to life to lose his intense fidelity to the truth of things; even in the "Midsummer

Night's Dream" we have Bottom the Weaver. This sincerity, this homeliness, this shrewdness of observation and truth, is inbred in Englishmen; it is part of the national genius, of the Teutonic inheritance, but not one of these qualities can be truly applied to the "Faerie Queene." It is when we contrast the lives of these two great poets, Spenser and Shakespeare, that stand so close together in time and so eternally separated in the nature of their work; it is when we think of the one, with his genial, intimate human sympathy, walking the streets and haunting the crowded theatres of London, a part of that rich, full, abundant life that once beat high in Elizabethan England, and then let our fancy travel back across the channel to the other in his loneliness and his dreams, it is only then that we can understand the "Faerie Queene." We can dimly understand why at times we are reminded in our reading of the poem of Tennyson's

"Soul possessed of many gifts
That did love beauty only."

For beautiful as the far-off music of this dream may be, we long at the last for reality, for nature, for man. Dwellers in a "lordly pleasure-house," where all things are gathered to satiate the mind and the senses, at the last we

"hear the dully sound
Of human footsteps fall."

We leave our ideal tower in utter weariness to "build us a cottage in the vale." Some critics have, indeed, asserted that there is in Spenser's poem that highest of all conceptions of beauty, that conception which sees in it a means and not an end, which regards it as the cherished handmaid of the something not wholly revealed.

Spenser's master, Plato, has given us in the "Banquet" this high idea of the eternal spirit of Beauty residing apart from all its visible manifestations, and the same lofty conception has been developed in Plotinus and the neo-platonists. Does Spenser show that highest conception of the function of art which holds that it is the noblest office of all artistic beauty to send our souls unsatisfied through and beyond it to its unseen source, even to Him who has given us beauty as a message and a promise? We must judge Spenser in this, not by what we may deem his theoretical views on the matter, but by the effect his poem actually produces upon us. Taking the "Faerie Queene" as it stands, I cannot find in it this suggestiveness of the Divine. It is not instinct, as some poems

are, with the "something beyond"; it does not stir in us that holy dissatisfaction by its hints and glimpses of "worlds not realized"; its beauty is rather that of Renaissance Italy sufficient unto itself. In spite of Milton's veneration for Spenser as a teacher, he lacks this trait of the world's great helpers, great guides.

He does not uplift and inspire us by transfusing this daily life and this earth of ours with the ineffable light of a sacred meaning and purpose; he escapes from this life and this earth altogether. In a splendid passage on the nature of the highest poet Victor Hugo says:—

"Let him have wings for the infinite, provided he has feet for the earth, and that after having been seen flying he is found walking. . . . To be altogether beyond man, that is not to be. Show me thy foot, genius, and let me see if, like myself, thou hast earthly dust on thy heel. If thou hast none of that dust, thou hast never walked in my pathway, thou dost not know me and I do not know thee."

IV.

It has been my province to dwell only on one aspect of the "Faerie Queene" to the exclusion of all others. It is almost presumptuous, as well as unnecessary, to praise again those rare qualities which justly give it its exalted place among the glories of a great literature. Great poems, like great mountains, may be approached from many sides. It were a pleasant task to linger over the gliding flow, the full and rounded music of its verse; over the charm of its magical atmosphere which changes and refines this sordid earth like that strange light which transforms at sunset the region of the Nile.

As I write these last words the wonderful greatness of the "Faerie Queene" impresses itself upon me afresh. How ablaze it is in its magnificent pageantry of light and color; how finely managed are the low tones of its sombre scenes! What a profuse poetic nature is poured out in it; what a spiritual beauty touches it in places with the brief gleam of a far-off radiance like the rare coming of angels! This splendid creation of Spenser's prodigal imagination lights up as with the red glow of some southern sunset the chill gray daylight of sober England. It has not been my purpose to do more than hint at other aspects of Spenser's masterpiece; we have been constrained to consider defects rather than excellences. Yet surely we honor Spenser best by a wise discrimination; by frankly acknowledging the shortcomings of his work we define for ourselves its peculiar and

unchanging charm. We appreciate the individual note of the "Faerie Queene" by thinking of Spenser at Kilcolman, by realizing that the brutality of Ireland and the beauty of Italy conspired to set it apart, an alien to the spirit of English literature in its time, and in all time, the one great Romantic poem of Teutonic England.

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THE ABERRATIONS OF DEMOCRACY.

THE fact that Government by the People is swiftly extending its sway over the civilized world is the salient fact of modern history. In Great Britain and her dependencies the democratic principle has made rapid progress. Within the memories of those who are still young, England has several times reduced the property qualification of her voters, each time admitting some hundreds of thousands to the franchise, so that almost all householders or rent-payers now possess the suffrage. In France the suffrage is universal. Louis Napoleon extended that boon to the citizens, though he took good care that it should not invest them with any great amount of actual power. Under the Republic it means vastly more, and France possesses now a government of the people. What they will do with it is yet to be determined. In Germany, too, the Imperial Diet is chosen by universal suffrage. Every native-born German who has reached the age of twenty-five can vote in his native province for representatives in the Reichstag. Of course the large reserves of power to the emperor and his chancellor, and to the Bundesrath, make Germany something quite unlike a pure democracy. Nevertheless, the whole people have some large share in the government of the country. In Italy, native or naturalized Italians twenty-five years of age, who pay a tax of about eight dollars and can read and write, are voters; the suffrage is limited, but there is no class limitation, — no obstacle which industry and thrift may not easily overcome. In Spain, the lower house of the national legislature is elected by the people; the electors are those who have paid for five years a land tax of about five dollars, or for two years an industrial tax of about ten dollars. These facts show to what an extent political privilege is already in the hands of the European peoples.

Forty years ago the masses of the people had little to say about the making of the laws under which they lived; to-day, in most of the great nations of Europe, their voice is distinctly audible, and every decade adds to its authority. The philosopher Bluntschli, who does not believe in democracy, declares that "an impartial analysis of the conditions of modern Europe leads to this result, that the strength of the people, and their political participation in the state, has sensibly increased, and is still on the increase."

What are the causes of this remarkable phenomenon? Many explanations are given:—

1. "The entire mental development of the time," says Bluntschli, "has a democratic character. The action of common schools has never been greater. Popular literature was never more disseminated than at present." This is a concomitant of democracy; is it a cause or an effect? The great improvement in the common schools of Great Britain followed the extension of the suffrage, and was, confessedly, a consequence rather than a cause. "We have given these people the suffrage," said the statesmen of England; "now we must see that they are fitted to exercise it." In France, also, the extension of the suffrage certainly preceded the chief improvements in popular education.

2. Economic conditions, it is said, also favor the growth of democracy. To some extent this is true. The abolition of slavery and serfdom in Europe, and the introduction of a system of free contract between the employed and the employer, have been closely connected with the growth of political democracy. But if we would go to the bottom of this question, we must try to find out what power it was that broke the shackles of the slave and led the laborer up the path to free contract. Nor would it be quite true to say that improved economic conditions have been the immediate cause of the extension of the suffrage in modern times. That would be reading history backward. It was not improved economic conditions that planted democracy in New England. The agitation for the extension of the franchise in Old England began in the very darkest day of the history of English labor; began when degradation and starvation were the working-man's constant portion. The uprising of the lower classes that culminated in the Chartist movement was an attempt to gain political power in the hope of improving their economic conditions. They thought that the suffrage would be a weapon with which they could compel their masters to pay them better wages.

"Chartism," said one of their leaders, in a great meeting on Kensall Moor, "is no mere political question; it is a knife-and-fork question: the charter for us means good lodging, good eating and drinking, good wages, and short hours of labor."¹

8. Various recondite and metaphysical causes are also assigned to this phenomenon; I will not estimate their efficiency. Whatever may be said of these deeper currents of causation, it seems to me that the growth of democracy in the Old World is due in large measure to historical rather than to intellectual or economical causes; and that chief among these is the existence of democracy in the New World. The European peoples have had an object-lesson before their eyes for many years, and they have been studying it well. The one capital offense charged against America by the conservatives of Europe is, says Mr. Lowell, "that we are infecting the Old World with what seems to be thought the entirely new disease of democracy." And while it is true, as he says, that the germs of this disease have been fermenting in the blood of Europe for a long time, yet the active cause in developing its recent symptoms is the splendid growth of the American republic. "There can be no doubt," says Mr. Lowell, "that the spectacle of a great and prosperous democracy on the other side of the sea must react powerfully on the aspirations and political theories of men in the Old World who do not find things to their mind." The French Revolution of 1789 was a distinct and thunderous echo of the American Revolution of 1776. Ever since that day, every popular movement has drawn much of its inspiration from the history of this country. What the people of Europe might have done without this incitement I will not try to tell; doubtless efforts would have been made to throw off the yoke of prescription and grasp political power; but these efforts would have been far less hopeful and resolute if America had not continually appealed to them.

America is the leader in the march of the modern nations toward democracy. But who leads the leader? Why is America a democracy, and not an oligarchy, or an aristocracy, or a monarchy? The founders of this nation had many models before them: how did they happen to select this one? Was it a fortunate throw of the dice? Was it the outcome of whim or prejudice? No; it was a result as natural as any other product of historical evolution. The men in the cabin of the Mayflower established a democratic government, because they were thoroughly imbued

¹ Hyndman's *Socialism in England*, p. 211.

with Christian principles, and because they meant to apply their Christianity to every part of the business of life. They got their Christianity directly from the New Testament, not from the decretals of any ecclesiastical establishment; and that pure doctrine of Christ, left to work itself out without obstruction in this new society, produced a democratic form of government.

"Every religion," says De Tocqueville, "is to be found in juxtaposition to a political opinion which is connected with it by affinity. If the human mind be left to follow its own bent, it will regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society upon one uniform principle; and man will endeavor, if I may use the expression, to harmonize the state in which he lives on earth with the state which he believes to await him in heaven. The greatest part of America was peopled by men who, after having shaken off the authority of the Pope, acknowledged no other religious supremacy; they brought with them into the New World a form of Christianity which I cannot better describe than by calling it a democratic and republican religion. This sect contributed powerfully to the establishment of a democracy and a republic; and from the earliest settlement of the emigrants, politics and religion contracted an alliance which has never been dissolved."¹

This last sentence is somewhat misleading. In the same chapter De Tocqueville notes and commends the complete separation of church and state in this country; what he means is that our democratic institutions have grown out of our religious ideas, as a plant grows from a seed. The logic of Christianity is democracy; and Christianity had a chance, on this free soil, to work itself out logically.

De Tocqueville is not alone in the belief that the natural outcome of Christianity is democracy. Another French philosopher, Henri Beaudrillart, places first among the causes which have produced the democratic régime, "the influence of Christianity upon ideas and manners. This is the foundation of Christianity, — a free, responsible soul, fallen, it is true, but in a condition to raise itself. What duty after this is there greater than to respect this responsibility in one's self and in others, and to develop the moral nature in others and in ourselves? All the children of God are brothers; all the sons of men are equal in their fall; all the members of Christ are equal in their redemption. . . . The belief in responsible liberty, in a common redemption, in equality before

¹ *Democracy in America*, chap. xvii.

God, came into existence with Christianity itself." And although, as this writer points out, a state of conquest and violence long retarded the civil effects of Christianity, nevertheless it steadily made its way; it sapped the foundations of slavery; it lightened the burdens of the oppressed; it prepared the way for the democratic régime. At last its appointed time came. "Did not the ideas of equality and Christian brotherhood," demands this philosopher, "as applied to society, manifest themselves at the time of the foundation of the English colonies of America? Who, then, will deny that American democracy was born of Christianity?"¹

I have dwelt upon this point because it is the vital point. Our American democracy is a plant that grew from the seed of Christianity; the formative influence which shaped our institutions was not primarily economical nor philosophical, but religious.

"But if democracy is the child of Christianity," it may be answered, "then it would seem that Christianity would better be looking after her progeny. For certain it is that this heir of her divine patrimony does not always behave itself divinely. This people of ours, clothed with the great prerogative of self-government, — how far are they yet from the ideal of good government! How much there is of laxity, of dishonesty, of corruption in all our governmental operations! How dismal are many of the failures of our suffrage in the selection of representatives! The managers of our parties, the occupants of our offices, — are they the most capable and the most trustworthy men of the community? Bribery in elections is confessedly becoming more and more common. Office is largely considered, not as a trust, but as a perquisite; men spend large sums in securing office, and consider themselves justified in getting back their money, and something more, by a corrupt use of power. Men are chosen to our school boards, not ordinarily because they know something about education; to our police boards, not always because they can be trusted to enforce the laws; to our city councils, not commonly because they have any skill in municipal finance, but because they want these places as stepping-stones to something higher, and are willing to spend money and eat dirt in getting themselves elected. Thus it happens that certain classes of criminals, whose business is lucrative, and who can contribute liberally to the election funds, enjoy a practical immunity from the operations of the law. So, too, it comes about that great corporations, using their money

¹ Lalor's *Cyclopedia of Political Science*, art. "Democracy."

freely to corrupt electors and legislators and judges, secure valuable franchises for nothing, and get the privilege of taxing the people *in perpetuo* for their own enrichment. Under such favoring legislation and such corrupt administration arises a vast plutocracy, luxurious, unscrupulous, insolent; and over against this a proletariat, steadily growing, of hundreds of thousands so poor that they are almost destitute of hope, and are ready to drop from the march of the toilers into the prison or the poorhouse, whichever may happen to come first. This separation of classes is due in part, no doubt, to economic causes, and in part to inherited depravities, but it is also due in part to the great privileges that our legislators, carelessly or corruptly, have bestowed on combinations of capital; and to the fact that our pushing democracy, intent on self-aggrandizement, have been unmindful of the weak and the wayward who walk by their side, and with whose welfare they are charged.

"Such," say our critics, "are some of the most obvious failures of the democratic régime on the side of law and social economy. Nor is it clear that its effects upon private morality are altogether salutary. Certainly it breeds irreverence. Respect for high character does not thrive among us; the doctrine that one man is as good as another destroys the basis of reverential feeling. Our children and youth are notoriously disrespectful to the aged, and even to their own parents; filial honor and obedience are decaying; parental authority is greatly enfeebled. There is scant reverence for God. This is the outcome of our democracy; and our democracy, you say, is the child of Christianity. Can it be a legitimate child?"

I have put the case of the critics and impugnors of our democracy pretty strongly; perhaps they will accept the indictment as sufficiently sweeping. And what answer can we make to such charges? Doubtless we must allow that they contain too much truth. The defects and failures of our democratic institutions are neither to be denied nor ignored; and there are no people in the world so deeply concerned to know exactly what they are as we ourselves. Especially needful is it that we make this inquisition thorough, in view of the extremely favorable estimate of our national life which Mr. Bryce has lately offered us in his notable book. It is the noblest portrait of a nation ever drawn; it is only a little too ideal; some of the warts are not painted; and we must not be misled by the flattery, grateful though it may be.

In answer to the rather contemptuous query with which our

indictment closes, I venture to reply that our democracy surely is the legitimate child of Christianity, albeit it is, beyond a doubt, a somewhat wayward and unfilial child. It has not kept in the ways in which it was brought up. It has fallen into bad company. In its earlier years it made the acquaintance of a waif from over the sea whose influence was not wholesome. That was the French philosophy of which Rousseau was the representative. It was a specious and insinuating doctrine; our young democracy was charmed by it; you find the traces of its influence in the writings of several of the Revolutionary fathers. But it was fundamentally defective. Its talk was all of rights, never of duties. Its notion about government was that man made it; "its powers," so our "Declaration" phrases it, "are all derived from the consent of the governed." Men make government by entering into contract with one another; political rights all have this origin; that is just which they agree to make just; there is no Eternal Right over their heads to which they are all alike subject, or if there is, it is quite impossible for them to know its nature, or to receive its mandates; if man were good enough to know the will of God, Rousseau said, he would be so good that he would need no government. It is not, then, in the nature of man, but in the will of man, in his momentary choice, that government finds its origin. And since men, by a voluntary compact, become the architects of the temple of justice, it follows, of course, that what they have built they may pull down when they will, or alter it to suit themselves. It seems to follow, also, that any man, when he chooses, may withdraw from the combination; that social rights and obligations may be put on and off like garments. And if it does not follow that the minority, who oppose a law, may trample the law under their feet, it certainly follows that the minority may at any time cancel the contract by secession. Of course this is no part of the theory as promulgated; it is contrary to the reasonings of all the philosophers who have advocated the theory; but that is because their reasonings were illogical; because they did not follow their principles to their legitimate issues. Locke, as well as Rousseau, tried to show that "every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it;" but that is not the logic of the situation. The power to enter into such a relation implies the power to come out of it; and if no term is named in the compact, then it may be dissolved at the

pleasure of any of the parties entering into it. It is precisely of the nature of a partnership at will, whose only bond is the mutual agreement of the partners. Bluntschli is exactly right when he says:—

“For practical politics this doctrine is in the highest degree dangerous, since it makes the State and its institutions the product of individual caprice, and declares it to be changeable according to the will of the individuals then living. It destroys the conception of public law, instigates the citizens to unconstitutional movements, and exposes the State to the uttermost insecurity and confusion. It is to be considered, therefore, a theory of anarchy rather than a political doctrine.”

It must not be supposed that this contract theory held undisputed sway in the counsels of our fathers; in truth, it was only a secondary influence; the strain of their philosophy was in a much more sober key; if it had not been, we should never have had any centennial anniversaries to celebrate. Rousseau's theories were logically worked out once; that was in Paris, between 1789 and 1795. The French Revolution, with its frightful phantasmagoria of fire and blood, was the natural fruit of this anarchic philosophy. Doubtless Rousseau's dogma was the very weapon chosen by Providence for the pulverization of that æonian “crust of custom” which history knows as the old régime; as social dynamite it served its purpose admirably; but let it be remembered that its only mission is to destroy. If we had had no other guide in the working out of our destiny than this crazy theory, our epitaph would have been written long ago. But the influence of this doctrine was felt in the early years of our national life; it found expression in the Declaration of Independence; the mind of Jefferson was completely possessed by it, and Jefferson had then, and has always had, much to do in shaping our political theories. “The will of the majority,” he said, “is the natural law of every society, and the only sure guardian of the rights of man.” There has been enough of this sort of nonsense in all our politics to make a great deal of mischief. Out of it has come much of the intense individualism that borders on anarchy. By tradition and by conviction we are a law-abiding people; in most of the greater matters we have maintained our loyalty to that ideal sovereignty which our flag symbolizes; but there has been and is in many smaller matters a constant disregard and defiance of law; large classes of our citizens habitually set at naught those statutes which do not coincide with their interests; and this kind

of lawlessness is undoubtedly increasing. Our officers of the law often refuse to enforce the law; the statute is a dead letter before the ink is dry with which it is printed. Sometimes the police authorities assemble and vote that they will respect one law and ignore another. They are supposed to be servants of the law, but they usurp the functions of the Legislature and the Supreme Court; they announce themselves censors and dictators. That this chronic lawlessness, which affects magistrates and people, is due, at least in part, to the development, in the public mind, of the germs of that poisonous theory of which we have been speaking, I cannot doubt. It is too evident that there are multitudes among us who have no notion of the sacredness of law; who set it aside with the utmost levity whenever it crosses their will. If you listen to the harangues of the beer-gardens, or if you read many of the newspapers of the country — especially those printed in other languages — you will get the impression that the one inalienable possession to which many of our citizens cling is their “personal liberty,” by which they mean their liberty to do precisely as they please; and that any law which interferes with that is to them no law. “Government,” they seem to argue, “derives all its just powers from the consent of the governed; whatever the government does without obtaining our consent we shall ignore or resist.”

That the aberrations of our democracy are due, thus, in part, to intellectual causes — to defective theories of government — is not to be denied. And it is plain that there is need of a good deal of elementary teaching along this line. If any one is disposed to say that mere political theories are of no practical consequence, let him reflect that we have just passed through a war which cost the country a million of lives and some billions of dollars, all on account of a mere political theory — the theory of state-sovereignty. However it may be in religion, it is evident that in politics it makes a tremendous difference what a man believes. There is no more malignant type of blood-poisoning than that which is suffered by the body politic under the influence of a false political philosophy. The “victorious analysis” of Jean Jacques, which atomizes human society, really lay at the foundation of the doctrine of secession. If any true conception of the solidarity of human society — of the organic life of the nation — had entered into the thought of the people, the war of the rebellion would never have been fought. It is time that “victorious analysis” were remanded to the laboratories where dynamite bombs

are manufactured, and that we introduce into our political thinking a little sober synthesis. Here is the truth, clearly stated by Hermann Lotze, of which our politics stand in deepest need : —

“If man could live his destined life in solitude, and if he entered only incidentally into social relations, then indeed no form of society which had grown up historically would be binding on him without his consent. But man has no power over the place and time of his birth, both of which involve his life from the first in a network of conditions that have grown up historically ; he does not rise to the independence of which his nature allows without the assistance of others, who in their very work are protected by an historically established reign of law in society ; his mental development would be a nullity if the same condition of society did not bring to him in countless ways the material of mental growth and aid him in making use of it. Thus, then, before he becomes a person having rights concerning which he can dispute, he is profoundly indebted to the institutions of society for the very development of his personality.”¹

Let the political philosophers of the sanctum and the stump meditate much on these words ; peradventure it may dawn on them that something deeper than the momentary will of a fickle multitude is shaping the destinies of a nation like ours. It will be melancholy, indeed, if the review of our national life to which the centennial celebrations constrain us do not convince us of the existence of historical forces that steadily make their way in spite of “the will of the majority,” do not make us aware of the existence of laws which are not fixed by any contracts that we can make, but which we must obey or perish.

Another cause of the aberrations of our Democracy is much less recondite. It has been overwhelmed by the rush and pressure of material interests. The cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choke the word of the patriotic monitor as well as of the Christian preacher. Our young Democracy found himself with a vast continent on his hands to subdue and develop ; a rich domain, with promises of wealth untold as the reward of industry and enterprise. Do we not know that the tempter whose name is Mammon has often taken him to the top of some exceeding high mountain and shown him the farms and mines and factories and shops and railroads that were yet to be, saying unto him, “All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me.” It was a grievous temptation ; we must

¹ *Microcosmus*, ii. 543.

not marvel greatly if he has sometimes yielded to it. Such opportunities for the multiplication of wealth were never before offered to a whole people; such a stimulus to the acquisitive instincts was never applied to the life of any nation. Our neighbors, who are often justly shocked and scandalized by the mercenariness of Americans, would do well to ask themselves whether, under the same circumstances, they would have behaved any more soberly. The material development of this country must needs have enlisted no small share of the energies of our people; if it has occupied a disproportionate place in their thoughts, leading them to neglect the duties of patriotism, and to permit the growth of unsocial forces, and the encroachment of the disorderly and criminal classes, that fact is not to be wondered at, much as it is to be deplored.

Doubtless this is one of the main sources of our weakness. Our failures in government — especially in municipal government — are due to the neglect of political duty on the part of intelligent and reputable citizens. This neglect is often charged upon educated men; but unless my observation is at fault, the mercantile and manufacturing classes are more blameworthy in this regard than the scholars and the teachers. The educated men of my acquaintance are in the habit of taking an active part in political affairs; it is the business men who are derelict, and their neglect is due partly to their absorption in their business, and partly to an unwillingness to risk their gains by antagonizing the dangerous classes. Nothing but a great quickening of the conscience of this class will save us from disaster. That this quickening will come, I have no doubt; but I fear that we shall wait, in many of our cities, to be taught the lesson of our political responsibility by raging mobs and blazing warehouses. We shall learn the lesson; it were well if we could learn it in a less expensive school. But if a good share of the wealth heaped up by our merchants in the neglect of their political duties should thus be wiped out, the solemn words of Mr. Lincoln, in reviewing the devastations of the war, will surely be recalled: "As was said three thousand years ago it must still be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'"

The poison of the French philosophy, the paralysis of our practical materialism, these will partly account for the aberrations of our democracy; but there have been other influences. Into the life of this nation has been poured from the beginning a steadily increasing stream of immigration. Many of the best elements of

our national life have thus been contributed ; but over against these gains the injuries and losses have been terrible. The material development of the nation has been hastened, no doubt, by immigration, but its moral and political development has been immensely retarded. So long ago as 1835 De Tocqueville wrote : "The American cities contain a multitude of Europeans who have been driven to the shores of the New World by their misfortunes or their misconduct ; and these men inoculate the United States with all our vices without bringing with them any of those interests which counteract their baneful influence." What this distinguished Frenchman saw to be true fifty years ago is far truer to-day. Every year a considerable company of thrifty, orderly people find a home upon our shores and begin soberly and peaceably to perform the duties of American citizens ; but every year also great cargoes of ignorance and filth and brutality and bigotry are dumped upon our wharves and speedily absorbed into the body politic. Most of these immigrants come from countries where their training has utterly unfitted them for self-government ; their attitude toward the powers that be has always been hostile ; the law has been to them a foe to be feared or a tyrant to be circumvented. We can very well understand the feeling of that Irishman of Mr. Lowell's story who, landing in New York, and asked what his politics were, inquired if there were a government there, and on being told that there was, retorted, "Thin I'm agin it!" It is natural for the Irishman to be in that frame of mind, but it is highly unfortunate for this Republic. And much the same is true of the ignorant German who comes from a land where the unsparing exactions of a strong military government have chafed and angered him, and whose notion about America is that it is a free country, — a country, that is, where every man is a law unto himself, and where "liberalism" implies a successful and insolent defiance of the laws of the land. It is well known, also, that the most turbulent and dangerous elements of the German population, driven out from that country by the police, have found a refuge upon our shores, where some of them have begun to plot anarchy before the scent of the steerage had departed from their garments.

How sorely our problem of government has been complicated by this admixture of alien and intractable elements needs not to be explained. These people are not fit for citizenship in a republic, nor can multitudes of them ever be fitted for it. A large share of our paupers and criminals come from this class ; in all

our prisons, our almshouses, our asylums, the proportion of these persons is enormously large. Of the bribable voters they constitute also a vastly disproportionate share. The occupations that are more or less lawless are recruited pretty largely from our immigrants. The saloon-keepers as a class are habitually and intentionally lawless; read over the voluminous list of the saloon-keepers in any city directory and you will see that the vast majority of them bear names that indicate their foreign origin.

What a demoralizing influence upon our politics must come from the introduction into our voting population of such a mass of ignorance and prejudice could easily be imagined if it were not well known. This is the kind of material with which the demagogue loves to work; the presence of these crude masses is what gives rise to the demagogue. Reason cannot reach them, but their antipathies, their passions, and their fears can be played upon, and the manipulator is always ready. They know little or nothing about American questions, but they bring their own hereditary hatreds along with them, and the feuds of races over the sea are fought over again in our politics. Who was not sickened by the realization, in the last presidential campaign, that the issue of the election might very likely be made to turn upon a successful appeal to such antipathies, which have no relation whatever to America? Let me say again, that there are large numbers of our citizens of foreign birth to whom these words do not apply; who are as intelligent, as orderly, as loyal to their adopted country as any of its native citizens; but the statistics of the criminal and dependent classes show how many there are among them of whom no such praise can be spoken. Is it greatly to be wondered at that our American Democracy, overloaded with all this undemocratic material, has come somewhat short of the hopes of its most sanguine prophets?

I have shown some reasons why the democracy that sprang from the faith of the founders has been perverted from its original type. We have not now, on this continent, the kind of democracy that is naturally developed out of Christian ideas; we had it once, but we have lost it, partly by our own fault, partly by misfortune; the kind of democracy that now prevails here is quite unlike that which gave the law to the thirteen colonies. In some particulars it may be better; in other and more important elements it is sadly inferior.

There is reason for the faith that a democracy planted on Christian principles and abiding in them will live while time en-

dures ; the gates of hell will not prevail against it ; but a democracy which departs from these principles has no sure foundation ; when the storms of sedition and anarchy come it will fall, and great will be the fall of it. Nor is there any safe course for us but to bring our democracy back to these foundations.

We cannot too quickly clear our minds of that eighteenth-century nonsense about society being the result of a compact. It is not from the consent of the governed that governments, whether democracies or despotisms, derive their just powers ; then only do they possess just powers when they study and reenact the eternal laws of God. Such laws there are, revealed in our own consciences, impressed upon the very structure of society itself. You can find out God's moral laws by studying human conduct and human history, just as you can find out his natural laws by studying nature. God has a way for societies, a way for nations ; let them find that way and follow it. Let them conform their laws to his law, and then obey them. It would be no more absurd for the farmers of this nation to assume that they could determine by a majority vote the best methods of raising wheat, than for the electors to imagine that they can determine by a majority vote the best methods of ruling the state. Those methods are to be found by patient study — not to be determined by counting noses. Doubtless what the majority determine to be the law must stand as law, and be respected until the majority is endowed with higher wisdom to repeal or modify it ; but the real validity and authority of these laws is derived not from the human wills that establish them, but from the Eternal Righteousness that enters into them, from the Eternal himself to whose will they are conformed. It is precisely in proportion as we succeed in understanding and reenacting his law that our constitutions and our statutes are armed with justice and with majesty.

When our laws are conceived of as having such an origin as this, then some sense of their sacredness must take possession of the minds of the people. And the one thing that this people needs, just now, is a new sense of the sacredness of law. Note these words of Montesquieu : " When, in a popular government, there is a suspension of the laws, as it can come only from the corruption of the Republic, the state is in danger." Under the shadow of that peril we sit every day. We have learned to think that we can play fast and loose with law ; enforce it when we will, ignore it when we will. It is largely because we have the notion that law is a creation of our own and that we can do as we

please with it. It is time that our theories were reformed. Just as science has no coherence, but becomes nonsense and jargon the moment you deny the uniformity of natural law, so society loses its form and becomes chaos and anarchy when the authority of the civil law is seriously impaired.

We must obey the laws ourselves, and we must make those who come to us from over the sea understand that they must obey them too. It is natural for them, in their reaction against the despotisms from which they have fled, to rush to the extreme of lawlessness. The one thing for them to learn, as soon as they step upon our soil, is that law in a republic is as sacred, as inflexible, as imperative as anywhere on the earth. If we can teach them this lesson, and by our own example of loyalty to law can enforce it upon them, we can trust to time and light, and the gentle influences of Christian civilization, to make good citizens of them, or, at any rate, of their children ; but on this point there must be no parleying. Those who are not willing to obey, religiously, the laws of this country must be warned against coming hither ; if any such are here already, the sooner they take themselves off the better for us and for them.

And yet when we insist, as we are bound to do, upon obedience to existing laws, we must exercise some discretion in the enactment of laws. Not every part of conduct can be brought under statutory regulation. The Christian ethics inculcates general principles and leaves the application of them largely to individual determination. Something of the same method must obtain in the legislation of a Christian democracy. If we insist that our laws must be obeyed, then we shall do well to proceed cautiously in the enactment of laws, framing only such as are likely to secure a prompt and general enforcement. That extravagant and ill-considered legislation has afforded our law-breakers some excuse for their lawlessness cannot be denied. While we repress their anarchy we must remove their excuses.

It is the deepest faith of every true American that the aberrations of our democracy can be corrected ; but it can only be done by frank and courageous criticism ; by seeing things as they are and calling them by their right names ; by sending our braggarts and our demagogues to the rear and summoning to the service of the state the men who have understanding of their time and of all times ; who can be trusted to lead their own nation and many nations following in the ways of well-ordered freedom.

Washington Gladden.

A DOCTRINAL TEST AS A CONDITION OF CHURCH-MEMBERSHIP.

NOT long ago a leading denominational journal, in an editorial entitled "Theological Tobogganning," traced very graphically the rapid descent of a certain church from the hill-top of orthodoxy to the dead level of nihility, and intimated at the same time that this historical chute is a warning to "some of our pastors and some of our churches, who are dissatisfied with their creed-formulæ, to move a little carefully and slowly in their revision," lest they take the same fatal slide.

The warning is timely, doubtless; for some of our pastors and some of our churches *are* dissatisfied with their creed-formulæ, and are moving surely, if not slowly, towards their revision. During the last twenty years very many Congregational churches have revised their creeds, and almost invariably the process has been one of abbreviation and simplification; and however we may be inclined to interpret it, here is the fact, that there is a general movement of our churches in the direction of shorter and simpler creeds. How may the fact be accounted for? What does it mean that so many of our church creeds are going tobogganning? This is a matter of no little importance and of general interest.

The fact in question may be explained as the loosening of the churches' grasp upon their great doctrines — a gradual evolution, or dissolution, of the evangelical faith; in short, "Theological tobogganning." But the question which forced itself upon the writer in reading the editorial above referred to, was, Whether the historical instance cited as a warning is a fair type of the present movement in our churches; whether this tendency to the revision of creeds is in the same direction; whether there may not be a distinction between laxity and simplicity? If the true explanation is the one already suggested, there is, indeed, ground for serious alarm and solemn warning. But before accepting a conclusion so grave we ought to inquire, What are the motives which actuate the churches in their creed-revision? What are the real reasons back of the dissatisfaction with the old formulæ, and what are the ends in view of the new? I am loath to believe that this tendency toward simpler forms of admission to our churches — a tendency of unmistakable direction and of irresistible momentum — is indeed looseness in the holding of Christian doctrine, the more unwilling because the phenomena

may be accounted for, I am sure, in a more satisfactory way. What, then, is the explanation?

In the first place, it is found that there are serious practical difficulties in the use of a doctrinal statement as a test of membership, and that they are serious in proportion as it is complex and comprehensive.

(1) There are many immature Christians, whether children or not, yet "babes in Christ," whom the church gladly welcomes to its membership, — what church of Christ can afford to exclude a Christian disciple because intellectually immature or inferior? — and who cannot therefore have an intelligent apprehension of the creed to which they must publicly assent. To many thoughtful minds within and without the church this seems an empty form, if not something worse, and many conscientious men and women look upon it with serious misgiving. "When I united with the church I did not understand the creed at all — *and I knew I did n't*," was the confession of a young woman, in words which reveal the thoughts of many hearts. This difficulty, serious as it is, is not, however, an insurmountable one, because much more might be done, nay, ought to be done, to prepare young Christians for church-membership; and there is little excuse, save in the looseness of Congregational methods, for the remark made by a very intelligent, useful, and upright member of my church: "When I united with this church thirty-six years ago, I knew no more of its creed than I know about the Koran!" It is shameful, but it is doubtless true, that many intelligent members of our churches could say the same thing without much exaggeration.

When all has been done that might be done to remove the obstacle of ignorance, the remainder of the difficulty may of course be disposed of by some modifying clause, as, "This you believe in so far as you understand it," etc.

(2) But a practical difficulty of far more serious a nature is encountered when the candidate understands the creed well enough but cannot conscientiously accept some part of it. It is the Christian disciple who *thinks*, who stumbles over the creed at the door of the church. Of course he who does not think much about it has no difficulty whatever with the creed, no matter how profound it is! But the disciple who thinks, and who has doubts *because* he thinks, meets a formidable obstacle in the creed — formidable in proportion as it is long and he is conscientious. In such a case there are just two ways of dealing with the difficulty: either admit that it is insurmountable, and turn back, or else try

to get around it somehow. Most church committees will hesitate to reject the thoughtful, conscientious Christian on the ground of his intellectual difficulties, for such an one is often the stronger and more earnest Christian, and to reject him seems a great wrong. The pastor, then, will usually discover some way of evading the obstacle rather than to do the greater wrong, as it seems, of excluding the sincere Christian from Christian fellowship.

This, then, is the dilemma in which more than one church committee has found itself as it has stood, creed in hand, between the disciple and his Lord's table: Either deny fellowship to one who is undoubtedly a member of the body of Christ; or, *demand an act of insincerity on the very threshold of Christ's church, at the time of all others when a Christian should be most sincere.*

This leads us to another practical difficulty, closely akin to the one we have just considered, for it is the consequence of it: —

(3) In every congregation there are some good men and women who, though not members of the church, are genuine Christians, as in many tangible ways their lives bear witness. What pastor cannot name many such, for has he not preached to them and prayed for them and pleaded with them, and does he not yearn to see them come into the church and take the place that is theirs by Christ's invitation at His table? But in seeming disregard of all urgent reasons, and above all of their Lord's tender words, "This do in remembrance of me," they stand aloof. Why? Because the church expects of them before they enter its communion more than they can conscientiously give, namely, hearty assent to its creed; and therefore if they come to the Lord's table at all, it must be either at the cost of personal sincerity, or in discourteous disregard of distinctive usages of the church. Under these circumstances most persons choose to stay away, and thus a doctrinal test of membership in Christ's church sometimes becomes either a barrier or a stumbling-block between the sincere disciple and his rightful place at the Lord's table. And the pastor who attempts to enforce Christ's command, "This do in remembrance of me," finds himself working at a terrible disadvantage. But in attempting to remedy this difficulty he is met forthwith by another: —

(4) The problem is to frame a doctrinal test which shall omit no essential Christian doctrine and at the same time exclude no Christian believer. In obedience to the imperative sense of the obligation to administer the sacraments in the spirit of Christ, a church undertakes to simplify its creed, resolved that, like "The

way of Holiness," it shall be so plain that the wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein. But very soon the question arises whether there is not a limit to the abbreviation and simplification of a doctrinal statement, and whether such a creed as is sought is anywhere to be found.¹ Any one who has attempted to *make* such a creed will, I feel confident, readily assent to the conclusion of another:—

"The problem to invent a creed which shall sum up the doctrines of grace and at the same time be a test of admission which shall contain every element of revealed truth and exclude no regenerate disciple is as incapable of solution as the quadrature of the circle."²

The result of the attempts to solve this problem abundantly justifies the statement; for what is the outcome of all this movement in the direction of simpler creeds? It has been very unfortunate—for the creeds. The process of abbreviation and simplification, not to say dismemberment and mutilation, to which the creeds of our New England churches have been subjected in obedience to the desire of welcoming every true Christian believer, has unquestionably been a very unfortunate one, so far as the creeds themselves, considered as scientific and comprehensive statements of doctrine, are concerned; and so, perhaps, unfortunate for the theological training of the churches. Whatever we may think of this movement in other aspects of it, we must admit that it has been "*theological tobogganning*" indeed!

We have found, however, these four practical difficulties incident to the principle that a doctrinal test should be a condition of membership in Christ's church, viz: the difficulties which a doctrinal statement presents, first, to those who because they cannot understand it cannot intelligently assent to it; and, second, to those who because they cannot believe it in some particulars cannot *conscientiously* assent to it; third, and consequently, to a large class of devout and sincere believers who, unless the distinctions of the visible church are disregarded, cannot be urged to come to their Lord's table so long as these difficulties remain; and, finally, the practical impossibility of providing for these difficulties consistently with the principle to which they are incident, for every one of them grows out of the principle that the true basis of Christian fellowship is doctrinal agreement. Perhaps any one of these

¹ For the fitness of the Apostles' Creed to this purpose, see an editorial in *ANDOVER REVIEW*, January, 1889, "Creeds and Church Membership."

² The Rev. Kingsley Twining in *New Englander*, vol. xxxii. p. 676.

four difficulties is enough in itself to account for the fact that "some of our pastors and some of our churches are dissatisfied with their creed-formulæ," and therefore renders unnecessary the alarming suggestion that the churches are in danger of slipping from the heights of orthodoxy; but I believe that it is not merely, nor indeed chiefly, because it is found that the principle involved in doctrinal tests of membership does not work altogether well in practice, that the churches are inclined to abandon it. There is a profounder explanation of the facts than that, and it is this: the churches are questioning whether the principle is right in itself, and are asking, "What is the true principle of Christian fellowship? What are the true conditions of church-membership? What right have we to impose conditions other than those laid down by Christ and his apostles? Shall we exclude any whom He would have received or they would have acknowledged?" Groping its way backward through the shadows of ecclesiasticism, the Church of Christ to-day is seeking the divinely ordained conditions of membership in the clear light of apostolic simplicity. What, then, are the conditions of membership in Christ's church? We turn to the apostles for answer. We cannot attempt at this time to give the answer in full, but it is so explicit that we need not mistake what it is.

Upon that day which we may call the birthday of the church, when, after the descent of the Holy Spirit, the multitude to whom the leader of the apostles had been preaching, "were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and the rest of the apostles, 'Brethren, what shall we do?' Peter said unto them, 'Repent ye and be baptized every one of you in the name of the Lord Jesus.' . . . Then they that received his word were baptized." Peter's "word" was: "God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified." Baptism then was an act of simple confession of faith in Jesus as Lord and Christ, *and all who were thus baptized became, ipso facto, members of the Christian community, that is, the church*, for the church was constituted of the baptized, and every baptized one was a member of the church. Without going into the particulars of evidence, I must content myself with saying, furthermore, that the terms of admission thus instituted at the outset by Peter are reiterated by other apostles with remarkable unanimity, so that their answer to our question, What are the true conditions of Christian fellowship, is unequivocal; for we find that both the teaching and the practice of the early church agree in declaring that "repentance toward God and faith

toward our Lord Jesus Christ," together with baptism into the name of Christ¹ as the act of confession, constitutes any one a member of Christ's church. We cannot fail to notice that the conditions of membership as defined by the apostles are identical with the terms of salvation. The same golden key of faith which opens the kingdom of God to every believer also readily unlocked the doors of the early church, for they swung wide open to every one who, with this key in his hand, could say, "I accept Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord," and just by confessing this in the act of baptism the believer crossed the threshold and became a member of Christ's church. But if to-day that golden key does not always open the door of Christ's church, shall we say, "You must find a key that will fit," or shall we examine our complicated locks? In other words, shall we not ask whether the simple confession of that faith in Christ which really constitutes one a "member of the body of Christ" ought not to be enough now, as it was then, to make him also a member of the local church? — not excluding any reasonable provisions of a covenant, of course.

We recognize the distinction between the visible and the invisible church, and it is a very real one. There are doubtless many included in the invisible church who are not numbered among the members of the visible church, and there are some nominal members of the latter who may not be members indeed of the former; but while we are thus obliged to draw a line of distinction between the visible and the invisible church, that is, between the actual and the ideal, or, more exactly, perhaps, between the formal and the real, we must also realize that the nearer the boundaries of the visible church correspond to the limits of the invisible, the better for the church of Christ in the world; and that if it were what it ought to be, there would be no such distinction at all. Why, then, should not the church of Christ do everything in its power to make its boundaries co-extensive with the invisible church, and how can it do so save by making its terms of admission run as nearly parallel as possible with the terms of salvation? Does the Church of Christ desire to exclude from its communion any who are vitally related to Christ by faith? Shall it deny fellowship to such as are being saved? Will it close its doors to any who "may enter in through the gates into the city"?

But it will hardly be asserted that the intelligent holding of a creed is an essential condition of salvation, and there is no evi-

¹ The longer Trinitarian formula was probably not used at first. See *ANDOVER REVIEW*, *ut supra*.

dence that in the early church there was a doctrinal test of discipleship. All the elaborate statements of Christian doctrine which have been used as tests of membership are of much later origin. In the first century it was *faith*, not *belief*, which constituted the disciple a member of Christ's church. Have the true conditions of membership changed since then? the terms of salvation certainly have not. The real question at the root of our inquiry is, What is the true *principle* of Christian fellowship? Is it belief or is it faith? If it is belief, then the more elaborate and accurate — and, of course, also divisive — the creed of the local church the better. If it is faith, then the question becomes primarily not one of longer or shorter creed, but of any creed at all. Do not let me be misunderstood. I mean no creed only in the doctrinal theological sense, for of course a credo is fundamental to Christian faith, and the simplest confession of Christ contains the germ of all creeds; and so it is almost an absurdity, strictly speaking, to say that the true principle of Christian fellowship involves no creed at all; but it is no absurdity to make a distinction between a simple personal confession of faith in Christ and a statement of Christian doctrine more or less comprehensive, for there is a radical difference between the two: the principle of the one is faith, the principle of the other is belief. One says, "I believe *in*," the other says, "We believe *that*." (A comparison of the Apostles' Creed with the Nicene Creed will further illustrate the distinction.)

Is there any question that the creeds of our churches are for the most part modelled upon the principle that a common belief is the true bond of fellowship? Are they not statements of intellectual belief rather than confessions of personal faith? Do they not say "We believe *that*," rather than "I believe *in*"? And if not very formidable, nor admirable, as statements of doctrine, — for they are too often the effeminate and crippled progeny of a sterner, sturdier stock, in comparison with which they seem like "dudes" beside a dragon, — yet do they not have some family traits? Have they not retained, to change the figure, much of the form and flavor of theological productions? Are they not usually formal and dreary, so that they read, as another has said, "like an oath before a magistrate"? They certainly have too little of the life and warmth of confessional expressions of faith in a personal Saviour.

If the churches are not altogether satisfied with their creeds so far as they are modelled upon the principle that belief, that is,

intellectual opinion, is the true ground of fellowship, — and indications that they are not are not wanting, — this dissatisfaction may be accounted for, not merely by the fact that this principle does not work well in practice, but by the more serious consideration that it is not right in *principle*. While our New England churches have not yet abandoned the principle emphasized by our Puritan fathers, that soundness of belief is a test of church membership, they have not, let us thank God, followed this principle with the logical consistency of a John Ward; for there is usually a delightful discrepancy between the severity of the creed and covenant, and the comfortable clemency of the pastor and committee! And many a hard creed and cold covenant have been transfigured with a glow of love as the formal words were mel-
lowed by the tender accents of a human voice, musical with the sweet spirit of a Christlike welcome.¹ The fact is, many of our churches no longer heartily believe in the *principle* of making a doctrinal test the condition of Christian fellowship, although very few, I suppose, have formally abandoned it, and substituted for it some expression of the apostolic principle of faith as a rule of fellowship; nevertheless, as already intimated, the actual practice is usually in substantial accord with the principles of the gospel as they have been stated with admirable wisdom and spirit in the Cambridge Platform.²

¹ But even the elocution of genuine and tender feeling could hardly soften the asperities of a covenant like the following extract from the existing covenant of a certain Congregational Church: —

“And you cordially join yourself to this as a true church of Christ; unreservedly engaging to submit to its discipline, so far as conformable to the rules of the gospel; and solemnly covenanting to strive, as much as in you lies, for its peace, edification, and purity, and to walk with its members in Christian love, faithfulness, circumspection, meekness, and sobriety. Thus you covenant, promise, and engage.

“And now, do we, the members of this church, receive you cheerfully to our communion; engaging, on our part, to love, pray for you, and watch over you as Christians; and entreating you to remember, that from this solemn hour you have assumed obligations from which you can never escape. Wherever you go, these vows will be upon you. They will follow you to the bar of God; and in whatever world you may be fixed, will abide upon you to eternity. You can never again be as you have been. You have unalterably committed yourself; and henceforth you must be the servant of God. Hereafter the eyes of the world will be upon you; and as you demean yourself, so religion will be honored or disgraced. If you walk worthy of your profession, you will be a credit and comfort to us; if otherwise, a grief and reproach.”

² “(1) The doors of the churches of Christ upon earth do not by God’s appointment stand so wide open that all sorts of people, good or bad, may

Why, then, may not this dissatisfaction with the older formulæ and the movement toward their revision be ascribed to an honest desire to make the formal conditions of membership in Christ's church correspond more closely with the real; and why should we not attempt to do this, that both our theory and our practice may be conformed to the simple principle of the gospel and be welded together by its spirit? If this were done, it is evident that each one of the practical difficulties which we meet in attempting to make a doctrinal test the condition of Christian fellowship would disappear at once. The weak and the doubting disciple will encounter no longer a stumbling-block at the door of Christ's church, which, as it takes its stand on the firm ground of apostolic teaching, can, in Christ's name, invite all Christians to come to his table, and expect of those who come only what the Master himself expects of all his disciples. And the creed, finding its true uses as a standard of teaching, may, instead of being crippled and dwarfed, grow into the full expression of the best thought of the church. There are several proper and important uses of a creed, but I believe its use as a test of church-membership is not one of them, — it is not good for a chisel to be used as a screw-driver, — and it is just because such a use of the creed has a definite tendency to defeat the very end for which it would be strenuously maintained by many, that it ought to be abandoned. If this seems to any like abandoning the faith once delivered to the saints, and like levelling a bulwark of orthodoxy, let me add that a creed in itself is no safeguard; it has no inherent power to diffuse itself as if by magic, even though it be occasionally displayed publicly. We must

freely enter in at their pleasure, but such as are admitted thereto as members ought to be examined and tried first, whether they be fit and meet to be received into church society or not.

"(2) The things which are requisite to be found in all church members are *repentance* from sin and *faith* in Jesus Christ, and, therefore, these are the things whereof men are to be examined at their admission into the church, and which then they must profess and hold forth in such sort as may satisfy rational charity that the things are there indeed.

"(3) The weakest measure of faith is to be accepted in those that desire to be admitted into the church, because weak Christians, if sincere, have the substance of that faith, repentance, and holiness which is required in church members, and such have most need of the ordinances for their confirmation and growth in grace. The Lord Jesus would not quench the smoking flax nor break the bruised reed, but gather the tender lambs in his arms and carry them gently in his bosom. Such charity and tenderness is to be used as the weakest Christian, if sincere, may not be excluded nor discouraged. Severity of examination is to be avoided."

rely upon some more active and efficient agencies to foster the orthodoxy of new disciples. If catechetical instruction based upon the creed,—a kind of instruction which has been displaced but by no means replaced by the Sunday-school,—if this is needed to supply the disuse of a doctrinal test of membership, let us not forget that it is also the only thing which in common honesty can justify the use of it. But whatever our formal terms of admission, let us learn to put the same paramount and implicit reliance reposed by the apostles in that faith which alone constitutes any one a member of the body of Christ.

Charles H. Cutler.

BANGOR, ME.

NOTE.—The use of a doctrinal statement as a condition of church-membership has been discussed from the point of view of a pastor; it may therefore be fitting to add the following form of admission, recently adopted, with only two dissenting votes, by an old Congregational Church. It is offered, not as the ideal form, but as a practical contribution to the discussion, and in the hope that it will be of service to other churches in the difficult process of creed-revision.

The church retains its former creed intact, to be published in the manual with the following Note : —

The foregoing Creed remains as an expression of the doctrinal belief of the Church, with which the teachings of the Church are expected to be in substantial accord.

But there are sincere followers of Christ, we think, fit candidates for our church fellowship, who cannot, for whatever cause, assent to this or any like form with full intelligence and heartiness. We ask of those who join us, not assent to a form of doctrine but confession of a personal faith and loyalty toward Jesus Christ. Such a confession we have sought to embody in the *Form of Admission* which follows, and to this alone members joining the Church hereafter will be asked to assent.

FORM OF ADMISSION.

The candidates, without being called, will come forward while the minister is reading the following words : —

What shall I render unto the Lord for all His benefits toward me? I will take the cup of salvation, and call upon the name of the Lord. I will pay my vows unto the Lord now in the presence of all His people.

OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST saith :

Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me ; for I am meek and lowly in heart ; and ye shall find rest unto your souls.

Whosoever therefore shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven.

Grace be unto you and peace from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ.

DEARLY BELOVED : You humbly trust that by the grace of God you have been led to accept Christ as your Savior, and with the help of the Divine Spirit you are trying to follow Him as your Master. Believing that He has called you into His Kingdom and given you a place with His people and a work to do with them, you desire in grateful obedience to confess the Lord Jesus Christ, and consecrating yourself (*yourselves*) to His service, to enter into the fellowship of this His church.

In token that this is your sincere belief and desire, do you now make confession of your faith in the Lord Jesus Christ as He is presented in the Scriptures, and do you, heartily repenting of your sins, accept Him as your Master and your Divine Savior ?

Desiring to be numbered with His disciples, you will now be baptized in this faith.

Baptism of those who have never been baptized.

Do you who were baptized in childhood freely accept that consecration, confirming for yourself (*yourselves*) the vows made for you ?

Covenant.

You do now then, in humble dependence on God, consecrate yourself (*yourselves*) to His worship and service, and joyfully give yourself (*yourselves*) to Him, to be His forever. Abiding henceforth in Jesus Christ, you will strive with the help of the Holy Spirit to cultivate within you the fruit of the Spirit, love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance ; and naming yourself (*yourselves*) with the name of Christ, you avow your purpose to glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are His. Do you thus covenant ?

Here those, if any, who unite by letter will rise.

BELOVED : You have been recommended to our communion by the church (*churches*) of your former membership. Trusting that you will both receive comfort and strength and impart the same to us, we welcome you in the love of a common Master to our joys and labors, as you enter (with those who confess Christ for the first time) into

Covenant with this Church.

You do now (all) enter into covenant with this church, to join in its work, ordinances, and worship ; to submit to its discipline ; to work and pray for its growth, purity, and peace ; to walk with its members in love and faithfulness.

This you heartily promise ?

The members of the Church will rise.

We then, the members of this Church, do joyfully welcome you to our communion. By the help of the same Spirit on whom you rely, we promise you our sympathies, our watchfulness, our prayers. We welcome you in the name of Christ to a share in the hopes, the labors, the joys of His Church. Receive then our Christian welcome. We greet you as fellow-citizens of the saints and of the household of God, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ to an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away; and we pray that He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ.

The people being seated, the minister may here, if he so pleases, give the right hand of fellowship to each new member, with an appropriate passage of Scripture for each.

For this cause we bow our knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, that He would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God.

Beloved, the Lord bless you and keep you; the Lord make his face to shine upon you and be gracious unto you; the Lord lift up his countenance upon you and give you peace.

Now unto him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy, to the only wise God, our Savior, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever. Amen.

It is proper to acknowledge indebtedness for suggestions embodied in the above form to the Trinitarian Congregational Church of Taunton, Mass., also to St. Lawrence Street Congregational Church, Lawrence, Mass., Congregational Church, Montclair, N. J., and others.

C. H. C.

CHRIST IN CHRISTIANITY.

In the contest over the belief in miracles — as in most other contests — each side misunderstands the other. The unbeliever usually assails the belief as superstitious, but it is not superstition to suppose that higher necessities may at times apparently affect the regularity of nature's laws. On the other hand, the doubter is condemned at once as a heretic, a materialist, or even as an

atheist, while as a matter of fact many serious men have no control over such doubts, and their honest incredulity is not incompatible with all that is best in religion.

The weightiest objection in the minds of such skeptics is not materialistic. They do not dwell on the physical but on the mental improbability of the occurrence of miracles. The belief seems to them like the suggestion of the existence of caprice in the mind of God. Miracles cannot be discredited on the ground that they are wonderful, for the whole universe, visible and invisible, is a continual wonder.

We use the word "materialist" much too loosely. What is matter after all? We know spirit much better. Matter is merely the name which we give to the unknown centre to which phenomena point. On the other hand, *we* are spiritual centres ourselves. We know our own spirits at first hand. Everything but our own spiritual existence we must take upon faith. All our knowledge of matter is an exterior knowledge. How we skim over the surface of things; how we rebound from them in our attempt to get into them! Nature, like a mischievous boy, dazzles our eyes with her mirror, so that we cannot see what there is behind it and who moves it. We have each of us pierced the surface of nature at one point only, and that is in our own selves. I know my own soul, and this is no surface knowledge. Here, at least, I am behind the scenes. I can, at this point, see what there is under nature's face; and what do I find? Thought and will and conscience. All my fellow-men report the same discovery. Wherever we strike through the crust of the earth, then, we disclose not matter but mind. Is not mind, then, the stratum which lies beneath phenomena as the Silurian rocks support the Devonian? The word "matter" is really a mere algebraic X — an unknown quantity — standing for something, we know not what, unless it be spirit. Your materialist is, in fact, the most extravagant of idealists. He constructs his whole universe of matter, and matter is the most abstract of ideas. Let him succeed in proving that matter and spirit are one, and he will only have shown that matter is spiritual, not that spirit is material. As we are accustomed to distinguish spirit from matter, so we draw the line between life and force, and disparage any attempt to prove a relationship between them, on the ground that such a course tends to degrade life and place it on a materialistic plane. But are the forces of nature mechanical and dead? In our present condition of knowledge is not this a violent assumption? All motion seems to pro-

ceed either from animal and vegetable life or from the heavenly bodies, in whose heat and attraction most so-called lifeless forces originate. Is it not possible that life is the cause of all motion, and that the movements of stars and planets are manifestations of life, magnified to a degree never dreamed of by the microscopist and whose secret yet eludes us? What but a germ of life could have caused the first movement in the motionless chaos? The apostle of matter and force may think that he is reducing the universe to very simple terms, but he is really further from a solid basis than the philosopher who begins with his own living soul.

The honest believer and the honest unbeliever are neither of them as foolish nor as wicked as they seem to each other. They have one bond of union — honesty — which should entitle each to the other's respect, and each should consider sympathetically the position of the other. What, then, is the situation, with reference to historical Christianity, of the man who denies the possibility of miracles? Nothing can be gained by minimizing the effect of such a determination. The miracles of the Gospels must stand or fall together. He cannot consistently say that such and such a miracle is incredible and yet preserve the resurrection of Christ's body and his corporeal ascension into heaven.

Now what is left for a man who finds himself forced, as he thinks, by irresistible logic into this condition of unbelief? Shall his Christian friends send him to the "Evidences" with instructions to lift himself up by the waistband? Such forcing of belief is an inhuman torture. Faith, produced in that way, is an unhealthy monster, conceived in cowardice, and bred in hypocrisy.

If our skeptic turns in disgust from such teaching, what will he find left in Christ? Must he satisfy himself with a perfect example? But of what use is a perfect example if it is impossible to follow it? Or is he to recognize only the great discoverer and teacher of the doctrine of self-renunciation? But there is small comfort in a teaching which cannot be perfectly followed, and even if he could follow it, he cannot console himself with self-renunciation without hope. Let him turn, says some one, to the religion of humanity. Here he will find the Christian philosophy of self-sacrifice united with hope in the future perfection of the human race. He can find peace and joy in doing his share in the great work of evolution.

No thinking man can at the present day deny that evolution accounts for many facts in nature and that it properly holds a

prominent place in our philosophy. It can in no way diminish the wonder and beauty of the physical and mental world to go back one or two steps in the path of causation and find that they accord with our reason. Things are none the less what they are because of their past. There is still magic in eye and ear to turn mere physical vibrations into landscape and music. How dismal a world we should have, if our sensations were mathematical and mechanical only, and told us the number and form of these undulations and nothing more! This is all that they have to reveal, but in what a language of sound and color they interpret it! And so it is with morals. Let us admit that a sense of right and wrong is an inheritance with some kind of utilitarian and selfish origin, just as our sight and hearing may have been rudimentary in our remote progenitors; still morality is, nevertheless, to-day a great spiritual fact, no more to be denied than that the leaf is green or the harp-note melodious. It is evolution, perhaps, that has instilled into our perceptions an enchantment which transforms vibratory motions into a Sistine Madonna or a Pastoral Symphony; which gives to lowly acts of common life the tint and tone of nobility and self-sacrifice; and which turns science into art, utilitarianism into morality, and philosophy into religion. Right and wrong, color and sound, are actual entities, no matter how they came to be so.

Will this evolution, then, which has done so much, finally bring our race to the millennium? Evolution cannot do everything. There have been crises in the history of life which cannot be explained by the ordinary rules of natural selection, heredity, environment, and survival of the fittest. These laws do not account for the first manifestations of vegetable or of animal or of human life. It is difficult to conceive of the periods of these events except as times of struggle. The world must have been in travail to have produced such marvels, nor can the labor have been brief or easy. How the first germ of plant-life must have been fettered by the iron bonds of inertia! How often, to change the simile, must it have fallen back disheartened into the still sea of chaos, only to bubble up again, and again to disappear! We can sympathize still more with the transformation from vegetable to animal life. How helpless the first flickerings of consciousness must have been! How hopeless must have seemed the task of grasping the powers of the will! The sleep of plant-life must have striven like a nightmare once more to creep over the half-animate creature; and what a burst of triumphant effort was necessary to

set it free! And then comes the stride from animal to human life. Alas, we know too much of this! We are in the very midst of it now. We have the new nature, but for thousands of years we have endeavored in vain to cast aside the old. We have still all the brute impulses which are proper in beasts, but humiliating or even sinful in us. Their life is grounded on selfishness; ours should rest on self-sacrifice. They are perfect in their way; our perfect type is still unattained.

If evolution was powerless to bridge the gaps between stone and plant and between plant and animal, will its rule of the survival of the fittest lead us to perfection, or is there any natural reason for expecting a golden age for man on earth? The general trend of life has indeed been upwards. Must the seeker after truth find his consolation in the culmination of this advance,—a final glory in which he cannot himself share? Any such expectation is scientifically inaccurate. Man can never in his present conditions fulfill even his own highest conception of what he ought to be. Those necessary animal instincts upon which depend the continuance and physical well-being of mankind—those passions which control our bodies, hold the outposts of our minds, and are continually storming with frequent success the inmost fortress of our souls—are in themselves degrading and bestial. The duties which nature imposes upon us are altogether beneath our true dignity. Our higher natures must ever rebel against our bodily needs. It is hard to conceive of a perfect race of men with carnivorous teeth. The apotheosis of man on earth—if it ever occurs—will be short-lived, for a race without low instincts will soon die out. Evolution can do nothing more on its old lines for humanity. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest makes way for the new principle,—he that loseth his life shall find it.

Our doubter, then, can secure no relief in evolution. Unable to rest in the mere example or teaching of Christ, dissatisfied with the gospel of humanity, which is Christianity without Christ, must he, to find a Saviour, go back to Paley and the rest, and fit himself to their Procrustean bed? Surely this cannot be necessary. What is the essence of Christ's position in Christianity? It is the fact that he is the connecting link between God and man, the mediator, the intercessor. "I am the way; . . . no man cometh unto the Father but by me." "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." And yet He is also represented as God

himself. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." In short, Christ is the man-ward side of God.

One of the recent assertions of science, the fact that God, the infinite, is unknowable, is by no means new. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven: what canst thou do? Deeper than hell: what canst thou know?" The idea of infinity is bewildering for us. It brings to our minds a confused notion of boundless space with eternity for a sort of fourth dimension; of infinite power, knowledge, wisdom, and goodness. We can form no conception of omniscience. What is thinking but the wandering of the mind from one fact or fancy to another? Its guidance to the deepest truths is the noblest exercise. Thank heaven, we cannot compass them. There is enough truth to puzzle forever. What would thinking amount to if we held all truth? We can no more conceive of an all-knowing being who can think in the ordinary sense of the word than of an omnipresent being who can move. "My thoughts are not as thy thoughts." But does all-thought become no-thought? Into such absurdities are we plunged as soon as our finite minds approach infinity. Bring infinity into a simple algebraic problem and we have two equal to one. Extend our finite vision and all seems contradictory, for the infinite is the equilibrium of contradictions. It has precisely the same effect on our philosophy that it has on our algebra. It makes nonsense of both.

We cannot believe, however, that the source of our being is entirely beyond our apprehension. We can reason towards God, if we cannot reason to Him. Although our bodies are in one sense separate and individual, they are yet a part of the world and of the universe. So our minds are connected with all mind. We can predict the movements of planets. We find beauty in comet and star. The reasonableness, the sublimity of these things, touch an answering chord in us. We share the ideas for which the heavenly bodies stand. We are related to them, and are of the same family. Between us and them the only link is the Father of all, and it is certainly no presumption to hope for some knowledge of Him. He is the first cause, but the cause must be at least equal to the effect. We have reason and consciousness and individuality; He must have these attributes or something transcending them. We are persons; He must be a person or something more. This is not anthropomorphism. It does not represent God in man's image, but creates man in God's.

Christianity recognizes the impossibility of knowing God as the infinite one, and yet offers us some knowledge of Him in Christ. There is something in us which makes this contradiction seem reasonable. It satisfies our heart and our mind, and we appreciate the fact that all speculations on infinity lead to similar perplexities. The mysteries of God elude our examination. We can out of the corner of the eye see many a faint star which, when we gaze directly at it, becomes vague and disappears. So insight into the deep things of existence comes not of direct effort. They shine forth unexpectedly while we are looking elsewhere, and they catch only our sidelong glance. When we try to follow them and retain them and stare them in the face, they melt away and we even wonder if we saw anything. Christianity gives to man's side of the Deity no abstract and elusive character. It gives him individuality; and sympathy, which means literally co-suffering; and love, which is impossible without self-sacrifice. These are, logically speaking, strange attributes for an infinite being, but our souls demand them. Self-renunciation is in us the short-cut to infinite wisdom, and it must find in the infinite something analogous to itself. Our morality cannot be greater than God's, nor its conditions more favorable. The nature of God must admit of virtues equal to or surpassing ours. He cannot be an infinite, indivisible being without righteousness or affection. The idea of a Trinity seems to offer a suggestion of relationship and duty. Perhaps our natural fondness for unity is a shallow feeling after all. Every simple musical note is made up of several distinct sounds. Our own natures are not altogether single. We have a lower self and a higher self, a lower and a higher will. One seeks after the nearest pleasure; the other strives for the approval of conscience. Morality is the duty which our lower self owes to our higher self, it is loyalty to self, while religion is loyalty to God, — to a God who turns towards man a face of helpful sympathy.

This is the God of Christianity — the Christ himself. Let us picture Him coming now to our skeptic. Would He say to him, "You must believe that I lived and died thus and so in Palestine eighteen hundred years ago. However improbable it may seem to you, you must believe it, or I will turn my back on you forever"? This would be not only ungodlike but inhuman. He would rather say: "My child, your lower nature, with its appetites and passions, is degraded and degrading; your motives are double, like your character; your honor is mixed with disloyalty; your love with selfishness, envy, and intolerance. Your heart is deceitful

above all things and desperately wicked. But you have a higher nature which yearns for something better. You cannot rise above your lower nature to the higher by yourself, but I can help you to put off the old man with his deeds and put on the new man. A broken and a contrite heart I will not despise. I feel for you, sympathize with you, love you. Take my hand. Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest." This is the Christ who, as St. John says, was the "true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." It is God in his relation to man. He speaks in our sense of sin, in our conscience, in our aspirations, in our better selves. Take the hand of this present Christ, the living aspect of the Eternal One; yield yourself trustfully and lovingly to God as you apprehend Him, and in the hope of a fuller apprehension, and what becomes of the question of miracles, or the conflicts of infallible books and infallible churches? You can now turn with an easy mind to the history of Jesus of Nazareth. Perhaps as you study the simple story, and learn more of the grandeur of that wonderful character, you may recognize in the Galilean teacher the Christ whom you already know; but in any event you can be thankful for the record of a life which typifies so beautifully and abundantly the relations of God to man. In the study of these relations, in learning more and more of the nature of God, lies the true evolution of humanity. That we know God no better of ourselves is the fault of our faculties, mental and moral. We know Him, doubtless, as well as we are capable of knowing Him. We must each and as a race endeavor to extend those faculties and to "grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

Ernest H. Crosby.

NEW YORK CITY.

EDITORIAL.

THE OPENING OF MANSFIELD COLLEGE, AND THE PURITAN
RETURN TO OXFORD.

ABOUT five years ago, if we remember aright, there was talk in private circles of a plan to establish at Oxford, in connection with its University, a Congregational Theological Seminary. The scheme involved the removal of the Independent Spring Hill College, Birmingham, and the transference from Airedale College of Principal Fairbairn. As developed, it involved a marked change in the organization of Spring Hill College, and an advance upon the prevailing method of theological training. As a rule, we suppose, the Nonconformist ministry in England, so far as it has been educated in its own institutions, has been trained in colleges which have combined academic and professional courses — a state of things something like that which existed generations ago in New England when the college studies were largely shaped to prepare men for the ministry, and much behind what has been secured in the present century by the entire separation of the academic and theological courses, and the founding of distinct schools thoroughly equipped for the latter purpose. How long the plan of removal to Oxford may have been in ripening we cannot say; it certainly encountered many obstacles, among them the legal embarrassments connected with the trust funds of an endowed school. In England, however, there exists a convenient and useful Board of Charity Commissioners, to which such difficulties can be referred, and by whose aid, in the present instance, they were removed, so that in 1886 a new foundation at Oxford was begun, under the name of Mansfield College, with a three years' course of theological studies, as follows: —

First Year. — Apologetics and Philosophy of Religion: Dr. Fairbairn. N. T. Exegesis, I.: Professor Massie. Hebrew, Elementary: Mr. Spurrell. N. T. Introduction, I.: Professor Sanday. O. T. Theology: Professor Cheyne. History of Christian Institutions, I.: Dr. Hatch.

Second Year. — Systematic Theology, I., and History of Religions, I.: Dr. Fairbairn. N. T. Exegesis, II.: Professor Massie. Hebrew, Advanced: Mr. Spurrell. N. T. Introduction, II.: Professor Sanday. O. T. Introduction and Exegesis, I.: Professor Driver. History of Christian Institutions, II.: Dr. Hatch.

Third Year. — Systematic Theology, II., and History of Religions, II.: Dr. Fairbairn. N. T. Exegesis, III.: Professor Massie. Hebrew, Rabbinical: Dr. Neubauer. O. T. Introduction and Exegesis, II.: Professor Driver. O. T. Interpretation: Professor Cheyne. History of Christian Institutions, III.: Dr. Hatch.

The announcement also states: "It is expected that Chairs of Homiletics and Church History will be established at an early date."

This scheme corresponds very closely with those common in this coun-

try, though Biblical Theology is restricted to that of the Old Testament, and in other important respects the range of studies is more limited than with us — due, no doubt, to the necessary incompleteness of a first announcement. A marked and pleasant feature is the appearance, in the roll of instructors, of well-known names of professors and lecturers connected with the Church of England. The faculty, when full, will consist of “five professors, as many fellows, and several readers or lecturers.” The name, Mansfield College, is given in honor of the family which endowed the school at Birmingham. Its students are required to become members of the University of Oxford. They must have graduated at some university, or at least have passed “Moderations” at Oxford. The college, however, has scholarships for the aid of men who are not prepared to enter upon its theological courses. Candidates for these scholarships must show ability to graduate from the University after three years of study. They are awarded upon examination, and upon a promise to take the full theological course in Mansfield College, after graduation from the University.

During the present month the new and attractive buildings which have been in preparation are, we suppose, to be set apart to their uses, and the college is to be formally opened. A series of meetings is announced, continuing from the 14th to the 16th of October, and numerous guests have been cordially invited to be present from this country. We fear that the season of the year, it being the time when clergymen and professors are specially required to be at their posts, will permit very few to accept an invitation which none can decline without sincere regret. For the occasion is one of no ordinary significance and interest. It emphasizes and illuminates the legislation which has opened the universities to Dissenters. It marks especially the Puritan return to Oxford. Nothing was so dear to the Puritan as his religion, and no science, in his esteem, so sacred and ennobling as divinity. In no true and worthy sense, therefore, could it be said that he had gone back to Oxford if he were not there authorized and free to teach theology. In its eminent Principal, Mansfield College has a head, and Congregationalism a representative, worthy to follow Owen, Goodwin, and John Howe, and his reception at Oxford, as we read the signs, has been most encouraging. He must, indeed, be very ignorant of his own limitations, and insensible to the greatness of Christianity, who should not desire that every apprehension of this revelation of divine truth and grace should find its most adequate form and its complete expression. Every division of the sacramental host should wish to have every other in best array; every lover of truth desire that each conception of it should gain its best scientific statement. The ejection of the Nonconformists from the universities more than two hundred years ago was esteemed by them a calamity. No men in the kingdom were by inheritance more firm believers in the power of truth, more ardent cultivators of it, or more devoted friends of education.

And they well knew that great universities, even if the field were clear, as it was not, for their establishment, cannot be extemporized. Banishment from the universities was to them not only exile from Hellas and Pierian founts, but from the yet more longed-for springs and heights of sacred learning. With what indomitable devotion to their principles, with what constant endeavor to remedy the disadvantages of their position, with what success in the cultivation of Biblical science and promotion of liberal education, they have maintained their best traditions and contributed to the renown in letters and arts and sacred science, as well as to the liberties, of England, history has recorded; and at last they have won!

“Peace hath her victories
No less renown’d than War.”

And it is one of the blessings of such triumphs that foes are converted into friends. Mansfield College rears its stately halls on “a portion of the old cricket ground of Merton College,” — that college which is pre-eminent beyond all others as the *fons et origo* of the English Universities. The new is grafted into the old; it is of the trunk and the root. And we seem already to hear the ancient University saying to its latest branch: “You are grafted into your own olive tree.”

In his thoughtful Inaugural Address as chairman of “The Congregational Union of England and Wales,” Dr. Fairbairn, in a passage remarkable for its depth and brilliancy, imagined that a Tacitus, with his strong sense of right and keen insight into men and history, should revisit this earth and compare the Christianity of the nineteenth century with that whose beginnings he had watched in the first. We think it would be worth a trip across the Atlantic to hear him introduce at the coming festivities John Owen, the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford and Dean of Christ Church, to tell us the worth of the “detestable superstition” that was once expelled from Oxford. Unlike the pagan historian, he was himself a believer in that superstition, and suffered in its behalf; yet like him he would return with confession of mistaken judgments. The *Biblia Sacra Polyglotta* has triumphed over his tenet of a text of Scripture infallible even to the Massoretic vowel-points, and Scripture does not teach, as he supposed, that an atonement sufficient for all was intended for only a few or a part. On many points besides doctrines his accent would be less confident than of old; on many points of policy his manner more conciliatory. The toleration he extended to Episcopalians at Oxford is not precisely what he would now wish for Congregationalists there, and his encouragement of music and leaping bars and bell-ringing might seem to him only a very imperfect recognition of what the church may encourage in amusements in the name of the Son of Man, or make tributary to her devotions in architecture and sacred song. Doubtless the kingdom of God would seem to him something much larger and nobler than a Puritan commonwealth, and a Christian university some-

thing quite other than a sectarian school or his own highest ideal. Still, as we have intimated, he would return not merely with confession of error; he would come *in propria persona*,— what more commanding and gracious personality could even Oxford desire to see revived from her illustrious dead?— a man who “made conscience of his thoughts,” and who in the language of his inaugural oration as Vice-Chancellor addressed himself to his work, “trusting in a promised divine presence according to the demands of the age and its Providential opportunity, integrity of conscience alone supplying the place of all other aids and ornaments, and with a spirit neither depressed nor servile.”¹ Still, too, would he urge a spiritual apprehension of Christianity as the supreme necessity, and a defense and teaching of the gospel reliant upon the self-evidencing power of its truths as alone correspondent with its divine origin and power. And still would he turn every student of theology to the source of all strength and power for the Christian ministry, “the eternal fountain of supply in Christ, who furnisheth seasonable help to every pious endeavor, unless our littleness of faith stand in the way; thence light, thence strength, thence courage, are to be waited for, . . . nay, rather, are to be prayed for.”²

We send across the sea our salutation to Mansfield College, and wish it a career of usefulness corresponding to its opportunity, and the noblest traditions of the university into which it is incorporated. From Oxford came some of the most eminent of the early Congregational ministers of New England. Those joined to them in the succession and fellowship of the Christian ministry in this land will unite with us in this greeting; nor they alone, but all who believe that there is a unity of the church in truth as well as in labor, and that theological science has a great and noble task to fulfill in making this unity manifest and serviceable.

THE LONDON STRIKE.

“Go to the docks” is the last word to the London laborer. When thrown out of all regular employment he has one more chance, that of becoming a “casual” at the docks. Once there he finds himself in the midst of a motley crowd, all waiting for the same chance with himself. They have come from the street, from the jails, from other irregular work, or from no work, to earn enough perhaps for a meal, the only one, in some cases, for twenty-four hours. Some of them will be unable to work for more than an hour, and will then withdraw, or sell

¹ Illius ideo presentiae gratiosae promissae innixus, pro statu temporum, et occasione rerum, quam, divinâ ita providentiâ disponente, nacti sumus, unicâ conscientiae integritate aliorum adjumentorum et ornamentorum omnium vices obeunte, nec propendente, genio, negotio huic me accingo.

² Perennem ille auxiliorum fontem constituit Christum; qui nulli non pio conamini εὐκαιρὸν suppeditat βοήθειαν, nostra nisi obstat ἀλειτουργία: inde lumen, inde vires, inde spiritus mihi expectandi, imo orandi sunt.

their places for a trifle. No laborer earns so precarious a living, or so suffers from the advantage taken of his necessities, as the "casual" at the docks. Such, at least, was his condition before the strike.

We must distinguish between the "casual" and the regular employee at the docks. The export trade employs its own men, who are trained to their work of packing and storage, who work on regular time and receive regular wages. These men have for some time been associated in a trades' union. In the import trade the ship-owners give the cargoes into the hands of the dock companies, and it is from them that the "casual" gets his work, if at all. The employees of the dock companies are divided into three grades, — regulars, preferred or ticket-men, and casuals. The proportion between these grades, or classes, at two of the East London docks is as follows:—

WEST AND EAST INDIA DOCKS.¹

Permanent laborers	818
Preferred laborers	700
Casual laborers	—
Maximum number	2,355
Minimum number	600

LONDON AND ST. KATHERINE DOCKS.

Permanent laborers	1,070
Preferred laborers	450
Casual laborers	—
Maximum number	3,700
Minimum number	1,100

The strike originated with the casuals, and was continued in their behalf through the support of all associated laborers to the number of 100,000. The demands of the strikers were for an advance from 5d. to 6d. per hour, and 8d. an hour for night work, a minimum of 2s. for all dock laborers employed before being dismissed, and a termination of the contract or sweating system under which the contractors received back a considerable part of the wages nominally paid to the laborer. The companies were willing to accede to the last two demands, but resisted the first, the increase of a penny in the hourly pay, the ground of their resistance being that they could not afford to advance the price as they were not paying reasonable dividends on the investment. They declared that the alternative of paying more for labor would be to increase the cost to ship-owners, and force them to seek other ports of entry. We shall refer to the fallacy of this contention.

The demands of the strikers have been complied with, except in the time of the increase of pay, which is to begin on November 1st. The success of this strike is worthy of careful reflection, as it shows more clearly than any strike of recent years those conditions which justify a strike, and which give it a successful issue.

¹ *Life and Labour*, vol. i., p. 190.

Of course the chief condition everywhere is the justice of the cause. Here it was undeniable and conspicuous. We have described the condition of the "casual" laborer at the dock. The reply of the dock companies to this condition was that they could not afford to do better. But upon investigation it proved that this only meant that they were carrying a great deal of unproductive capital on which they were trying to pay dividends. A well-informed writer in the London "Times" stated that "probably one half of the capital outlay of the London and St. Katherine docks and the East and West India Dock Companies may be considered obsolete for all practical purposes in connection with shipping." A great deal of capital seems to have been sunk in arrangements not suited to the steam navigation of the present time, a condition quite in contrast with the state of the Liverpool docks. Nothing remained for the companies to do in this circumstance except the very necessary, though very trying, expedient of reducing the capital to its actual working value, of "writing off" so much as represented what was obsolete. To attempt to secure returns upon this part of the capital at the expense of the laborer was precisely the same in result, though not so bad in intention, as the attempt which has sometimes been made in this country to oblige the laborer on railroads to pay dividends on watered stock through a reduction in his wages.

Another condition of peculiar significance has been the good order observed by the strikers. Something of this has been due to the unexpected self-restraint and restraining influence of the leader, John Burns, already known as a socialistic agitator of the more violent type. He continually counseled patience, forbearance, sobriety, while he succeeded in infusing that degree of courage and hope which made it possible for men to endure. And the endurance of the men under the prolonged parleying and indecision was admirable and even heroic. We have seen no record of mob violence. Property was as safe in London during the strike as in Edinborough. Pickets were kept out to pick off new laborers hired by the dock companies, but little intimidation was practiced. On the whole, the strikers have won the moral respect of the city and nation by their behavior. The London Press speaks, without exception so far as we have seen, in praise of their conduct under the severe strain put upon them by the delays incident to difficult negotiation.

As a result of both these conditions the further condition of public sympathy was present in a remarkable degree. It was, in fact, the immediate and continued and generous material support of the public which kept the strikers from starvation, and so from surrender. Gifts of money were received from widely different sources. The contributions from Australia were specially prompt and generous. It is estimated that at the close of the strike there was a surplus in the hands of the Committee, an unprecedented event. As an example of the general sympathy

and helpfulness, we quote from the "Christian World" a brief statement of the work of the churches in the neighborhood in the way of feeding the multitude:—

"From the beginning the ministers and churches on the spot have labored incessantly to do all in their power to keep the wolf from the door of the dockers. The military organization of the Salvation Army and its possession of food depots in the midst of the dock districts has enabled General Booth to feed eight or nine thousand daily, at the charge of a farthing or a halfpenny per head. Church of England clergymen, Non-conformist ministers and churches, the Christ Church (Oxford) East London Mission, have labored side by side. Some seven hundred men, morning by morning, have breakfasted at St. George's Chapel, the centre of the Wesleyan East London Mission, and Rev. James Chadburn, the Children's Friend, has, in the Shaftesbury Mission Hall, distributed porridge, sandwiches, and other refreshments, to not far short of a thousand daily. Rev. J. Toulson, President of the Primitive Methodist Conference, with thirteen ministers and several laymen, form a central relief committee, under which five local committees are at work. Rev. F. W. Newland and his church are giving a dinner to 450 children daily. Eleven South-eastern ministers unite in a joint appeal to our readers for help. Many churches have sent collections to the Strike Committee. We believe it is nothing more than the truth to say that but for the relief administered by the churches, the struggle could not have been maintained. Famine would have sided irresistibly with the dock directors."

A somewhat unusual but very effective condition of success in the result of the strike was the mediating influence brought to bear upon the companies and upon the strikers. In this work the figure of Cardinal Manning holds a deserved prominence. The Lord Mayor of the City and the Bishop of London labored to the same end, but the work of the Cardinal was more patient and persistent, and, in the end, really brought about the agreement by which November 1st was accepted as the time for the increase of pay, the strikers demanding immediate increase, and the companies holding out for January 1st. It is not always that any one occupies a position inviting the confidence of one party and the sympathy of the other. The office of mediator is a most difficult one to hold with firmness and patience to the end. But the example of Cardinal Manning shows what can be done, and will prove a most helpful precedent in allaying strife in the future conflicts of capital and labor.

Without question the London strike has wrought much good in various ways. It has done something to take the lowest class of laborers out of the terrible "residium" of the unemployed and to give them a foothold in the ranks of labor. It has brought together the people and the masses, especially the church and the masses. "He would be a bold man," the Rev. James Chadburn says, "who attacked a Salvation Army meeting in East London to-day; and our mission hall" (Mr. Chadburn writes from Trinity Parsonage), "where we have fed 1,100 children daily, is quite safe. 'God bless you, sir,' with finger raised to his hat, says the docker

to the minister to-day." Above all it has taught the lowest laborer self-respect. It has given him a new reliance and a new courage. East London is on a higher moral level than that of two months ago.

It would be foolish for any party or for any sect to attempt to make capital out of the result. The strike proves nothing for or against Socialism, for example. John Burns, the leader, is a Socialist, but it was the coöperation of all classes which gave him success. He would probably allow that it was a victory of English justice and English pluck over an inherited system of oppression and wrong.

"THE DEATH OF COPERNICUS."¹

MR. AUBREY DE VERE's recent poem, "The Death of Copernicus," deserves attention for its historic insight and apologetic value, as well as for its literary merits. In the latter respect its diction seems to us at times to become slightly prosaic, as though the serious argument of the poem weighted too heavily its wings, yet this is only an occasional lapse, and there are passages of sustained imaginative and rhythmical power in no ordinary degree.

The conception of the poem is noble and fitted to finest uses. Copernicus is narrated to have received the day before his death the first printed copy of his "*De Orbium Coelestium Revolutionibus*." He had kept it back for thirty-six years, that he might thoroughly test its conclusions, and not needlessly disturb the established Faith. The burden of the poem is his musings called up by the sight of his book, on the relations of the "Truth of Nature" and the "Truth Revealed." The former is more especially astronomic truth—the new outlook upon the vastness and unity of the stellar universe, an infinitude of worlds of which he had demonstrated that the earth could no longer be deemed the centre. But should he publish his discovery? The central significance and importance of this planet was to the faithful a sacred truth, attested in a supernatural and infallible revelation which affirms that the earth "cannot be moved," cherished in church traditions practically as authoritative as Sacred Writ, and congruous with its essential dogmas of the Incarnation and the Cross. The astronomer recalls how he had tested his conclusions, trying them by all the methods known to investigation; how he had tested no less the teaching of Scripture by its own laws. Here, as in his special science, he discovered that the text and the interpretation which had been put upon it were things very distinct. The Ptolemaic system was not Nature's teaching, but a human gloss. No less had Scripture been misunderstood.

"Faith is more than Science :
But 'twixt the interpretation and the text
Lies space world-wide."

¹ *The Death of Copernicus*. By Aubrey De Vere. *Contemporary Review*, September, 1889, pp. 421-430.

Satisfied that the special revelation did not contradict what seemed to him to be the truth taught by his Science, he had at last printed his book ; but on the verge of the shadow of death, as he turned to the world of faith, one doubt arose — what would be the effect upon the minds of men of divulging his discovery ? If the earth is not the centre of the Universe, what of the Incarnation ? As the Psalmist of old turned from the starry heavens to the divine law in a sublime sense of their correlation in purity and majesty, so the dying astronomer sets the universality of Christianity over against the infinitude of the skies.

“ The stars do this for man ;
They make infinitude *imaginable* ;
God, by our instincts felt as infinite,
When known, becomes such to our total being,
Mind, spirit, heart, and soul. The greater Theist
Should make the greater Christian.”

And the heart of the poem and the solution of the religious difficulty is given in these lines : —

“ This Earth too small
For Love Divine ! Is God not Infinite ?
If so, his love is infinite. Too small !
One famished babe meets pity oft from man
More than an army slain ! Too small for Love !
Was Earth too small to be of God created ?
Why then too small to be redeemed ?
.
“ Is not the Universe a whole ?
Doth not the sunbeam herald from the sun
Gladden the violet’s bosom ? Moons uplift
The tides : remotest stars lead home the lost :
Judæa was one country, one alone :
Not less Who died there died for all. The Cross
Brought help to vanished nations : Time opposed
No bar to Love : why then should Space oppose one ?
.
If Earth be small, likelier it seems that Love
Compassionate most and condescending most
To Sorrow’s nadir depths, should choose that Earth
For Love’s chief triumph, missioning thence her gift
Even to the utmost zenith.”

From this point of view, elevated as that from which the astronomer had surveyed the worlds in space, the Christian believer looks out upon the cycles of human history. With subtle insight he discerns the necessity, in a moral ordering of the world, of a gradual and adjusted bestowment of blessings.

“ Best gifts may come too soon.” . . .
.

How sweeter must have been had I been worthy —
Grant me Thy Beatific Vision, Lord :
Then shall these eyes star-wearied see and live !”

The most thoughtful poetry of our time is in accord with its deepest theology ; and the Universality of Christianity is the religious aspect and interpretation of the largest teaching Science is giving of Nature in the doctrine that the Universe is a Whole.

“CHANGES IN METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION” OF THE AMERICAN BOARD.

THE “Congregationalist,” in replying to the editorial question of the REVIEW, Does the American Board propose to continue its proscriptive policy ? specifies what in its opinion may not be, and what may be done. Of the “things which are very clear,” it says, “One is that the great majority of those who give to the treasury of the Board is unwilling that its money should be spent in teaching what it considers a loose theology, and will persistently disapprove of any action which may favor that, on the part of its officials.”

This, we suppose, means that the resolutions which committed the Board to theological partisanship will not be repealed at New York — a course which we ourselves do not anticipate as probable. It is so much easier in times of excitement to bring any large body into a false position than to extricate it. Even when the mistake is realized by some of those who may have led the way into it, few have the courage to retrace their steps. The usual course is to allow the ill-advised action to stand, and meanwhile try to devise some method by which its harmful workings may be relieved or neutralized.

“Another” (thing which is clear) it goes on to say, “is that the great majority of Christian people for whom the Board has been working is wholly unconvinced that because a council can be found to ordain here a man whose doctrinal position more or less differs from that of historic Congregationalism, it would necessarily, therefore, be either right or wise to send such a man to the unevangelized.”

This, we suppose, means that the Board will not attempt at its next meeting to reconsider the very decisive vote by which it denied the competency of councils to pass upon the theological qualifications of missionary candidates : and here again we should agree that such reconsideration is improbable. Doubtless the majority of the Board would prefer, so far as the practical alternative may present itself, to allow any churches within its constituency, which may be so disposed, to act for a time independently. The reply of the churches to the denial by the Board of the theological competency of councils was given in a dignified, but in a very positive manner, through the Council which ordained Mr. Noyes as a foreign missionary. And other replies of similar import may

be expected as often as occasion offers. Still we do not see how the Board can consistently reconsider its action in reference to councils, for that action was originally necessary, and remains necessary, as the complement and support of the assumption by the Board of theological functions. It would place the Prudential Committee in an awkward dilemma to enjoin upon them by resolution "unabated carefulness in guarding the Board from any approval of the doctrine of future probation," and at the same time allow the Committee to accept the advice of councils recommending candidates in sympathy with that hope.

So far, then, we agree with the predictions of our contemporary in regard to what is improbable, in the near action of the Board, as to any change in its present proscriptive policy. But having stated so clearly what may not be expected, it goes on to say: "On the other hand, . . . were the majority to be convinced that *any changes in methods of administration* would obviate serious difficulties now thought to exist, no doubt they might consent to them."

Precisely what the words which we have italicised are intended to mean we cannot determine. The whole paragraph seems to imply that the minority have some changes to suggest, to which the majority might on certain conditions be ready to "consent." We are not aware of any such purpose among the minority. As we said in our former article, the responsibility for the management of the Board is now entirely in the hands of the majority. It would be altogether an impertinence for the minority to propose "changes in the method of administration." The majority may fitly propose such changes as would in their judgment "obviate serious difficulties now thought to exist." And when proposed it can at once be seen whether they are sufficient to meet the present emergency.

Certain changes, however, of the kind referred to, namely, in the method of administration, have been already suggested, the working value of which may be a fair subject of discussion in advance of the meeting of the Board. We mention two or three in the way of illustration.

One change, of which we have heard the suggestion, and which we have reason to believe will be found necessary to preserve the present organization of the Board intact, is that of conferring some appropriate authority upon the Presidential office. At present the office is simply influential. And events continually prove how insignificant, at critical times, mere influence is when contrasted with actual power. A letter of advice is a very poor equivalent to a vote. When absolute authority is conferred upon a small body of men who have a distinct policy to carry out, it is for them to decide how much or how little heed they will give to influence from any quarter whatever. What is naturally wanted is the authority to enforce influence on the part of those with whom it has been vested, to the degree in which such persons are supposed

to have responsibility. For want of any such authority the position of the President of the Board must have been, one would think, embarrassing to the occupant, as it has certainly been misleading to the public. Let any one recall the public utterances of Dr. Hopkins at the meeting at Des Moines, or read his letter subsequent to that meeting upon occasion of the retirement of the Hon. Alpheus Hardy from the Prudential Committee, or let one go back and inquire into the extraordinary personal efforts which he made to modify the action of the Prudential Committee in the case of the first rejected candidates, and it will be seen of how little authority were the opinions and judgment and influence of Dr. Hopkins as President in determining the policy or directing the executive management of the Board. It is hardly necessary to ask how far his successor has been satisfied with the facilities which he has found at his disposal for bringing about the object for which, after much deliberation, he accepted the Presidency, namely, to effect an agreement between the two parties in the constituency of the Board. His letter of acceptance was interpreted as making for peace, and it is generally understood that his personal efforts have been toward the same end, but the management of the Board has been in no way, so far as the public can judge, affected by his relation to it. Indeed at no time has the Prudential Committee exhibited so determined and intolerant a spirit as during the past year.

We cannot, of course, say what effect a change in the Presidential office, such as that of making the President an *ex officio* member of the Prudential Committee, would have toward "obviating the serious difficulties now thought to exist." That would depend entirely upon the personality of the President. A man of deep missionary enthusiasms would have the opportunity of making his influence felt beyond his vote. But the change in itself seems to be one worthy of the consideration of the Board. If effected it would at least give unity to its public deliverances. At present there is constant confusion growing out of the variation between the semi-official utterances of the Board and its official actions. What is now needed more than anything else is perfect consistency in statement and action on the part of the majority. This is something which we think the minority has the right to ask, by whatever *method* those in control of the Board may think best to accomplish it.

Another proposed change in method is that of transferring the examination of candidates from the Home to the Foreign Department. The immediate occasion of this proposal seems to lie in the fact that it has of late fallen to the lot of the Foreign Secretaries to visit the more liberal seminaries of the denomination to present the claims of foreign missions. As would naturally be the case from their sense of the needs of the various fields, they have pressed the claims of the foreign service upon the students. And they have urged them to apply to the Board, assuring them of considerate and sympathetic treatment. But the students know perfectly that these assurances are personal and not official.

The door of entrance to the Board is well understood by them to be located on the other side of the house. They are familiar with the nature of the correspondence and examination which attend application to the Board, and with the general method of the presentation of cases. And they are not disposed to repeat the experience of applicants of former classes.

Would not, then, the proposed transfer, which may take advantage of the broader views and sympathies of the foreign secretaries, exactly meet this difficulty? We think not, for the very patent reason, that it would seem to the ingenuous minds of the applicants like "climbing up some other way" than that which the Board had carefully marked out. They recall the action of the Board in which it emphatically negatived the resolution of Professor Fisher, "That the missionaries of this Board shall have the same right of private judgment in the interpretation of God's word, and the same freedom of thought and speech, as are enjoyed by their ministerial brethren in this country," while passing the resolution, from which we have quoted, enjoining upon the Prudential Committee special carefulness in guarding the Board from those who were at that time exercising the right in question. Unless, therefore, such a transfer should be understood to imply a change of policy on the part of the Board equivalent to a change in its theological resolutions, we do not see why any student contemplating the missionary service should wish to take advantage of it, especially where direct and honorable ways of entrance upon his work are open to him from the churches.

The change in method which has been formally proposed and strongly advocated by some is that of the reorganization of the Board with the view of making it a representative body. We do not care to anticipate the discussion upon this proposal, which may take place at the meeting of the Board, for we do not see the practical bearing of the proposal upon present difficulties. The discussion, if it takes place, will be very interesting, especially as it may run out upon cross lines. It will be of interest, for example, to note what position the more zealous advocates of a stringent Congregationalism in Japan will take in the attempt to make the Board a truly Congregational body. But the reorganization of the Board according to Congregational principles can hardly be expected to be brought about in time to affect present issues. It can hardly be expected that the reorganization can be made thorough and comprehensive. And any change allowing a certain representation of the churches, but practically keeping the control of the Board for several years in the hands of the present corporation, would of course avail nothing in the immediate emergency. In fact, there is more danger that the discussion of this question will divert attention from the present difficulty, than that it will bring forth anything radical enough in its result to aid in solving it.

The present difficulty is a very simple, but a very obstinate one. It

has for some time amounted to a grievance. It is this. The American Board refuses to accept for its service candidates from the liberal seminaries of the Congregational denomination, who are in sympathy with the general teaching of those seminaries, though such candidates are freely accepted by every other benevolent organization in the denomination, and though they are continually endorsed by councils in every part of the country.

The "Congregationalist" proposes to remove this grievance, or, to use its own words, to "obviate serious difficulties now thought to exist," by changes in the methods of administration. We are not prepared to say that the much to be desired end cannot be accomplished in this way. Everything will depend upon the spirit and purpose of the majority. Their action at New York will show how seriously they are disposed toward conciliation. The minority do not ask the majority to recant. As we said at the outset we do not expect that they will immediately repeal their resolutions or reconsider their votes. We assume that whatever will be done, if anything of a conciliatory nature is attempted, will be done by indirect methods. But the methods if indirect must accomplish one thing, namely, the admission of young men of good theological standing in the denomination to the service of the Board: otherwise they accomplish nothing. Every one knows that this has been from the first the issue, and that it is still the issue. Let everything else be settled, including the whole question of reorganization, and then let some young man, holding for example the views of Mr. Noyes, apply to the Prudential Committee and be rejected, and instantly the controversy would burst out in redoubled heat. Indeed the present quiet is due simply to the fact that no test cases have come before the Prudential Committee since its rejection of Mr. Noyes: a fact which has suggested to the most thoughtful friends of the Board the very serious problem which now confronts it — how to regain the confidence of young men whose respect and affections it has alienated. And this in view of the extraordinary demands which in the wonderful providence of God are being made upon the Board. Probably the great missionary question which will come before the meeting at New York will be that of the evangelization of Japan. An appeal will doubtless be presented from the Japanese Mission which will arouse the missionary sentiment to the highest degree, and which will test the Board in its capacity, under its present policy, for furnishing men in numbers and in quality adequate to the emergency. The appeal will be heard by young men in the colleges and seminaries and by the churches. It will be for the Board to say whether the response shall be made through or outside its channels.

CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN.

THAT Christianity in some form is to be the religion of Japan seems to be the opinion of most of the new leaders of thought in that empire. The chief question is whether it shall be a Christianity, if there be such a religion, devoid of supernaturalism, or historic Christianity. In a recent informal address by Mr. Kentaro Kaneko, Secretary of the Japanese Privy Council, before the officers of the American Unitarian Association, the speaker advocated Unitarianism as the form best adapted to the Japanese mind. As he said, speaking of the intellectual character of his people, "We have found nothing that seemed to be in advance of the Japanese except Unitarianism." Not that Unitarianism is really in advance of Buddhism; but that it has the advantage of Western enterprise and life, while Buddhism after its growth of a thousand years is decaying.

"The question then comes up, What is the difference between Buddhism in its highest state and Unitarianism? So far as I know, they are just the same. Then why should the Japanese give up Buddhism and take up Unitarianism, which has never grown in our country, while Buddhism has been growing a thousand years? That question will be answered by looking at the direction of the progress we are making. All our progress is coming from Europe and America. The civilization of Christendom is reaching high tide in our country. The great world-current is sweeping through Japan. The original Buddhism is not strong enough to resist that power. Religion must take the same direction, must follow the general tide of civilization; and therefore the Japanese can much more readily take Unitarianism, which comes from the West in the line of civilization, than to build up the old Buddhist doctrine it has had a thousand years. This form of Christianity has a very promising future there."

We were reminded upon reading these words of a very thoughtful book of some fifteen years ago, written by one then a minister of the "liberal faith," entitled "The Secret of Christianity." The argument of the book was that "the law of Christianity is that of antagonism. It opposes itself to the ruling tendency of the popular life; it seeks to reform, to regenerate. This simple law of antagonism has explained every important element of Christian civilization whether mediæval or modern. It is the real secret of Christianity." The writer drew his illustrations chiefly from the relations of Christianity to different forms of paganism, and as it seemed to us showed in a large way the truth of his position. And we are not now prepared to believe that Christianity will gain a race chiefly because it can be made to appear an easy fit to the current religious ideas. Christianity has not become the religion of successive races by adoption, but by some form of spiritual conquest. We fear the result of any other method than that of spiritual conquest, the taking possession of a race through its gift of that in which it is lacking. Why should Christianity be sent to a people as the simple equivalent of what

they have, only with more accomplishments in the sciences and philosophy? We believe, from such knowledge as we have gained from personal conversation with some of the more intelligent Japanese who have visited this country, that what the Japanese mind craves is not the present incidentals of Christianity, its immediate advantages over Buddhism, but its eternal verities. The Japanese mind is doubtless indifferent to ritual, unsusceptible to mere emotion, impatient of doctrinal refinements, but that it has a clear perception of spiritual Christianity, and that it is capable of responding to its personal claims with ardor and devotion, we cannot doubt with the evidence before us in the lives of some who have accepted the historic Christian faith.

And we find confirmation of this belief in the statement from which we quote of Dr. Greene, the oldest missionary of the American Board in Japan, in a recent letter to the "Boston Herald":—

"But it is said that these Christians are all from among the illiterate classes. This is a great mistake, for nearly fifty per cent. of all the church membership is made up from the old military class—the Samurai—to which nearly all of the present officers of the government belong. This class constitutes about 2,000,000, out of a total population of 39,000,000. The Japanese are an intensely religious people, and the educated Samurai share this element of the national character with their less educated countrymen of the lower classes. Mr. Kaneko, and probably many others, have, no doubt, come to reject entirely all supernaturalism in religion; but the great mass of the people, the high as well as the low, respond gladly to the preaching of the gospel. Not less than thirty students in the Imperial University are avowed Christians. Among the members of a single Congregational Church are a judge of the supreme court of Japan, a professor in the Imperial University, three government secretaries (holding a rank hardly, if any, inferior to Mr. Kaneko himself), members of at least two noble families; while in a Presbyterian Church are the three most prominent members of the Liberal party, one of them a count in the new peerage. Two influential members of the Legislature of the prefecture of Tokio, one of them the editor of the *Keizai Zasshi*, the ablest financial journal in Japan, are also members of a Congregational Church. In the prefectures of Kyoto and Ehime the Christians have two representatives in each local Legislature. In the prefecture of Gumma the president and vice-president and three other members of the Legislature are Christians, and in the executive committee, out of a total of five, three are Protestant Christians. So far from its being true, as you assume, that the missionaries have no more effect upon the influential classes than 'water on a duck's back,' it may be questioned whether in all its history Christianity has ever gained, in so short a time, a stronger hold upon the upper classes than in Japan during the past sixteen years. No man who looks below the surface can now ignore its influence upon Japanese society."

And as germane to the present comment we add the reply of Dr. Greene to the reflections of Mr. Kaneko upon the current teaching of Christianity in Japan:—

"It is asserted by Mr. Kaneko, that in the preaching of the missionaries

the emphasis is upon the 'damnatory part' of the Christian religion, while 'the positive truths which lift man up to God' are neglected. The exact reverse is the truth, so far as my observation goes, both as regards the missionaries and the native preachers. The missionaries, like most other Christians, believe in a future of rewards and punishments, and they believe, also, that man is saved through faith in Christ. They do not hesitate to teach those doctrines, but they teach, also, that salvation from sin is vastly more important than salvation from the penal consequences of sin, and that a faith which does not lead to Christlikeness is no faith at all. This view of faith has met with a wide acceptance among thoughtful men, and there never has been a time when the interest among such has been greater than now. The Japanese clergymen who serve as pastors of the city churches are well prepared to meet the brightest of these inquiring minds. They are omnivorous readers of the best theological and philosophical literature to be had in the English language. They have access, many of them, to nearly all the more prominent of the secular reviews of England and America. Several whom I might name are probably as familiar with the writings of Mill, Spencer, and Bain as the average graduate from the philosophical courses at Harvard University. They have fought their way to their present faith through long and painful conflicts. They know the worst that philosophic doubt has to suggest, and they rejoice, in spite of it, in what is to them a life-giving faith. Their faith is confirmed by what they see of the reforming power of Christianity in individuals and in society, for Japanese society has its dark as well as its bright and attractive side. Surely it cannot be denied that Christianity has its lesson for a people which has held, and but for Christianity would be still holding, to the *patria potestas*, with all its terrible fruits, for its fruits are even now terrible, as the writer knows from his own observations. Surely Christianity has something to teach as to the social position of women when divorces are over thirty per cent. of all marriages. Much as we lament the frequency of divorce in America (between four and five per cent. of all marriages in Massachusetts), we must not forget that this large increase during recent years is an evil incident to the growing appreciation of woman's place in society, while in Japan the frequency of divorce is due to the fact that she is the mere creature of her husband, with few rights which she can assert against his will.

"The Japanese Christians are grappling with these great questions with most encouraging success, and they have been largely instrumental in creating for the nation a new and better idea in the family. Their influence is further seen in the decline of intemperance and social immorality in the towns where churches are found. In one prefecture, that of Gumma, the Christians have exerted a profound influence upon local legislation."

"We missionaries are well aware that our teaching is but one of several channels through which the influence of Christianity is flowing out to Japan, and we acknowledge with gratitude whatever serves to hold up the Christian ideas of individual and social life. So far as our Unitarian friends go to Japan to take up the work of social reform with the earnestness and zeal manifested in other movements by so many of their faith, whose names we all hold in honor, we shall welcome their coming and bid them godspeed. There is a vast work to be done. Let them not depreciate the labors of others not less earnest, perhaps not less intelligent, than they. The very suddenness of the

change which has come over Japan has brought special dangers with it. Let none of us ignore these dangers, but meet them squarely, acknowledging their magnitude and our need of a wisdom which is near to humility."

A further communication, of very great interest, from Dr. Greene, may be found in the "Boston Evening Transcript" of Saturday, 28th September.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY.

FOR the full outline, and for general authorities to be used under Section I, see January number, pp. 85, 86.

SECTION I. THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF LABOR.

Topic 10. *Wages and Profits.*

In tracing the Social Evolution of Labor we have marked the nature of the advance from slavery to serfdom, and from serfdom to the wage system. The school of Karl Marx denies the advance, affirming that the wage-earner is still the slave. There have been periods in the history of free labor, especially at the time of the introduction of machinery and the establishment of the factory system, when the denial was plausible. The chapter in "Capital" (Karl Marx), upon Machinery and Modern Industry, with its array of facts compiled chiefly from Parliamentary Reports, is a terrible indictment of the factory system in its earlier stages. But whether the present condition of the operative is due chiefly to economic or to political reasons, the advance is manifest. Doubtless much is due to the general progress in political freedom, an obligation which the intelligent observer specially acknowledges in behalf of the workingman of Switzerland and America. But in any fair estimate of the cause of the social advancement of the wage-earner, a great deal must be attributed to the industrial system itself; and this may be said in perfect consistency with the admission that the history of the system reveals great oppression, and that the system is still capable of tyranny and injustice. Industrialism has organized labor as well as capital, so that in so far as there is contention between the two, the contention is carried on upon terms which are growing more nearly equal. The wage-earner, in many departments of industry, has reached a position of comparative independence and power. The incidental questions affecting the health, comfort, and associations of the average operative have been settled or are in process of settlement by legislation. The remaining question to which no satisfactory answer has yet been given is that of the adjustment of Wages and Profits.

SUB-TOPICS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCES.

1. *The parties immediately concerned with the adjustment of Wages and Profits — the capitalist, the manager, the wage-earner.*

Note the increasing importance of the manager, and the wages of management.

Principles of Political Economy. (Sidgwick.) Book ii., chap. 9, sec. 3.

The Wages Question. (Walker.) Chap. 14, on the Employing Class.

Principles of Political Economy. (Mill.) Book ii., chap. 3.

2. *Who is the Wage Earner? How may the wages class be discriminated from the labor class?*

The Wages Question. (Walker.) Chap. 12, on the Wages Class.

3. *The relation of the employed to the irregular worker and to the unemployed.*

Wages and Earnings of the Working Classes. (Levi.)

Life and Labor, East London, vol. i. (Booth.)

The Economics of Industry. (Marshall.) Book ii., chaps. 7 and 8.

4. *The sources of Profit.*

Manual of Political Economy. (Fawcett.) Book ii., chap. 5.

Capital. (Karl Marx.) Part III.

The Elements of Political Economy. (Laveleye.) Book iii., chaps. 8 and 9.

5. *What determines the rate of wages?*

Some Leading Principles of Political Economy. (Cairnes.) Part ii., chaps. 1 and 2.

Manual of Political Economy. (Fawcett.) Book ii., chap. 4.

Work and Wages. (Brassey.)

Six Centuries of Work and Wages. (Rogers.)

6. *Means of increasing the remuneration of labor.*

(1) By combinations among laborers.

Methods of Social Reform. (Jevons.) Pp. 110-120.

The Conflict of Capital and Labor. (Howells.)

Economics of Industry. (Marshall.) Book iii., chaps. 6 and 7.

Third Annual Report of the (U. S.) Commissioner of Labor, 1887. Strikes and Lockouts.

Some Leading Principles of Political Economy. (Cairnes.) Part ii., chapters on Trades Unionism.

(2) By industrial partnerships.

Methods of Social Reform. (Jevons.) Pp. 133-155.

Manual of Political Economy. (Fawcett.) Book ii., chap. 10, on Coöperation.

Profit Sharing between Employer and Employee. (Gilman.)

History of Coöperation. (Holyoake.) Andover Review, February, 1889.

Evolution of the Relation between Capital and Labor. (Adam Shortt.)

7. *The proposed abolition of wages through the change from the competitive system to the systems of Socialism.*

The Coöperative Commonwealth. (Gronlund.)

Social Problems. (Henry George.)

Principles of Political Economy. (Newcomb.) Pp. 512-525.

The Progress of the Working Classes in the last half Century. (Giffen.)

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE BOOK OF PSALMS ; OR THE PRAISES OF ISRAEL. A new Translation, with Commentary. By the Rev. T. K. CHEYNE, M. A., D. D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford, Canon of Rochester. 8vo, pp. xvii, 413. New York : Thomas Whittaker. 1888.

Canon Cheyne's translation of the Psalms, with brief notes, chiefly critical, was published in 1884 in the "Parchment Library," and was welcomed by scholars on both sides of the sea as having an aim and a place of its own. The changes which have been made in the present edition do not materially affect the style. The author recognizes that where a literary as well as a scholarly standard has been aimed at, it is desirable to exercise caution in alteration. In many particulars, however, the renderings have been improved, and as it now stands the translation more than ever deserves high praise for faithfulness and vigor. It puts new meaning into many passages whose familiar phrases have long spoken to the ear, not the sense, and will thus be helpful not only to intelligence but to devotion. That the new renderings should often jar on ears accustomed to the cadences of the old versions is inevitable. The new may be better, for all that. "Worship the LORD in the beauty of holiness," is an exhortation we do not like to miss ; yet the meaning it conveys to the English reader is not only foreign to the text and context, but lies quite outside the circle of the Psalmist's religious ideas. "Worship Jehovah in hallowed pomp," is much more commonplace, but it is just what the author says, and that is the first thing in translation. The first thing, not the only thing. The higher aim of the translator is to reproduce, as completely as possible, the impression which the original makes on one who is thoroughly familiar with the language. Often the literal translation of a figure produces in English a very different effect from that which the author intended. In such cases the higher faithfulness requires a freer treatment. In practice it is frequently very difficult to decide between the conflicting claims of fidelity to the letter and to the spirit. If Canon Cheyne errs, it is, as the scholar is prone to err, on the side of too great literalness. "My heart bubbles with goodly words," Psalm 45, 1, may be an exact equivalent of the Hebrew, though post-biblical usage makes this at least doubtful, but it is a figure which makes the impression of ingenious infelicity. Sometimes, too, consistency of rendering has dictated a word which is not the fittest in its context, as, for example, "thy club and shepherd's staff, they will comfort me," Psalm 23, 4. "Without flaw," may in many connections do very well for *tamim*, but "the God who . . . rendered my way flawless" is a collocation of words only the principle of uniformity could have suggested, and which itself has to be translated in the commentary. It must not be thought, however, that such examples represent the literary quality of the translation. The general level is high, and there are many striking and admirable renderings. Nothing could be better than Psalm 110, 3 : "All alacrity are thy people in the day of thy muster upon the holy mountains ;" or "Jehovah swears irrevocably," in the following verse. How much 114, 1, gains by the use of just the right word for *lôcēz* ! "When Israel went forth out from Egypt, the house of Jacob from a barbaric people," etc. But I may not multiply instances.

One of the features of Professor Cheyne's Psalms is the treatment of the text. The Hebrew text of the Psalter, like that of other books of the Old Testament, has suffered much from accidents of transmission. There are only too many places which a scholar with a grammatical conscience can hardly translate at all. Text criticism must therefore go hand in hand with exegesis. Often, unfortunately, there is no remedy but conjecture, and nobody need tell the critic how uncertain that is. But at the worst it is better than the alternative, which is to guess at the meaning from the context and force it on the text by grammatical violence or etymological subtleties. The author has worked on this principle. Where the text seems irremediable he has sometimes indicated this by asterisks, but when a probable emendation offered itself he has generally adopted it. The Critical Notes, pages 389-406, render account of the departures from the received text, and often give a review of the history of criticism in important and difficult passages. Workers in the same field will appreciate the wealth of material which is here laboriously and discriminatingly gathered from many and often remote sources. In the translation itself there is nothing to show where Professor Cheyne has felt constrained to abandon the Massoretic text. This is, I think, a mistake. It may indeed be said that the scholar does not need to be told, and that the English reader would be no wiser for being told, so that it is unnecessary to disfigure the page or disturb the reader's enjoyment by critical signs. But, apart from all other considerations, there are many ministers and students of theology who would like to read the Hebrew with this commentary, to whom the difficulty of making out the relation of the translation to the text will be a constant hindrance.

To the translation of each Psalm is now prefixed a brief introduction, in which we get the author's conception of the Psalm as a whole, and much beside that is helpful to understanding and appreciation. Critical questions are in principle reserved for another volume, a companion to "Job and Solomon," which will be awaited with interest. But it is happily impossible to be quite consistent in this separation of criticism from exegesis, and the reader will have little difficulty in discovering Canon Cheyne's opinion on the chief issues of Psalm criticism. As regards the age of the Psalms, he records in the Introduction his judgment that Ewald's list of eleven Davidic Psalms is "the most conservative view of the headings at present tenable." The word Davidic, he says elsewhere, "becomes to us a symbolic term for vigour and originality of style." I infer from the special introductions that he recognizes in most of the Psalms the type of post-exilic piety, to use Stade's words, and in some of them more distinctly the situation of later times. Another point is of more consequence for the interpretation. The Psalter is "a collection of liturgical forms in which, in trouble and in joy, the Jewish Church embodied its praiseful prayers and prayerful praise." With Olshausen and Reuss, to whom must now be added the names of Stade¹ and Smend,² he regards the Jewish Church as the real subject of the Psalms, even of such as seem to bear most distinctly the stamp of individual experience. He does not, indeed, exclude the individual element; sometimes he leaves the question open; sometimes he adopts a mediating hypothesis.

¹ *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, II., 212 ff.; cf. ANDOVER REVIEW, Sept. 1889, p. 333.

² *Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft*, 1888, 49-147.

In Psalm 6, for example, the speaker is either the pious Israelite personified, or a representative righteous man who feels the sins and sufferings of his people as his own. In Psalm 23 a national element cannot be denied; the shepherd's tending is, no doubt, for the sake of His name (Jehovah, Israel's God), as Olshausen urged; v. 1 reminds us of the references to Jehovah's flock in Asaphite Psalms, as well as of Deut. 2, 7; the foes in v. 5 may well be national foes. "Still the national and the personal elements cannot be dissevered by most potent analysis." "The speaker is any pious Israelite in whose mind both national and personal hopes and fears rest side by side." Psalm 22 "is most probably a description, under the form of a dramatic monologue, of the ideal Israelite, called by a kindred writer 'the covenant of the people,' and 'the light of the nations' (Is. 42, 7), who shall rise out of the provisional church-nation, and, identifying himself with it, lead it on to spiritual victory." Those who are familiar with the author's Isaiah will recognize here the theory of the "Servant of Jehovah" which he has there defended. But the Psalms which are most closely akin to 22 are, as far as I see, consistently interpreted of the people. Compare the introductions to Psalms 38; 40; 41; 102. Apparently 69 is understood in the same way. In 35 "it may be safer to regard the individualizing features as poetical ornament."

The commentary is compact, but full of matter. Its strongest side, perhaps, is the way in which it makes the Psalter explain itself, by comparing one part with another. The reader who will work through the references here given will find them rich in instruction and suggestion. The wealth of illustrative material which the author's wide and varied reading puts at his command, is employed as in his other works, with tact and reserve. Brief as it is, this volume is one of the most valuable helps to the understanding of the Psalms which we have, and is to be heartily commended to every one who wishes to enter more deeply into the sense and the spirit of a book which is not only a monument of Jewish piety, but a classic of Christian devotion.

G. F. Moore.

Impressions of Russia. By Dr. Georg Brandes. Translated from the Danish by Samuel C. Eastman. Pp. x, 353. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 13 Astor Place. 1889.—Dr. Brandes seems to know Russia better than if he were a Russian. He can objectify it as they cannot. He dwells on its vastness, its uniformity, the extraordinary passiveness of its people and their receptiveness, underneath which there is an unconquerable originality; on their weakness of will and faithfulness to ideals, till they come out before us in something like intelligibility. The two fundamental institutions, he says, are the absolute control of the Czar and community of landed property in the Mir. The former is in danger, the latter is even yet encroaching on individual ownership. He brings out very vividly the extreme severity of the climate even in the south, and the powerful effects of this in intensifying the national character. A Russian, if conservative, is the intensest of absolutists; if radical, is what we all know. The extraordinary freedom in the relations of the sexes in the cultivated classes is brought out fully, but is vindicated from the charge of sensual brutality. Russia is described as a land where the will always sinks overpowered, and where

hopeless melancholy is the keynote of life. All this is illustrated by her writers. Pushkin, Gogol, Shevtchenko, Turgenief, Dostoyevski, Tolstoi, Derzhavin, Zhukovski, Lomonósov, the founder of the modern literature, are all penetratingly described. The author's frank antichristianity and his contempt of the distinction between good and evil, except as a superficial accident, render him peculiarly at home in this land of tyranny, superstition, and pessimism.

The People's Bible: Discourses upon Holy Scripture. By *Joseph Parker, D. D.*, Minister of the City Temple, Holborn Viaduct, London. Vol. VIII. I Kings XV. I Chronicles IX. Pp. vii, 360. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 18 and 20 Astor Place. 1888. — These homiletic comments, altogether practical, developed with a lively fancy and keen regard to life, are often connected with the sacred narrative by somewhat elongated threads. But the threads do not snap; the reference to the meaning of the narrative is always there. Of course they are not like the reproductions of Robertson, who has taken the inmost meaning of the Biblical narrative into his inmost soul, and gives it out, it is hard to say whether with more faithfulness or more freedom. But they are agreeable and profitable reading, and would be exceeding agreeable to hear. People who do not read sermons could easily read these.

The Second Book of Samuel. By the *Rev. Professor W. G. Blaikie, D. D., LL.D.*, New College, Edinburgh. Pp. viii, 400. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. — Thirty-two chapters, essentially homiletical, on the history of David. Grave and solid, and not simply attached to the history of David, but actually deduced from it. He attaches various Psalms to conjunctures of David's life somewhat contemptuously of prevailing criticism, but may say at least that they are applicable, whether that was their original application or not. The point of view is the elder one, but it makes full account of the truth that the least in the kingdom of the Son of David is greater than David, as to the standard of faith and conduct available to him.

Romanism versus the Public School System. By *Daniel Dorchester, D. D.* Pp. 351. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1888. — This is a book intensely polemical in spirit, but dignified in tone, and written with an evident endeavor to be as nearly impartial as is possible to the author's ecclesiastical position. It is not, however, what we need, a pellucid compilation of the *acta* of the long controversy. Probably only a layman, of some such position as that of Dr. W. T. Harris, would be adequate to that. But it is a useful book, and gives a great deal of very desirable information. The author is doubtless quite right in stating that the Latin Church cares little to educate the masses, and that if there were no public schools here there would probably be few parochial schools. Concerning the rulings in Ohio and some States still farther West, which virtually shut out God and Christ altogether from the public schools, he is silent, since they shut out the Pope also. Into the profound truths which are inextricably interwoven with unendurable hierarchical pretensions over education, the author does not even make an effort to look. But of the scandalous way in which Catholic bigotry is sometimes encountered by Protestant unfairness, he has a strong sense, and manfully expresses it. We are sure, however, that his proposal to compel all children under fourteen to attend the public schools will never commend itself to an uninflamed American sense of personal and parental right.

The book always misspells "Brownson" "Bronson," and has one slip of "most reverend apostle" for "most reverend archbishop."

The Tests of the Various Kinds of Truth. By James McCosh, D. D., LL.D., D. L. Second Series. Pp. 132. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1889. \$0.70. — These lectures before the Ohio Wesleyan University touch upon the nature and differences of Ultimate, Deductive, and Inductive Truth, and upon the joint application of the two last. The last lecture inquires whether there is testimony to prove the supernatural, and answers affirmatively. The distinguished author rejects the assumption that there is one genetic principle of knowledge or one exhaustive criterion of truth, but proceeds to show that there are both principles and tests sufficient to give us a sufficient affluence and certainty for all our present essential requirements. He puts Deduction lower than Mill, but allows its value, especially in combination. He is very sarcastic upon the German philosophers from Spinoza to Von Hartmann, but allows that there is something in most of them after all. The question of Universals he settles very sensibly by the position: "Universalis in particularibus." The treatment of testimony to the Supernatural is sound, but not particularly striking. His statement that ghost-stories are against the analogy of nature, and therefore undeserving of attention, may be questioned. Many of them have excellent evidence, and so strong-headed a man as Isaac Taylor believes them to be according to the analogy of nature. They are less worthy of attention than the miracles of Jesus only because they amount to so little. As Isaac Taylor says, their only value seems to be that they keep up a dim sense of things unseen in the general mind.

Christian Education. By Rev. Daniel Curry, LL.D. First Series. Pp. 131. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1889. \$0.70. — A pleasant series of five lectures, delivered before the Ohio Wesleyan University. They are: (1) Introductory and General; (2) Character and Capabilities of Christian Education; (3) Its Purpose; (4) Lions in the Way; (5) Character-Making. Dr. Curry by no means follows those superserviceable clergymen who are so anxious to prove to Antichrist that they have nothing against his assuming the charge of our national education. He affirms that the dread of "godless schools" is far from being a vain cry.

Living Questions: Studies in Nature and Grace. By Warren Hathaway, Pastor at Blooming Grove, New York. Pp. 365. New York: Fords, Howard & Hulbert. 1889. — Seventeen Sermons on various Biblical and doctrinal topics, such as The Guiding Hand, God Revealed, A Royal Sensualist, The Vine and the Branch, etc. They are fresh and sound, elastic in their theology, but thoroughly centred in the Scriptures and in Christ. The two sermons on The Real Issue are a vigorous following up of the Protean attempts of atheism to compel the great truth of Evolution to yield atheistic results which are not inherent in it, but which it must be dragooned into yielding if it is to retain any value in the eyes of a large proportion of its advocates, who are thereby shown to be simply atheistic theologians in masquerade.

John the Baptist, the Forerunner of our Lord: His Life and Work. By Ross C. Houghton, D. D. Pp. 372. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1889. \$1.50. — An agreeable, somewhat diffuse, popular biography of the Baptist, with quite a full presentation of the illustrative and confirmatory literature. The sarcastic

comments on Roman Catholic relic-worship with which it concludes form a rather undignified anti-climax. This "hall-mark" of the author's standing, perhaps, could not be spared, but might have done better in another place. The author himself seems to lean a little to the evident invention of Salome's retributive form of death. The print of Jesus' baptism represents him and John, as they probably should be, both in the water, about to give and receive an immersion. Perhaps John did not ordinarily plunge his candidates in person, but he doubtless did the Saviour.

The Progress of Religious Freedom as shown in the History of Toleration Acts. By Philip Schaff, D. D., LL.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889. Pp. vi, 126. — This clearly printed and clearly presented brochure — first read before the C. H. Society — emphasizes the important distinction, that America has passed far beyond Toleration, while Europe, in form and largely in fact, still maintains the theory that freedom of dissenting worship is only a concession. It might have been added, that France is beginning to treat liberty of worship in general as a concession, which she would like to revoke but does not quite dare.

The author brings out the two unhappy gradations by which those two great men, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, committed the Latin Church to persecution, Ambrose and Alcuin representing the purer Christian feeling. It might have been well to point out that Rome has always denied that she has jurisdiction over the unbaptized, and that, as Neander shows, she did her best in the Middle Ages to protect the Jews. It is curious that this simple distinction has, as the "Nation" has pointed out, misled Mr. Lea into reproaching her with inconsistency. A pretty serious crack in his great work on the Inquisition, not to have apprehended this vital position.

Is it true that the Orthodox persecutions of the Arians compared in violence with those of the Orthodox by the Arians? We have not so understood from Gibbon.

Dr. Schaff is justly severe upon the reluctance of the Protestants to cease persecuting. He gives Frederick the Great no more praise than his due, but might perhaps have mentioned that, in the previous century, the sincerely religious Emperor Maximilian II. had been equally firm in his refusal to persecute either Protestants or Jesuits. The author rightly makes the Edict of Nantes the centre of his book, from its promulgation to its revocation. These few pages are a brilliant portraiture and vindication of the Huguenot Church, and will leave on the mind in ineffaceable vividness the varied abominations of the dragonnades. Every Protestant ought to know them, not to inflame his bigotry, but to kindle his thankfulness that there has been such a church, and that, driven abroad like the first disciples, she is still working in many lands, above all in ours. Those of us who are proud, not of one, but of many lines of Huguenot blood in our veins, owe him proportional thanks for having brought this great history into so intense a focus.

Dr. Schaff remarks that Leo XIII. is enlightened, moderate, and prudent, but maintains the unchangeable Roman theory of the duty of the state to coerce all the disobedient children of the Church. But, as he points out, theories must bend to facts, and however it may be with Rome, Catholicism in America is undergoing an essential transformation in this respect, which the Doctor declares to be admirably illustrated in Cardinal Gibbons.

Scriptures, Hebrew and Christian. By Edward T. Bartlett, A. M., and John P. Peters, Ph. D. Vols. I. and II., pp. xii, 545; xi, 569. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1886, 1888. — This joint work of the Dean of the Episcopal Divinity School in Philadelphia and the Old Testament professor is especially arranged for the benefit of young readers, as an introduction to the study of the Bible. Beginning with the Creation, it goes through the history of Israel to the Captivity, giving the marrow of the story in such narrations as appear to have lived in the mouths of the people, but omitting everything which appears to belong to the work of literary redaction. Such ancient documents, especially songs, as the editors judge contemporary, they give *in situ*, including the Ten Commandments. To David they attribute, in order, the Eighth, Nineteenth (first part), Twenty-ninth, Seventh, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-second, Eighteenth, and Third Psalms, as well as the Last Words, and the Elegy over Saul and Jonathan. We would raise, however, a hesitating question, in the name, not of the Higher, but of the Superlative Criticism, respecting the last. Is it not too completely Davidian to be acknowledged genuine, too thoroughly consonant with David's enthusiastic character in friendship, war, and national feeling, too absolutely agreeable to its hitherto undisputed authorship in its tone, occasion, objects, and allusions, to be received? Such is the way that certain great authorities seem to reason.

The second volume opens with the Psalms of rage and despair, intermingled with the prophecies of vengeance and restoration, and the narratives of the Return, with the Psalms and Prophecies of Reëdification. The 119th Psalm, as the Praise of the Law, introduces the Law, the Book of the Covenant, the Little Book of the Covenant, the Eight Levitical Codes, the Deuteronomic Code, in its Seven Parts, and the Levitical Ritual. Then follow, as Hebrew Tales, those narratives of Ruth, Elijah and Elisha, and Jonah, which do not so immediately belong in the annals, but which the editors declare to be in no way less historical on this account. These are immediately followed, perhaps too immediately, by the Danielic narratives. Then come, intermingled in a somewhat difficult sequence, various prophecies of Micah, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Jeremiah, Zephaniah, and Zechariah; then, as Hebrew Poetry, a large selection of Psalms, and, as Hebrew Wisdom, various Proverbs. Lastly comes the great poem of Job, enriched by the omission of Elihu's interpolated speech.

Younger and older readers, who use the book, will certainly apprehend by means of it that there is life and various development in the history of Israel, and that the revelation of God was accomplished through the deep interaction of human personalities and relations. After reading it they would never be able to reduce the Old Testament again to the dead level of a Koran.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Harald Höffding, Professor an der Universität in Kopenhagen. *Ethik. Eine Darstellung der Ethischen Prinzipien und deren Anwendung auf besondere Lebensverhältnisse. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Dänischen übersetzt von F. Bendixen.* Pp. xiv, 492. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag (R. Reisland). Mrk. 10. — "If one views from a distance the snow-clad mountains they seem to be suspended in the air, but as one comes nearer it is evident that they stand upon strong and solid foundations. It is even so with ethical principles. . . . It has been my task in this work to point out what ethical foundations there are, whence they spring, and what application they find in the most important relations of life. Practical experience and theoretical investigation have ever deepened my conviction that ethical principles — the basis and rule of all judgment concerning good and evil — have their origin in the nature and relations of men themselves, without being dependent upon any other authority. I have here made the attempt to establish and carry out this conviction." Dr. Höffding, while he finds all the material of ethics in man, expects that ethics will come to scientific character by means of the objective method. Bentham's failure to see how a subjective principle forms the supposition of an objective is avoided. It is clearly shown how all ethical judgments and objective method must fall back upon a subjective foundation. "Every principle of ethical judgment rests upon determined psychological, historical suppositions." The aim and content of ethics is that conduct which is consciously directed "for the greatest possible welfare and progress of the greatest possible number." The author discriminates between theological and Christian ethics. "Christianity began not with a theological system any more than with a church organization, . . . Christianity contains only two principles, faith and love." "All Ethics is practical idealism. It supposes that we set for ourselves a goal; but a goal is no being, but an actual obligation." The treatise falls into three chief divisions: first, an exposition of ethical principles and problems, pages 1-124; second, individual ethics, pages 124-182; and, third, social ethics, pages 182-484. The relative importance which Dr. Höffding attaches to social ethics is indicated in this division. After a special introduction to this department, the Family is made the subject of a careful study, pages 192-251. The ethical meaning and natural form of the family, marriage and divorce, the position and relations of the wife, of parents and children in the family and in the state, are suggestively handled. In the second division, where the author treats of the different forms of social culture, we find a clearness and fullness truly gratifying. Social laws are brought to bear upon social questions with excellent effect. The material, intellectual, æsthetic, and religious forms of culture are characteristically distinguished and comparatively estimated. The relations of religion and philanthropy are cleared with special fullness. Under the third division, the State, pages 396-484, are reviewed the important topics, people and state, law and morality, the ethical significance of the state, the jurisdiction of the state, and the constitution of states. In conclusion, pages 482-484, we are reminded that "the whole exposition of ethics which is here given rests directly upon the supposition that there is in human nature a uni-

versal power and disinterested sympathy," and that "the doctrine of development has shown that it is possible for us to join our realism with the idealism of our predecessors if we give heed to the rule, be full of enthusiasm for the greatest things and thoroughly true in the smallest." The work is indispensable to the student of sociology. We are informed, in the preface, that the German translation is superior to the original by reason of many alterations and additions.

Wolf Wilhelm Grafen Baudissin, Professor der Theologie an der Universität Marburg. *Die Geschichte des Alttestamentlichen Priestertums*. Pp. xv, 312. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel. Mrk. 7. — We are here furnished with a masterly review of the content of the thought and life of Israel in the light of the history of its Priesthood. Notwithstanding the vast bibliography of the Old Testament, there are not more than three or four works that even attempt a survey of the religion of the old covenant from a sacerdotal standpoint. Professor Baudissin has a thorough appreciation of the worth and worthlessness of the priesthood in relation to the value of the Old Testament as a whole. The legitimate questions in this department concern neither the foundations nor superstructure of the Old Testament verities, but belong rather to that movable furniture and ornamentation that appear much the same in any building whatsoever. Yet, the disposal and arrangement of this furniture, if accurately ascertained, will give much light on the form of life and thought in Israel. The work opens with a five-page list of the literature of the subject, beginning with De Wette's "Introduction to the Old Testament," and concluding with the publications of 1888. The author, finding much confusion and little agreement in the views of Reuss, Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen, has adopted the admirable method of first succinctly stating his propositions and then critically examining them. The eight chapters which constitute the work are as follows: the priesthood according to the priestly documents of the Pentateuch, and according to Jehovistic books; the priesthood according to Deuteronomy, — Joshua, — Ezekiel, — Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah; the priesthood according to the old historical books, and the prophetic and poetic writings; and, finally, an excellent summary of the historical results. The indexing of the book is complete. There was no regular priesthood before the time of Moses, but from the time of the sojourn in the wilderness it is a prominent institution in Israel. The author makes use of whatever light is helpful in making his exposition clear, and Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Assyria furnish their shares. "The Deuteronomic law, carrying in its language and especially in its theologic character the impress of the period of Jeremiah, is that same law, which according to 2 Kings xxii. was found in the temple and publicly made known by Josiah. The reform which Josiah was able to carry on by promulgating this law was the making current of the actual motive principles of Deuteronomy."

Geschichte der Ethik in der Neueren Philosophie. Von *Friedrich Jodl*, Professor an der Universität zu Prag. Erster Band; pp. xi, 446. Mrk. 8. Zweiter Band; pp. xiii, 608. Mrk. 10. Stuttgart: Verlag der J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung. — This work is undoubtedly the most important contribution to the history of modern ethics that has yet appeared. The first volume, published six years ago, carried the history to the end of the eighteenth century. The second part, which now appears, brings the history to our own generation. One of the excellent features of the work is that the author has not attempted too much, but

confines himself strictly to the main current, holding before us throughout the main problems of ethics. The task of ethics is twofold. The first concerns itself with the question, What is morality? and seeks, by collation and comparison of ethical experience, a definition and, by idealizing these experiences, to gain a norm. The other is concerned with the question: How does morality originate, out of what limitations of natural circumstances, and under what conditions of human nature does morality arise? These problems are thought to constitute the territory of ethical investigation, and with this idea of his task Professor Jodl prosecutes his history. The history thus confined to the inductive method may be called the history of philosophical ethics. Thus we have a pretty clear and well-beaten path through philosophy, whether it leads anywhere or not. The second excellency of the author's work is his method of division and distribution. On the one hand, the philosophy of ethics is so far isolated that, at all points, its relation to metaphysics, theology, and psychology is clearly shown, and, on the other, the method of continuity is so far set aside that the various schools of ethics, in their development and national characteristics, do not fall into that dismal, monotonous mush that is so often mixed in the name of evolution. Throughout, the historic and systematic methods are so united as to hold interest and give definite instruction. Again, we must notice that the author seems to have no pets either to nurse or defend. There is an absence of that party spirit which has vitiated so much so-called history of thought, and turned it over into the field of apologetics. When we consider the chaos of contradictions through which the historian of ethical theory must move, and that this is the first attempt on the part of a German to treat systematically modern English and French ethics, we are impressed with the success attained and the general fairness of judgment. The first volume opens with a review of Greco-Roman ethics, pages 1-37, and of Christian ethics, pages 37-85. The idea of these two chapters is to form an historical introduction by an exposition of those principles that usher in the modern ethics. The third chapter treats of the beginnings of modern ethical philosophy as they arose out of the resistance offered to the consensus of all religious creeds, that without religious faith and obedience there was no salvation, no moral advance for man. It is strange that Charron, Bacon, and Grotius should be the first significant exponents of such an issue. From this point on the author follows his method of grouping. Thus we have Hobbes and his opponents, the Cambridge school and Cumberland; Locke and his opponents, Clarke and Shaftesbury. In the sixth chapter we have the English Utilitarians and the strong echo of intellectualism through Price, and in the seventh chapter a review of the Scottish school of the eighteenth century. Of the remaining four chapters two are given to the growth of skepticism in France, and one each to Spinoza and Leibnitz. The second volume begins with Kant, who was the first who succeeded in thinking in the German language. The first part of the volume is given to Germany, and treats in successive chapters the ethics of the categorical imperative, of Schiller, of Fichte, the speculative idealism of Krause and Hegel, the ethical systems of Baader, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Beneke, and Feuerbach. The second part is a history of French ethics as represented by Cousin, Jouffroy, Proudhon, and Comte. The ethico-religious problem in France is studied in its spiritualistic, positivistic, and atheistic aspects. The third book opens with a presentation of:

the general characteristics of English philosophy in the nineteenth century, and divides the history between the intuitionists and the utilitarians. The work closes with a chapter on the ethico-religious problem in England. We know of no handbook on this subject that is of equal value, nor any book likely to be more serviceable to the student of ethical philosophy. The value of the work is enhanced by the copious notes appended to each volume. Taken together, they constitute 192 pages of valuable reference and illustration.

Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur. VI. Band. Heft 1. *Die Texteüberlieferung der Bücher des Origenes gegen Celsus in den Handschriften dieses Werkes und der Philokalia.* Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Ausgabe. Von Dr. Phil. Paul Koetschau. Pp. viii, 157. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 5.50. — The author has gathered from the libraries of Germany, and those of Paris, Rome, and Venice, an immense amount of material which he has here presented in a condensed and orderly form. As indicated, the purpose is to open the way to a critical edition of the works of Origen. It is thought that a correct text of the books of Origen *vs.* Celsus is obtainable only through a critical study of the tradition of Philokalia which must assist the judgment in determining the traditional element in the former work. It is also supposed that a critical edition of the larger work would furnish a basis for the reproduction of "ἀληθὺς λόγος." The present work is done under the three following heads: the MSS. of the books of Origen *vs.* Celsus, the MSS. of Origen's Philokalia, and the direct and indirect MS. tradition of the books against Celsus. The author concludes that it is quite possible to reproduce critically the original text of the eight books of Origen *vs.* Celsus. A list of all the mentioned MSS., with an elaborate scheme of their origins, dates, and relations, is subjoined.

Das Wesen der Religion. Zur Orientirung für angehende Theologen, dargeboten von Friedrich Lillie. Pp. v, 123. Hannover: Hau'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 3. — Theologians and teachers will find in this little book a very pleasant and profitable companion. The six chapters which constitute the work show a discussion of the following topics: Religion and religions, the origin of religion and its development, the peculiar character of religion, revelation and reason, religion and science, and religion and morality. The purpose of the book is to show what the true essence of religion is, and what is the relation of religion to science, philosophy, and ethics, and, particularly, to the life that is. The spirit in which the work is done is well expressed in the famous phrase: "In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas."

Das Nachgespräch Jesu mit dem Nikodemus. Von Prof. Dr. Steinmeyer. Pp. vi, 135. Berlin: Verlag von Wiegandt und Grieben. Mrk. 2. — Another of those thorough Biblical studies for which Professor Steinmeyer has become so justly celebrated. The introduction is a study of "the visit from the side of the Pharisees," "the reception from the side of the Lord," and "the problems of the conversation." Then follow the three chapters: "Jesus and Nicodemus," "Christ and his Community," and "the Lord and his Servant." All is found to centre upon the one fundamental thought of Christianity; faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God.

Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons. Von Prof. Dr. Theo. Zahn. Erster Band: Das Neue Testament vor Origenes. Zweite

Hälfte. Pp. 518. Mrk. 12. *Einige Bemerkungen zu Adolf Harnack's Prüfung der Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons.* Erster Band. Erste Hälfte. Von Theo. Zahn. Pp. 37. Pf. 60. *Anonymous Adversus Aleatores* (gegen das Hazardspiel), und *die Briefe an Cyprian, Lucian, Clerinus und an den Karthaginiensischen Klerus* (Cypr. Epist. 8. 21-24). Kritisch verbessert, erläutert und ins Deutsche übersetzt von Dr. Adam Miodouski. Mit einem Vorworte von Prof. Eduard Wölfflin. Pp. 128. Erlangen und Leipzig: Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf. (Georg Böhme). Mrk. 1.80. — In this second part of his work Professor Zahn pursues the same cautious, scholarly course which we have noticed in the first part. While there is a careful exclusion of all dogmatic and semi-visionary inference, all questions relevant to an understanding of canonical history are, in their places, thoroughly discussed. We notice in the present volume a full treatment of the use and authority of the apostolic writings in the doctrines of the church and of the heretics about the middle of the second century, pp. 453-796, and also the origin of the first collections, pp. 797-968. In the above noticed pamphlet Dr. Zahn takes occasion to reply to certain strictures imposed upon his first volume by Dr. Harnack, whose polemic followed as closely as thunder upon lightning, so closely, Dr. Zahn remarks, that one may suppose the lightning struck somewhere. Taking a pretty large territory as the domain of Christian discussion, it is not at all clear that Professor Harnack's basis of supplies lies wholly within this field. Nevertheless, the majority of the differences which we have observed have in the main, like the thunder and lightning, their origin and end in the clouds. Dr. Miodouski investigates anew the anonymous polemic against gambling which Dr. Harnack has attributed to the Roman Bishop Victor I. of the second century. It is strongly argued that neither a Roman nor a Bishop nor the second century had anything to do with this writing, but that its date of composition was the third century, and its author, perhaps an African, unknown. Dr. Zahn supposes the author "a Roman Bishop of the third century, whose name we do not know." Professor Funk places the homily in the second half of the third century. Professor Wölfflin thinks the author learned his Latin from Cyprian, and patterned him; while others still regard Cyprian as the veritable author of the tract. The work is a very excellent and well-conducted study.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

FRIEDRICHRODA i. Thür.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago.
 Asa Turner. A Home Missionary Patriarch and his Times. By George F. Magoun, D. D., First President of Iowa College. Introduction by A. H. Clapp, D. D. Pp. 345. \$1.75; — Notes on Difficult Passages of the New Testament. By Elias Riggs, D. D., LL. D., Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. Pp. 259. \$1.25; — The Childhood of Jesus, and other Sermons. By Adolphe Monod. Translated by Rev. J. H. Myers. Pp. 196. Paper 40 cents; cloth, 60 cents.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. American Religious Leaders. Jonathan Edwards. By Alexander V. G. Allen, D. D., Professor in the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Mass. Pp. xi, 401. 1889. \$1.25; — American Statesmen. Benjamin Franklin. By John T. Morse, Jr., author of "Life of John Adams," "Life of John Quincy Adams," "Life of Thomas Jefferson," etc. Pp. vi, 420. 1889. \$1.25.

Ginn & Company, Boston and London. College Series of Greek Authors. Edited under the supervision of John Williams White and Thomas D. Seymour. Euripides, Iphigenia among the Taurians. Edited by Isaac Flagg. Pp. 197. 1889. Mailing price, \$1.50; — Library of Anglo-Saxon Poetry. Vol. III. Elene, An Old English Poem. Edited, with Introduction, Latin Original, Notes, and Complete Glossary, by Charles W. Kent, M. A. (*U. of Va.*), Ph. D. (*Leipzic*), Professor of English and Modern Languages in the University of Tennessee. Pp. vi, 149. 1889. Mailing price, 65 cents; — Elene; Judith; Athelstan, or the Fight at Brunanburh, and Byrhtnoth, or the Fight at Maldon: Anglo-Saxon Poems. Translated by James M. Garnett, M. A., LL. D., Professor of the English Language and Literature in the University of Virginia, translator of "Beowulf." Pp. xvi, 69. 1889. Mailing price, \$1.00; — The Irregular Verbs of Attic Prose, their Forms, Prominent Meanings, and Important Compounds; together with Lists of Related Words and English Derivatives. By Addison Hogue, Professor of Greek in the University of Mississippi. Pp. xii, 268. 1889. Mailing price \$1.60; — Les Trois Mousquetaires. Par Alexandre Dumas. Edited and annotated, for use in Colleges and Schools, by F. C. Sumichrast, Assistant Professor of French in Harvard University. Pp. vi, 289. 1889. 80 cents.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. Systematic Theology. A Compendium and Commonplace-Book, designed for the use of Theological Students. By Augustus Hopkins Strong, D. D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Pp. xxiii, 760. 1889. \$5.00; — The Expositor's Bible. The Book of Revelation. By William Milligan, D. D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Aberdeen; author of "The Resurrection of our Lord," etc. Pp. viii, 392. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston; — The Epistles of St. John. Twenty-one Discourses, with Greek Text, Comparative Versions and Notes, chiefly Exegetical. By William Alexander, D. D., D. C. L., Brasenose College, Oxford, Lord Bishop of Derry and Raphoe. Pp. xiv, 309. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston; — The Sermon Bible. Vol. III. Psalm lxxvii. to Song of Solomon. Pp. 476. 1889. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston.

Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., New York and Boston. Impressions of Russia. By Dr. Georg Brandes, author of "Eminent Authors of the Nineteenth Century." Translated from the Danish by Samuel C. Eastman. Pp. x, 353; — War and Peace. By Count Lyof N. Tolstoi. From the Russian by Nathan Haskell Dole. Authorized Translation, in four volumes. Vol. 1, pp. v, 359. Vol. 2, pp. 392. Vol. 3, pp. 424. Vol. 4, pp. 405.

Thomas Whittaker, New York. American Episcopacy. By S. D. McConnell, D. D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia. 15 cents.

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
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THE
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WHAT IS REALITY?

PART V. FROM THE MICROCOSM TO THE UNIVERSE.

FOR illustration's sake, let us suppose a mariner of ancient times to have been carried, by stress of weather, to a remote land, which had once been the home of a cultivated but now extinct people; and further, that in this deserted land he has discovered various objects, the uses of which are not at once apparent. One of these is a globe. To his mind, dreaming still of the earth as a vast extended plain, this seems nothing more than a toy. But his curiosity is aroused by the oddity of its ornamentation; and all at once it occurs to him that parts of it have a resemblance to the mental picture of land and sea that he, as a navigator, has formed for himself.

Further examination discloses additional coincidences. But after a time the resemblances are exhausted, and there remains much that exceeds and much also that contradicts his experience. In view of this, three suppositions occur to him. It may be that the resemblances are purely accidental, and that his own fancy has helped them out, making them appear to be more important than they actually are. Or, secondly, it may be that the decorator knew something of the surface of the earth, and that having amused himself with this knowledge as far as it went, he extended his sketch in a purely imaginative way. Or, thirdly, perhaps the maker of the globe knew, not simply as much, but much more than its present possessor; and, perhaps, therefore, this seeming toy may be treated as a reliable model of the earth.

As this last hypothesis is the only one that can lead to any-

thing, we will suppose not simply that our navigator commits himself to it, but that he devotes his life to the verification of it. His limited means admit of his doing this only in a very imperfect and partial way. He cannot circumnavigate the globe; but he treasures every bit of knowledge he can get: he collects the accounts given by other navigators and compares them with his own experience; he brings together all the vague guesses of astronomers and philosophers about the shape of the earth; and thus, by putting this and that together, he arrives at a settled conviction that his hypothesis is correct, though there are many things about it that he can neither verify nor understand. He is obliged, we will say, to end his days without being able to form any satisfactory conjecture as to *how* it is possible that the earth should exist as a sphere. But, for all that, his unwavering faith in his model has guided him truly, and enabled him to reach satisfactory and valuable results in many directions.

Now, when a philosopher makes the hypothesis that the little world of which man is the centre is a true and reliable guide to a conception of the relations sustained by the universe to its centre, he acts upon the same principle as our supposed navigator.

Let us imagine a philosopher who has become as deeply imbued with the realistic prejudices of the present age as the old-time navigator was with the geographical prejudices of his. He has, we will say, given himself wholly to the study of science. He has followed with enthusiasm its progressive conquests. He has been completely won over to its method, as he has traced the steps by which one principle after another has been, first, guessed at, then proximately verified, then simplified, then adopted into a larger generalization. He sees, moreover, that by faithful adherence to its methods, science has obtained such a grasp on the working principles of the world that it has accurately prophesied events while they were still far away in the future. In view of all these achievements he is filled not only with a profound respect for these methods, but also with a feeling of restful confidence in the results to which they lead. Here, he assures himself, is something certain, something proved, something real. In this I have a foundation on which to build a philosophy.

There is nothing to interrupt this impression of finality, this feeling of perfect satisfaction, so long as his attention is confined solely to the agreements of science. But there comes a reaction. For, as a philosopher, he must find a *meaning* in the world; and somehow, the meaning has wonderfully faded out of that which

formerly was replete with significance. Turn wheresoe'er he may, by night or day, the things which he has seen he now can see no more. Intelligence, purpose, morality, have become shadows and illusions. He can find no foundation in his philosophy for poetry or for religion. He lives in a world of atoms and forces. Units of mass and units of motion, in an endless round of action and reaction, chase each other through his imagination. If he concentrates his attention upon the atom for the determination of the secret of being, he seems to himself like one shut up in an absolutely dark cell. Or, if he tries to contemplate the world as the outcome of an aggregate of homogeneous units in motion, he is revealed to himself as the intelligent centre of an unintelligent universe. He has a boundless prospect, but it is that of an illimitable desert. As a philosopher, again, he demands efficiency. There is nothing in all this unintelligent, undifferentiated immensity for a world of variety and order to rise from. All the efforts of philosophers to deduce the forms and qualities of concrete things from homogeneous atoms and forces are seen to have been as ineffectual as the dreams of perpetual motion.

He reflects, further, that the great object of philosophy is to discover a concept that shall be all-comprehensive, to grasp a central principle which shall enable us to think of the universe as a great organic whole. But in his world of atoms and forces he finds no such principle. Whence, he asks himself, comes this conviction that the world *is* a unity, that it *has* a central, controlling principle? and whence the craving of philosophy to apprehend the totality of things after such a fashion? Must it not be possible to trace this conviction and this craving to some experience, some actually known whole, dependent upon an efficient central principle, like that demanded for the universe? Such a principle if it exists in experience ought to be found at the other extreme of the scale of being from that in which science has landed him. Yet he cannot find it in the camp of idealism; for this philosophy is as clearly the product of abstraction as the one he has had to abandon. He is looking for the antithesis of all abstractions. Nothing less than the fullest, most highly-organized form of existence can serve his philosophic need.

In this strait, an old-time word occurs to him — the *microcosm*. Not the ego, in the seclusion of self-consciousness, — but man the soul and body, man the centre of a little world of which he is the life, the light, and the creator. May not this afford the clew that he is seeking? In this little world he finds the most complete

contrast to the world of atoms and forces. There he could discover no centre of causation, but an endless chain of sequences proceeding from nowhere, and tending no whither. Each link of the chain of nature, even in its most complex manifestations, appeared as the equal of every other link in importance and significance. There was an infinitely varied play of forces, endless transformations of groups, and nothing more. But the moment these forces of nature enter the kingdom of man all is changed. The valueless becomes valuable. The aimless is made to serve a definite end. Instead of following each other in a meaningless round, they are disciplined and guided; they become the vehicles of man's thought and the instruments of his will.

He passes in review the constructive work of man in its various departments, — each one of them a marvel of achievement. Personating the race, he sees himself surrounded by a most extensive and wonderful world of adaptations, every ray of which converges to him as its originating source and sustaining centre. Withdrawing into his own personality, he knows himself as the creator and centre of a less extended but no less real world. This, certainly, is no dream of the imagination. This is reality, if anything is real; for in this world he lives and plans and executes designs. Is it not, in fact, the very reality that he is seeking? Does not this picture of the little world of man, more or less clearly defined in the consciousness of every individual of the race, declare itself as the unmistakable origin of the conviction that the aggregate of things is a unity, and that it is governed by one central principle? And, if this is the *origin* of the conviction, is it not here also that he should seek for its justification? Is it not reasonable to believe that the world of which the individual is the centre is a diminutive model of the great universe? — that the knowledge that comes through self-consciousness offers to man his one, and only opportunity of penetrating below the surface to the inmost reality of things? And may he not, therefore, venture to use the microcosm as a guide to a knowledge of the world, as a student of geography uses a globe to obtain a conception of the earth?

There are many difficulties about such an hypothesis, and through these he must patiently and candidly think his way. But first of all he asks himself as to the rationality of his proceeding as a whole. Suppose he does find many resemblances between the microcosm and the universe, is this in itself a reason

for believing that the inner principle of the one is also the inner principle of the other? The hypothesis that he has made is not a new one. It is the well-worn one of poetry and religion. He has, it is true, reached it in a different way. He has not instinctively taken it for granted. He has not claimed for it the authority of an inspired revelation. He has rather been driven into it by a process of exclusion from all other hypothetical interpretations of the world. But, however he has come by it, he is obliged to recognize it as a view of things that has had much contempt poured upon it. Under the name of anthropomorphism, it has been pronounced to be the antithesis of scientific method. Is it possible to rescue his hypothesis from such imputations by finding for it a truly scientific basis?

It certainly ought to be; for if it is ever scientific to hold that a knowledge of one particular group of organized phenomena furnishes a clew to the nature of another group of phenomena existing on a higher scale, it ought to be possible to refer such a belief to some general principle. We ought to be able to say that experience has demonstrated the fact that the universe is, to some extent at least, a series of repetitions, so that an intimate knowledge of any one organized part of it is, within certain limits, a true guide to the interpretation of other parts of it, and progressively to every part of it. This certainly is assumed by science; and every step in its advance is a witness to the truth of the assumption.

Up to a certain point the work of science consists in observation, in prying research for the collection of a great number of facts; then comes the work of comparison and classification; then the work of conjecture, in which the imagination has free play; then the process of exclusion, in the course of which many of the suggestions of fancy are set aside as unworthy of attention; then the process of verification for the proof of the surviving conjecture. We are at present interested in that stage of the progress that relates to the formation of hypotheses.

The scientific imagination, though free within certain limits, is not without guidance, and its chief guide is analogy. Having ascertained a principle of limited range, it expands this, by means of the imagination, till the same principle is capable of including a very much wider class of phenomena. Every time it repeats this process it acts on the assumption that the world is a series of modified repetitions; and every time an hypothesis so made is

verified the correctness of this assumption receives an additional proof. The results of science thus present us with what has been appropriately called a "hierarchy of principles." Each partial generalization foreshadows a higher one in which it is sooner or later seen to be comprehended. And what is true of principles is equally true of groups of phenomena. The whole science of classification depends upon the fact of repetition with modification, on different scales.

Very recent discoveries have disclosed the existence of such orderly arrangements on different planes where we should least have suspected its existence. Chemistry, as we know, has been arrested in its all-dissolving progress by certain elements that defy all attempts at analysis, — elements that have, therefore, to be treated as final, absolutely dissimilar substances. Here, if anywhere, we should anticipate that the above-mentioned rule would fail us. But the very remarkable discovery has recently been made, almost simultaneously by a Russian and a German chemist, that these elements are capable of being classified in successive series.

The following very brief and clear statement of this is given by Professor Huxley: "If the sixty-five or sixty-eight recognized elements are arranged in the order of their atomic weights, the series does not exhibit one continuous progressive modification in the physical and chemical characters of its several terms, but breaks up into a number of sections, in each of which the several terms present analogies with the corresponding terms of the other series. Thus the whole series does not run

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, etc. ;

but

a, b, c, d, A, B, C, D, α , β , γ , δ , etc.,

so that it is said to express a *periodic law* of recurrent similarities. Or the relation may be expressed in another way. In each section of the series the atomic weight is greater than in the preceding section; so that if w is the atomic weight of any element in the first segment, $w + x$ will represent the atomic weight of any element in the next, and $w + x + y$ the atomic weight of any element in the next, and so on. Therefore the sections may be represented as parallel series, the corresponding terms of which have analogous properties; each successive series starting with a body the atomic weight of which is greater than that of any in the preceding series, in the following fashion: —

d	D	δ
c	C	γ
b	B	β
a	A	α
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
w	W + X	w + x + y

This is a conception with which biologists are very familiar, animal and plant groups constantly appearing as series of parallel modifications of similar and yet different primary forms.”¹

The discovery of this order led the Russian chemist Mendelejeff to indicate the existence of other elements not hitherto recognized. When he first ranged the known elements in a tabular form he found that a perfectly symmetrical arrangement left, here and there, vacant spaces. He called attention to these gaps, and ventured, not only to prophesy that elements then unknown would be found to fill them, but even went so far as to describe in detail what these undiscovered elements would probably be like. Only a few years elapsed before all the elements thus described were discovered, — the last one about three years ago.

This is only one of the most recent of the marvelous achievements of science, reached by faith in the principle that the universe is a system of orderly repetitions with variations. Other illustrations of the principle, having a closer relation to our problem, will easily occur to the reader. If we wish to find an analogy for the assumption involved in our hypothesis, that the exceedingly limited may reveal the nature of that which is inexpressibly extended, we have only to call to mind the great law of Newton, — that every particle of matter in the universe is related to every other particle, as each of the planets is related to the other heavenly bodies. Following out this law in connection with the atomic theory, we attain to that astounding conception for which science has no rebuke, that a molecule may be a solar system in miniature. Alluding to such a conception, Professor J. P. Cooke says: “A theory which assumes that within the masses of material bodies the motions of suns and systems are reproduced on a scale so minute as to task our power of imagination to grasp the conception, is found to be in complete accordance with all the facts which can be observed.”²

But there is another aspect of our hypothesis that needs illustration. The extreme simplicity of the relations above instanced

¹ *The Advance of Science in the Last Half-Century*, p. 56.

² *The Credentials of Science the Warrant of Faith*, p. 265.

may seem to separate them, by a wide difference, from the relations postulated for the interpretation of the inner reality of things. The relations sustained by the human mind to its environment are so complex, so heterogeneous, so hard to be harmonized among themselves, that the thought of using them as a guide to a more extended field of knowledge may well appear extravagant. But even here we are not without a precedent in the methods of science.

The marvel of marvels in nature for complexity and condensation is the egg. The globe of our supposed navigator, though the most elaborate one ever made, is to this epitome of nature's processes as a flint implement to the most delicately constructed mechanism. For in it, by the aid of the microscope, we may trace the whole process of the creation of a higher animal. First, we have the germ, a nucleated cell. This becomes two by a division of itself and by growth. By a repetition of this process it becomes a multitude. The egg then comes to us as an aggregate of homogeneous cells, capable of being still further multiplied and, at the same time, modified into a great variety of classes, having different forms and functions. By these as by a trained army of artisans, each knowing just where to go and what to do, the living organism, that in its unity we call a being, is built up.

Now, in this wonderful process, modern science believes that it has discovered the true key to the history of the development of the whole world of animate and inanimate forms. At the beginning of this book on evolution, Dr. Joseph Le Conte says: "Every one is familiar with the main facts connected with the development of an egg. . . . Now this process is evolution. It is more—it is the type of all evolution. It is that from which we get our idea of evolution, and without which there would be no such word." As to the importance of the principle thus made known to us, the same writer says: "The process pervades the whole universe, and the doctrine concerns alike every department of science,—yea, every department of human thought. It is literally one half of all science." And, as to its certainty, he says: "The law of evolution is as certain as the law of gravitation. Nay, it is far more certain."

Now let us see to what extent this important principle, suggested by the egg, rests upon analogy. It has been reached, we may affirm, by the comparison of three separate series of forms found in nature. First we have the *taxonomic* series. This is

the result of classifying the contemporary forms of animal life on a scale of relative complexity. Beginning with a unicellular organism we advance step by step till we reach the higher animals, made up of innumerable cells having a great variety of forms, functions, and relations. The members of this series are not a succession of stages proceeding directly one from the other, but a series of completed independent existences living alongside of each other.

The second series is the *phylogenetic* or geological series. This seems to be the history in time of the former. It shows that the simplest organisms came into being first, then those somewhat less simple, and then successively those which were more and more complex. The members of this series do not appear to be genetically related to each other, any more than those of the first series, but the arrangement of their succession in time gives us the idea of a progressive creation. But now we come to the third, the *ontogenetic* or egg series. For the purpose of comparison, the process that takes place in the egg is marked off into a succession of stages; and the relations which these stages sustain to each other seem to reveal in a wonderful manner the secret of the other two series. Like the taxonomic series, it begins with a single cell, and then, by the gradual multiplication and differentiation of cells, it reaches that unified complex of organs, a higher animal. In this series all the members *are* genetically related, that is, they are stages of being that proceed directly the one from the other.

This seems to explain the geological or historical series, because its members are similarly related to each other, both in the order of time and in the order of complexity. And it seems to explain the classification series, and to unite this with the historical, by showing how a series that has been progressive in time may in its results present the aspect of an aggregate of unprogressive fixed forms. For the egg series, although progressive, gives rise all along its course to forms that remain as immovably fixed as the different species of animals that we see around us. Different classes of cells, as we have seen, are evolved; and although some of these give rise to new classes, some of them remain to represent the particular phase of the organism that they introduced. The same is true of organized groups of cells. There is a continual branching and rebranching. But in the completed organism the various stages of differentiation continue to be more or less perfectly represented by classifiable cells and groups of cells.

More remarkable still do these coincidences appear when it is further observed that the earlier stages of the egg series of a higher animal bear a striking resemblance to the more mature stages of lower animals. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by a comparison of the successive embryonic stages of the human brain with the mature brain of animals lower in the scale. The first observable form of the human brain is less elaborate than that of the ordinary fish. In the next stage it resembles that of a fish; then, by the relative increase of the cerebrum, it reaches the reptilian stage; by continued growth, it partly covers the optic lobes and resembles the brain of a bird; then it wholly covers the optic lobes, and, partially overspreading the cerebellum and the olfactory lobes, may be called a mammalian brain; and finally, it covers and overhangs all and becomes a human brain. In view of these facts Dr. Le Conte sums up the argument for evolution as follows:—

“Now why should this peculiar order be observed in the building of the individual brain? We find the answer, the only conceivable scientific answer to this question, in the fact that *this is the order of the building of the vertebrate brain by evolution throughout geological history*. We have already seen that fishes were the only vertebrates living in Devonian times. The first form of brain, therefore, was that characteristic of that class. Then reptiles were introduced; then birds and marsupials; then true mammals; and lastly, man. The different styles of brains characteristic of these classes were, therefore, successively made by evolution from earlier and simpler forms. In phylogeny this order was observed because these successive forms were necessary for perfect adaptation to the environment at each step. In taxonomy we find the same order, because, as already explained, every stage in advance in phylogeny is still represented in existing forms. In ontogeny we have still the same order, because ancestral characteristics are inherited, and family history recapitulated in the individual history.”¹

When presented in this form, the reasoning that connects the egg series with the other two does not at first sight seem to rest altogether upon analogy. But a close inspection of the argument will, I think, convince us that it has very little else to support it. The order of the thought seems to be this: First, we compare the three series and find a close resemblance in the succession of their stages. Second, knowing that the stages in the egg series

¹ *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*, p. 150.

are genetically related to each other, we *infer* that those of the geological series are similarly related. Third, by a reflex argument, we infer that the *reason why* the members of the egg series are genetically related is found in the fact that those of the geological series were *previously* so related. Now, aside from analogy, what support do we get for the first inference?

If investigation showed that similar conditions affected the two series we could at once establish our inference on the principle that like causes produce like effects. But this is not the case. The conditions in the one case have no resemblance to the conditions in the other; at least, they have no resemblance to the conditions that are adduced as the chief cause of the original order. Conflict with and adaptation to environment are said to have originated the race series. But the environment of the individual embryo is in every respect unlike that of the unprotected, militant organism. In reasoning from the egg series to the geological, therefore, we have nothing to go upon but analogy, that is, a similarity of order existing under external circumstances that are in every way dissimilar.

Let us examine the second step. Having, on the strength of analogy, made the hypothesis that the members of the geological series are genetically related, how can we, on the basis of this hypothesis, scientifically deduce the phenomena of the egg series from it? It is said that the principle of heredity supplies us with the means of making such a deduction. But let us further ask to what extent does the principle of heredity, as thus applied, rest upon inference from analogy? The answer must be, *almost entirely*. We know nothing about the principle of heredity, as related to the remote past, except inferentially and analogically. So far as direct knowledge of the law of heredity is concerned, it remains such a mystery, from beginning to end, as to make the exclusion of almost any hypothesis with regard to its action impossible. But the same ignorance of its laws makes it impossible to deduce results with any certainty from it. The analogies under discussion have contributed many suggestions about the law of heredity. But *from* the law of heredity, independently of these analogies, we get very little assistance.

The elder Agassiz, who did so much to prepare the way for the evolution hypothesis, brought together and classified the materials in all three of the above-mentioned series, and, moreover, made it the great work of his life to demonstrate the close relationship in which they stood to each other. He even went so far as to affirm

that the observed repetitions were such as to render the embryonic series a true key to classification in the other two. But he did not advance to the position that species are derived from each other by natural descent, because there was nothing in the known principles of heredity to compel such an inference. The connection between the three series was, for him, one that had its origin and reason in the mind of the Creator. There was a uniformity of plan and method, but not an interdependence between the series, or a derivation of one from the other.

In short, it seems to me unquestionable that, in so far as the modern theory of evolution gains support from embryology, it is indebted entirely to analogical relations existing on widely different scales, and under circumstances that seem to be wholly unlike each other. I am not, be it understood, attempting to disparage the argument thus derived. I wish only to show how much influence analogy has in determining our beliefs; and to what an extent the most complex relations may be employed as a key to the understanding of other complex relations from which they are very widely separated. Nor, on the other hand, am I trying to make it appear that the analogical argument is the only one to which the hypothesis of evolution refers for support. When once the hint of a genealogical relationship between species had been furnished by the egg series, scientific research busied itself to find corroborations of this hint in other and widely different relations of things; and although this research failed to discover much that it expected to find, and found in many cases that which seemed, at first sight, the contradiction of the hypothesis it was trying to verify, yet so many and weighty were the converging evidences in its favor that evolution was tentatively established.

Now let us return to our own hypothesis that the conscious relations which man sustains to his environment furnish us with a key for the interpretation of the inner reality of the universe,—a key that becomes more and more useful as science discloses more fully the nature of our environment. Let us observe, in the first place, that we actually *do* use these relations, known only to self-consciousness, for the interpretation of the inner reality of a very considerable and very important part of the world, and that experience indorses this use.

Probably no statement with regard to the realities of the external world would be generally considered safer than that which affirms that the individual is surrounded by a multitude of living, thinking, energizing beings like himself; and probably no kind

of knowledge would, at first sight, seem to us more *direct* than that which we have of the friends and neighbors with whom we are daily brought in contact. But reflection shows us that all the knowledge of others that we possess is grounded upon analogy, that is, upon a never-ending succession of analogies. Not that our knowledge of persons is peculiar in this respect. All our connected comprehension of the world is attained in the same way. Every new object presented to sense, and every new idea presented to thought, must, to use Mr. G. H. Lewes's expression, "be *soluble in old experiences*, be recognized as like them, otherwise it will be unperceived, uncomprehended. A conception which is novel, or largely novel, is unintelligible even to the acutest intellect; it must be prepared for, *pre-conceived*; and by the exhibition of its points of similarity and attachment with familiar conceptions, its congruity with these may become the ground of its acceptance."¹ Our beliefs with regard to the nature of what we call inanimate things are gained by comparing inanimate things with each other; those that concern living things are reached by comparing living things with each other; and those that have respect to conscious beings come by comparing conscious beings with each other.

Except for our own self-consciousness we could know nothing whatever of self-consciousness or intelligence in other beings; and our progressive knowledge of them is attained, first, by a series of analogical assumptions or hypotheses, which may properly be described as prejudices; and, second, by the verification or correction of these by farther experience. That this process is, to a great degree, an unconscious one, makes no difference as to its nature. When systematically carried out, its method is identical with that by which all scientific truths are attained. Certain general conclusions with regard to mankind result from it. First, that all members of the human race are like ourselves, and like each other; second, that no two members of the race are like each other; and, third, that the least developed can attain only to a very limited and imperfect knowledge of the most developed.

In other words, experience indorses our use of self-knowledge as the ground of interpretation for conscious beings widely separated from us, but at the same time lays upon us the necessity of wide blank spaces in our conception, to be filled up tentatively by the imagination. The more closely connected two persons are by birth, training, and temperament, the fewer the blank spaces, the

¹ *Mind as a Function of the Organism*, sec. 77.

more complete and reliable the conception formed. Yet those who are most widely separated find, in virtue of their common humanity, grounds for a fairly probable judgment of character.

But this is only the beginning of the analogical use to which we put our inner knowledge of self. All our interpretation of the motives of the lower animals proceeds upon the same principle as our interpretation of men. In our critical moments we may be inclined to deny that a shepherd-dog has any community of nature with man. But in the synthetical, practical judgments of his shepherd-master he figures as a slightly modified human being. I think we may affirm that our success in dealing with the more intelligent animals depends upon the faithfulness and discrimination with which we apply this self-derived analogy. "Put yourself in his place" is, within certain limits, as good a maxim for the regulation of our conduct toward a horse as toward a man. From the more intelligent animals we descend, by regular gradations, till we reach those that are lowest in the scale of organization. The structure of the apparently brainless ant, with its plurality of coördinate nerve centres, seems at far too great a remove from the human organism to afford the slightest ground for a trustworthy analogy. But when we study its adaptations and modifications of means to ends, we are, in spite of our knowledge of structure, convinced that ants not only have intelligence, but that they have an amazing amount of it. And when we drop still lower to contemplate the behavior of the apparently structureless amoeba in search of its food, we cannot refrain from applying the same analogy for the interpretation of what we behold.

Now, then, if we may successfully reason analogically from one form of life to another on a descending scale, why not, with equally good results, on an ascending scale? On the one hand we are under the necessity of continually diminishing the conception of mind with which we set out, and on the other we have to expand this conception. In the one case the imagination has to supply limitations, and in the other it has to exert itself to remove them.

An objection which readily suggests itself to the ascending application of our analogy may, at first sight, seem to be conclusive. Man is the most highly organized being of whom we have any direct knowledge. He represents the limit of organization. The swarm of lower animals, in the midst of their diversity, present some resemblance to man. Even the microscopic, structureless

rhizopod is of the same substance (protoplasm) that in man supports consciousness. When, therefore, we try to understand these lower orders by reference to ourselves we have a verifiable community of substance to support us; but when we try to carry the analogy higher we have nothing whatever but fancy to build upon. The following expression is given to this criticism by Mr. G. H. Lewes: "The universe assuredly exists, but it does not live; its existence can only be identified with life, such as we observe in organisms, by a complete obliteration of the specialty which the term *life* is meant to designate. Yet many have not only pleased themselves with such a conception, but have conceived the universe to be an organism fashioned, directed, and sustained by a soul like that of man,—the *anima mundi*. This is to violate all scientific canons. The life of a plant-organism is not the same as the life of an animal-organism; the life of an animal-organism is not the same as the life of a human-organism; nor can the life of a human-organism be the same as the life of the world-organism."¹

It is difficult to answer the charge that the hypothesis of an *anima mundi* violates all scientific canons; for where no particular offense is specified, one is at a loss how to begin. But we will do our best to defend the positive view, and show that the hypothesis in question is in perfect accord with scientific procedure. Let us remember, in the first place, that science has demonstrated to us that the physical basis of mind is the same as the physical basis of the universe, that the various forms of energy in the world are interchangeable. The great mystery is that any form of that which we call matter or force can support consciousness or intelligence. Experience, however, teaches us that a particular combination called protoplasm does support mental activity. But is it scientific, or unscientific, to draw from this fact the conclusion that without protoplasm there can be no consciousness?

In every advance of science we have to postulate something that is different from experience. We do not get on by reasoning from identities to identities. All we can scientifically affirm is that the one series or order of conscious beings with which we are acquainted is protoplasmic. But as Dr. Cope very truly says: "We are not necessarily bound to the hypothesis that protoplasm is the *only* substance capable of supporting consciousness, but to the opposite view, that the probabilities are in favor of other and

¹ *The Physical Basis of Mind*, sec. 9.

unspecialized, but unknown, forms of matter, possessing this capacity."¹ Nor need we, as Dr. Cope does, refer this possibility to other planets. We may postulate another series or order of beings that repeats the phenomena of consciousness on a different scale and therefore under different circumstances. Where we find such a similarity of results as appears in comparing the operations of man with the operations of nature, it is reasonable and it is scientific to assume hypothetically the presence, in both cases, of a similar cause, operating under different conditions.

It is unquestionably true, as Mr. Lewes says, that the life of an animal-organism is not the *same* as the life of a human-organism, and that this last is not the same as the life of the world-organism; but it does not follow that we violate any scientific canon by using the one for the interpretation of the other. Science invariably prosecutes its physical quests by the use of imperfect analogies. The atomic theory is the foundation of chemistry and physics. But what is the atom? It is a purely hypothetical entity, conceived of in the first instance by means of a very crude analogy. It is imagined as an infinitesimal particle of matter, with most of the known qualities of matter thought out of it. In fact, there is no quality of matter that in some of its relations does not have to be denied of the atom; and yet, by the use of this concept, science has accomplished great things. The general truth to which this points is thus expressed by Stallo: "The steps to scientific as well as to other knowledge consists in a series of logical fictions which are as legitimate as they are indispensable in the operations of thought, but whose relations to the phenomena whereof they are the *partial* and not unfrequently *merely symbolical* representations must never be lost sight of."²

This may seem to be surrendering all our claim to the reality of the results to which our method brings us; but it is not. By the use of such symbols we reach a knowledge of *relations* which is absolutely certain. Professor J. P. Cooke thus states the case with regard to the atomic theory: "Our atoms may be mere fancies, I admit, but like the magnitudes we call waves of light, the magnitudes we have measured and called atoms must be magnitudes of something, however greatly our conceptions in regard to that something may change. Our whole atomic theory may pass, the words molecule and atom may be forgotten; but it will never cease to be true that the magnitude which we now call a molecule

¹ *The Origin of the Fittest*, p. 417.

² *Concepts of Modern Physics*, p. 296.

of water consists of two of the magnitudes which, in the year 1872, were called atoms of hydrogen, and of one of the magnitudes which, at the same period, were called atoms of oxygen.”¹

The same writer, in another connection, says of the undulatory theory of light: “There cannot be a question that the values obtained are real magnitudes, . . . the definiteness of the results gives us the strongest assurance that our theories contain an element of truth, although the truth may be *clothed* with much error.” But of this same theory he affirms that it “demands postulates which even the wildest imagination cannot reconcile with common-sense.”²

Now let us remember that the great object of our inquiry with regard to the Supreme Being — the object which removes it from the category of aimless speculation — is the ascertainment of the *relations* which such a being sustains to the world of which we are a part; and the *relations* which we as rational moral beings sustain to him. And, as the value of any scientific hypothesis is measured by the degree to which it can be depended upon in practice, so the ultimate test of the value of our conceptions of God must always be the appeal to life. We cannot for a moment think that our humanly formed ideas of Him are anything more than symbols. They cannot give a complete knowledge of Him, but only certain aspects of his being and character, certain relations which he sustains to us, — relations of which our experience is, for all practical purposes, a sufficient measure.

But we are not on this account to jump to the conclusion that the symbols are to be despised. They are, to invert the order of Stallo's expression, as *indispensable* as they are legitimate. We cannot move a step without them. Take them away and there is no reality left. There cannot be relations without things to be related; and in all such cases, where the hypothetical reality leads to the discovery of verifiable relations, we know for a certainty that our conception of this postulated thing or being is true in some very important respects. We cannot substitute at random any other symbols for those that have been thus verified. At any given time they constitute the nearest possible approach to reality. It is none the less true, however, that they are open to modification, that they have reached their position through the instrumentality of other less perfect symbols, and

¹ *The New Chemistry*, p. 239.

² *The Credentials of Science*, p. 220.

that there is every reason to believe in a continuance of the process to which they owe their existence.

Our thought, like our life, is a moving equilibrium ; and the same practical problem confronts us in every department of it namely, to hold firmly our faith in that which has been established by experience, while keeping our minds open for the reception and assimilation of those new aspects of reality that further experience is sure to bring. In politics, in social adjustments, in the natural sciences, in religion, it is the same. Without stability, we cannot prosper in any of these ; but it must be the stability of a growing organism, not that of a stone.

Let this suffice for a general setting forth of the legitimacy and value of the analogical method. We must now turn to a defense of that particular application of it that we have, as it were, drifted into. At the close of the fourth number of this series we said that the basis of our analogy would be the complex ego of experience, — “ the ego, plus *all* the relations that it sustains to other objects.” And already, by way of illustration, we have applied our method in the use of one particular class of relations, — those, namely, which the mind of man sustains to the physical organism which is at the same time the vehicle and the expression of his personality. It will probably have occurred to the reader that the use of this particular set of relations, if it can be justified, renders unnecessary, or even impossible, the use of any other. The relations which the ego sustains to the living tissues of the body and to its various organs and faculties seem to have very little in common with the relations that it sustains to other intelligent beings ; and when we come to the relations which exist between it and inanimate things, the difference appears to be radical and quite irreconcilable.

If, therefore, we attach ourselves to the first for a conception of the relations that the Supreme Being sustains to the universe, does not this choice absolutely exclude the use of the other two sets of relations, which we must regard as equally real ? And have we, it may be further asked, been guided to this choice by anything more than a caprice ? The view which it opens before us is not one with which we have been made familiar by traditional thought ; it is, in many respects, the antithesis of that thought. The quality of externality that characterizes the relations that we sustain to inanimate things has characterized also the time-honored conception of the relations that the Supreme Being sustains to the world as a creator ; and the relations existing

between human individuals have formed and dominated all our thought of God as a moral governor. Our religious beliefs have become identified with these methods of conception; and these symbols are so interwoven with our religious experience as to have become their very framework and support. How, then, without traversing principles laid down in this very article, are we to substitute other symbols for those that have been so thoroughly indorsed, as to their validity, by use?

These questions we shall try to answer in succeeding articles.

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THE NEW PRISON LAW OF NEW YORK.

THE situation which confronted the New York Legislature of 1889 was the culmination of a long-standing hostility of the labor organizations to convict labor. From the workingman's point of view, the one thing necessary is to get work. For any one to be long out of work is, to him, fatal. The amount of work needed to supply the markets appears to be a fixed quantity, not enough, at best, to go around. Many workingmen must be out of work, by turns, all the time. Manufacturing done by prisoners appears to be so much work taken from the fixed quantity, already insufficient for citizen laborers. If either must suffer from idleness it should be the criminals in the prisons, and not the honest laborers outside. The argument is plausible, and appears to fit the facts, especially to men accustomed to deal with hard facts rather than with hard arguments. To see its fallacy one must look beyond the surface of things. The demagogue has an easy advantage in the argument.

It is not strange, therefore, that with the entrance of the workingman into politics, convict labor became one of his leading grievances. But the abolition of convict labor altogether, however desirable it might appear, or however logically it might follow from the argument, was at first too novel and radical a proposition to be seriously proposed as a practical measure. The opposition to prison labor took the form of opposition to the particular system of prison labor then prevailing, known as the contract system. By the contract system, the contractor hires the time of prisoners, at a certain price per day or other period, to work upon the machinery or materials which he places inside the prison.

The contractor, or his agent, enters the prison to superintend and direct the labor of the prisoners, and is in many ways tempted to interfere with prison discipline. The per diem wage paid for the labor of the prisoners is necessarily low, and has the appearance of a tendency to depress the market wages of citizens to the same level.

The argument of the politicians did not proceed so much upon the suggestion of a better system as upon the badness of the contract system. The public account system was really proposed as a substitute by those who looked far enough ahead to think of any substitute. By the public account system, the State furnishes machinery and materials for the labor of the prisoners, and the State markets the products. There is no appearance of wages paid for prison labor. But the State enters the markets and competes with its citizens, both in the purchase of materials and in the sale of the manufactured products. The State can pay higher prices in buying, and receive lower prices in selling, than its competitors, without danger of failure from reducing the margin of profits.

The prison reformers were about equally divided upon the issue between the two systems. A very few advocated still a third, known as the piece-price system. By the piece-price system, the State receives payment for the products of the labor of the prisoners upon materials owned and furnished by the person making the payment, but the machinery or plant within the prison may be owned either by such person or by the State. In this way, the party with whom the State deals does not enter the prison as a superintendent or director of the labor of the prisoners, but only as an inspector of the products. If the goods manufactured are not of the agreed quality, he may reject them, but he is not tempted, as is the contractor under the contract system, to induce the prison-keepers to manipulate the men for his benefit, or to bribe the prisoners themselves to favor his work. There is no appearance of wages paid for prison labor; there is no necessity for reducing the price per piece for working up the materials into manufactured products below the current price outside. The problem of price is simple: given a certain quantity and quality of raw materials, what can the owner afford to bid for having them worked up into a certain quantity and quality of manufactured products within a specified time? Who shall do the work, is immaterial to the owner, so long as the agreed quantity, of the agreed quality, is forthcoming at the agreed time.

Except for a prejudice against prison-made goods, without regard to actual inferiority, there would seem to be no reason whatever why the manufacturer should not pay the State as much for manufacturing his materials, as it would cost in the citizen market to manufacture, from the same materials, the same quantity and quality of goods in the same time.

Under the piece-price system of conducting prison labor, there ought, ordinarily, to be no tendency to depress or enhance the prices of labor or of commodities by the payment of other than regular market rates; the State does not enter the market either as a purchaser or seller of goods; and the prison discipline remains wholly in the hands of the prison authorities. It would seem that the piece-price system combines the special advantages of both the contract and public account systems for ordinary lines of manufacturing, without the special disadvantages of either, and reduces the appearance as well as the substance of competition with citizen labor to a minimum, so far as different systems of prison labor are concerned.

As early as 1871, a bill for the abolition of the contract system passed the lower house of the New York Legislature, but was lost in the upper house, rather from lack of time than lack of disposition. By 1883 the movement had gained such force that a majority of the Legislature felt compelled to take action. Either from uncertainty or timidity, they shifted the responsibility from their own shoulders, and passed an act to submit the question of abolishing the contract system to popular vote at the next general election. The election, had accordingly in the fall of 1883, resulted in favor of the abolition of the contract system, by a large majority of a light vote. It has often been erroneously supposed that this election effected an amendment to the state constitution. But the constitution sanctioned no such evasion of legislative responsibility. The election had no strictly legal force, but was merely an expression of public opinion, which the Legislature could follow or disregard in its discretion.

The Legislature of 1884 acted promptly in accordance with the election, and early in its session passed the following brief and pointed statute: "The Superintendent of State Prisons shall not, nor shall any other authority whatsoever, renew or extend any existing or pending contract, or make any new contract for the employment of any convicts in any of the prisons, penitentiaries, or reformatories within this State."

Most of the prison contracts then pending terminated in 1886

and 1887, so that the adoption of a substitute for the contract system did not at once become a serious practical issue. The Legislature took no action with reference to such substitute until 1888. The Superintendent of State Prisons, however, under the somewhat doubtful authority of previously existing statutes, adopted the public account system. The change involved very heavy expenditures upon the part of the State in purchasing machinery and raw materials. The proceeds of all sales of manufactured products were required by statute to be paid into the State treasury, and, by a provision of the State Constitution, could not be drawn out again, except by virtue of legislative appropriation. Thus the amount of each annual appropriation for carrying on the prison industries, necessarily very large, upon the inauguration of the public account system, bore no relation to the actual expenses. The appropriations necessary for continuing the prison industries were still very large, after the industries were yielding a net profit to the State. This was misunderstood by legislators and taxpayers, and the prison industries were often embarrassed for lack of legislative action.

Twice, during the regular session of the Legislature of 1888, the prison industries were on the point of suspension for lack of the necessary funds. Twice the Legislature responded with temporary appropriations. The bill making the usual necessary appropriation for the continuance of the prison industries during the year, passed the Senate by a close vote, after the most brilliant debate of the session, but was defeated in the Assembly, by five majority, on next to the last day of the session, and the Legislature adjourned in May without further action. By July the appropriations applicable to prison industries were exhausted, and without further legislative action the prisoners would be compelled to remain idle the balance of the year. Governor Hill called an extraordinary session of the Legislature, which met in July. The first subject recommended by the executive for their consideration was, "the proper employment of the convicts in the penal institutions of the State, and the making of whatever appropriations may be necessary to prevent the prisoners remaining in idleness." Instead of making an appropriation for continuing prison industries, an act was passed, with scarcely a dissenting voice being heard, and with but two opposing votes in both houses, which practically abolished prison labor. Only such articles as should actually be needed and used in the public institutions of the State, for clothing and other necessary supplies, could be manufac-

tured in the prisons, under this law. The Superintendent of State Prisons estimated that not more than 150 prisoners could be so employed. This left more than 4,000 prisoners idle in the three state prisons and the Elmira Reformatory, so that the provision for continuing any productive labor whatever was, practically, a mere pretense. The law required the immediate cessation of all other productive labor. Not even the stock in process of manufacture could be completed. The machinery and materials purchased by the State at great expense for carrying on the public account system, but just fairly under way, had to be closed out at a sacrifice. The use of motive-power machinery for manufacturing purposes was prohibited altogether. The law took effect August 1, 1888, and from that day the prison workshops had the appearance of a deserted village.

The Legislature did not meet again until January, 1889. It was then evident that a reaction had begun. The evil effects of idleness upon the prisoners, and the additional expense to the taxpayers, were vividly pictured in the reports of prison managers and by the press. Warden Brush, of the Sing Sing Prison, said in his official report: "The prisoners soon become restless, unhappy, and miserable. Time with them passes slowly; their bodies become unhealthy, and the mind must become diseased. In fact, nothing but disease, insanity, and death can be expected from this condition." An additional burden was being directly imposed upon the taxpayers at the rate of at least half a million dollars per year. All were ready to admit that the situation must not continue, and that something must be done. Several timid and half-way measures were introduced which aimed at a mitigation of the evils, but none boldly grappled with the situation, or foreshadowed any definite or stable policy. While matters were thus hopelessly drifting, two leading members of the Legislature (Senator J. Sloat Fasset and Assemblyman R. P. Bush), of opposite political parties, but both from the county in which that pioneer experiment, the Elmira Reformatory, stands as a conspicuous object-lesson in prison reform, discerned in the signs of the times, with the instincts of true statesmanship, the possibility of passing an advanced and comprehensive prison reform measure. Independently, and almost simultaneously, they took proceedings to have such a measure prepared, and thereby discovered each other. But for their cordial coöperation thereafter, no thorough-going measure could have been adopted by the Legislature of 1889.

The preparation of such a measure was no slight task from a

purely legal point of view. The statutes relating to state prisons had been piled one upon another, in hopeless confusion, since 1847. A constitutional amendment, adopted in 1876, had introduced what has since been known as the reformed system in prison administration, but the old statutes were left standing. To sort out the provisions of the earlier statutes, which remained in force, from those which were superseded by the later statutes and constitutional amendment, was a hopeless task. The prison authorities admitted that in many important matters of practical detail, they could not tell whether they were following the law or not, and no lawyer would undertake to assure them.

It was evident that law reform was needed in the method of the statutes, as well as prison reform in their substance ; that the only thorough procedure would be to repeal all existing statutes, and to build a new law upon the foundation of the general policy of the previous statutes, grafting in all the principles of prison reform which had stood the test of discussion or experiment by penologists or prison managers.

The preparation and passage of the new law was forwarded by the enthusiastic coöperation of the leading prison officials of the State, among them Superintendent Brockway of the Elmira Reformatory, and Warden Brush of the Sing Sing Prison, than whom there are no higher authorities either in prison reform theories, or in practical prison administration.

The most at first hoped was, that a thorough and comprehensive measure, broadly based upon the most advanced lines of modern prison reform, but constructed conservatively with a view to avoiding undue disturbance of the existing administration, and introducing novel features by first experimental steps, might receive intelligent discussion in the Legislature of 1889, and after a few years of agitation might be enacted into a law.

The first problem to be solved was prison labor, as the problem at the foundation of any system of prison reform, as well as at the foundation of the immediate emergency to be met. That all able-bodied prisoners should be held severely to hard labor, was agreed upon at once, not primarily as an instrument of vengeance or of torture, or even of securing economy to taxpayers. In the four prisons which receive all criminals convicted, in the State of New York, of the higher grade of crimes known as felonies, and such criminals only, are confined over 4,000 prisoners, averaging under thirty years of age, at date of sentence, for an average term of less than five years. Over 800 of these men, averaging under

thirty-five years of age, are discharged each year to mingle freely again in society. The most important question to society is, not how these 800 men, who leave prison each year, have been treated by society during their five years of seclusion, but how will society be treated by these 800 men during the remaining thirty-two years of their lives. Are they better men or worse men ; less dangerous or more dangerous ; better fitted by reason of their imprisonment to gain an honest livelihood, or incapacitated thereby from earning an honest living, and compelled to be criminals or paupers thereafter ? These are the great economical as well as humanitarian considerations by which the problem of prison labor must be solved. The expense of the criminals to the rest of society while in prison, is slight in comparison with the expense to society of their plundering and violence during the much longer time they are out of prison. If the latter expense can be reduced by increasing the former, the economic gain is worth while, but the gain in other ways makes the mere economic gain appear contemptible.

The man in prison who has no trade, or who has never learned to work, should not be let out of prison until he has acquired a trade and working habits, that he can be an honest man afterward if he wants to be, and that he will be more likely to want to be honest. There is a vast amount of nonsense in the talk about the possibility or impossibility of the reformation of criminals. It is a pity that the terms *reform* and *reformation* could not be abolished for a time from the English language. No man is so far reformed that he is insured against committing crime. No prison treatment which allows a prisoner to go out alive will insure against relapses into crime. No prison treatment accomplishes its true purpose, unless it cultivates tendencies and habits and powers which will encourage and enable the discharged prisoner to be honest, and improve his chances of becoming a good citizen. Hard labor is clearly the first element in such training, and the prime object of the hard labor is industrial education. Every prison should be, first of all things, a school for industrial education, in which the labor should be hard, intense, working the prisoner up to the highest gait of activity of which his constitution is capable, regularly and steadily, until regular hard work becomes a habit and a necessity.

The next step in cultivating a disposition to do honest work is that the prisoner should work in prison under the same motives which inspire an honest man to work outside of prison. He should

be made to recognize and feel a gain from severe and thorough work, and a loss from any default. "If any would not work, neither should he eat," is a good law, supported by good authority. If the criminal has succeeded in evading this law out of prison, he should not, for a day, be allowed to evade it in prison. He should work in hope, looking forward to a reward for his labor. He should work in fear, looking forward to the natural penalty of omitting to labor. He will find earning and saving by honest labor a luxury, which, very likely, he has never known before. It is not sentimentalism to propose that the State shall actually pay the criminal in prison for his work, — pay him his food, his clothing, his shelter, and pay him also a margin for savings, or, better yet, for contributing to the support of his family. This element was urged most earnestly by the most severely practical men who were consulted in the preparation of the New York law. Said Warden Brush, substantially: "I can bring many a dying prisoner — actually dying, not shamming illness — back to life and health by giving him a few cents a day for extra work beyond his regular task. It is lack of hope, of purpose, of aim, of an internal impulse inspiring to activity, which kills men in prison. If the fear of external punishment is a man's only reason for activity, he will soon die." The fund of a prisoner's earnings affords a means of punishment, by fines for misconduct to be deducted therefrom, which alone would justify its establishment. The magic of property has as transforming an effect inside of prison as outside.

An industrial school cannot be conducted without a division of the attendants into classes. The classification of the prisoners into grades is a necessary element of the true theory of prison labor, and at the same time serves other useful purposes in prison discipline.

These principles appear in the New York law in substantially the following form: Prisoners shall be divided into three grades, as follows: In the first grade shall be included those appearing to be corrigible, or less vicious than the others, and likely to observe the laws and maintain themselves by honest industry after their discharge; in the second grade shall be included those appearing to be less corrigible and more vicious, but so competent to work, and so reasonably obedient to prison discipline, as not seriously to interfere with the productiveness of their labor or that of their associates; in the third grade shall be included those appearing to be hopelessly incorrigible, and so insubordinate

and incompetent, otherwise than from temporary ill-health, as seriously to interfere with the discipline or productiveness of the labor of the prison.

All prisoners, physically capable thereof, shall be employed at hard labor for not to exceed [bill as introduced read "not less than"] eight hours of each working day, but such labor may be either for the purposes of production and profit, or of industrial training and instruction. The labor of the prisoners of the first grade shall be directed with reference to fitting the prisoner to maintain himself by honest industry after his discharge, as the primary object, or as the sole object, if industrial training or instruction can be more effectively given thereby. So far as is consistent with this primary object, the labor of the prisoners of the first grade shall be so directed as to produce the greatest amount and value of useful and salable products. The labor of the prisoners of the second grade shall be directed primarily to the production of the greatest amount and value of useful and salable products, but, secondarily, to fitting them to maintain themselves by honest industry after their discharge. The bill, as introduced, provided that the labor of prisoners of the third grade should be directed solely to the production of the greatest amount and value of useful and salable products, but was amended by the legislature so as to provide that the labor of prisoners of the third grade shall be directed solely to such exercises as shall tend to the preservation of health, or the manufacture, without the aid of machinery, of such articles as are needed in the public institutions of the State, or such other manual labor as shall not compete with free labor.

Prisoners entitled to commutation of sentence for good conduct may receive compensation from the earnings of the prison, to be graded by the warden on the basis of their industry and good conduct, as well as the pecuniary value of their labor. The total compensation allowed to the convicts of the prison shall not exceed ten per cent. of the earnings from productive prison industries. The compensation of any prisoner is subject to forfeiture by misconduct, and is subject to reduction by fines to be imposed upon a uniform system to be established by the warden. The amount standing to the credit of any prisoner may be drawn by him during his imprisonment, upon the approval of the Superintendent of State Prisons, to aid dependent relatives of the prisoner, or for books, instruments, and instruction not supplied by the prison to the men of his grade, or may, with the approval of

the superintendent, be so disbursed by the warden, without the consent of the prisoner. Upon the discharge of the prisoner, the whole amount standing to his credit may be drawn by him at his pleasure.

These principles were incorporated into the law upon their merits, and not as a compromise. But, by a fortunate coincidence, they naturally modified the opposition of the labor organizations. Another principle, specially urged by the labor organizations, was, by a like fortunate coincidence, essentially right. By the employment of prisoners in diversified industries, with a limited number in each, the competition with citizen industries may be so widely distributed as not to be seriously felt at any one point; wider scope will be given for industrial education; and, most important of all, the prisoner's chances of obtaining employment after his discharge will be improved. Upon this point the bill as introduced suffered most severely from amendment by the Legislature. The law provides that diversified lines of productive industry shall be pursued in each prison, to be selected with reference to interfering as little as possible with the same lines of industry carried on by the citizens of the State, and also with reference to employing the prisoners, so far as practicable, in occupations in which they will be most likely to obtain employment after their discharge from imprisonment. The total number of prisoners employed at one time, in manufacturing one kind of goods, shall not exceed five per cent. of all persons employed in manufacturing the same kind of goods within the State, except in industries in which not more than fifty free laborers are employed, and except that not more than one hundred prisoners shall be employed in all the prisons of the State in the manufacture either of stoves and iron hollow-ware, or of boots and shoes.

At this point the opposition to the law in the next legislature will be centred. Representatives of various industries will, undoubtedly, urge upon the Legislature the exclusion of their several industries from the prisons. The danger is that, one by one, their demands will be granted. It is to be hoped that they will all come down upon the Legislature together, and that their conflicting claims will nullify each other. There is no practical danger that the New York Legislature will again deliberately abolish all industries from the prisons.

With these modifications in the administration of prison labor, the old controversy between contract, public account, and piece-price systems had become a matter of secondary importance. As

a matter of expediency, the restoration of the contract system was out of the question, and the continued prohibition of that system in the new law was not considered a sacrifice of principle.

The law provides that the system of productive labor in each prison shall be either the public account or the piece-price system; and whenever the amount appropriated by the State shall be insufficient to conduct or continue the labor under the public account system, the labor shall be conducted under the piece-price system. As nearly as possible, full market rates shall be obtained for all products of prison labor. The former statutory provision, that proceeds of sales should be paid into the State treasury, was modified by allowing such proceeds to be deposited in bank, and used for the purchase of new materials for manufacture, so that, under either system, the continuance of prison industries will not be dependent upon legislative appropriation.

Thus the prison labor problem has been solved in New York, temporarily at least. The solution of this problem, upon the true theory of prison treatment, incidentally included the adoption of four leading principles of prison reform: (1) Labor for industrial education primarily, and for profit secondarily; (2) The classification and grading of prisoners for industrial education primarily, and for disciplinary purposes secondarily; (3) An opportunity for the prisoner to earn wages for extra work, coupled with good behavior; (4) The employment of prisoners in diversified lines of industry, with a limited number in each line.

The labor organizations appear to have accepted the solution. So far as the writer has been able to discover, no labor organization has counted the passage of the prison law among its grievances against the Legislature of 1889.

Scarcely second in importance to the right solution of the prison labor problem is the introduction of the indeterminate sentence and release on parole. This second great principle of prison reform was in no way involved in the immediate emergency, but advantage was taken of the emergency to allow the indeterminate sentence to be applied, for the first time, to prisoners sentenced to the state prisons. The system of indeterminate sentence and release on parole was first permanently established in the Elmira Reformatory. Previous experiments of the system had been sporadic and not continuous. At the Elmira Reformatory, this system has passed beyond the experimental stage, and has been successfully adopted in the state prisons of several other States. Nevertheless, it was thought best merely to introduce the principle

into the bill experimentally, leaving its application optional with the courts, rather than to adopt it to its full extent, or to make it compulsory. To the surprise of those who prepared the bill, the introduction of the indeterminate sentence, instead of arousing opposition, increased the favor with which the bill was received by the Legislature.

The law provides, on this point, that whenever a man over sixteen years of age is convicted of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for a term to be fixed by the court, within certain minimum and maximum limits specified by law, the court may either sentence the convict to a fixed term as heretofore, or may sentence him generally to imprisonment in a state prison. In the latter case the prisoner may be released upon the expiration of the minimum term, or he may be detained the full maximum term for which he might have been sentenced, as may be determined by the board of commissioners of paroled prisoners, consisting of the Superintendent of State Prisons, and the warden, principal keeper, physician, and chaplain of each prison. If any member of this board shall have reasonable cause to believe that a prisoner on parole has violated his parole, and has lapsed, or is probably about to lapse, into criminal ways or company, the prisoner may at once be arrested and returned to prison, to be detained until the expiration of his maximum term, unless sooner released on parole for a second time. Any prisoner on parole may be absolutely discharged, before the expiration of his maximum term, if it shall appear to the board of commissioners of paroled prisoners that there is reasonable probability that he will live at liberty without violating the law, and that his absolute discharge is not incompatible with the welfare of society.

The third great principle of prison reform, intellectual education, appears in the law substantially as follows: Instruction shall be given in the useful branches of an English education to such prisoners as in the judgment of the warden or chaplain may require it, or as may be benefited thereby. The time devoted to such instruction shall not be less than an average of one and a half hours daily, between six and nine in the evening. Provision is also made for the employment of suitable teachers.

The value of the intellectual education of criminals has been greatly misapprehended by those not acquainted with the criminal character. The ordinary criminal is such because of mental defect, rather than from superior courage or ability. If he is acute, it is with a narrow, intense cunning, which is the reverse of wis-

dom. His thoughts are bad. His mind dwells on demoralizing topics. A high gait of physical activity at hard labor is not alone sufficient to change his habits of thought. An equally high gait of intellectual activity upon a new line of topics must be compelled. The school studies pursued must be such as cause the prisoner to struggle. The examinations must be frequent and severe. For loss of school-marks the prisoner must be disciplined by loss of grade, or of extra privileges, or of early release on parole.

The convict, who has probably been more or less a loafer, with loose, irregular habits, with no trade, or with a trade but half learned, enters the prison, and, after examinations, is assigned his task in the shops, and his lessons at the school. If he succeeds in each, his prison life will be more comfortable and his imprisonment shortened; he may even 'in the mean time earn something for himself and his family. He starts in with high hopes and overweening confidence, for the criminal is almost invariably an egotist. His tasks in shop and school soon seem impossible, and he quickly weakens his efforts. Sharp discipline follows. Under the new stimulus he starts again, and after various trials and failures, and renewed stimulus, he finds what appeared impossible, to be easy. His mind is strained to its highest activity on his school lessons, and he has no time for day-dreaming or evil-plotting. A new field opens to his intellectual vision. A broader view of life comes with the consciousness of newly developed powers. Hope and ambition are stirred in new and better lines. Cleaner physical habits have encouraged cleaner thoughts. Ambition and confidence have been chastened by disappointment and failure. If the prisoner is tempted to relapse into inactivity, he falls back upon the sharp pricks of prison discipline.

To have seen the *esprit de corps* of a large body of prisoners changed from admiration of crime to an ambition to gain virtue, is a convincing experience of the power of such discipline as a force in the education of the prisoner.

Now becomes possible the introduction of the final element of complete prison treatment. The stirring of the religious emotions, in connection with such a course of prison discipline, may now kindle more than a mere flame, to be quickly smothered or extinguished by evil habits and associations not permanently interrupted.

It is a heathen theory that the criminal is like a wild beast, *hostis humani generis*, to be exterminated, or merely caged for a

while behind iron bars. It is a heathen theory still, in its most civilized form, that the sole end of prison treatment is the protection of society against the criminal. It is the Christian theory that the convicted criminal is still a man and a brother, a child of the Divine Father, — weak, perverted, disordered, vicious, but in any view needing seclusion, permanently it may be, in a hospital for remedial treatment, possibly for surgical treatment, literally, even to the sterilization of the most unfit, but treatment always seeking to remedy rather than aggravate the disease of his soul.

But after the best of treatment within the prison, the critical period comes with the prisoner's discharge. "It is more difficult to keep an ex-convict right in action than it is to get a convict right in purpose. The criminal lacks moral storage capacity. His moral compartments are not built for heavy seas." The best of treatment will be liable to have but a temporary effect, if all restraint is suddenly and absolutely released upon his discharge from prison. With the indeterminate sentence and release on parole, to supplement the right prison treatment, the strongest possible pressure to secure lawful conduct is brought to bear upon the criminal, at this, his most critical period.

The chief merit of the new law is that it met the immediate emergency. It satisfied the politicians without sacrifice of principle. It remains to be seen whether the new direction opened for the solution of the prison labor problem will lead to the permanent settlement of the controversy, and the adoption of a stable policy by the State, or whether this law, also, is to be followed by still another reactionary relapse. But besides meeting the immediate emergency, the new law embodies nearly every idea of modern prison reform that has been seriously suggested by students of sociology or managers of prisons. The newer and more advanced ideas are adopted cautiously and conservatively, as first steps in experimentation. Some principles which ought now to be accepted as final, and to be radically carried out, have suffered by compromise. In many respects the law is crude and imperfect. No single idea is new. One or more at a time they have all appeared, sometimes more fully elaborated, in other States. But it is believed that the New York law presents the first complete combination into one system of all the modern ideas of prison reform, and therein consists its chief claim to the attention of all, without regard to locality, who are interested in the preservation of the health of the social body.

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A PLEA FOR ENDOWED NEWSPAPERS.

ORIGINALLY regarded as inimical to the best interests of both State and Church, the public press has acquired a formative influence upon these older institutions in spite of their ill will. Even now autocratic despotism vainly tries to protect itself from a free press, its direst foe. Representative government depends upon the press as upon the lungs through which party life draws the vital breath.

Many of the former functions of the Church are now exercised in fullest freedom by the newspaper. It is the public censor. Its paragraphs are often more pungent and more intelligible than the sermon. It speaks to a large congregation as frequently as the minister speaks to his small one, and, here and there, it speaks several times as often. It is restrained by no hard and fast rule of doctrine. In the newspaper office there is nothing immutable but the wisdom of the editor and proprietor. To the mass of people the controllers of influential journals are the real managers of the great world's stage. They set the scene. They put the words into the players' mouths. They point out the moral which adorns the tale.

"There's nothing," said the rattle-headed city editor in that very bright story, "Seth's Brother's Wife," — "there's nothing like original news to show the influence of journalism. One morning, after the cakes had been bad for a week, I said to my landlady that I believed the fault must be in the buckwheat. She said, No, she did n't think so, for the flour looked very nice indeed. I put a line in 'Local Glimpses' that day, saying that, unfortunately, the buckwheat this year was of inferior quality, and the very next morning she apologized to me, said I was right, the buckwheat was bad, she had read so in 'The Chronicle.' "

The news columns of our journals are intended to fulfill a dual mission. They become at once mirrors of fact and preachers of opinion. Strictly speaking, a real *newspaper* would be a picture of the actual, without any attempt to present deductions and opinions. No such journal exists, or probably can exist, among us, with a possible exception in the case of some small commercial bulletins, which contain a very special class of facts. How to secure and preserve, in the representative public press, an honest and healthy relation between fact and opinion, between public and

universal interests and private, individual, and narrow interests, is the urgent question.

The general failure of the newspaper as an institution to meet this question plainly and justly is the cause of a natural dissatisfaction among the more cultivated classes. They grumble at the newspaper as a necessary evil, although it ought to be a necessary blessing. They expect its facts to be partial and biased in statement. They do not respect its conclusions. They curse the reportorial system even while availing themselves of it. The more prosperous dailies they scarcely dare to take home for fear that the children may read them. Now the newspaper is, like the Church and the State, an embodiment of the social forces, and, like the Church and the State, it should lead and not follow. The "New York Herald" is, perhaps, the most enterprising newspaper in the country. Does any one feel the same pride in its morals that he may feel in its vigor? No one is moved to thank God and take courage by the reflection that the "Herald" and the "World" are the leaders of their class, the chief journalistic witnesses of truth and guardians of society. Why is it that the great dailies can seldom rise to the dignity and glory of their high calling? The newspaper misleads, first of all, because it is a business enterprise, doomed to death if the profits are not forthcoming. The owner must get advertisements in order to be able to attract a larger circulation; he must acquire a large circulation in order to hold his advertisements. So long as the existence of his journal is at stake, he is bound, like Gulliver, with a million threads. The dominant political rings can give him profitable public printing. The powerful corporations enchain him with patronage. He is besought to manufacture public sentiment in favor of this candidate, of that business enterprise, and there are hints of golden rewards. He dares not speak of municipal or corporate corruption, or of private wickedness, for fear of losing advertisements or personal favor, or of damaging the local prosperity. In San Francisco, people of all classes regard it as a matter of course that the Southern Pacific Railway Company should dictate the utterances of all the local newspapers. He who ventures to doubt this belief excites only a smile of incredulity. The prevalence of such an opinion conveys a much more stinging reproach to the community than to the corporation.

In the second place, the press is untrustworthy because its management is so generally irresponsible. The capital and the brains invested in the concern are usually not the property of the

same person. The man of brains, for his livelihood, must do the bidding of the capitalist. The editorial office is subordinated to the counting-room. Newspaper writers are accustomed to the idea of a double personality, — one journalistic and unreal, the other private and true. The two characters may have few points in common, but the same man must carry them both or lose his position. He may be in favor of anti-saloon legislation, but the paper circulates among the saloons, and must not offend its constituents. He may be a nationalist, but the "boss" owns a block of B. & A. stock, and the paper must not criticise the railroad lobby in the legislature. Thus newspaper workers must breathe, more or less frequently, an atmosphere of hypocrisy. This editorial reminds us that the proprietor has a fat contract for city printing. This arraignment of art or the drama indicates that the usual professional "courtesies" have been forgotten. That paragraph, prominent among the locals, suggests the thought that John Smith is a frequent and profitable contributor to the advertising columns. For misstatements that have once found their way into print no adequate redress is usually possible. If a freebooting journal is sharply called to account, responsibility cannot easily be traced to the proper persons. A lawsuit against the owners is possible; it is also costly and doubtful.

Thirdly, the press is tied to the car of party fortune, and no single journal can be trusted to present political news with fairness and truth. A striking proof of party tyranny may be seen in the attitude of our papers towards current English politics. I have yet to see a single journal of note which has taken pains to give an impartial statement of both sides of the Home Rule controversy, or has given its readers cause to suspect that the Unionist argument is founded upon aught but bigotry, malice, and selfishness.

If, however, the two evils of virtual irresponsibility and of Mammon-service could be diminished, there would undoubtedly be much less cause for complaints of unfairness and untruthfulness. In the first place, the public should be able to fasten responsibility for every utterance of the newspaper as speedily and unerringly upon the writer as upon the newspaper-owner. Stringent laws should insure the full and repeated publication of all names of persons officially connected with the paper. Pseudonyms should be forbidden, at least in the news columns, under penalties. If every editorial must be signed with the writer's own name, and if every department of the paper must bear the name of the

manager, or of the men actually employed upon it, and if the law held these men responsible, together with the proprietors, there would be less washing of dirty linen in public, less blackmailing, less reckless misrepresentation. The editorial vertebræ would be stiffened amazingly. The writer or editor would say, "I cannot afford to let these statements appear under my name unless I am sure that they are true;" or, "I have personal knowledge that these advertisements are traps of scoundrels to catch the unwary, and I can't have my friends in the — Street Church asking me about them." The best proof of the utility of required signatures is that newspaper owners who dictate the policy of the paper from the counting-room invariably condemn the idea. I know of a proprietor in San Francisco who instructed his subordinates to demolish the proposition ruthlessly in the columns of his journal. One refused to do so, but another performed the work, and his article was lined and interlined by the owner (*his* owner, I almost said) before it went to press. I do not mean to imply that the proprietor of a paper is always the cause of weakness or ill-doing, nor that signed articles would produce a complete reform. They would, however, add directness of responsibility, and is not that to be desired?

The second thought seems to suggest a more radical evolution. Newspaper ownership takes three different shapes. The condition that we have been mainly considering is the worst of all, wherein the journal is the private financial venture of some capitalist, who aims only at the largest possible interest on his investment. The paper and its influence are always exposed to temptation, and are often seeking diligently to find it. Lofty aims, fidelity to principles, these are the showman's tricks of trade. The course of the "New York Herald" shows that such a paper may become decent after it has won wealth. When it is too rich to be bought it adopts the independent tone and assumes a flavor of integrity. Sure of its income, it desires, like other well-to-do citizens, an honest and pure social order. The "Herald" is now, oft-times, a power for good, but the story of its career is demoralizing.

Again, the same person may possess both capital and brains, and be both editor and proprietor in name and in fact. His personality dominates the paper openly and consistently: Such a paper may do more good and less harm than the other, because all responsibility may be laid at once, and without hesitation, upon one pair of shoulders. The public has gauged the master's character, knows whether he deserves respect or contempt, and

treats his paper accordingly. Herein lies the strength and the weakness of such papers as Greeley's "Tribune" and Bowles's "Republican" [were for a time, as Pixley's "San Francisco Argonaut" and Bowen's "Independent" are to-day.

Finally, the paper may be the property of a syndicate, who determine only the general policy and partisan affiliations of the publication, but who leave all details of administration and conduct to the editorial staff. I believe that this method of control is by far the best, provided that the associated owners can select the right men as managers, and can then abstain from meddling. But the old, vicious principle is present here also. Ordinarily, the associated owners expect dividends, and require the management of the paper to produce dividends. This demand is likely at any moment to become a cause of irritation and of moral obliquity.

In place of any one of these systems of ownership, journals whose purpose is to disseminate news, which are, emphatically, *newspapers*, should exist upon endowments, administered as trust-funds by corporated trustees. No such journal should have an owner dependent upon it for livelihood or an income. Also, journalism, which is already recognized as a profession, should be organized as such. It should be hedged about with safeguards like those which defend the older professions. Admission to an editorial chair should be an achievement similar to admission to a professorial chair or to the bar, and similarly obtained. Would it not be well if such an office were obtainable, under state license, only after graduation from a reputable school of journalism, or after fulfilling the requirements of the local editorial association? Such strict professional regulations would not kill the little local papers. Duly accredited lawyers always appear in the rural districts, and an enterprising young man would find it as easy to take a course in a school of journalism as in a school of law. Furthermore, would not "The Podunk Clarion" be improved a thousandfold? Sooner or later, a systematic professional organization of journalism is sure to come. Journalistic courses are already heard of in our colleges, and the idea will grow.

Let journalists once obtain a preliminary training and an organized professional power, proportional to the influence that they must, and do, inevitably exert upon society, and the demand for newspaper endowments will seem not chimerical, but natural and necessary.

The professional independence of the journalist and freedom

from unworthy financial motives will both be promoted, if not quite secured. Let the next philanthropist with four million dollars, which he cannot take with him into the next world, incorporate with it "The Johns Hopkins Journal," or "The Peabody Daily Press." Let these funds be confided to chosen trustees, under conditions similar to those attending the foundation of a great university. Let the testator order that, with his bequest, the trustees shall create and maintain a great news-journal, non-sectarian, non-partisan, and officered with the best talent that money can secure. Let the positions upon this paper be as assured to the incumbents as are chairs of instruction in the universities. The income of such an endowment would enable the corporation to command the best talent in the country, and to place its accredited representatives at every important distributing point on the globe. Neither advertisers nor subscribers could wield a malign influence upon the policy of such a paper. A Woolsey, a Lowell, or a Schurz would not refuse name and abilities to the editorial staff, for no university in the country could surpass it in importance or equal it in influence. Its facilities for the collection of news would make it essential to the reading public of whatever creed or party. It would go far towards realizing the highest ideal that the "London Times" ever dreamed of, and failed to reach. Endowed journals of this sort would dwarf the existing press as a university overtops a district school. The number of newspapers would probably diminish, a consummation by no means to be deplored. The Press, as an institution, would come more and more under the control of the educated classes, and into closer affiliation with the institutions of higher education.

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THE ARABIAN BROTHERS OF PURITY.

EVERY intellectually awakened people seems destined to run through four phases of thought in very much the same order of time. Beginning with religion in its more simple form, and passing into ecclesiasticism, men find themselves confronted with science, which may be characterized as the observation of nature

and life. Then, as the result of reflection on man and his surroundings, philosophy arises, and the career of thought nears its completion in the extinction of faith, or the extinction of science, or a closer adjustment of religious dogma to the conclusions of unaided reason.

In making such a generalization we must give full latitude to our terms. Science may appear in its crude period of mere observation, gathering the material of reflection, but not yet arranging it under systems. Philosophy may be in that early stage which represents the first efforts of man to meet, independently of supernatural revelation, the problems which his life experiences force upon him. Later in the course of development all things take more definite form and relation, under which the same struggle goes forward in continued effort to solve enigmas.

These transitions of thought appear near the surface of history. Though the singular course of Judaism would seem to take it from under ordinary law, we trace in it hints of the usual process. Nursed in a simple patriarchal belief, it developed, through Moses, the germs of church domination. The books of Job and Ecclesiastes, springing upon us questions that arise from the observation of nature and the course of human affairs, reveal the struggles of doubt and the strivings of an undisciplined philosophic spirit.

Further towards the rising sun Brahminism, out of the earlier Aryan faith, organizes a hierarchical and caste rule, from which comes, by reflection on life, Buddhism, the philosophy of pessimism beatified in Siddhartha, whose serene sadness waits for the release of Nirvana.

The familiar course of Greece and Rome, their passage through the four stages to the downfall of heathen belief or its absorption into the higher hopes of Jesus, needs not be cited. The philosophies which were part of the process have become leading elements in the subsequent strivings of western nations after truth.

Modern Europe has passed along the predestined line, moving now backward, now forward, but with a general advance. Christianity was partially crystallized into ecclesiasticism before the missionaries reclaimed the far West, but its hierarchical and dogmatic sway was of a mild type compared with that which prevailed from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, and was finally broken by the force of a revived philosophy developing freedom of thought along with the increased study of nature and of human history. Through a twilight, in which we watch the conflict of traditional belief with the revelations of nature and the speculations of

human reason, the processes of doubt, assertion, denial, and readjustment have gone forward, until our day of unexampled critical study enforces the necessity of statements broad enough to include the generalizations of science with the convictions of religion.

Were popular impressions of Mohammedanism just, its history must present an exception to the usual course of experience. Common fame has, without discrimination, represented the followers of the Prophet as enthusiasts and bigots, with ready sabres for the bodies of infidels. Imagination, fed by fable and war-scenes, has pictured the morals and faith of the Saracens as a dead level of sensualism, superstition, and cruelty. Students of science and philosophy, busying themselves with the history of these branches of learning, have in but limited measure corrected this view of an empire that once stretched from the Indus to Spain, harboring the arts of peace as well as of war, nursing the reflections of philosophy as well as of religion, and showing at an early date the courage of scientific investigation with free speculation in face of the prevailing fanaticism of the people.

Three dates, parted by a century, mark for the historian of Islam as many epochs in its career. The death of Mohammed (A. D. 632) signalizes the close of the period in which the faith was founded and the military power consolidated. One hundred years later (A. D. 732), the defeat of the Saracens in Spain by Charles Martel set a limit to the conquests that had occupied the first century of the empire. The end of the next period practically coincides with the death of El Mamoun (A. D. 833), the most distinguished of those Abbaside Kalifs whose united patronage of learning contributed to the success of science and reflected glory upon the dynasty. His devotion to intellectual pursuits and his freedom of opinion assured to the liberal arts victory over the clamors of a religious prejudice which was, however, far from allayed by the royal example. The previously introduced studies of nature and the ancient philosophers had fostered a tendency to speculation, but with El Mamoun came the more vigorous prosecution of independent inquiry. Under him lived El Kindi, the first of that long line of philosophic minds that flourished through a period of four hundred years and terminated with its culmination in Ibn Roschd or Averroes, at the end of the twelfth century. The spirit of free thought and religious dissent grew simultaneously with this intellectual movement.

The Arabian Brothers of Purity are the representatives, in the

latter part of the tenth century, of a style of thinking which had early begun to assert itself. Their legitimate predecessors may be found in the various schools of opinion that arose before the day of El Mamoun, when theology rather than philosophy chiefly occupied the minds of disputants. First among heretics the Kadrites, having denied the orthodox doctrine of predestination, and asserted man's liberty of choice for good or evil, with his consequent responsibility, were met by the Jabarites going in their advocacy of necessity to the extremes of fatalism. But these orthodox fatalists must needs deny the attributes of Deity and give occasion to the rise of another sect to defend the ascription of such human distinctions to an infinite being. The Cifatites undertook the task, and in their turn plunged into the slough of a rank anthropomorphism. Such disputations, applications of the processes of reasoning, and appeals to the spirit of criticism prepared the way for the Motazales, or dissenters of the eighth century, holding a middle position between former disputants, but making a strong movement in favor of the authority of reason, in their declaration, thoroughly unorthodox, that its light is sufficient for all knowledge necessary to salvation, and that, with or without revelation, its doctrines are obligatory upon men of every age and clime. They were the originators, or became the chief advocates, of what was known in the phraseology of the time under the word "calam," the fundamental principle of which seems to have been the application of reason to matters of belief. Thus came into existence a school which sought the reconciliation of philosophy and religion, a tendency that gathered strength until, in the tenth century, it became dominant, and resulted in the formation of the society which is the subject of this essay.

The Brothers of Purity, or the Sincere Brothers and True Friends, might be called the Mohammedan scholastics of the tenth century, with the difference that the Arabian, in his efforts to compound philosophy and religion in a harmonious system of belief, was more thoroughly emancipated from ecclesiastical control than were his successors in the later scholastic institutions of Christian Europe, or than was that earliest Middle Age speculator, John Scotus Erigena. They appear in the intellectual history of their people as a result of the philosophizing spirit applied to the problems of faith, but the chief interest which draws us towards them, the chief bond of sympathy between them and ourselves, is moral and religious rather than philosophical. Their philosophy may be dead; their spiritual aspirations live. Those

who cherished them excite within us, by the loftiness of their principles and the purity of their sentiments, admiration mingled with surprise that such a development should have been reached under the surroundings in which they lived. We are affected by a sense of kinship in view of those longings and struggles which so frequently, under the most diverse conditions of race and faith, attest the oneness of our humanity.

The external history of these brethren cannot be minutely traced. What we know of them is mainly gathered from their writings, which consist of fifty-one treatises, and cover, after the manner of the encyclopedist, the entire range of knowledge at that time accessible to the universal student. These products of their industry are now regarded as the best exponent of the state of learning, and perhaps of moral and religious conditions, among the Arabians in the latter half of the tenth century. Besides what we gather from these pages, we have but few historical data. A conversation which took place in Bagdad, about the year A. D. 983, between a certain vezir and the sheik Tauhidi, who was himself a man of varied learning and a voluminous author, has been preserved to us and affords valuable suggestions.

From these various sources we learn that, at the time of which we speak, the Brothers of Purity formed an order, the members of which were banded together under a common intellectual and religious impulse. The date of its origin cannot be fixed, nor is the time known when it ceased to be. The chief seat of the brotherhood was at Bassora, renowned as a principal centre of Arabian learning and commerce. It was conveniently situated on the Euphrates, above the Persian Gulf, and was well adapted to the dissemination of the principles of the order along lines of communication which still reach by sea to India, Persia, Arabia, and Europe, while caravans enable an intercourse with such inland cities as Bagdad and Damascus. Accident rather than deliberate choice may have led to the location of the brotherhood in a city distinguished for its influence on the progress of letters, and in which it is more than probable that the original founders of the society chanced to dwell. Here, in fact, had originated two hundred years before that philosophical school, the Motazales, of which, as we have seen, the Brothers of Purity were in style of thought the lineal descendants. The literary fame of such a city and its traditions of intellectual freedom must have stimulated the activities of the society, while its commercial relations favored the extension of branches into distant places wherever a few followers might be gathered.

The sessions of the order were held in secret. Time was spent in the pursuit of various investigations, in free discussion, and in mutual counsel. The members were by such means kept in close fellowship with each other, but they do not seem to have been known to the public. A veil of secrecy was thrown over all their proceedings. Few names even of leaders in the movement can be cited, and these on circumstantial evidence. The authorship of the treatises was suspected, but not revealed. The writings were attributed by common report at Bassora to Abu Solaiman, called Mukadasi, and this opinion prevailed in the East, but nothing more positive transpired in regard to the matter. Where so little is definitely known we cherish with a feeling of kinship the memory of the quick-witted and well-read Zaid Ben Riffa, and of Abul Hassan, Abu Ahmed, and El Hufi, who, in the conversation at Bagdad between the vezir and sheik Tauhidi, are represented as men of learning and culture, and are supposed to have belonged to the organization, the secrecy of which, in all except doctrine, baffled its immediate contemporaries, and prevents us from penetrating to a more definite knowledge of the persons composing it. This secrecy may have been of choice, but there can be little doubt that it was also a necessity. The principles of the Brothers of Purity and their spirit of propagandism were irreconcilable with the current faith, and could hardly have been consistent with the personal safety of those who were impelled to advocate them among a people easily stirred to violence in defense of the traditions of Islam. In the privacy of the fraternity, in secret meetings for counsel and aid, animated by a corporate spirit, these men could devote themselves to a work which, however little it might bring them of worldly advantage, seemed to offer the largest reward in the spiritual rescue of their fellow-men. The supreme end of the order was the discovery and proclamation of a way by which man may reach his final and highest good. This motive inspires and guides all study, dictates moral discipline, and animates propagandist efforts. That portion of the treatises in which the material sciences are reviewed, and which contains discussions of fundamental truths regarding matter and spirit, space and time, along with accounts of the origin of minerals, plants, and animals; the nature and motions of the heavenly bodies, the processes of meteorology and geology, is frequently interrupted by exhortations in a religious vein, reminding us of a time when among us reflections of this kind were not excluded from works of a similar nature. Every effort is made to direct attention to

that higher end of knowledge, the purification of mind and heart, and their preparation for a final state in which divine things are the sources of satisfaction. This motive is so constant, and so permeates the atmosphere, that we might imagine ourselves under the leadership of a monastic institution, rather than of a learned society composed of free-thinking philosophers and inquirers after truth in its broadest range.

The realities which must always underlie efforts for the rescue of men from an evil destiny are, to the minds of these philosophers, clear and tangible. The Author of creation, though usually spoken of under the term of "Universal-soul," loses none of his personality. He is in close relation to men, and is active in creation. The vision of him is the supreme good and the goal of striving. The spirit of man, which is part of the Universal-soul, is in its turn treated as possessing every attribute of personality, freedom, and responsibility. Individual existence is eternal, the joys of the pure are unending. "Mayest thou, strengthened by the spirit of life, behold the hosts of the Most High and live the life of the blessed in joy, delight, and pleasure that has no end," is the language of one who holds to a conscious hereafter. If the phraseology used occasionally reminds us of the theory of direct emanation from God, and leads us to anticipate final absorption in a universal spirit, and if the eastern belief in transmigration is sometimes suggested, these ideas do not seem to have taken serious hold of the Arabian mind as here revealed to us. In this respect we are nearer to western than to eastern thought.

Throughout the discussions contained in these writings, contrary to the usual expectation entertained in regard to everything Mohammedan, we are impressed with the spiritual way of thinking. The pleasures and pains of the future world are presented under material images, as are those of Christian teaching; but this is the traditional effort to picture intangible verities. "Paradise," says one of the treatises, "signifies the world of spirits, which consists exclusively of spiritual forms; not in corporeal matter, but in a life parted from matter, a life of rest, pleasure, cheer, and joy." The resurrection is not of the body. It is the realization of the true being of the soul after it is separated from the flesh. It is the release of the spirit, its final emancipation. "When the soul leaves this structure and no longer makes it her dwelling she is accompanied by no possessions obtained by means of the body, excepting that glorious knowledge she has won, the beautiful angelic features, the right views, the good and pure and acceptable

deeds which are of lasting benefit. They endure in the nature of the soul that has accustomed herself to them, and are impressed upon her as the spiritual, luminous, shining form. As often as she sees this her essence and these forms she rejoices in them and is full of delight." The meaning of this is unmistakable. Man's highest estate is to be found in character, than which no conception is more of kin to spirit. Nothing of *sensé* remains. Paradise "is visited neither of pain, nor sickness, nor desire, nor hunger, thirst, heat, cold, nakedness, nor yet of care, trouble, grief, misfortune." There the man delights in the consciousness of purity, in the possession of knowledge and grace, in the sight of the heavenly hosts, the beatific vision of the All-Merciful. This is salvation, the object and aim of the activities of the brotherhood.

The processes by which we suppose men to reach the highest possibilities of their being must always correspond to our views of human nature and the hindrances it has to encounter in its upward career. The philosophical speculations of the Brothers of Purity assumed as their starting point the essential distinction between matter and spirit. Universal-matter and Universal-soul are placed over against each other. By the action of the latter upon the former arises the visible creation, which from circumference to the centre of the earth is everywhere pervaded by spirit. The Universal-matter is not the world as we see it. It is the unformed universe, holding very much the same relation to the speculations of the time as the modern conception of star dust holds to our scientific speculations. Each separate form of mineral, plant, or other visible thing that enters into the world of sense around us arises out of it. The formative principle is the everywhere penetrating spirit.

In like manner each individual soul is part of the Universal-soul. Man is the universe on a small scale. He is body pervaded and animated by spirit. "The body of the universe is in its totality like the body of man," says the sixth treatise on natural science, "and all its spheres and heavenly stages, with the stars of the spheres, the things of various quality, and the products of creation, are related to the whole as the members of the human frame. The soul of the world causes the spheres to circle by the will of God, and sets the stars in motion, as the soul of man moves the limbs and joints of the body."

The Universal-soul, having entered the visible creation and penetrated to the centre of the earth, ascends again by the way

of minerals and plants to the heavenly world in a completed circle. The soul of man, which is part of the heavenly soul, is also to struggle upward to its original place. The union of spirit with body, which is necessary to this process, is not an unmitigated evil. In this frame which has become our temporary dwelling may be traced tokens of the divine wisdom, and learners in the school of the brotherhood are exhorted to "a ready zeal in acquiring by means of the bodily structure a spiritual building, and by means of the bodily senses a spiritual perception." The finer qualities realized in an earthly existence endure when the flesh becomes dust.

But if this union may be regarded as a necessary step in human development, it is attended with perils. The visible creation attracts the gaze of man and wins his desires. He becomes involved in passions and lusts; he loses his spiritual insight, truth is hid from him, the beauties of Paradise cease to have power over him; he sinks in the abysses of sense, is overwhelmed in the sea of matter, falls into the sleep of indifference, the slumber of the foolish. He is the slave of the body, degraded in his desires, unfit for the enjoyment of things spiritual and divine. In such a history and in these environments originates the problem which the Brothers of Purity endeavored to solve. Above this material universe towers the world of pure spiritual forms where dwells the First Cause, towards whose existence point the traces of design visible in the things that have been made. The Universal-soul awaits its release from the sea of matter, into which it has plunged as a forming and guiding power, and seeks its return to the heavens. As long as the spheres revolve it is in bond with the world, but when it parts from the things that have been developed by its active presence, creation dissolves, and the soul of the universe returns to its own unfettered being. This is the great resurrection, not to be confounded with the resurrection of man, whom a lot awaits which depends on his own choice. A spiritual Paradise is offered to him in a world not subject to change, sorrow, pain, or destruction. But under the moon sphere is the alternative of "Fire and Hell," which "signify . . . the corporeal world always undergoing change and dissolution." In this world of unrest remain those who in this life have been the slaves of matter. They are subject to its storms, while those who rise to the spirit-dwelling are evermore free and abide in eternal peace.

To escape from the world of bodily forms, to be free from the world of matter, to part from the flesh and all that bondage which

the flesh symbolizes, to enter the land of pure spiritual being, to have the clear perception of divine things, to vision the angel bands, to possess their likeness, and have the favor of God, — this is the one object worthy of human striving. “Does it not become thee to care for thy soul, to seek her well-being, to strive after her release, to break her fetters and save her from the sea of matter in which she is immersed, from the bands of nature and the darkness of the bodily world? Take from her the burdens which hinder her from mounting to the kingdom of heaven, from joining the angelic hosts dwelling in the vastness of the spheres; from treading the steps of Paradise, there to bathe in the joys and satisfactions of which the Koran reminds us.”

The methods by which the Brothers of Purity hoped to free themselves and others from the dominion of material things, and secure a passage into the joys contemplative or active of Paradise, give to the society its peculiar character.

Religion in its ordinary acceptation, or revealed faith, does not afford unerring guidance to the soul's upward progress. When questioned in regard to their belief, the Brothers of Purity would probably have professed to be followers of the Prophet. But this would not have been true after the orthodox requirement of such discipleship. They may have held that the founder of Islam was the greatest of prophets. They would undoubtedly have said that he was inspired of God. Inspiration is a broad word. But the Koran, which professes to be the authoritative embodiment of religious truth, they did not hold to be an infallible guide. In it truth is mixed with error. It is marred by corruptions that convey no intelligible meaning. Its mistakes and misunderstandings can only be cleared away by philosophy, which thus becomes the court of appeal. They freely quote sentences from the Mohammedan Scriptures, but in confirmation of conclusions already set forth rather than as primal authority. The sense given to these extracts would not accord with the usual interpretation. In order to bring the teachings of the faith and of reason into correspondence, the Brothers resorted to the theory of a hidden meaning, a convenient device not without parallel among Christian expositors.

Learning, as mere intellectual attainment, does not effect the sought-for release. The mind may be strengthened and stored with the treasures of science while it remains blind to the deeper meanings of the world and of human life. The majority of the learned are said to miss the knowledge of their souls by neglect.

"They have little care for the spirit, and but faint longing to set it free from the sea of matter and the abyss of the corporeal, to escape the bands of nature and be delivered from the darkness of the body. They direct all their striving towards provision for the wants of a worldly life, possessions, food, drink, women, and beasts of burden. The body is lord over the soul. They suffer the human to rule the divine, darkness to prevail over light, and Satan over the angels. They belong to the host of the devil and the enemies of the All-merciful." Knowledge, and the culture which may be reached by means of it, play a conspicuous part in the system of discipline adopted by the brotherhood; but it is not knowledge acquired for its own sake and independently of its ulterior bearings; it is knowledge used with the aims and aspirations of the philosopher. We shall find, also, that it is knowledge taken in broad range, brought into harmonious relations, and bearing the fruit of a conduct consistent with man's surroundings and possibilities. In order to effect the release of the spirit from matter and restore it to its primal, untrammelled condition, all the aids of human wisdom must be invoked, all the resources of divine revelation must be opened, and the student must gird himself to the practice of a pure morality. For these ends he must enter the secret councils and engage in the private discussions of the society established on the basis of free inquiry after universal knowledge, of mutual truth, sincerity, and helpfulness. Philosophy and religion, harmonized by reason and brought to bear in ethical doctrine and the pursuit of a spiritual aim, will give the perfect result not otherwise to be attained. If a choice between the teachings of reason and those of revelation had been forced upon the members of the order, they would probably have regarded the former as the final resource. Of Mukadasi, whom we have mentioned as the reputed author or at least editor of the treatises, is reported the saying that the prophets are for the sick, but philosophy for the well; from which we may infer that the true norm of knowledge exists in the reason. But not all men are well, and the brotherhood found use for the revelations of the world's prophets as well as those of the world's philosophers. They sought to build out of the combination a way of approach to the Creator, paved with a mosaic of human thought and divine utterance.

The one prerequisite to persevering effort for emancipation from matter and its seductions is belief in a future life. Resistance to the power of the senses, in preparation for transfer to the spirit-

ual Paradise, is not possible unless "thou dost undoubtingly and without need of confirmation by others attain to a sure recognition of the preferableness of the future world before this present world. For it is not in the nature of man to exercise renunciation, until he has come to the sure knowledge of the preëminent worth of that future as compared with this present which passes away." In such unquestioning belief the pupil must devote himself, first of all, to the science of the soul, in order that he may know its qualities and powers and may contemplate its excellence. As this is the highest existence, so is it the highest object of research, of supreme importance to man, who thus learns his possibilities, and is prepared for considerations which, awakening him out of the sleep of folly, may stimulate his aspirations after the highest good. Yet the way of release leads over all heights of learning and along all still waters of meditation. The teachings of the ancient philosophers, the instructions of wise men, the revelations of the prophets, the scientific observation of nature, all have their use in opening the eyes of men to the comparative value of things and to the truth of the higher nature. From this universal culture result the fifty-one treatises, which embody in popular form and familiar style the science, mental and physical, known to the Saracens of the period immediately following that of their most brilliant political as well as intellectual achievements. The student of philosophy finds in these the gauge of their advance in speculative inquiry; the history of natural science is illustrated by one of its completest and most lucid summaries; and the student of comparative religion watches the struggles of free inquiry after a satisfactory solution of the ever-recurring problems of human destiny.

But the catalogue of studies, or the enumeration of sources of knowledge, utilized by the Brothers of Purity is not completed when we have mentioned the departments of science recognized by us, nor when we have included the revelations of the prophets, in which were comprised, besides the Mohammedan Scriptures, the five books of Moses, the Gospels, and the Psalms, all of which they held to be inspired and to conceal mysteries discernible by the spiritual sense. The world of nature, also, enfolds in its external phenomena ideas of which the visible things are but symbols, and which allure the search after hidden knowledge; while above all revelations of the prophets, all teachings of nature, all searchings of human reason, rise before the mystic vision of the brother the divine books, not of material paper and ink, but written by angels

of light, who have caught the meaning of the divine mind, or have gleaned foreknowledge out of the secret tables whereon are traced the lines of human destiny fixed by the final reckoning and judgment. Through such avenues the mind of the Saracen, untamed by science of its desert imaginativeness, stimulated, it may be, by an infusion of mysticism from the far East, broke away from the restraints of sound learning into the region of enthusiasm, dreams, and vagaries; the state of rapture, ecstasy, and vision enjoyed by the Christian hermit in his cave or the Christian monk in his supernaturally illumined cell. It has been rightly said that here was opened the door to every extravagance, and to imaginary experiences inconsistent with dispassionate criticism. The members of the order were divided according to their attainments into four degrees, each of which corresponded with a particular period of life. The highest state was that of angelic power, which might be reached at the age of fifty, and was especially characterized by the grace of resignation, the reception of divine strength, and the vision of God. It was preparatory to eternal life and the final separation from matter; and was followed by the power of ascent to heaven, the vision of the last things, resurrection, judgment, entrance to Paradise, and the presence of the All-merciful. To this state all brethren were called.

Moral discipline was equally emphasized with intellectual. A philosophy that made so much of man's subjection to the influence of matter would result in demanding of its pupils resistance to the allurements of the visible world and the indulgences of sense. "He who loves science and wisdom must walk in the way of the wise, which consists therein, that in worldly things one confine himself to that which is absolutely necessary, avoiding that which is superfluous, and striving with the greatest zeal and carefulness after knowledge." The overflow of the Universal-soul enters into men only gradually and as they are able to entertain it. The soul of one man can impart itself to another only as there is preparation on the side of the recipient. Such influx is hindered because the eyes of men are veiled by matter and they are given over to the desires of the body and its lusts. When the spirit awakes and turns to the pursuit of knowledge, persevering therein, the Universal-soul is enabled to communicate itself. Then is begotten the light of reason, spiritual aspiration is experienced, and eternally enduring joy. A blameless life of purity and self-restraint thus becomes a prime condition of success in the endeavor to escape from the fetters of sense. A farewell spoken at

the end of a treatise is in the following vein: "God help thee, O brother, to an upright walk, and guide thee in the right way, with me and all our brethren."

To a righteous life must be added an unprejudiced mind which welcomes all sources of truth. No book may be rejected on account of fear or bias. Every author who has something to communicate must be met with a fearless and fair mind. For mutual counsel, frank discussion, and safe guidance the brethren are to keep in close contact with each other, attending the secret sessions of the society, where all things can be canvassed and opinions expressed without danger of molestation or suspicion of betrayal. No department of knowledge is too low and none is too high. The origins of minerals and their properties, the natural history of plants and animals, the revolutions of the spheres, as well as the mysteries of the spirit of man and the teachings of the wise, serve as furnishing to the mind and bring lessons to the heart. The conflict between science and religion is reconciled by philosophy. Religious practices are explained in accordance with the teachings of reason, and are commended; religious expressions have their scientific equivalents. The angels of God charged with the operation of the world's mechanism are to the philosopher powers of nature wrought by the Universal-soul.

Conspicuous among the virtues enjoined is that of mutual helpfulness. Every man according to his ability is to serve his neighbor in spiritual and intellectual as well as material emergencies. The poor man is not to refuse this on account of his poverty, nor is the rich to make his advantage felt by his less fortunate friend. Envy, malice, and pride are alike forbidden. All are children of one Creator. The greatest favors are to be rendered without expectation of thanks. If it be said that, since the law seems especially to apply among themselves, a trace of selfishness may be found in this apparent renunciation, it must be remembered that the society was promulgating principles applicable to all men, and that it probably proposed for itself but a temporary existence until those principles should come into general practice.

How widespread the organization became we have no means of knowing. Had it not reached sufficient expansion to inspire its leaders with hope, they would hardly have bestowed so much labor on treatises designed to instruct the members and diffuse their views among the people. The writings speak of brethren "in whatever district," and again, "in whatever region of the world they may live." We have heard the principles of the

society discussed in Bagdad, and, when we consider the facilities afforded by Bassora for communication with distant parts, we may presume that what transpired in one city may have been repeated in others. Among the common people the doctrines of the order would not make much headway. Though they were popularly expressed, and were set forth in one work with an attractive play of humor under the title of "*The Contest between Man and Beast*," they were too refined for general acceptance. Science and philosophy were always suspected by the masses, and teachings which rested on so broad a basis could not win a general following. But the treatises must have won a wide circulation on account of their value as a compendium of learning, and they must have exerted no inconsiderable influence towards the elevation of thought above those material tendencies which every age is sure to manifest, and which are conspicuous in the Koran. The great fondness of the Arabians for large libraries, their rivalry therein, furthered this influence. We learn that the books continued in circulation through a long period. Nearly two hundred years after their composition we find them in the collection of a certain Kadi at Bagdad, where, with other philosophical works deemed pernicious, they were burned by order of Kalif Mostandjid in the year 1150 A. D. In further evidence of their distribution, copies which escaped the destructiveness of fanaticism have come down to us in manuscript. That of Paris is pronounced of superior excellence; that of Vienna is less complete.

The value of the treatises as a contribution to the history of natural science, philosophy, and religion, can hardly be overestimated. The intrinsic worth of the speculations contained in them must be judged by specialists. The Arabian mind was distinguished rather for the facility with which it absorbed the thought of other nationalities than for the originality of its own thought. In a school of learned men, who, while they stood close to the far East, had for their chief instructors the ancient philosophers of Greece, and were influenced by the later speculations of neo-platonism, we need not be surprised to find traces of all those systems which had appeared in the world's intellectual history. An Aristotelian observation of nature, a Platonist searching for ideas, a neo-platonic representation of soul emanating from and returning to a divine source, a hint of the migration of souls, and an anticipation of Middle-age European scholasticism, all these the student of philosophy finds in the treatises of the brethren — a mosaic rather than a compound, because even in our day the

world has found no satisfactory way of uniting in a harmonious system the dicta of reason gathered from experience, and the so-called intuitions of that spiritual sense which, continuing to assert itself over all doubt, presents the strongest fascinations, the most ineradicable convictions, and the mightiest incentives of hope to aspiring humanity.

The teachings of the Brothers of Purity in regard to the natural world are limited by their speculative ideas and by the absence of a strict inductive method. The reasons assigned for phenomena are often fanciful and betray ignorance of what we call natural laws; but a vast amount of information is crowded into these pages, and in some departments we are surprised at the wide range of observation and the truthful account of processes.

Whatever may be our conclusion as to the intellectual merits of the work done by these men, we cannot fail to be deeply impressed with the courage of their undertaking, the boldness with which they asserted freedom of inquiry and speculation, the open-mindedness with which they approached all sources of knowledge, their exaltation of sincerity and truth in social and intellectual dealings, their insistence on self-renouncing service of their fellows, their lofty views of nature and humanity, their hopes of a spiritual destiny, and their efforts to establish man's best aspirations and endeavors on a basis broad enough to satisfy at once his intellectual questionings and spiritual longings. That all this involved revolt against a hardened ecclesiasticism, the rejection of sect, and the discarding of party war cries in a conscientious search after truth is only part of that continually recurring experience which has given so much of pathos and even of tragedy to the strivings of the human spirit. Their work was high and noble; it was prosecuted in a spirit exemplary to us and all who engage in studies that touch the deepest interests of our race.

This account may close with one more extract from the writings of the society. Speaking of the soul's release, the first treatise on natural science says: "This may be accomplished if thou seekest the companionship of the sincere friends and thine excellent brothers who love thee, and of those noble men who seek thy well being and thy saving in common with their own souls. They have freed themselves from the service of the children of this world, and strive with pains-taking after another and lovely world. Walk in their way, aim at their goal, purify with them thine inner man, and take on their character. If thou dost tread their spiritual city, if thou walkest in their angelic way, perform-

est their pure discipline, studiest their spiritual law, thou mayest perhaps be strengthened by the spirit of life to behold the hosts of the Most High and to live the life of the blessed in cheer, delight, and joy without end. This mayest thou attain in thine immortal soul, exalted, luminous, and clear ; but not in thy mortal and perishable body, which is dark, heavy, subject to mutation and transformation. May God help thee and us and all our brethren to a right life ; may he in his grace permit thee and us to reach the abodes of salvation."

Edward Hungerford.

BURLINGTON, VT.

THE BLOOD OF JESUS CHRIST: THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE.

It is doubtful whether any incident in the history of the religious thought of the Christian Church more strikingly illustrates and confirms the declaration of the apostle, that "the letter killeth," than its interpretation of the teaching of the New Testament respecting the blood of Jesus Christ. Upon the face of it, this teaching is metaphorical. The moment we attempt to realize it materially, even in imagination, it becomes repellant. And yet from a very early age it has been literalized, and the Church has been taught that it has been saved by the physical blood of Jesus Christ, flowing from his veins and arteries, — by the sanguineous fluid. To the present day it is taught by something like half of Christendom that a literal partaking of the blood of Christ is necessary, if not to salvation, at all events to any high and divine development of character: for the Roman Catholic Church holds that when the priest, properly appointed for that purpose, pronounces a benediction upon the bread and the wine before him, the bread and the wine become literally body and literally blood of Jesus Christ; and that, then, those who partake of that literal body, that flesh and that blood, are thereby sanctified and made anew. It goes further than this. It declares that in the sanctifying benediction of the priest the bread and the wine become the entire Jesus Christ. "If," say the Decrees of the Council of Trent, "any one denieth that in the sacrament of the most holy Eucharist are contained truly, really and substantially, the body and blood together with the soul and the divinity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and, consequently, the whole Christ, but saith that

he is only therein as in a sign or in figure or virtue, let him be anathema."

Nor can we Protestants inveigh against those who have literally interpreted the metaphorical teaching of the Scripture on this subject for their literalism. We do, indeed, repudiate the doctrine of transubstantiation, — the notion that the bread and the wine are converted into body and blood and soul and divinity by any magic touch or priestly benediction; but still, in a great many Protestant pulpits it is taught that there is something sacred and mystical in the physical blood of Christ, and that the world is saved by the drops which fell from his hands and feet, or the larger portion which poured from his wounded side. And this notion has been wrought into hymns, and uttered in verse and in sermons and in expressions that have lost all metaphorical meaning whatever, and stand as though they represented a literal verity. It has been declared that this blood of Christ was necessary, in order that our own suffering might be intermitted. It has been declared that, because we were guilty of infinite sin, having sinned against an Infinite Being, and were therefore under an infinite condemnation, it was necessary that an infinite person should suffer physically; that Jesus Christ, an infinite person, did suffer an infinite amount of suffering in a finite quantity of time, in order that the infinite suffering might be taken off from the human race. So the love of God has been reduced to a mathematical formula.

It is not strange then, perhaps, that some religious teachers, revolting against this treatment of the teaching of the New Testament respecting the blood of Christ, have erased that teaching from the New Testament altogether; have treated it as archaic, as belonging, at all events, to a past age, and as something to be blotted out of the consciousness of the Christian Church. Yet, if we are to erase it from the teaching of the New Testament, and if we are to blot it out of the consciousness of the Christian Church, we shall erase a great deal from the New Testament, and we shall blot out a great deal from the consciousness of the Christian Church.

The New Testament declares that we are purified by the blood of Christ; that we are washed by the blood of Christ; that we are cleansed by the blood of Christ; that we are justified by the blood of Christ; that we are redeemed by the blood of Christ; that we are brought nigh to God by the blood of Christ. It declares that by his own blood Christ entered into the holy place. It declares that by the covenant, signed by his blood, we enter into

fellowship with Him. This figure of blood is woven into the fabric of New Testament teaching, and is really more pronounced and prominent in the New Testament than in the Old.¹ Moreover Christ himself has laid special prominence upon it; for He has wrought it into an object lesson to remain with the Church throughout all coming time. He has not merely said, — we might perhaps think Him misreported in that, — “He that does not eat of my flesh and drink of my blood has no life in him,” but He has wrought this figure into a ceremonial, a sacred service, which has abode with the Church in various forms for eighteen centuries, and bids fair to abide with it as long as the Church shall stand.

What, then, is the meaning of the “blood of Christ.” What does the New Testament mean by it?

I. Going back to the Old Testament, we find there the declaration that “the blood is the life.” The blood of the sacrifice was the life of the sacrifice. The blood of Christ is the life of Christ. Turning from the Old Testament to other literature, we find this figure wrought into the language of all peoples, blood standing everywhere as the symbol and sign and token of that which is inmost in the person, his intrinsic and essential nature. It is difficult to say why. One might suppose that the nerves were more than the blood a representative of the man’s character, that his brain was more a representative of him than his heart; but in all languages and literatures it is the heart that stands for the very essence of the man, not the brain; the blood, not the nerves. So we speak of a man as hot-blooded or cold-blooded, meaning thereby hot of temperament, or cold of temperament; so we declare that a man’s blood is heated, when we mean that he is aroused, and all his powers are alive with extraordinary activity.

First of all, then, we are saved by the character, the life of Jesus Christ. The blood of Christ signifies not the drops that trickled from his back when He wrestled with agony in the Garden of Gethsemane; nor that which trickled from the hands and feet as He was nailed on the cross. It represents not what He

¹ To see how much must be taken out of the New Testament if its teaching concerning “the blood” is excluded, examine the following passages. The Bible student may also be interested to apply the principles embodied in this article in the interpretation of these passages, and to test the correctness of these principles. Matt. xxvi. 28; John vi. 54-56; Rom. iii. 25; v. 9; 1 Cor. x. 16; Ephes. i. 7; ii. 13; Col. i. 20; Heb. ix. 12-14; ix. 20, 22; x. 19; xii. 24; xiii. 12; 1 Pet. i. 19; Rev. v. 19; vii. 14; xii. 11; xiii. 21; xix. 13.

did or suffered eighteen hundred years ago. It stands primarily for Christ himself in his very personality. What saves, redeems, purifies the world, is not primarily what Christ said as a teacher, nor the example He set as a man, nor even the manifestation which He made of the nature of God, but what Christ was and is in Himself, his individuality, his personality. He, the Divine One, not only living then, but through all centuries living, He is the Saviour of the world. The world is saved, not by a "plan of salvation," not by something that we think about Christ; not by something that has been taught about Christ; not even by what Christ has said about himself; not even by his own teaching; nor yet by something that He did and suffered. It is saved by Christ himself. Because in Him the blood, — that is, the very heart of God, is brought in contact with the heart of man, therefore Christ is the world's Saviour.

In the desert of Africa, Livingstone, the missionary and traveler, writes in his diary these words: "What is the atonement of Christ? It is Himself. It is the inherent and everlasting mercy of God, made apparent to human eyes and ears. The everlasting love was disclosed by our Lord's life and teaching. It showed that God forgives because He loves to forgive." This is the primary meaning of the blood of Christ, the meaning which lies on the very surface of the phrase.

II. But if we look at this figure of blood as we use it in common language, we shall see that there is something more in it; we shall see that it represents, not only the character and person, but that it represents a character transmittible, and a character transmitted. We speak of blooded stock, meaning thereby stock not only noble in character, but with a noble pedigree. We speak of men of noble blood, meaning thereby not only men of noble nature, but men who have inherited from fathers and mothers a noble nature. That kind of character which comes through education we call culture. That kind of character which comes as a free gift, given and almost unconsciously received, that we call blood.

This may help to interpret to us the second element in the teaching of the New Testament. There is a power transmittible in God, and there is a power of reception in man. We take character as God's free gift, and He passes it over to us. The very blood of God, as it were, flows through our arteries; the very heart of God becomes itself the pulsating heart of humanity. He fills us with his own life, as though He had emptied us of our own corrupt blood and filled the arteries and the heart with a new and

diviner fluid. A father adopts a son, taking him out of the street. He surrounds him with culture and educative influences ; he gives him a refined home and educated companions ; he sends him to a school and college ; and yet in spite of it all there crops out in the adopted one's nature now and then some grossness, some coarseness, some element that belonged to his father or his grandfather. But if the foster-father in bringing into his family this boy out of the street could bring him into the inheritance of his own qualities ; if one of a long line of noble ancestry, he could transmit to him the refinement received from that ancestry ; if he could pour into him courage, nobility, fidelity, the fineness, the refinement of nature, such as is the product of generations of breeding, — he would do what God represents himself as doing for us. He adopts us into his household. He brings us under educative influences. He environs us with spiritual culture. He surrounds us with those who have been animated by his own spirit. But that is not all. When God adopts, He adopts not merely into the family and household of faith, but He adopts into the very generation of Divinity. We become sons of God ; heirs of God ; joint heirs with Christ ; partakers of the divine nature. We are saved by the blood of Christ when the transmitted nature of God enters into us and becomes a part of our own nature through Jesus Christ.

III. But there is still one other thought current in our thought when we use this figure in common conversation. We say the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. What do we mean ? We mean that the sacrifice of those who have been willing to suffer for a principle is the upbuilding of the church. Is the man who died upon the rack, and whose broken joints gave forth no drops of blood, — is he not a part of the seed of the Church ? Are Cranmer and Latimer, whose bodies are burned, no part of the seed of the Church ? The ashes of the martyrs are the seed of the Church as truly as the blood of the martyrs. We look back across the intervening years to the men who were willing to shed their blood for their nation's liberty ; but we honor most of all the one who went through the war of the Revolution unwounded, shedding no drops of his blood. When we get away from theology, it is not blood that is precious, but that self-denial and self-sacrifice which is represented and typified by blood shed for those who have no claim except in the court of love. We are saved by the life of Christ ; we are saved by the transmitted life of Christ ; we are saved by that transmitted life

poured out for us, laid down for us. These are the three thoughts involved in the declaration that we are saved by the blood of Christ. Not by something said or done or suffered eighteen centuries ago, but by that spirit of self-sacrifice and denial that was in the heart of Christ, and is in the heart of God, and will be in the heart of God as long as God is God, and as long as He has suffering children with whom to suffer.

But it is only as this spirit that was in Christ is in us, that we are saved by it. It is only as we take Him into ourselves and make Him a part of our own nature, that we are saved by Him. It is only as He takes us unto himself and we take Him unto ourselves that we are purified, cleansed, redeemed, sanctified, lifted up on high.

It is not true that gospel truth must always be stated in Scripture form ; but it may be very reasonably asserted that no doctrine is New Testament doctrine which cannot be stated in New Testament words. And theology has had to create unscriptural terms to state that doctrine of atonement on which it has insisted, a doctrine which cannot be stated in New Testament language. Are we saved by expiation ? There is no word "expiation" in the New Testament. Are we saved by substitution ? There is no word "substitution" in the New Testament. Are we saved by vicarious sacrifice ? There is no word "vicarious" in the New Testament. Are we saved by atonement ? There is no word "atonement" in the New Testament. Twice the word occurs in the Old Version ; but in neither place does it belong there ; in both places has it been taken out by the translators in the New Version. We are saved by One who brings the divine life down into the world ; and we are saved when our own hearts and our own lives are open, and his heart and his life are poured into ours. As the stream pouring through a filthy receptacle cleanses it, so the poured-out life of Christ, filling the hearts of all his children, and all his followers, flows through the world, a constantly increasing river, cleansing humanity. As the waters of the Nile rise and overspread its banks, and carry harvests wheresoever they flow, so this life of Christ, flowing through the centuries, and rising above all bounds that would hold it within narrow limits, carries with it harvest in its open palm into whatever heart or home or life it enters. There are in two or three European Roman Catholic cathedrals phials that contain what is claimed to be the sacred blood of Christ. We are not worthy to be called Christians unless we are such phials, unless

we ourselves hold within ourselves something of that sacred life, personality, character, divinity, that was in Christ himself. The legends tell us that holy men have traveled over the world that they might find the holy cup in which Christ administered that first communion. We need not go far to find it, for right here, by our side, are holy men and women in whose hearts there is the life-blood of Christ, and from whom we may drink, imbibing their spirit in their forth-putting influences. For the true Holy Grail is the heart set to do Christ's service, and filled with Christ's spirit.

Lyman Abbott.

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK.

EDITORIAL.

SHALL THE PAPACY GO FROM TIBER TO THAMES?

EVERY one will know to what we refer. The remarkable article which has suggested our question may or may not deserve the scorn which the "Spectator" has heaped upon its exposition of the relations between Dublin and Rome. The body of the article would equally deserve our deep attention if Ireland should fulfill Carlyle's benevolent suggestion, and submerge herself in the Atlantic for twenty-four hours. Its perfection of style and range of thought, as well as the momentousness of the subject at this present conjuncture of Italian history, all combine to fix universal interest upon this essay of a cultivated Irishman, whether Mr. Addis or some one else, who having been a Roman Catholic, and having apparently lost, or nearly lost, his faith in the claims of the Papacy, has not become embittered against it, but still has half a hope that it may even now unfold a sudden boldness of wisdom, which shall once more establish it in the leadership of Christian mankind. It may be well to ask therefore, How much warrant is there for this imperfect hope?

Three things may be distinguished here. First, does the Church, in her perfect development, require a centre? Secondly, is that centre likely to be found in England? Thirdly, will that centre be found in the Papacy, transplanted and readjusted?

As to the first, Frederick Robertson pours scorn upon the belief that the Church will ever again require a local centre. He insists that she ought to be vital in every part. Undoubtedly she ought. And the damning sin of Rome, in these later ages, is that she is less and less willing to allow of a free vitality throughout the Church. That is true of Rome which Mr. Howells has said of the unhappy Italian poet Leopardi, that the great cerebral sponge seems to have sucked up all the juices of the frame. But it by no means follows from this that the Church is bound to subside into a zoöphytic life, and to become a mere structureless agglomeration of cells. The body of Christ which St. Paul describes is not of this embryonic grade. It has its organs of various rank, from the head to the feet, each serving all, but in a graduated scale of service, as becomes the highest life, which therefore needs to express itself in the most highly developed and differentiated organism. And that only is an organism of the highest type whose vital forces pour themselves into some well-defined centre, from which they are reflected in waves of informing energy upon the circumference. And this image presents itself to St. Paul's mind as that of the Church on earth. Indeed, he applies it immediately to the particular congregation, though as a type of the whole, for the jealous isolation of independency, a passing revulsion from the abuses of centralized power, cannot be imagined as having had a place in the apostolic mind.

The conception, therefore, of a centre of the Church on earth is likely to have as much vitality in the future as it has had in the past, and it is to be hoped that it will have a much more perfect realization. An *absolutely* perfect realization, of course, it will never have until time melts into eternity. The present question is, Will that future centre be in England? We may be well assured that it will not be in Italy. The great historical process which, as Mr. John Fiske says, is transferring the primacy of mankind from the men who speak Latin to the men who speak English will assuredly draw within the range of its efficacy the religious no less than the ethical side of Christendom. The late Archbishop of Halifax assured his Italian brethren at the Council, that within half a century the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Celtic bishops would be found outnumbering those of Italy, and giving laws to the Church of a very different tenor from such as satisfied them. It is true, the clamor of "heretic," "heretic," resounded through the hall; the president rang his bell violently, exclaiming, "What is good enough for Italy is good enough for the world"; and the masters of the ceremonies, laying hold of the archbishop's soutane, dragged him out of the tribune with imperious precipitancy. But the Italians cannot so easily drag down the appointed race which shall inherit, in its turn and for its time, the place which they have had.

Rome is the centre of the Mediterranean world. But, as the geographer Reclus points out, there are two cities which, within a radius of two thousand miles, are the centre of a greater mass of land than any other. One of these is London, and the other Paris. If one of them is appointed to be the œcumenical centre of Christendom in its wider sense, as Rome has been in its preliminary sense, we can easily forecast which of the two it is likely to be. The Latin city may, perhaps, be predestined to be likewise a spiritual capital, but not of the Church of God. When London is the centre of Christianity, why may it not be that Paris will be the capital of organized and developed Antichristianity, in its last great struggle with the Galilean?

Certainly the extension of the "tongue of Milton and the laws of Alfred" through all the planet has some great meaning. The English race seems to be coming to sustain to the vast organism of mankind that relation which the nervous mass sustains to the human body. And if the time is coming, as very probably it is, when the predominance of wealth and of political power will pass away from England, both, perhaps, gathering to our side of the sea, this will only assure more firmly still to her the continuance of the spiritual primacy of her race, and through that of the whole race of mankind. Certainly, the native vigor which God has closed in the Teutonic stock of Britain, enriched and amplified by its large admixtures, and steeled by the vicissitudes of fate through a thousand years of glorious history, may well render it, as it is now beginning to be, the leader of the forces of faith. Of no other nation on

earth can it be said in as eminent a degree as it has been said of England, that it embodies "magnificent mental endowments, teeming energies, and unsurpassed dignity of national character."

But can the Papacy be transplanted to England and naturalized there, becoming in London, for all mankind, what it was for a thousand years for Western Europe? Certainly no argument for its divine institution could have such force as its capacity of undergoing such a transformation. Unquestionably it had a divine mission throughout the Middle Ages. The very fact that some elements of its character were, abstractly speaking, widely alien from Christianity, added for a while to its Christian power. As Principal Fairbairn has remarked in substance, the Church has sometimes advanced towards her goal by appearing for a while to recede from it. And when Leo the Great took up the instruments of Roman dominion, and turning his back upon the past boldly advanced to the conquest of the barbarian future, it was no vain fancy that caused him to work in the strength of the words: *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam*. But far greater than any such resolve which the Roman Leo was inspired to make in the Roman spirit, and with the help of the civil and religious appliances of Rome, would be the flight of the Papacy from the banks of the Tiber to the banks of the Thames. It would be a transmigration that would be a transformation, and indeed a veritable transubstantiation. The Papacy, as its initial activity through Clement of Rome in the first century makes plain, antedates the thought of claiming a succession from Peter. The name of Peter has been the Biblical vesture which has given an evangelical tincture to the reality of Cæsar in the Church. Peter did not bring the Papacy with him from Jerusalem, or from Antioch, he found it in Rome. And it would have appeared in Rome and wrought for a while essentially the same work if Peter had never seen the Tiber, though doubtless it was the instinct that the centre of the Church should be fixed where the centre of mankind was found, which brought the two *principes apostolorum* thither. The Papacy, however, would not have lived out half its days had not its Italian spirit of domination and craft been evangelically mitigated by the memories of Peter and Paul. But the Papacy is not native to the banks of the Kidron, or of the Orontes. It is the true growth of the Tiber, and if it were transferred to the Thames, it would be only to die. Its seventy years in Avignon almost ruined it; a transfer to London would destroy it quite. It is Latin through and through. It is no mere stiffness of unreasoning, but the clear-sightedness of reasoning conservatism, which gives it to divine in the religious use of any other tongue the beginnings of heresy, a deviation from its proper idiom that may be sometimes conceded, but always disliked. The shivering tenacity with which it veils its face in its mantle, and awaits what stroke may fall upon it on the spot of its origin, goes far to show that no such mighty mission lies before Leo the Thirteenth as lay before Leo the First.

The Institute of the Papacy, therefore, appears to be drawing towards its end. But the Idea of the Papacy is likely to survive its Italian embodiment. It is that Idea which gives such strength to the Institute that is as yet its only expression. So long as the providence of Christ has not evolved a new, more adequate, more flexible, and more purely Christian incarnation of this idea, so long will the affections and reverence of Christian mankind cling largely about it, undeterred, or only half deterred by the long associations of cruelty and fraud which defile its history. But as a centre of the Church, imperfect, indeed, but effective, was providentially developed in the ancient centre of mankind, independently of apostolic sanction, but drawing apostolic sanction to itself, so, we have good reason to believe, a better centre of the Church may be developed in a better centre of mankind. England has the gift of imperial rule, but in her it is more and more passing into something better than the gift of rule, into the gift of guidance. She left behind her on the heights of Yorktown the disposition to suppress the great communities that should look to her with reverence. Since then, on the whole, and increasingly, her disposition has been to develop and moderate, and in ripeness of time to obey the summons which the great Clement the Fourteenth heard, but could not prevail upon Rome to heed: "Let the nations go free." Should the central guidance of the Church of God be committed into her hands, it will doubtless have its abundant faults and defects. But it will contrast with the Italian leadership as brightness with the dusk.

What form would such a guidance assume? Doubtless no such form as we can yet precisely forecast. Different anticipations of it already exist. The Evangelical Alliance is quietly, but pretty effectively, drawing to itself a metropolitical control over the non-episcopal churches, at least of English speech. Those who dislike its rawness, its recentness, and what they regard as its narrowness, are apt to take refuge under the pastoral staff of Canterbury. This great and illustrious see, to which, within the precincts of the Reformation, no other can be compared, passed, during the episcopate of Tait, as the Rev. R. S. Oldham, of Kent, has well said, from a English primacy into an œcumenical patriarchate. Urban II., seven hundred years ago, saluted Anselm as *papa et patriarcha alterius orbis*. Anselm's present successor is that in an extent of which Urban never dreamed. And the difference between the English reasonableness of Canterbury and the Italian imperiousness of Rome measures the difference between a lead of the Church which should be vested in the former and that which has been vested in the latter. The remarkable resemblance between the slow but steady development of influence in the English see and the slow growth of the Roman see is very fully set forth by Cardinal Newman in his book on the development of doctrine.

Undoubtedly a great opportunity lies before Canterbury. But it will

not be really entered upon until the haughty prelatists who despise the meek wisdom of her late Presbyterian archbishop have learned what the largeness of Christian brotherhood really implies. She will be more likely to have an assured hold upon the future when she is ready to welcome Ussher and Baxter as the supporters of her armorial bearings, and to let Becket and Laud drop into the dimness of an obsolete age. But the union of dignity, effectiveness, and unpretending brotherliness, which the Convocation of Canterbury has shown in the conduct of the Revision, is a good omen for the future of this cradle of Anglo-Saxon Christianity.

It is not to be supposed that in any event there will ever be a centre of the Church in so defined a sense as that the whole of living Christianity will be coördinated with it, or subordinated to it. No claim of divine right to lead the Church can ever be raised in behalf of a see which is more than five hundred years younger than the Church. The haughty legitimacies and *jura divina* of the past must more and more give way to the one certain divine right, the right of preëminent serviceableness. Nor is it in any Institute below the Church of the Firstborn in heaven to establish the certainty of this preëminence in the eyes of all Christian men. But we may hope that a more truly Christian humility of helpfulness will secure a wider acknowledgment for some focus of Christian influences, and that this, in whatever form it may appear, will be found in the ages next succeeding us not far removed from the banks of the Thames.

THE OUTCOME AT NEW YORK: THE AMERICAN BOARD.

IN the result reached at the late meeting of the American Board we gratefully acknowledge the fact, that a way has been opened for the honorable settlement of the controversy which has agitated the Board for the past seven years. The result was in no sense a victory for either party to the controversy, neither was it a compromise, but rather the prelude to a settlement of difficulties. It was a triumph of Christian fellowship.

The outcome of the meeting was as gratifying as it was unexpected. Not a few of the friends of Missions went to New York with anxious forebodings. Some anticipated a recurrence of the scenes at Des Moines and Springfield; others a repetition of the session at Cleveland. But the meeting took its own course, characterized neither by organized antagonism to the policy of the Prudential Committee, nor by an equally impressive absence or silence. The dominant feeling at New York was expressed in the words in most frequent use — “unrest,” “disquietude,” and “discontent.” This feeling, which was manifested at the first opportunity, grew in extent and in intensity until it became necessary for the Board to pause and face the issue. The issue was separation. Would the ma-

jority force it? Would the minority accept it? The line of danger was reached, but it was not crossed. The moment came when division was made possible, but the moment passed by, and we believe that it cannot return. When the President of the Board declared, at the critical time, his recognition and acknowledgment of the fact that there are two wings in the Board, and that each has the right to its own opinions, his declaration marked the turning point in the long continued controversy. His exact words were these: —

“Brethren, I have no single desire in the world for this Board except as it may be in consistent harmony with the principle, which is a controlling one with me, to bring the members of this Board together. There was a party in the city some years ago that was described as angelic being, because it had two wings. Now, this Board has two wings, and it is perfectly legitimate that it should. We have the right, all of us, to our opinion, and we are to deal rightly and fairly with one another. I have believed as strongly as I have ever believed in anything in the future, not the subject of prophecy, that in the course of a year or two, if we could only hold together without these personal questions coming in, we should find ourselves agreeing, not in opinion necessarily, but in feeling, in purpose, and in work.”

In these words he struck the note of comprehensiveness. It was the word for which men had waited, for without it it was felt that there could be no progress, no peace. When it came, it was seen that the true word had been uttered, and that in accepting it the Board had reached the beginning of the end of the controversy. It was the utterance of this declaration which justified the hope under which Dr. Storrs two years ago accepted the presidency of the Board. In his letter of acceptance he said, “It was only in the hope that some way might appear in which we could all walk together that I consented to review the question which had appeared already decided,” namely, the question of accepting or declining the presidency. And in the prospect of realizing this hope, through the use which he made of his personal influence, we repeat with enlarged meaning the words which we then used in commenting on his letter of acceptance: “If Dr. Storrs shall prove to be a leader into this way of peace, none will rejoice more heartily than we: nor will we allow ourselves to question that his devotion to justice and liberty is as controlling now as in the days when he was associated in the editorship of ‘The Independent’ with Joseph P. Thompson and Leonard Bacon.”

As we have intimated, the real outcome of the meeting at New York was the formal recognition of the fact that there are two wings in the Board, and that each has the right to its opinions. This granted the way to peace, and coöperation is open. It was natural that a committee should be appointed “to inquire into the methods of administration pursued at the missionary rooms in Boston, and to recommend any changes which shall appear to them needful and important,” but the work of this Committee, apart from the reiteration of the policy which called it into

being, is the work of adjustment, the settlement of methods rather than of principles. The principle has been established. It is the principle of comprehensiveness, of which the spiritual expression is fellowship and the practical expression coöperation.

Meanwhile the question arises, what of the immediate future? Pending the report of the committee of inquiry and recommendation, what shall be the working policy of the Board, especially with regard to the acceptance of missionary candidates? To this question the Board gave a direct answer. The letter of Dr. Storrs in accepting the presidency was made at his request, or rather as a condition of his acceptance of a reelection, the platform of the Board for the ensuing year. We do not understand that this action absolutely repeals the resolutions of the Board under which the Prudential Committee has acted for the past two years, but we do understand that it is to be interpretative of these resolutions. And with this important circumstance in addition: Dr. Storrs, as President of the Board, has been added to the Prudential Committee, where we very naturally expect that he will act, as occasion may offer, as the interpreter of his own words. This fact, taken in connection with his more recent declaration to which we have referred, invests his opinions then expressed with great interest. We quote so much of his letter as refers to the proper method of dealing with missionary candidates, without comment.

"The Prudential Committee has been instructed for the second time to exercise caution as to the appointment of any candidates holding a doctrine which the Board yet esteems an unacceptable innovation, and whose tendencies it judges, as at present advised, to be perverse and dangerous. But this instruction clearly allows, if it does not suggest, that the Committee is to consider each case by itself, and, in the few instances likely to arise where there is any uncertainty on the subject, is to form its judgment with kindness and candor, as to the amount and the spiritual force of any tendency which may appear toward the opinion which it must not indorse. It has already unanimously decided, as I understand it, that when one does not find the new theory sustained by the Bible, and does not hold it as part of an accepted speculative scheme, but leaves the whole momentous matter to which it refers in the hands of Him who, as Judge of all the earth, will do what is right in wisdom and love, no hindrance is interposed to immediate appointment. This seems to me entirely accordant, in letter and spirit, with the repeated instruction of the Board; and I have no doubt that the same course will hereafter be pursued, and that considerate care will be exercised to discriminate between the want of an opinion and the presence of one which implies or favors the objectionable theory, — between even a vague hope, acknowledged to be unsupported by the Scripture, only personal to one's self, held in silent submission to subsequent correction, and a distinct dogmatic tendency or a formulated conviction.

No doubt the shadings of thought at this point will be delicate and intricate in some minds; while in most, the fact that the Master said nothing about any

future opportunities, with the intensity of his appeals for immediate repentance, and the solemn urgency of his imperative command for instantaneous missionary effort will make the theory of such future opportunities appear quite incredible. In the other and smaller class of cases, I am sure that the majority of the Board would wish, as I should, that great pains should be taken to disentangle feeling from conviction, a sympathetic impulse from a controlling theological bias ; that constant tenderness should be shown to those who are treading with diffident steps on the high places of inquiry for the truth ; and that due regard should always be had to the probable influence of an earnest missionary zeal, and the educational force of missionary work pursued in a temper of loyalty to Christ, upon the formation of future opinion in those whose impressions are tentative and unfixed. I do not imagine that any material difference of judgment will here arise between the Committee with the Secretaries, on the one hand, and the Board on the other. The Committee may not pass certain definite lines ; but affectionate sympathy and Christian solicitude toward any whose minds are not set toward conclusions which the Board as a body does not accept will no doubt be the common impulse."

The theological significance of the result at New York may be wrongly estimated by those who are not familiar with the doctrinal views of the different parties in the constituency of the Board. Strictly speaking, the action had no theological significance. No one's opinion was changed or affected by it. The majority did not thereby withdraw their disavowal and censure of the theory or hope which had given rise to the theological controversy, and the minority did not withdraw their entertainment of it, or sympathy with it, or acknowledgment of its rights. If the theological attitude of the constituency of the Board toward the vexed question of Eschatology, especially as related to the salvation of the heathen, were analyzed, it would probably be found to show some such result as this. A part of the majority holding to the traditional theory of the Board as set forth in quotations and references in the pamphlet of the Rev. Dr. A. C. Thompson, the Chairman of the Prudential Committee : another and probably larger part repudiating this conception of the universal perdition of the heathen, and finding in the Atonement the ground on which, through various unknown agencies, the heathen are actually being saved in vast numbers without the knowledge of Christ. Of the minority, some entertaining the theory or hope that the knowledge of the love of God in Christ will at some time and in some way be given to all as a motive to repentance and faith : others not accepting this particular view, but allowing that it is as permissible as any view which they, or any of the majority, may hold. The range of opinion upon this subject is wide, and varying in degrees of positiveness, with a large element of agnosticism in the holding of all opinion at the point of application to the destiny of particular persons or classes of persons. For there are two great truths involved in the discussion of which no one can see the complete adjustment, or tell what the result will be in their application to a particular case, namely, the truth of the univer-

sality of Christianity in its relation of motive to the race, and that of the self-determining power of sin in the individual. Evidently there ought to be liberty of opinion in regard to the relative place of these truths in the Christian system. As was said at the meeting, "We must differ in opinion unless one or both parties are false to their convictions, which above all things may God forbid" — a liberty of difference which was expressly recognized in the closing words of Dr. Storrs's plea for agreement, "not in opinion necessarily, but in feeling, in purpose and in work."

The one effect of the action at New York in its theological bearings is to remand theological discussion to the place where it belongs, and where it always has belonged, outside the American Board. A Board constituted for missionary ends is no place for the philosophical or critical or even spiritual treatment of controverted truth. That demands its own time and place. It belongs within the domain of reverent Christian scholarship, where each and every truth has a fair field, and must expect to abide the issue. To quote again from Dr. Storrs's letter of acceptance: "The questions of Eschatology, vast as they are, wide in their relations, intensely attractive to many minds, are sure to be discussed in years to come, perhaps more largely and more profoundly than they have been hitherto. Congregational scholars and divines will take, no doubt, a distinguished part in such discussions; and it may be that in their final result the new opinion is to gain such a power as it has not yet received; or it may be on the other hand, as many anticipate, that it will disappear, except from individual minds, and that to the general devout thought of the earnest missionary church it will dissolve itself into the baseless fabric of a dream."

The theology of the Board, in its Eschatology, must always be that of the individuals and churches making up its constituency. At present the constituency of the Board has no clear and well-defined Eschatology. Nothing is more evident than the rejection, even on the part of a majority of the majority, of the belief in regard to the universal perdition of the heathen, held at the date of the origin of the Board, and constituting one of the chief motives of its origin. All discussion, therefore, is timely and necessary which may serve in the end to replace the abandoned belief on this subject with a belief which is at once positive and tenable, a belief which, if it is not in itself the missionary motive, shall be in harmony with and support the motive which is now dominant and active. The understanding now is that such discussion shall go on outside the Board and not within.

The result at New York in its missionary bearings cannot be over-estimated. Even in advance of the final settlement, the principle of coöperation can be put at work for immediate results. Without doubt the missions which belong to that branch of the Church which the Board

represents have suffered through dissensions. As Congregationalists we have not kept pace in our missionary efforts with the growth of the denomination, nor with the advance in missionary zeal and enthusiasm in some of the other denominations. Occupying the great vantage ground inherited through the American Board, we have not fully used our present opportunities. The large and unexpected legacies bequeathed the Board have allowed some enlargement of the work ; but we ought to make ourselves more and more independent of this uncertain element of progress. Missions belong to the living church, and are its peculiar responsibility and privilege. We have begun the settlement of our differences none too soon to take our part in the general advance of Christianity throughout the world. The call for reinforcement and enlargement which came from every quarter, the call not of despair but of hope and opportunity, was a plea for union, fellowship, and cooperation. Especially is this true of the appeal from Japan so urgent, so inspiring, so definite with its specification of towns, cities, and provinces, open to and in waiting for Christianity. It is a matter of profound gratitude that in the face of these appeals from brethren of our own and of other races we can turn our thoughts and our energies from the things about which we differ to those in which we agree, relegating opinions to their legitimate fields of discussions, and uniting in the active and aggressive work of Christ among the nations.

CONCILIATION NOT COMPROMISE: THE COLOR QUESTION IN THE CONGREGATIONAL COUNCIL.

At the recent Congregational Council convened at Worcester, two sets of delegates presented themselves from the churches in Georgia. They represented respectively colored and white churches. But this fact did not prove that the color question was involved, because the churches had had an independent history. The colored churches, fifteen in number, had been organized in connection with the work of the American Missionary Association. The white churches, fifty-eight in number, were originally Free Protestant Methodist churches, which had about a year and a half ago adopted the Congregational polity and creed.

The colored delegates were admitted without question. An ecclesiastical difficulty arose in regard to the reception of the white delegates, which was intensified by the fear that the difficulty might in some way conceal the color question. The difficulty upon its face was that the white churches had presented not only delegates from the district or local conferences, but also a delegate from the general conference, corresponding to a State association. But there was already a State association composed of colored churches, which held the ground and was entitled to representation. And it soon came out in discussion that continued but unsuccessful attempts had been made to unite the two into

one body. The colored delegates having been admitted, and so having the privilege of debate, at once took the floor and stated the case from their point of view. They spoke with clearness and effect, and made a strong impression upon the audience. But as the discussion proceeded, others now joining in it, it became evident, as one member of the Council said, that the Council was getting a good deal of heat to the amount of light. The question uppermost in the minds of the members of the Council was, why did not the white churches accept through their committee some one of the various offers of the committee of the colored churches looking toward a complete union in a common State association? This was put directly and in various forms to the Committee of the Council which had presented a report favorable in part to the white churches, and also to the white delegates who had been asked to participate in the debate, though not yet recognized as members of the Council. The answers given, though not absolutely satisfactory, showed that the reasons against the plans of union proposed were not necessarily founded in social prejudice. There were reasons growing out of the previous condition of the white churches, their methods of organization and association, which made the particular plans less feasible than they appeared to be, or to use their own word, "impracticable." And the Council was disposed to accept these reasons as offered in good faith, because of the explicit promise that in the local conferences there should be no distinction whatever between the white and colored churches, and also because of the understanding that continued efforts should be made to bring about a complete union in one State organization. It was therefore voted that the white churches should be recognized so far as they had complied, in promise at least, with the conditions of Congregational fellowship, but that further recognition should await a more complete fulfillment of these conditions. And in consequence the white delegates from the conferences were received, while the white delegate from the General Conference or Association was denied admission, but was allowed to sit as an honorary member. This action, it was understood, met the approval of the leading speaker among the colored delegates, and was acceptable to a large majority of the Council.

The result was not a compromise; it was a recognition of the conditions of fellowship just so far as they had been fulfilled. Possibly the testimony of the Council might have been stronger against the principle of caste, if it had refused to receive the white delegates until all the conditions of fellowship had been complied with, in the State organization as well as in the local bodies. But on the other hand it was felt that the position of the Congregational Church was so well understood that it could afford to be magnanimous. The conciliatory policy seemed to be open without involving the danger of falling into compromises. If for any reason the result should not justify the policy thus pursued, there will be no hesitation about future action. The Congregational Church can

never allow itself to occupy a doubtful position upon the "color question," which is simply the question of caste. The following resolution, adopted in connection with the admission of the white delegates, expressed the mind of the Council, and reflects the mind of the denomination.

Resolved, That this Council re-affirms the historic position we conceive to be characteristic of Congregationalism, always the equality of all believers in Christ Jesus, and that we admit the before named delegates of the Congregational conferences in Georgia to membership in this body, in the belief that they also stand with us on this ground; and in the expectation that they will use their uttermost endeavors at home to realize and manifest the fact in the promotion of organic union among all the Congregational churches of that commonwealth.

THE TRIENNIAL CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

THE Convention of 1886 is most generally remembered as the Convention in which an attempt was made to adopt the name "The Church of America," instead of the name "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America." Alarm was felt by the broader minds of that church in view of the apparent growth of a narrow ecclesiasticism, and the public at large was both amazed and amused at such pretension on the part of a section of one of the smaller religious denominations of this country.

The Convention of 1889 has not been disturbed by any proposals or discussions which would array one party against another, but has been occupied with plans for increasing the practical efficiency of the Episcopal Church, and for giving more flexibility and richness to its worship. Measures for grouping dioceses into departments have been under consideration, and, as usual, missionary work has received earnest attention; but the time and interest of the Convention have been most largely given to the revision of the prayer book. Various changes have been agreed on which will probably receive final sanction in the Convention of 1892. We have not been able from unofficial reports to compare these modifications in detail with the present prayer book, but have the impression that the object has been to give more option to clergymen in the use of certain portions of the service, to distribute those portions in the order of morning and evening prayer so as to shorten both, and to remove certain infelicities of expression or arrangement. The revised hymnal offered by the committee, which has been at work on it since 1886, was not acceptable to the Convention, and another report is to be made in 1892.

General interest outside the Episcopal Church attaches chiefly to two results of the Convention; — the direction concerning the use of the Ni-

cene Creed, and the resolutions concerning Christian Unity. Heretofore the use of the Nicene Creed in public worship has not been required. It may be repeated instead of the Apostles' Creed, and the custom is quite general of using it on certain days, but the use has been optional. Now it is to be repeated in every church on Christmas Day, Easter Day, Ascension Day, Whitsunday, and Trinity Sunday. Discussion on the resolution requiring its use was prolonged and animated. Objections were made for a variety of reasons, but they pertained more to the history than to the theology of the Creed. Some opposed the requirement on the ground that the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from the Son as well as from the Father was never adopted by the Eastern Church, and that the recital of a creed containing that doctrine should not be required of any branch of the Church Catholic, as the required use thus becomes a hindrance to Christian unity. This, in fact, was the principal objection. It was urged that the Nicæano-Constantinopolitan Creed which was sanctioned by the Council of Chalcedon is the only form that has catholicity, and that the later Western form which added "*filiouque*" never had any general sanction, and is still an offense to the Greek Church. Others objected on the ground that no more should be required in the order of Holy Communion, with which it is connected on the five days specified, than at Baptism and Confirmation. Still others intimated that it imposed a theological burden too heavy for some of the clergy to bear, although no one made this objection on his own behalf. On the other hand it was urged that the Nicene Creed in the Constantinopolitan form, and with the "*filiouque*" added, has always been included in the formularies of the Episcopal Church in this country, that the bishops of the Church of England objected to giving episcopal orders here because the proposed prayer book omitted the Nicene Creed, and that the objection was removed by inserting that Creed in the order both of morning and of evening prayer, and that the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from the Son is explicitly stated in the Articles of religion and is therefore the doctrine of the Church, and finally that to make the use of it optional might result in the entire disuse of it in some churches, and thus deprive some of the laity of a cherished privilege. These considerations prevailed and every minister must henceforth repeat the Nicene Creed at least five times a year.

The discussion and final action indicate that the Episcopal Church with almost complete unanimity maintains the doctrine of the proper divinity of Jesus Christ. No one objected to the "*filiouque*" as a doctrine, but only to the proposed use of the Creed containing it. Indeed, the ritual of the Episcopal Church is so permeated with Trinitarian expressions, that communicants must accept the divinity of Christ with cordial assent in order to employ sympathetically the prescribed forms of worship. The service of that church to religion is scarcely less through its maintenance of the evangelical doctrine of the Person of Christ than through the importance it attaches to public worship.

There was reaffirmation of the basis of agreement on which it is thought the great evangelical communions can unite, and a direction to continue efforts looking towards union. It will be remembered that, at the Lambeth Conference last year, partly in consequence of overtures already made by the Episcopal Church in the United States, a basis of union was defined, and every encouragement was given to persist in the efforts which had been begun. The Convention in New York sanctioned the basis of union, and advised conference with representatives of other religious communions. The proposals of the Lambeth Conference were as follows: "That, in the opinion of this Conference, the following Articles supply a basis on which approach may be by God's blessing made towards Home Reunion: (a) The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as 'containing all things necessary to salvation,' and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith. (b) The Apostles' Creed as the baptismal symbol, and the Nicene Creed as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith. (c) The two Sacraments ordained by Christ Himself — Baptism and the Supper of the Lord — ministered with unfailing use of Christ's words of Institution, and of the elements ordained by Him. (d) The Historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the unity of His Church." There was no extended debate on the subject, but on the other hand no objection was made to carrying forward the movement as far as possible. It is worth something to have the great agreements of evangelical churches clearly recognized, as in the first three articles of the Lambeth proposals, concerning the Bible, the Sacraments, and the two ancient Creeds. Even the fourth is purposely left vague, so as to emphasize the authorized perpetuation of the offices and sacraments of the Church through a consecrated order of men rather than to insist upon particular forms of government or titles of incumbents. In the Church Congress recently held in Cardiff, Wales, the conditions and prospects of union were discussed at considerable length, some speakers taking up one by one the proposals of the Lambeth Conference. So far as the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in this country are concerned the fourth article alone seems to present difficulty, as many in those churches do not recognize the validity of ordination in some other bodies. Should the opinion become general which is entertained by some eminent churchmen that episcopacy, although of early origin, is not of divine command, even this barrier to union might be removed. It is not forgotten by some, also, that at the Reformation the Church of England did not affirm the *exclusive* claim of her Episcopate, and did not condemn Presbyterian or other ordination, but admitted to benefices without reordination a considerable number who had received only Presbyterian orders. One of the speakers at the Cardiff Congress, Dr. Perowne, the Dean of Peterborough, having recognized the facts just mentioned added in a very noble strain the following remarks: —

"Let me be clearly understood. I disclaim in the most emphatic manner any desire to treat Episcopacy as a matter of indifference. I do not think one form of church government as good as another. I have never uttered a word which, except by gross and willful perversion, could be made to bear such an interpretation. But I take the ground of our Reformers, I take the ground of our great Anglican divines, and I affirm that Episcopacy is of the *bene esse*, but not of the *esse* of a church. I believe it to be the best form of government, but I dare not say that without it there is neither church nor sacrament. I believe its origin may be traced back to Apostolic times. I do not see that it is of Divine command. I believe that Christ may call His ministers now as He called them of old. Paul and Barnabas went forth on their great mission as Christian evangelists before that hands were laid upon them by the officers of the Church. And their ordination, moreover, was not by apostles, but by the prophets and teachers which were in the church at Antioch. Shall we say there can be no true ministry apart from Episcopal ordination? Or shall we not rather say with Irenæus, "*Ubi Ecclesia, ibi Spiritus Dei, et ubi Spiritus Dei ibi Ecclesia*"? But let me repeat, if I urge concession here I urge it only for the express occasion. I urge it because without this concession reunion is impossible, and because to make this concession for the special end in view is to make no sacrifice of any vital truth. It is to take the position of the Reformers of our own Church before the reformation of the most illustrious of our Anglican divines."

It probably is a long road to a corporate union of the Episcopal Church with other evangelical churches, and it is not certain that an external unification is to be desired. Coöperation in missions and charities is a practical union which removes the reproach of divisions. Occasional alliances on a large scale may be arranged in order to promote coöperation and exhibit brotherly love. Conferences of representatives from the great denominations for the very purpose of discussing the possibility and conditions of union promote fraternal feeling. A delegate from Canada to the Convention in New York speaking of steps towards practical union said: "We appointed a committee and had a conference with committees representing the Presbyterian Assembly and the Methodist General Conference. The three committees met last spring and I had the honor of being present as a member. Let me assure you it was one of the most delightful occasions. Although we may not in our lifetime bring about this much desired end, still we can never do it unless we commence, and we feel that something has been done in bringing these people together to look one another in the face and confer upon the subject." Christian union has in fact been partly accomplished. The bitterness of denominational rivalry is fast disappearing on missionary ground, in the English colonies, and in the United States. The spirit of toleration is general. There is mutual recognition of the fruits of the spirit in the different communions. The churches are not antagonistic but supplementary to each other. They respectively exercise functions which are requisite to the complete religious development of the "nations and peoples." Proposals looking towards corporate union are rather a result and a sign of

much progress made in spiritual union than the initiation of a new movement. *Unity* is growing and will grow whether organic *union* is ever secured or not. The duty of all Christians is, as we have formerly said, to discourage all peculiarities of worship, government, and doctrine which are foreign to a catholic spirit, to avoid all that is provincial and eccentric, to elevate prayers, hymns, music, preaching and creeds to the level on which all Christians can hold communion with God and with each other. When religious life and worship are essentially the same, denominational groupings survive for convenience and not for division.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.¹

It will be impossible, at this early date after the appearance of this Report in print, to give as full an account of its new and abundant material as one could desire. But enough can be done to direct thought to its great subjects and to the work itself, which fortunately can be obtained without cost on application either through members of Congress or directly to the Department of Labor at Washington.

The official history of the Report is recited in the introduction. It begins with the appearance in Congress, in January, 1884, of petitions prepared in accordance with the suggestions made in a letter in the New York "Tribune" in the previous December. After various vicissitudes, the Senate almost unanimously supporting the measure, and a large but insufficient number in the House being in its favor, it finally passed the House and became a law March 3, 1887. An additional sum was given the Department in 1888, to enable the Commissioner to complete the work, he receiving \$17,500 in all directly for this purpose, though he had full power to use his regular appropriations for it. The work has taken two years and a half from the time of the first appropriation and preliminary study to its final issue in the printed volume, which comes nearly six years after its first definite proposal by the friends of the National Divorce Reform League. Its idea, however, is much older than this, having been suggested for the Census of 1880.

The Report gathers up nearly everything in the statistical works of Europe relating to marriage and divorce to supplement the collections of its special agent, Dr. E. M. Hartwell, of Johns Hopkins University, which were mainly confined to the period of twenty years in the United States, the direct subject of investigation. It has, therefore, the character of a thesaurus on its immediate subject, which is "Statistics of and relating to Marriage and Divorce." While the European matter, which takes nearly one hundred pages, does not cover Europe completely, it greatly increases the information previously in print in many scattered official publications, and in the little publications of Bodio and Bertillon, be-

¹ *A Report on Marriage and Divorce in the United States, 1867 to 1886*; including an Appendix relating to Marriage and Divorce in certain countries in Europe. By Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor. February, 1889. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1889. Pp. 1074.

sides bringing it together in clear arrangement. The laws of divorce and statistics of Canada are also included in the Appendix. The American matter dwarfs all our former statistical information on the subject of Divorce almost into insignificance. While it is not a report on Marriage and Divorce laws, it is by far the best source of information on these subjects, so far as it is necessary to know them in order to understand the statistics. We have now an official digest of these condensed into one hundred pages so ingeniously made by the use of headings, tables, etc., that more is compassed than can be found in several times the space elsewhere, and arranged so that any desired point is quickly found. Unusual pains have been taken to secure accuracy, as none of the existing compendiums were found free from errors. A vast amount of work is often condensed into single tables. The table showing ages of consent, those regarding marriage licenses, the officers issuing them, the fees prescribed, the methods of returns, are good examples of condensed, yet clear showing. The exhibit of Divorce laws is equally clear and full. The system of registration and publication of returns of marriages and divorces is clearly shown wherever any exists. But in the case of marriages, unfortunately, the want of any system worthy the name is the great discovery in most States.

The general tables of the Report are eight in number. Marriages and divorces throughout the country are first given for each of the counties by years for the twenty years 1867-1886. Statistics of divorce are practically complete, and enable each locality in the country to compare its own condition with that of any other. The causes of divorce, not merely the statutory causes, but the great variety created by the interpretations of the courts, are shown *in extenso*. These in some States count as many as sixty, and in one seventy-five. That is to say, the variations in practical application of a dozen or less statutory causes reach this number. The duration of marriage before divorce for the several States and Territories and by classified causes of divorce is shown for each year. This average for the whole country is 9.17 years. Where the husband was the applicant, it was only 8.97 years, but in case of the wife 9.27. The largest single number of divorces for any one year after marriage was 27,909, and these were those who had lived together four years before divorce. The next largest, 27,250, took place three years after marriage; while 21,525 sought divorce in two years, and 15,622 after one year. "It is surprising," says the Report, "to find that 25,371 couples, after living together twenty-one years or more, were obliged to seek divorce." The average duration of married life before divorce in this class is found to be 26.95 years. In any deductions as to the period at which divorce is most likely to occur we should remember that the number of married persons declines as we recede from the date of marriage, so that 25,371 divorces after twenty-one years of married life must be a far greater percentage than the number would be twenty years earlier. This adds to the terrible significance of the figures relating to divorce late in life. In many of the older States, the average age at divorce is increasing considerably, and it has risen more than half a year for the entire country. In Massachusetts in 1885, it was nearly thirteen years. In Arkansas the average for the twenty years is only 6.48. The table showing the place of marriage of the divorces is very valuable. Its exhibit is in four particulars. It shows for each State the number of those divorced who were married

in the State, those who were married in some adjoining State, those who were married in some other of the United States, and those married in a foreign country. There were only 7,739 of the last class in the entire period. Still another table gives the number of children in those cases where the facts were known. A study of selected counties in a dozen States is made with reference to the relation of intemperance to divorce, and various other points are treated, such as the number of applications rejected, and the number of cases in which notice to the defendant was made by publication.

Unfortunately the condition of the returns of marriage are such that a very few States only supply really complete figures regarding marriages, and a few more any that are nearly so. It is impossible, so soon after the Report has become available, to go into its contents as fully or thoroughly as can be done later. But some points which it has brought out can be noted now.

1. The primary fact that has thus been established is, of course, that of the wide prevalence and increase of divorces in our Western civilization. A generation ago it would have been thought incredible that in the twenty years, 1867-1886, there would be granted 328,716 divorces in the United States, or that over 25,535 could be granted in a single year. Yet this is the fact. And divorces increased from 9,937 in 1867 to 25,535 in 1886, which is more than twice as fast as the increase of population. The movement is exceedingly steady from year to year. Dividing into periods of five years each, we get a safe comparison. The second period has 27.9 per cent. more divorces than the first; the third 30.3 per cent. more than the second; and the fourth 31.4 more than the third. The only exceptions to the general increase, when the statistics are taken in quinquennial periods, are in Maine, Connecticut, and Vermont. New York and one or two other sections show but slight increase in proportion to population. In the older States, or perhaps one should say in those States where the movement early gained volume, the increase of late generally goes on at a slower rate. In the South it seems especially rapid, though not yet attaining the volume it has in the North and West. It is unfortunate that the Report was unable, from defects in the original material, to distinguish between divorces granted whites and blacks. But clearly the increase is chiefly among the blacks.

It is difficult for various reasons to find a perfectly satisfactory basis for comparison. The ratio of divorces to the population, to the marriages formed during the year, to existing married couples, or to the marriages dissolved for all reasons in the year, all prove imperfect forms of statement. Some fail for want of the necessary data; others for their need of corrections not easily made. But it is evident that divorces have been so numerous in several States that they must in some years be one in ten or even nine of the marriages.¹

The same thing goes on in Canada and Europe, though with a very different volume. Canada granted only four divorces in 1867 and eleven in 1886. European countries and states, including Canada, give results as follows for the years named, being those in which statistics for the earlier and later dates are supplied in the Appendix to the Report. Between 1867 to 1886, eleven foreign countries or states increased their

¹ For a discussion of the various methods of computing ratios, see the ANDOVER REVIEW for January, 1887, in the article on the "Verification of Social Statistics."

divorces in the aggregate from 3,541 to 9,200. Between 1876 and 1886, thirteen give figures. These show an increase from 6,540 to 10,909, or sixty-seven per cent. The increase between these two years in the United States was 72.5 per cent. But here, of course, the increase of population must have been much greater. Like the South, the increase in Europe seems now more rapid, partly because the movement has not yet attained the volume of our own Northern and Western States. The exceptions to the movement in Europe are almost as few as in the United States. All the countries in Europe which gave us figures for 1885 report a total of 23,735. Probably the statistics of all Europe, if fully collected, would now give about the same number of divorces as the United States, though the latter has less than one fifth of the population of Europe. The highest divorce rate in Europe for an entire country is in Switzerland, which had one for every 20 marriages in 1882. The city of Hamburg is the worst single locality reported, with one to 16. The German Empire has about one in 60; but Saxony has had one to 30. The ratio in France reached in 1885 one in 45, being one to 46 the next year.

Here, then, we meet the great fact of a vast social movement, affecting peoples under all laws, religions, and races, and with exceptions such as prove the rule rather than otherwise. For it seems true, generally, that some special reason, like an exceptional condition of law, or the comparative isolation of a state or country from the great social currents of the times, is the leading cause of the exceptions.

2. The influence of legislation upon divorces in this country is almost the first object of attention. This matter is discussed in the Report, with several pages of comment on the changes of laws and their effect upon the *increase* of divorces. The relation of laws to the volume of the movement, that is, to the greater or less number of divorces in the several States, is not discussed in the analysis of the tables, though the Report has a good deal of material bearing upon the point. Upon the increase, the conclusion seems to be that the relaxations or restrictions of law do affect divorces most perceptibly, but not enough to account for more than a part of the increase. In the three of our States showing decided decrease in divorces, the improvement is due to more stringent legislation. Every one will regret that Vermont repealed her law of 1884 before it was fairly tried. This secured a delay of six months after the entering of libels for divorce, and required the presence of the defendant in court when it could be secured. It greatly reduced divorces. Five States, including Indiana and Vermont, now require the prosecuting attorney of the State to appear, either in all suits, or in certain classes of them. But no information is at hand showing the use made of this feature of law. In Europe a similar provision is perhaps the rule, and the practice seems to conform to its spirit as well as its letter. The various "omnibus clauses," that is, enactments by which large discretion was given to the courts, and which aided the parties who sought divorce for reasons hard to establish under strictly defined causes, have nearly disappeared from the statute books, and the result is everywhere good. Indiana repealed such a clause in 1873, and further provided that abandonment must last two years instead of one, and that "failure of the husband to make reasonable provision for his family" must be "for the period of two years." This legislation checked the increase of divorces for five years. In the last ten years they have, however, increased sixty per cent.

Looking, now, from the increase of divorces to the influence of law upon their prevalence, there is evidently material for thought. Maine, since 1883, has several causes for divorce in place of one chief statutory cause, — "omnibus clause" that covered most cases before that date. Yet her divorces since are hardly two thirds what they were for four years before that time. High divorce rates, as a rule, nowhere exist unless the causes are so many or so loosely stated that divorces can be granted readily. Administration of law greatly affects the results. For example, New York, with only one cause for absolute divorce, has forty per cent. more divorces than New Jersey with two, not counting those which are more properly grounds for nullity. This better condition of New Jersey is probably due to her system of courts of chancery, to which all libels of divorce are committed, and whose rules of procedure, I have been told, are carefully framed and faithfully applied. The notorious case of Sheriff Flach has led to the revision of the rules of the courts in New York, by which the common practice of putting cases into the hands of a referee outside the court is likely to be restricted. I believe Chicago some years ago gave up the practice of hearing cases in private; "in chambers," as it is called. If I mistake not, it is no longer lawful in Illinois for the divorce lawyer to advertise his trade in the newspapers. This subject of administration under the rules of the courts does not come within the scope of the Report, but it is probable that a very marked improvement in respect to divorces granted would be effected by stricter administration of such laws as we now have.

3. The influence of conflicting laws upon divorce is a subject of great interest. There has been a strong public sentiment in favor of uniform marriage and divorce laws for the entire country, involving in the minds of most an amendment of the Constitution of the United States giving jurisdiction to Congress over all matters relating to marriage and divorce in the entire country. A few, however, have hoped for this result through some convention of the States. Several objects seem desirable. The first is to secure a common legal status throughout the country for the married and divorced, and for their children. It is well known that sometimes distressing conditions beset the innocent for lack of this uniformity. A second reason comes from the opportunities that now exist for deceit, fraud, and great wrong which individuals suffer, and which bring dishonor to the States by parties going from one State to another to obtain divorces more easily or more agreeably. It is possible for a man nominally to spend three months in Dakota, running into the State at regular intervals, if he does not care to spend the ninety days there, and come back with a divorce of which his innocent wife knows nothing. A winter's stay in California may be prolonged to six months with like results. Indeed, several States and Territories afford such facilities. A summer at Newport may be lengthened out to a year, with frequent visits to New York, and thus allow one to escape the necessity of establishing the one cause required in New York, or the resident of New York may contrive to comply with the law of the adjoining State of Pennsylvania, and reside there nominally or in reality for a year. Utah formerly permitted one filing a mere expression of a desire to become a resident to sue for divorce. Certain parties in certain States, in league with officers of the courts in Utah for two or three years did an enormous business for their clients. No less than 914 divorces for 1877 were discovered by the expert of the Department, nearly all of which

were thus obtained by parties from the East. This continued until the Mormons themselves instigated the repeal of the mischievous law.

It has been generally assumed by the more earnest advocates of uniformity through national legislation that their desired result would strike at the main root of the divorce business, so far as affected by legislation. Intelligent persons have constantly assumed that the larger part of the divorces of the country belonged to the class of those secured by migration for the purpose. But the Report, for the first time, puts this whole matter on the substantial basis of induction from the facts. The marriages of 289,546 out of the 328,716 couples divorced in the United States in twenty years took place in this country; only 7,739, as before stated, were married in foreign countries; and the libels failed to give the place of marriage in 31,389 of the cases. More than one fourth of the last relate to the divorces of Connecticut, as this State does not conform to the general rule in stating where the parties seeking a divorce were married. Now, of those whose place of marriage was reported, 231,867 couples, or 80.1 per cent., were married in the very State where their divorce was granted, and 57,679, or 19.9 per cent., were married in some other State than the one in which the divorce was obtained. This shows conclusively that certainly eighty per cent. of all the divorces are obtained, beyond doubt, in the States where the marriage took place, without any attempt at migration for the purpose.

The 19.9 per cent. who have been divorced in a different State from the place of marriage cover two classes. The first of these is that of those who have emigrated from the State of former residence between marriage and divorce in a perfectly proper way. Just how much must be subtracted for this element it is impossible to say. But I think few will hesitate to make the subtraction cover one half of the 19.9 per cent., and some might be inclined to reduce it still more before we get a fair estimate of the second class, which is made up of those who have purposely sought divorce in a State other than the place of their marriage. The average length of married life before divorce has been already given as 9.17 years, which must be not far from two fifths the natural duration of marriages. The Report shows the movement of the native population, according to the censuses of 1870 and 1880, to be so great that twenty-three per cent. in the earlier and twenty-two per cent. in the later year of the "native-born" population of the United States were in those years living outside the States of their birthplace.¹ Unfortunately the last census did not tabulate these facts for the adult population by conjugal condition. Had this been done, the results of the present Report could be reduced to an exceedingly close approximation to the facts.

But these facts are so given that their obverse side can be seen. For by the ingenious yet simple device of putting together the divorces from marriages occurring outside the respective States, a table is constructed showing where those married in any given State were divorced, and, comparing this with the contributions that State has made of its natives to the present population of the rest of the country, we get further light upon the problem. Though still confronted with the same indeterminate element that meets us in the other table, we see the facts from another point. It shows, for example, that New York had 9,205 of its mar-

¹ The exact percentages for those years were 23.2 and 23.1 respectively; and the percentages of divorces from marriages in other States in the same years were 19.4 and 19.

riages dissolved in other States, which is nearly sixteen per cent. of the entire 57,679 who obtained divorces in other States than the place of their marriage. But New York had in 1880 over twelve per cent. of her natives living in other States. This seems to indicate that New York is a State from which parties go for divorce—a theory that conforms to the popular impression and to the conclusion one would reach from knowledge of the restriction of absolute divorce in New York to one cause. So it might be shown by the balance of percentage on the other side that Illinois and formerly Maine were States which parties visited for the sake of easy divorce, but to much less extent than most think. I am not without hope that we can yet make pretty close deductions from such data as we now have.

The Commissioner gives many instances in which the facts correct the popular impression. For one example, take Rhode Island, a State which is particularly inviting to citizens of New York who seek divorce. Yet out of 4,462 divorces in Rhode Island during twenty years, only ninety-seven were granted to parties who had been married in the State of New York. The people of New York are also thought to go to Pennsylvania for divorce, and they undoubtedly do so. And yet out of 16,020 divorces in Pennsylvania only 765 were from the marriages of New York. This is 4.8 per cent., against about 2.4 per cent. of the population of Pennsylvania who were natives of New York. Indiana divorces had only 17.5 per cent. of which the marriage was known to have been in other States, and Illinois only 21.4 per cent. But this would probably be increased in these two States somewhat from the number of “unknown.”

The conclusion seems inevitable that migration from one State to another for the direct purpose of easier or more agreeable divorce, though it has doubtless covered thousands of cases in the last twenty years, really includes but a small part of the whole number. It must also follow that with all those who believe that divorce itself is an evil, the much discussed subject of uniformity has by no means the preëminent place in the real problem that most have given it. The uneasy couples of the East may to some extent go to the courts of Chicago, Indianapolis, or California. But the frequently, and in many instances, the very much higher divorce rates of the cities and other resorts for divorce, over rural communities as a whole, will not account for the great and rising flood that has inundated the entire country. After all, the six or eight hundred divorces in Cook County in each year is a less serious affair than the pretty even distribution of 1,500 to 1,800 over the hundred counties of Illinois, outside Chicago. If the Report does nothing more than compel a more judicious opinion on this one part of the great and intricate problem of uniformity, thus leading to broader views of the legislative questions involved, it will have accomplished much.¹

This investigation, which is, after all that may be said of its remarkable achievements, but little more than a preliminary survey of the ground, prepares us for the first time to grapple with the problems of marriage

¹ The writer could give many instances of fruitless attempts during the last seven or eight years to convince the public and individuals that the state of things regarding migration for divorce was substantially what the official Report now shows it to be. The popular opinion on this subject is a striking illustration of the extreme uncertainty of “common observation” on similar social facts, and of the supreme importance of their determination by the scientific statistician.

and divorce legislation with some real intelligence. While writing, a telegram comes from an influential source, asking about uniformity for the Territories and District of Columbia. I have replied in substance that it is too early to make fixed channels for the action of Congress even on this one point, though it is perhaps probable that some such course should be taken sooner or later. But I would move cautiously, for a while at least. For this subject of uniformity concerns every State in the Union, as well as the few remaining Territories which may soon become States. And it has its important international relations as well. It is not intended, however, to take up here a subject that needs a full article by itself for its treatment, but rather to use the little space left for two other points.

The relation of intemperance to divorce receives some light from the Report. Not much of this, however, comes from the comparison of the legal causes assigned for the divorces. For these vary in different States more from the condition of the laws than from the state of morals. That sixteen per cent. of all the divorces in the United States were granted for cruelty, thirty-eight per cent. for desertion, and only four per cent. for drunkenness proves nothing as to the respective influence of these causes. Some States do not allow divorce for these causes at all. It seems singular at first thought that one half of all the divorces for drunkenness in the whole country are granted in the States of Massachusetts, Ohio, Iowa, and Illinois, some of which are most reputable for sobriety, where together they make nearly fourteen per cent. of all divorces. But this may not mean that drunkenness is more common in these States than elsewhere, but simply that public sentiment and the conditions of the law favor resort to this plea for the dissolution of marriage.

The Commissioner caused a special investigation to be made on this point in forty-five selected counties in a dozen States, covering 29,665 cases of divorce. It was found that "in 5,966 cases, or 20.1 per cent. of the whole number, intemperance was a direct or indirect cause." And the Report adds: "From all the evidence which can be gathered it is probably true that this more fully represents the part played by intemperance in divorce than the facts where drunkenness is directly and singly alleged to be the cause." Of course, the careful reader will see that even into this twenty per cent. of cases there may have entered other coexisting causes. It is forgetfulness of this possible coexistence of a number of "causes" for any given result that has made so many of the statistics of the causes of poverty, crime, and other evils of little value or misleading in the hands of the unskilled. I think it will be difficult to change Mr. Wright's figures very much on this relation of intemperance to divorce. With figures on other social evils they point unmistakably to the wonderful complexity of the causes and forces at work in modern social life, and will contribute to the direction of public attention to the need of better methods of study on the subjects of social reform.

Let this meagre account of some of the rich material in this Report conclude with a reference to the work which it shows is needed in its own special line. While only twenty-one States provide for returns of marriages to some State officer, very few even of these secure such a degree of completeness that the figures have statistical value. Less than a dozen make any attempt at the collection and publication of their statis-

tics of divorce. While we carefully gather statistics that relate to most material and social interests, we have strangely neglected the means of studying this most important subject of the formation and dissolution of the Family. And it is only recently that several of the leading European nations have entered upon this work. By some common arrangement between the general government and the States, if not with foreign countries, this work, of which Mr. Wright has so admirably laid the foundations, as he did several years ago in Massachusetts, should now, as it was then, be followed by a system for the permanent collection of this important material. His earnest remarks on this subject and his account of the points that his Report would have gladly included, if they could have been secured with any reasonable labor, are important suggestions to all citizens, and especially to those directly concerned in legislation. It would be very easy to secure in the contents of all libels very many of these facts. Their classification and study would be invaluable aids to legislation and in sociological study.

Meanwhile it would seem desirable that Congress should consider the wisdom of making the extensive working tables of this Report, which could not be incorporated in the already large volume, and perhaps some further digest of the present issue, the material for a second volume on the subject.

I may possibly hereafter give some account of the general state of marriage and divorce laws in this country and Europe.

Samuel W. Dike.

AUBURNDALE, MASS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

V. WEST AFRICA.

EACH continent has its turn. The interest which, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, turned upon America now turns upon Africa. This is now the continent of great discoveries, of great expectations, of great colonial aspirations; the continent, also, which is exposed to peculiar dangers. One of these dangers threatens from the East, and from Islam; it is the Slave-trade. One threatens from the West, and from Christendom; it is the Liquor-trade. It is hard to say which is the most abominable, and which the most destructive. On the whole, however, the palm of evil may be assigned to the Slave-trade, since this is a force brought upon the people from without. But they are both evil, and only evil, and that continually. Christendom, however, has a conscience which may be educated; Islam has none, for Islam knows of no obligation outside itself, except that of forcible proselytism. But where is the Lavigerie that shall arouse the moral sense of Christendom against itself? Or, rather, where is the Wilberforce of the end of the century, who, as the former shamed Christendom out of a wrong towards Africa which it shared with Islam, will shame it now out of a wrong towards Africa of which Islam is innocent. The two great channels for the introduction of this Christian evil are the two great Western rivers, the Congo and the Niger.

The "Church Missionary Intelligencer" for February, 1887, speaks very fully, and draws an appalling picture of this evil, "of the havoc and ruin wrought by this frightfully insidious and unfortunately popular traffic. It may be summed up in the deeply pathetic words of the Rev. James Johnson, native pastor at Lagos, spoken at one of our Committees: 'If this trade goes on, it is only a matter of a few years for myself and my people!' The testimony of Mr. Joseph Thomson, the African traveler, is as follows: On the way out, on board an African trading steamer, he employed himself in noting 'how many bales or packages of useful articles the merchants of civilized Europe supply to the unhappy Negro, as compared with more baneful articles of trade. . . . At each port of call the eye becomes bewildered in watching the discharge of thousands of cases of gin, hundreds of demijohns of rum, box upon box of guns, untold kegs of gunpowder, myriads of clay pipes, while it seems as if only by accident a stray bale of cloth went over the side.' At one part of his journey he writes: 'In many districts the wealth and importance of the various villages are measured by the size of the pyramids of empty gin-bottles which they possess.' . . . One opinion is that 60,000 hogsheads of fifty gallons each is the annual consumption in the rivers of Niger, Benin, Brass, New Calabar, Bonny, Opobo, Old Calabar, and the Cameroons; 'in other words, this compressed space lying between 4° and 8° E. long., or say 250 miles of coast, consumes 20,000 tons, or say twenty ships full of 1,000 tons each year.' Writing from Brass River, at the end of 1883, Archdeacon Hamilton says: 'To give you some faint idea of its extent, one of the National African Company's steamers recently carried 25,000 cases of gin and demijohns of rum, and this was to supply two factories only.' We have quoted these estimates of quantity imported because they are tangible means of calculating the prodigious injury inflicted upon that unhappy land."

The "Intelligencer" continues: "We must pay to the National African Trading Company, now called the Royal Niger Company, a deserved tribute in acknowledging that they have endeavored to restrict this wretched traffic, and that they would have been glad if international regulations had been agreed upon excluding it altogether from the Niger district. Our own government, we may add, is in thorough sympathy with these views. But the chief opponent is Germany. To such proposals she, one of the most protectionist countries in Europe, opposes the argument about the sacred rights of trade. The reason of this is not far to seek. The liquor trade is largely in the hands of Germans, and they naturally bring very strong pressure upon their own Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Their pecuniary interest in the business is nearly four times as great as that of all other nationalities put together."

The present influence of Germany, both in Eastern and in Western Africa, seems to be a very doubtful good. Her watchword in Europe is "Blood and Iron"; her watchword in Africa seems to be, "Blood, Iron, and Rum."

Another ambiguous influence in Africa, as well as in the Pacific, is the attempt, on the part both of Germany and France, to bend general Christianity, in the form of missionary enterprise, into an instrument for the advancement of their own particular national interests, to take the missionaries under their patronage, on condition that they will consider it a part of their duty to preach Germanism or Gallicism, as well as the gospel. In time past it has been fashionable in Germany to

sneer at missionaries; just now it is rather fashionable to compliment them. But the new fashion does not seem to imply any real advance of essential appreciation over the old. The missionaries will be flattered so long as it is hoped that they will be willing to make themselves subordinate to the government; if it is found that they really recognize the impossibility of serving two masters, and that they are impracticable in working for Christ rather than the Kaiser, this wind of favor will go down as suddenly as it has risen. And all the Protestant missionary societies, at least, although heartily loyal to Germany, seem to be very decided, that it is neither their business to preach Germanism nor to confine themselves to German territory. We wish we could say that the French brethren were quite as free of undue Gallicism. The German government, however, instead of honorably recognizing the universal character of missionary work, seems only too well inclined to rid its territory of all foreign missionaries. In East Africa it is stated that the French priests and nuns are only tolerated until they can familiarize their German successors with the work; Bishop Smythies has received broad hints, which he, however, refuses to take, that he had better contract his lines within British territory, although he began his work before the German advance; the English Baptists on the Cameroons have been worried into surrendering their stations into the reluctant hands of the Basel Society, who hardly know what to do with a people trained so differently from their ways; and the French on the Gaboon have forbidden our American Presbyterians to use any foreign language but French in their schools, which has led to good out of evil by bringing them into joint action with the Paris Society, as this is sending them teachers. With this unamiable, almost brutal chauvinism, the large-heartedness of England in her great colonial empire stands in noble contrast. She welcomes missionaries of any nationality; permits them to teach their people in any language they please, and no more thinks of watching them than of exacting passports of them. It is true, she knows the imperial English will make its way, and that foreign missionaries will soon find it becoming vernacular to themselves, and be glad to have it so. The sins of British administration abroad are great, and none are so conscious of it as Englishmen. But Mr. Charles L. Brace is beyond question to be upheld in his testimony, that English society is in a specifically eminent degree pervaded by the spirit of Christ. That man is no enlightened Christian, and certainly he is no genuine Protestant, who does not pray that England, as well as we, may be saved, abroad and at home, from "all sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion," and from all Medean plots that would cut her in pieces, like Pelias, in the mocking assurance of thereby renewing her life. For well-intending zeal sometimes casts behind it a long shadow of insidious malice. Germany, too, who at heart is honest, as her colonial empire waxes older, will lose much of her surly jealousy. When the three great Protestant nations know for what end God has set them on high, then the gospel in its purer form will begin to gather fresh confidence in its advances throughout the world.

The "Intelligencer" remarks: "The aggressive attitude of Mohammedanism in Africa of late years and the activity of the forces of Islam at the present moment are ominous marks in the 'Outlook in Africa.' . . . Checked in Europe, checked in Asia, the expiring throes of that huge superstition are convulsing Africa."

The "Intelligencer," while sharply criticising Dr. Blyden's views of

Mohammedanism, remarks, however : " Of one thing we feel assured, and in this we are at one with Dr. Blyden, that Africa for the Africans is no unmeaning cry. It is not impossible that here and there explorers may discover tracts on which Europeans may manage to live with comparative impunity ; but it does not follow that, even with modern skill and appliances, these spots will be easily accessible. Residence within the tropics is accompanied with serious risks. The Portuguese have already dwindled to nothing under it, although not Northern Europeans. We doubt permanent impression being made upon Africa by the multitudes of adventurers now swarming into it ; deleterious commerce rather than substantial benefit to the Negro bids fair to be the result. Indeed, it seems problematical how far the benevolent efforts to evangelize the interior may not be overdone and vitiated by European cupidity, as they are already by Mohammedan brutality. A still better cry would, in our estimation, be ' Africa by the Africans.' They can cope with the insalubrity of the climate ; they can bear the scorching rays of the tropical sun ; they know, or ought to know, what is in the heart of their brethren. Evangelization by such means is and must be a slow process ; it takes a long time suitably to train agents and to imbue them with that amount of learning and intelligence which would qualify them to be teachers of their brethren. Nor has it been found in practice that all who have been trained are willing to quit civilization for the risks attending life in the interior. Still, if Africa is to be evangelized, Native agency is, so far as man can judge, indispensable for this end."

How far the Europeanized or Americanized black would possess the power of easy acclimatization or easy naturalization in Africa is perhaps somewhat doubtful. Still, it is evident that there must be a deep underlying sympathy, both physical and psychical, which there cannot be between the African and the white, above all the white of Teutonic race. As Goldwin Smith has truly said, they seem separated by almost the diapason of humanity. In the West Indies we used to feel as if we were discharging headless arrows, as we looked into the unresponsive faces which expressed, what the negroes did not hesitate to say : " Buckra and we no one." The spiritual centre of gravity is different in the two races. The vices against which we are most severe in preaching to them are those to which we are least prone ; the virtues which we pass over most lightly in presenting to them an ideal are those which they find it easiest to practice. Because he could not turn this childlike, easy-going, loquacious race into driving, taciturn Yankees, we have seen an able, faithful missionary almost as much enraged as if they had broken all the Ten Commandments at once. But, as the "Spectator" has well said, unless the African *genius* can be Christianized, the race will continue to present only an imitative, parasitical Christianity, which, whenever the tutelage of the white superiors is slackened, will begin to gravitate irresistibly back towards heathenism. There is not the slightest necessity that the Prophet of Africa should be a Moslem. He may well be a Christian of the deepest sort. But he must be an *African* Christian. His rebukes and his consolations must both be those of a brother, not those of a conscientious taskmaster endeavoring to force the people into a mould of character into which they can never enter.

The negro Mohammedans of West Africa have been spoken of as much more simple-minded and friendly to Christians than Moslems in general. The following account of an interview with them, at least, is

agreeable to this opinion. It is from the "Intelligencer" for May, 1888. The account is given by the Rev. W. Allan, who had accompanied the Bishop of Sierra Leone to the Temne country, in the interior. "We have all been to pay a visit to the palace of the Timneh king, a Mohammedan. He happens himself to be away at present, but we were received by the official called the king's father, without whom he cannot act, and also by the king's wives. I was introduced by the Bishop as the Church Missionary Society in a concrete form. The Bishop, through the interpreter, spoke very straightforwardly, asking for the king's direct encouragement in the work, and received most favorable replies. There was a Mohammedan priest there, in a prominent position, and he professed himself equally friendly, and all alike declared their willingness for the people to become Christians, and undertook to send the children to our Mission school although there is a Mohammedan school, kept by this very priest. The king's father promised that they would all attend an open-air service which we said we would hold to-day outside the king's house; and the priest said, as the Christian religion was older than the Mohammedan religion, it was heavier and must prevail; if the Testament contained good things which the Koran did not, they would be glad to know and believe them; they were only stumbling in the dark; the missionary had light, and they wished to benefit by it. . . . There were as many as forty present, and our interview lasted a long time. It was a very interesting visit, but of its real importance I do not feel able to judge. There was not a trace of Mohammedan bigotry visible, or the slightest indication of hostility to the gospel." The service was held, attended by about two hundred, including the king's father, who was very energetic in his expressions of approbation, declaring that it would become them all in future to see that the missionary school and preaching were more effective among them.

The Rev. W. Allan also gives the following account of his visit to the Niger Delta: "I found Mr. Robinson and the Henry Venn awaiting me, with steam up, and fuel, provisions, and other necessities on board. We started at once for Brass, with its three hundred communicants, where I had the pleasure of seeing the admirable iron church which the native converts have erected for themselves, and towards which Chief Sambo alone contributed 480*l.*, besides handsome church furniture obtained direct from England, and the native pastor, as well as the pastor's house and the premises for which our Secretary is negotiating, in order that he may have a roof on dry land to cover him, which at present is not the case.

"The next morning we weighed anchor at four A. M., and proceeded through pestilential creeks till night, when we anchored in as wide a portion of the creek as possible, in order to give as wide a berth as we could to the cannibal tribes who inhabit the shores, and amongst whom no missionary work has yet been done. Starting again at four A. M. on the Saturday, we threaded more of the fragrant creeks until about two P. M., when we arrived at Bonny, and before long were on shore, and under the roof of the Ven. Archdeacon Crowther and Mrs. Crowther, of both of whom I am thankful to say that I continually heard a good report in the course of my journeys, even from the censorious and negro-hating steamboat captains and officers. We were soon joined by Mr. Packer, who has no other home than accommodation kindly granted in a floating trading hulk. He was looking remarkably well, and seems to be much appre-

ciated by Archdeacon Crowther, having thrown himself heartily into the work, especially as to the erection of the large iron church, which is to accommodate 1,500, and which has been purchased by the liberal contributions of the chiefs and converts. I then went with the Archdeacon to see the Juju grove, where the twins used to be thrown out to die, and religious murders annually perpetrated to celebrate the commencement of the yam season; and also the ruins of the old Juju temple of skulls, which are rapidly disappearing from view. We also went to visit King George Pepple, and his sister, who received us warmly. It was then arranged that I should give an address on Sunday morning to the native congregation in the school, which is used as a temporary church, and that Mr. Robinson should preach to the Europeans. It was very delightful, about seven o'clock on Sunday morning, to hear the faint sounds of worship wafted from the shore to our boat (half a mile distant), and to remember that those who were engaged at that early hour in such exercises of devotion had been extricated, through the grace of God and missionary agency, from that horrible degradation in which they were so deeply sunk, and in which multitudes around them are unhappily as deeply plunged as ever. For several centuries European traders had been living amongst them, or beside them, without any amelioration of their state; but the gospel has achieved in a few years what commerce had failed in all those centuries to accomplish. The school-church was thronged on Sunday morning with a most devout and orderly congregation of adults, 855 being present. The heat was inconceivable and overwhelming, but I was enabled, at the close of the service, to address the congregation through an interpreter, and made a point, as usual, of saying, not what was likely to be agreeable, but what I hoped might prove profitable. The king was present, and also two, if not all three, of the Juju priests who were recently the ringleaders of the murders and cannibalism for which the Niger Delta has so long been infamous, one of them being already a baptized Christian, and the other two under instruction for baptism. The baptismal class numbers over 700."

The "Intelligencer" for March of this year says that at Sierra Leone, Lagos, and the Gambia, the girls' schools worked by Roman Catholic nuns are the best. "We are not surprised. While Protestant missions send out women by ones or twos, Romanist missions send them out by half dozens. The Church at home boasts of its pure faith; but it has yet to show its faith by its works. At the same time, the C. M. S. schools, though not first, are well reported on, and the government grants, which are dependent on results, are higher than ever before." This statement has been since found to be inaccurate, and the Roman Catholic superiority, where it exists, to lie chiefly in giving more instruction in sewing and other female work. — We find in the "Intelligencer" the statement, made by Sir John H. Kennaway, M. P., in the House of Laymen attached to the Canterbury Convocation (relating, it is true, to East Africa), that the waste of the slave traffic had been found so enormous that, to secure 5,000 slaves, 33,000 lives had been sacrificed. Cardinal Lavigerie's wonder that the Congo does not run blood instead of water is a very intelligible hyperbole. — Mr. Graham Wilmot Brooke and Mr. Ernest Shaw, two young laymen, have gone out as independent missionaries to the Upper Niger region. They expect, however, to work in close connection with the Church Missionary Society. — Bishop Crowther is not, as has been stated, the first negro bishop that has ever been con-

secrated, for during the time of the Roman Catholic missions in Loango there were, it is said, two native bishops consecrated, and doubtless there have been others, not to speak of such of our own colored countrymen as are bishops without claiming an unbroken succession. But Crowther is the first negro bishop of the Anglican communion. And, being a native African, originally a heathen, and then a slave, he unites at once every peril and every qualification of his great office and greater work. It is comforting to know that now for many years he has approved his appointment as having been eminently wise. He seems likely to be succeeded in his episcopate by a son to whose worthiness, as we have seen, the haters of his race bear the fullest witness. The "Intelligencer" says: "Bishop Crowther arrived at Bonny on January 20th. A week later he opened the new church of St. Stephen at that place. The new church is of iron, and was built (at the cost of the people themselves) to take the place of another which had become much damaged. It has sitting accommodation for 1,000 worshipers, but at the opening service no less than 2,000 managed to squeeze into the building, and the school-room and its grounds were thronged by thousands of spectators. All the chiefs but two of the Bonny district were present with their attendants. The service was conducted by the Bishop and his son, Archdeacon Crowther."

The Bishop of Sierra Leone, in his late charge, referring, doubtless, to the extreme insalubrity of West Africa, at least below the Sahara (for Senegambia seems very tolerable), says: "Perhaps there is no part of the world where we learn to appreciate continuity more than in Western Africa. God has permitted us to work side by side in his Church here for more than six years!" — It is known that at the Lambeth Conference as in so many other Christian conferences, the question was raised: Shall polygamists be baptized, but forbidden to take additional wives after baptism? The Bishop of Sierra Leone says: "I ventured to speak earnestly against any lowering of our standard on any pretense whatever, and I believe events will ultimately justify me in the course I took. I cannot but feel that the Church in Sierra Leone has so far, apparently, failed to realize the moral significance, as I do, of this question. I think, moreover, that there has been some confusion of thought about it. Possibly it is because the Church in Lagos is more in touch with the mission-field, and has more experience of facts as they are, that we have from there a decided voice against any compromise. And it was a *strength indeed*, to find, in the venerable Bishop of the Niger, one who maintained boldly in the Conference that our position in Africa would be untenable if we lowered our standard on this subject for a moment. The decision of the Bishops that *polygamists may not be baptized* may make our progress slower, may impose on us the duty of self-denying provision in a few cases here and there, but we shall be on the 'King's Highway,' and thus the progress will be sure." — "It was stated in England some time since that Mohammedanism was gaining *converts* in Sierra Leone. I am thankful that this cannot yet be truly said, but I dare not guess how far its presence in our midst, without any aggressive work on our part, is a source of great danger to many! What the next census will reveal, who can tell? It is more than possible that it may tell us that this peninsula is inhabited one half by those who profess Christianity, and one half by those who do not!"

The "Church at Home and Abroad," for June, 1888, after speaking

of the coöperation of the French brethren in sending teachers for the schools at the Gaboon, remarks: "The French Society may do yet more for this mission. A deputation sent by them to visit the Congo region proposes to visit also the Gaboon and Corisco field, and it has been intimated by them that the report of this deputation may be such as to induce the French Society to assume that part of the work of our own Board which now lies within French territory. This will completely cut the Gordian knot which has occasioned so much trouble and such painful suspense both to the Board and to all the missionaries, for several years." The French, it appears from the "New York Evangelist," not only require all European teaching in the missionary schools to be in French, of which no very serious complaint need be made, as things are, but even forbid any vernacular teaching in the missionary schools. Whether the French learned this vexatious interference with religious rights from our Indian Commissioner or he from them does not appear. Probably in each case it was a spontaneous growth of authority, thinking that religious rights are a sort of dust in the balance, that are to give way whenever some heady impulse of civil policy comes in their way, just as the English government in the seventeenth century effectually quenched all hope of gaining the Irish for Protestantism by ordaining that rather than Gaelic, which all then knew, the Church Service should be read in English, which was known to few, or in Latin, which was known to none. May we be saved from learning any of the tricks of English despotism in the past, or of French despotism in the present!

"A very remarkable revival," says the "Church Abroad and at Home," "was reported as in progress at Kangwe on the Ogove a year ago. This still continues. The spiritual interest among the people in this region has been very marked throughout the entire year. It is the custom of our missionaries to have an inquiry class formed of those who expect to unite with the church. These are generally kept under special instruction for the space of one year. Ninety-three new inquirers were enrolled in this class at the March communion, and by the end of June the number had risen to 117. The aggregate number of these inquirers for the year reached 379. Meantime, from those admitted previously to the class, 44 were received into full membership with the church, making the number of such accessions through the year on confession of faith 91. Mr. Good writes in one of his letters, 'We have striven to raise the standard of piety in the church, and in order to do this we have been more than usually strict in exercising discipline. The general spiritual tone of the church, though leaving much to be desired, is improving.'

"At Kangwe the usual congregation in the church on the Sabbath is from 50 to 150, while at the quarterly communions as many as three or four hundred attend, bringing their own food with them, and availing themselves of such shelter as is at hand.

"Miss Harding at this station has continued her work as usual, journeying from town to town along the river with a boat and Kangwe crew, and at every place conversing with and teaching the people. She writes: 'It has been a great pleasure to me to visit towns during this cheering revival year, when the people are eager to hear God's message and drink in the words of their spiritual teacher with avidity. On Sundays I have a large class of Fans, sometimes numbering twenty, so that we are beginning to reach that large and interesting tribe.' — "Talaguga, 215

miles up the Ogoe River, is the home of those patient and courageous missionaries, Dr. and Miss Nassau. Here for long years this devoted brother and sister have labored in one of the loneliest points in the dark heathen world. From among the forests and river villages they have already won a few converts to Christ, have put into their rude language the first lessons of gospel truth, and there every Sabbath day, in the midst of the all surrounding heathenism, may be seen an humble little chapel, with its clay floor and bamboo walls, filled with worshippers."

Dr. E. W. Blyden, of Sierra Leone, himself a colored man, and, we believe, a pure negro, has been known as maintaining that Christianity as represented by the white man, and above all by the English race, so disdainful, in both its branches, of African peculiarities, has no prospect of making its way in Africa against Islam, which is entirely indifferent to distinctions of race. The banner of Mohammed was first raised by a negro, and intermarriage with negro slaves has been so general in Arabia that the whole Arab race is now a race of mulattoes. But it appears that Dr. Blyden has no thought of representing Mohammedanism as final in Africa. He writes to the Presbyterian Board, May 19, 1888: "I am persuaded that when the negroes from the United States begin to press into the interior of Africa with their new civilization, their improved methods of industry, their towns, their farms, their schools, their churches, their temperance regulations, their superior social organization, they will introduce a new spirit into the pagan and Mohammedan tribes. All the Semitic and Arabic elements will be eliminated, and Mohammed as the prophet of a tribe will retire before the Prophet of humanity, the Prophet of the universe." But how far is there a prospect of such a negro emigration from our country, and how far does the present condition of Liberia warrant the hope that such an emigration would have these brilliant results?

The committee of the Presbyterian Council appointed to wait upon the King of the Belgians with reference to the liquor traffic on the Congo met in Brussels on the 16th of July, and proceeded together to the summer palace at Ostend. Being presented to Leopold II., the committee read a brief address, of which one paragraph is as follows: "A deep interest is felt in your Majesty's efforts to prevent the extension of the baneful traffic in ardent spirits in the Free State, and we feel assured that the measures which your Majesty has adopted, or may hereafter employ, for the restriction of that evil or of any other abuse of commerce, which tends to the ruin of weak and untutored races, will meet with the approval and gratitude of Christians in all lands." The king replied in English, expressing his gratification. Then "observing that the delegation was largely American, he expressed his satisfaction at the assurance that the people of the United States were in sympathy with his efforts, for he had had the impression, perhaps an incorrect one, that the United States were in favor of an unrestricted liquor traffic in West Africa." What a sting for us! America has freely consented that Madagascar may prohibit the import of liquor; why does she make any demur to giving King Leopold the same power of protecting his African subjects? What demons of the still have gained access to the ear of the Washington government? We can remove them if we will; will we?

The Presbyterian magazine for last November says: "The Roman Catholic missionaries on the Ogoe give fair notification to our Protestant French teachers at Kangwe and elsewhere that they will fight them and

fight us at all points. We have therefore one more element of opposition than Paul encountered. We have not only 'the world, the flesh, and the devil,' but by way of culmination the Jesuit is added." We presume the editors are here quoting Paul for "substance of doctrine." They add: "One would think that the habitations of cruelty are dark enough — that fetishism, the murder of witches, the burial of wives in funeral celebrations, the slave-trade, cannibalism, the liquor traffic under the flags of Christian nations, were sufficient to unite all branches of the Christian Church in the rescue; but no: the motto of the Catholics is, 'Down with the Protestants!'"

The "Missionary Yearbook" for 1889 gives the Gaboon Mission of the Presbyterian Church as having originated in 1842. Including 284 communicants in Liberia, with 272 scholars, and 984 in Sunday-schools, its African missions stand: Nine American ministers, 4 natives ordained, 3 licentiates; 4 American lay-helpers, 8 American ladies; 26 native helpers; 14 churches; 1,031 communicants; 97 additions. The Church Missionary Society began its mission in West Africa in 1804. It has at present 46 stations; 11 ordained, 6 unordained foreign agents; 49 ordained, 233 unordained native agents; 23,781 adherents; 11,110 communicants; 97 schools, and 7,945 scholars.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

LAST August a series of events occurred in London, the importance of which it is hard to magnify. The laborers at the London Docks struck for higher pay, and, after remaining on strike for a full month, succeeded in wresting from their masters all that they demanded. The great feature of this movement was the way in which many unskilled workers, with no organization and little to draw or keep them united save a common employment under hard conditions, have managed to hold out amid great privations and many temptations in order to achieve a common good. The "Times" and other capitalist newspapers were confident early in the strike that the movement would soon collapse. But the "dockers" showed growing determination and were too well supported both by the public generally, large sums being subscribed to keep and feed the families of the strikers, and by others of the laboring class, the men of many employments striking in sympathy, and in most cases succeeding like the dock-workmen in bettering their condition. The magnitude of the strike may be judged from the facts that families numbering 250,000 persons were closely affected, and that it has been roughly calculated that the total amount of loss to the dock companies, to laborers for wages, and to shippers and others is equal to the sum of \$7,500,000. Considering these facts, it is truly marvelous that there have been no riots nor destruction of property, and that the police have not once been obliged to interfere. It has been said, probably with truth, that no such exhibition of patience and self-restraint has been given on so large a scale in our country since the days of the cotton famine in Lancashire, when nearly a million men, women, and children were made to pass through such severe sufferings. Another aspect of "the great strike" has been the sympathy shown for the workers by all classes;

even the city of London, generally dominated by its capitalist instincts, sent largely to the strike fund; and the Lord Mayor of the city proved one of the best friends of the workmen in discussing their claims with the dock company's directors. The Bishop of London and (even more) the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Manning, together with members of the Houses of Lords and Commons, showed themselves active in the same way; indeed, sympathy came from many unexpected quarters, and herein lies much promise for the future. It seems as if all earnest men of whatever views and station were coming to see that all are interested in doing away with social wrongs. Equally remarkable has been the energy and ability shown by Mr. John Burns, the real leader of the strike, who has been previously mentioned in these "Notes from England" (see vol. xi. p. 435). He has displayed a genius for leading men and for ordering and arranging as well as for diplomatic negotiation, which mark him out as possessed of real political ability. He will be a candidate for a seat in Parliament at the next General Election. Possibly he may become a real weight in English politics.

The strike of the dock laborers in London has certainly taught the workmen of England in a most clear manner the power of combination and the force with which they can, when united, present their demands. Possibly we shall have to date a new era in our history of the relations of capital and labor from this event. How much the idea of combination for common ends is in the air is shown by a circumstance rather amusing than alarming. The elder school children of several towns in Scotland, especially Glasgow and Aberdeen, have struck, refusing to go to school. In a body they parade the streets carrying banners, singing popular songs, and stopping at convenient spots to air their grievances. Their programme embraces "free education, fewer home lessons, and no more *strap*" (abolition of corporal punishment would be a more polite way of expressing this last item)! This peculiar movement is undoubtedly connected with a change in the law which has just come into force. Parliament has made education free in the public elementary schools in Scotland for the four lower standards or classes, the two higher classes having to continue to pay school fees. The children in these higher classes seem to resent having to pay when their younger brothers and sisters need not do so, and accordingly they "go out on strike." The act of Parliament, by which free education is thus all but granted to the Scotch children, has been passed by a conservative government. The advanced Liberals, who have long professed a belief that free education ought to come, are naturally proud that their opponents have begun to accept their views, and there can be no doubt but that free education for Scotland means before long free education for England also.

The months of September and October form "the Congress season." This year the first important congress was that of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Newcastle. Though nothing sensational was brought forward, doubtless some good steady work was done, and the address of the President, Professor Flower, was very valuable, insisting on the need of good classification and arrangement in our museums, in order that they may become real centres of instruction and science. Every large town now boasts its museum, though often the

museum is a mere collection ; what is needed is system and science to display and use the collection to real purpose. The Church Congress at Cardiff and the Congregational Union at Hull have just concluded their sittings ; in neither case has there been anything remarkable said or done ; but it would be wrong to ignore the evidence given of the growth among the churches of a feeling of interest in social movements. The most successful of the sessions of the Church Congress was when the subject was the relations of religion and the drama, and the discussion was opened by Mr. Terry, a popular comedian, well known to London theatre-goers. The most important meeting at the Congregational Union was one held to discuss the land problem, some speakers on which theme openly avowed themselves followers of Mr. Henry George. But after all, many will be inclined to think that the chief value of these congresses is to give a holiday to workers, in which they can meet with men of common aims, and thus become acquainted with those whom they should know as fellow-workers, but who would otherwise remain unacquainted.

Joseph King, Jr.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

NEUER COMMENTAR ÜBER DIE GENESIS. VON FRANZ DELITZSCH. 8vo, pp. iv, 554. Leipzig : Dörffling und Franke. 1887.

A NEW COMMENTARY ON GENESIS. By FRANZ DELITZSCH, D. D., Leipzig. Translated by SOPHIA TAYLOR. 8vo, Vol. I, pp. vi, 412. Vol. II. pp. 408. New York : Scribner & Welford. 1889.

The character of Professor Delitzsch's exegetical work is too well known to need many words here. He has tried, with more than common success, to combine the advantages of the glossarial with those of the reproductive method of interpretation. His word-studies have made his commentaries a mine for the later editors of Gesenius's Lexicon ; the grammarian goes to him for the explanation of the minutest peculiarities of the punctuation or the Massora ; on the other hand the connection of thought is set forth clearly and fully, its moral and religious significance is brought out in a suggestive and often impressive way. He draws largely on the best interpreters, old and new, yet preserves his own originality. His later commentaries are by far his best. They show not only a larger and better digested learning, but riper judgment, a freer critical standpoint, and more critical insight ; they are less diffuse, less controversial, less influenced in thought and phraseology by the formulas of a school.

The last (fourth) edition of the Commentary on Genesis appeared in 1872. The author tells us in the preface to the volume before us that among his earlier works this never held a very high place in his own estimation. The New Commentary, in which are embodied the results of fifteen years' unremitting labor, will take rank with the "Psalms" and "Isaiah." A complete translation is now interwoven with the comment. Meant to be read with the Hebrew text, not instead of it, the

translation is in the main strictly literal; the idiom is often rather Hebrew than German. As in his other works, Delitzsch adheres closely to the Massoretic text, and rarely admits that it may be at fault. The commentary brings us not only the fruits of the author's own studies for many years, in which every word has been weighed over and over again as in assayer's balances, but the results of Biblical scholarship to the present time; it exhibits the actual state of learning and of controversy in this field. Foreign as well as German exegetical literature has been included in the survey. The style is so much more concise and direct than in the old commentary, and so much that was no longer of interest has been dropped, that notwithstanding the great increase of matter the volume is somewhat smaller than the fourth edition. The *Excursus* by Wetzstein are not reprinted; instead we have one by Friedrich Delitzsch, on "Larsa-Ellasar," and one or two short ones by the author.

Special interest is given to this volume by the position which Professor Delitzsch takes in it to the questions of Pentateuch criticism. As regards the analysis, he long ago recognized the composite character of Genesis, and accepted the so-called supplement hypothesis. The table at the end of the volume of 1872 presents the analysis essentially on the lines of Tuch, with references to Hupfeld and Schrader. He now adopts without reserve the results of the investigations of Wellhausen, Kuenen, and particularly Dillmann. The main lines of the analysis are, in fact, so well established that there is no serious controversy over them among those who admit the right of critical analysis at all. With those who do not, it is fruitless to discuss the details of the analysis, since we have no common principles of criticism to serve as a basis for argument. Delitzsch says: "That the investigation has not moved in a circle, but has made progress, no competent scholar will deny. The factors which enter into the composition of the Pentateuch are certainly known, and since the supplement hypothesis has been disposed of scholars are divided not so much by differences in the results of the analysis as by their religious attitude to the Scripture and the different way they make use of the results for the history of religion."

In regard to the order of the sources, Delitzsch has gone over to the views of the new school. The priestly history and laws are the youngest stratum in the Hexateuch. Expressed in Wellhausen's signatures, the series is: JE, D, Q. The final redaction which gave the Pentateuch its present form was subsequent to the Babylonian exile. The Jewish and Christian tradition as to the authorship and age of the Pentateuch is completely abandoned. The Old Testament gives no support to this tradition; the Pentateuch makes no such claim for itself; "nowhere in the canonical books of the Old Testament where the Tora, the Book of the Tora, the Tora of God, the Tora of Moses, is spoken of, is the Pentateuch in its present form meant." That Jesus and his apostles believed that Moses was the mediator of the law, that through him Israel became the people of the law, is important; "but historico-critical investigation as to his part in the authorship is not bound by the language of the New Testament." "They thought of the Tora as we should expect members of their people to think; they regard it as the work of Moses, and as proceeding from divine revelation; but it is not God's full and final revelation, and they take pains to emphasize, therefore, the human side of its origin, without raising the question whether Moses was immediately or only mediately and indirectly its author,—a question

which was aside from their high practical aim, and, moreover, foreign to the character of their time."

But although Delitzsch goes so far with the new critical school, he lays stress upon the fact that his conception of the process through which the Pentateuch came into being is essentially different from that which prevails in this school. The chief point at issue is the relation of Moses to the law. He maintains that a considerable part of the legislation in the Pentateuch goes back in substance to a Mosaic tradition. However much these laws may have been subsequently expanded, amended, wrought over, the Mosaic origin of the law is still the ultimate fact. The whole legislative development, which continued till after the exile, was determined by the root on which it grew. His position is set forth and defended at greater length in a series of articles in Luthardt's *Zeitschrift* for 1880 and 1882; with which may be compared the author's "Suggestive Jottings" in the "Sunday School Times" for 1886 (December) and 1887. In the introduction to the commentary the argument is briefly outlined. There is nothing in the circumstances of Moses' time to make the assumption that he had such a part in the origination of the law antecedently improbable. The art of writing had been practiced in Egypt for ages; under the 18th and 19th dynasties science and art attained their most splendid development; literature in all its forms was cultivated. It is not too early for the beginning of Israelitish literature. Moses himself was brought up at court as the adopted son of a royal princess, and was initiated into all the science and the mysteries of the priesthood. The legislation of the Pentateuch undeniably bears in many of its provisions the stamp of Egyptian influence. A law-giving is not out of place at the beginning of the history of Israel, for that history does not begin with a state of barbarism, but with a people which had long been in contact with the highest civilization of the time, a civilization founded upon law. The time of Moses was, as all but a few extreme skeptics admit, the creative period of Israel. From this alone it may be inferred that a Mosaic Tora lies at the basis of the Pentateuch. And it is antecedently probable that it contained more than merely the Ten Words. The history and literature of Israel sustain this inference. The life of the people did not, indeed, conform to the standard of the law. In that there is nothing strange; for the law of Israel was not customary law with a religious sanction, but revealed, that is, ideal, law aiming to become custom. On the other hand, the religious history of Israel is inexplicable without such a basis. Ethical monotheism is, as the antagonism to it shows, not a natural growth, but the requirement of a revelation which set up an ideal the realization of which was frustrated by the natural propensities of the people. The assumption of a Mosaic Tora is justified, too, by testimony in the later literature which can hardly be challenged.

The author then takes up the testimony of the Pentateuch itself. Moses is expressly said to have written: two groups of Sinaitic laws, Ex. 20-23; 34; the command to exterminate Amalek (v. Ex. 17, 14); the list of halting-places, Num. 33; the Tora contained in Deuteronomy (v. Dent. 31. 9, 24); the Song, Deut. 32. The Decalogue is primary document of the Sinaitic legislation, and must be regarded as "das Echtteste des Echten;" we may recognize in it, if anywhere, the characteristics of Moses' thought and style. But the Decalogue, in both forms in which we have it, exhibits the distinctive peculiarities of expression

which we call Jehovistic-Deuteronomic. The hypothesis that in Exodus 20 it has been conformed to Deuteronomy 5 is rejected. The inference to be drawn from the facts is that if either of the two characteristically different modes of expression in the Pentateuch goes back to a primitive Mosaic type, it is the Jehovistic-Deuteronomic rather than the Elohistie. The law of the Second Tables, Ex. 34, is a later recapitulation of the Book of the Covenant, Ex. 21-23. As regards the latter, there is at least no decisive reason for rejecting the statement that, later editorial additions aside, it was written down by Moses as the fundamental law of the Sinaitic covenant. We have thus in the Book of the Covenant, as in the Decalogue, the genuine Mosaic type in its relatively oldest and purest form. The Doom of Amalek contains nothing characteristic; that Numbers 33 is the list which Moses wrote out cannot well be proved. Deuteronomy 31. 9, 24, refers not to the whole book, but at most to the legislative part, chapters 12-26. The author of the last discourses of Moses is not Moses himself and does not pretend to be. In them a traditional basis is reproduced with so much intelligence and so much artistic skill, that neither the words which are put into the mouths of the old prophets in the books of Kings and Chronicles, nor the Psalms in which the poet has entered most completely into David's situation, and writes, as it were, out of David's own soul, afford a parallel. The relation of the Deuteronomist to Moses is like that of the author of the fourth Gospel to his Master. The laws, as well as the discourses, have passed through the subjectivity of the Deuteronomist. In the latter he reproduces material which had been handed down in outline by tradition, expanding and supplementing it in the spirit of Moses; in the laws he remodels the traditional legislation of the fortieth year as the moral and religious needs of his own time suggested. This legislation was the Mosaic deuterosis of the Book of the Covenant; the Deuteronomy as we have it is a post-Mosaic deuterosis of this deuterosis.

In regard to the Elohistie history and the priestly legislation, Delitzsch defines his present position in three theses: 1. The primeval and patriarchal history, from the Elohistie account of the creation to the story of Joseph, was committed to writing long before the exile; that legends and traditions of this sort were extant is to be presumed, and that they had substantially the form in which we have them in Genesis may be gathered from the pre-exilic literature. 2. The history of the law-giving is not in the Priests'-code any more than in JE or D, fabricated in order to falsely attribute to the laws Mosaic origin, but is derived from tradition which was not in all points, *e. g.* in regard to the Tabernacle (whether it was an oracle-tent, or a place of worship), consentient. 3. The foundation of the legislation which was ultimately codified by the Elohist was already laid when the Deuteronomist wrote. Deuteronomy 24. 8, *e. g.*, refers to the law of leprosy which is now incorporated in the Priests'-code, Lev. 13; 14. There is sufficient evidence of this kind to show that the Elohistie type of legal phraseology existed before the date of the Deuteronomy beside the Mosaic and the Jehovistic-Deuteronomic type. The interval of time is insufficient to account for the difference between these types. As the latter originated with Moses, so the Elohistie type must go back to some eminent priest whose legislative and historical style was perpetuated among the priesthood as the prophetic historical style in the schools of the prophets. The Priests'-code is the product of a gradual development, which, allowing that it

continued into post-exilic times, has, nevertheless, its roots in the Mosaic age.

Inspiration, defined as the work of the Spirit which coöperates in the production of an authentic record of the history of redemption, is to be ascribed not to the sources, which separately may be incomplete, one-sided, and inadequate, but to the whole in which they are now united. To the Christian as such the Pentateuch, the whole Bible, is one, the work of one Spirit, having one meaning and one end. And in reality this unity is in all essentials beyond the reach of any discoveries of the critical analysis.

This résumé, which I have given as far as possible in the author's own words, is necessarily incomplete, but is perhaps sufficient to indicate Delitzsch's position. A criticism of it would soon overrun the limits of this notice. I must content myself here with one observation. The order JE (or EJ?), D, Q, which Delitzsch accepts is determined not merely by the relations of the sources to one another, but by their relation to a definite historical situation; Deuteronomy to the reforms of Josiah, the Priests'-code to the work of Ezra. The earliest legislation, Ex. 20-23, presupposes a settled people, tilling the soil. For the rest it represents chiefly ancient customary law, in which there is nothing to connect it with Moses or his time. Tradition attests only that Moses wrote down the fundamental laws of the covenant at Sinai (p. 20). Delitzsch's belief that Exodus 21 ff., excluding later additions, is this Mosaic collection of laws, rests on literary grounds almost exclusively. But are the criteria by which he thinks we may recognize the genuine Mosaic type adequate? I hardly think there will be two answers to that. Setting aside the very reasonable hypothesis that the Decalogue in Exodus has been conformed to that in Deuteronomy, as, for example, in the received text, the Lord's prayer in Luke to that in Matthew, Delitzsch's own examination of the language of the Ten Words would prove that the genuine Mosaic style is not that of J, but of the Deuteronomist. But Deuteronomy is not Mosaic. With all respect for the motive which makes the author wish to vindicate in some sense the Mosaic origin of the law while giving up the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, I cannot regard the attempt as successful. But no one can help admiring the love of truth and the intellectual and moral courage which such a book from such a man attests. "God is the God of truth, אֱלֹהִים אֱמֶת! To love the truth, to yield to the constraint of the truth, to surrender traditional views which cannot stand the test of truth, is a sacred duty, a part of the fear of God." These are words which cannot be deeply enough impressed on the conscience of every student of Scripture. It is not the smallest part of the value of this book that it adds the example to the precept.

Of the translation it is impossible to say much good. Delitzsch is not always the easiest of authors to understand, and he often expresses himself in a fashion which is anything but easy to turn into English, — so much it is but just to say in advance of any criticism. We should not quarrel with the awkward and unidiomatic English, nor judge too severely occasional misapprehensions, if, on the whole, the meaning were fairly well conveyed. I am compelled to say that this is not the case. The translator has in many places completely misunderstood her author, and still oftener has not understood him at all. I put together here a few examples, taken almost at random from the introduction. De-

litzsch writes, p. 6, that the Urim and Thummim remind us of the sapphire image of the Goddess of Truth which, in Egypt, the ἀρχιδικαστὴς wore on a golden chain upon his breast. In the English we read: "The Urim and Thummim [recall] the sapphire image of the Goddess of Truth, who wore the ἀρχιδικαστὴς hanging from a golden chain on her bosom"! The position of judge was surely an unenviable one! The invention of writing, we are told three times, culminated in the acro-phœnician [acrophonic] principle. "Die aus Davids Lage und Seele herausgedichteten Psalmen," are, "Those Psalms in the Psalter composed on the subject of David's condition and state of mind." "Skizzenhaft Ueberliefertes" is a "sketch of traditional occurrences." In the Preface Delitzsch predicts that, in spite of all the progress which the New Commentary shows, it will still fail, by reason of his theological position, to receive the praise of being thoroughly scientific; the translation makes him say: "The praise of full and complete scholarship will still be withheld from it," a thing which no one would dream of saying. I shall give one more extended illustration of the translator's method. Speaking of the hypothesis that the phraseology of the Decalogue in Exodus has been colored by the influence of Deuteronomy 5, Delitzsch writes as follows: "Wir verzichten auf diese Hilfsannahme, bei welcher die Urgestalt des Dekalogs zum x wird; es giebt für masshaltige Forschung keine Urgestalt des Dekalogs als die aus dem Zusammenhalt der zwei Texte sich ergebende, u. s. w." This becomes: "We however relinquish these expedients, and renounce the reduction of the Decalogue to an imaginary original form."

Words which belong to the terminology of criticism are seldom rendered by the English equivalents. The supplement hypothesis, *e. g.*, is uniformly the completion hypothesis, etc. Misprints are also much too numerous, especially in the titles of books.

George F. Moore.

WHITHER? A THEOLOGICAL QUESTION FOR THE TIMES. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D. D., Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Union Theological Seminary. Pp. xv, 303. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889.

The occasion of this book is the proposed revision of the theological standards of the Presbyterian churches in the United States. Professor Briggs advocates either a revision of the Westminster Symbols, or an additional article qualifying subscription to them. His book is principally devoted to an exhibition of the departures which have already been made from those standards by all Presbyterian ministers and churches in this country. In various matters of polity, worship, and doctrine the whole Presbyterian body has drifted away from the Westminster standards, in some respects for the better, in some respects for the worse, and he argues that in common honesty the symbols should be revised, or subscription should be relaxed. He also contends that, inasmuch as important revisions have been made at various times in respect to the classification of church officers, the structure of presbyteries, and the order and character of public worship, there is no good reason why the doctrinal utterances of the Westminster divines should be considered too sacred to be altered. He believes, however, that there should be a return to some of the doctrinal statements of the symbols,

in order to get out of the narrow lines of orthodoxism, especially the statements concerning the Scriptures and salvation through Christ. The inerrancy and infallibility of the Bible are not laid down in the Standards, and were not believed by many members of the Westminster Assembly. The mediation of Christ, which is grounded in his incarnation, and includes the offices of prophet, priest, and king, is reduced by orthodoxism to his sacrificial death, and even thus He is regarded as the victim rather than as the priest. It is claimed, in like manner, that there is neglect of the doctrines of the Living God, Creation, the Forgiveness of Sin, Adoption, Sanctification, Repentance unto Life, and Assurance of Grace, and a meagre conception of the Sacraments.

The principal, if not the only, defects in the symbols pertain, in Dr. Briggs's opinion, to the doctrine of decrees, and the limitation of the divine electing grace. The Confession is wrong in dooming a portion of those who die in infancy to perdition, together with all the heathen, except a few incapables. As no scholar in America has so thorough an acquaintance with the proceedings of the Westminster Assembly and the opinions of its divines as Dr. Briggs has attained, he will not be disputed concerning the changes and departures indicated. The book will also weaken the attacks made upon his own opinions by some Presbyterian divines and scholars, so far as the attacks are directed to his departures from the creeds of the church. It will be seen that this work has a peculiar interest for Presbyterians, an interest which is intensified by the boldness and severity of criticism directed against several distinguished and living divines, with some of whom Dr. Briggs is intimately associated as editor and professor.

A wider interest is felt in his statements concerning the Scriptures and the intermediate state. His views on the inerrancy and infallibility of the Bible have already been explained in his well-known book entitled "*Biblical Study*," and are here restated more briefly, with some severe strictures on those who would rest the authority of the Bible on its absolute freedom from error. "What an awful doctrine to teach in our days when Biblical criticism has the field! What a peril to precious souls there is in the terse pointed sentence, 'A proved error in Scripture contradicts not only our doctrine, but the Scripture claims, and therefore its inspiration in making those claims!'" No more dangerous doctrine has ever come from the pen of men. It has cost the church the loss of thousands. It will cost us ten thousand and hundreds of thousands unless the true Westminster doctrine is speedily put in its place. This false doctrine circulates in a tract bearing the impress of the Presbyterian Board of Publication, among our ministers and people, poisoning their souls and misleading them into dangerous error." This is turning the tables on the critics of higher criticism with a vengeance.

The most cautious part of the book concerns eschatology. The author condemns, indeed, the doctrine of a private judgment at death as leaving no significance to the public judgment at the end of the present dispensation. He attacks also the doctrines of a premillennial coming of Christ, and also of a definite millennium yet in the future before his coming. He places the work of sanctification largely in the intermediate state, but assumes that the initiation of salvation may, in all cases, occur during the earthly life. This assumption is based on the opinion that the present life is not a probation at all. He admits that if this life is a probation the middle state must also be. "If this life be a probation,

then there is no ground in the Scriptures, or in the Westminster symbols, or in sound reason, why this probation should not be extended into the middle state for those who have had no probation here. I have examined all the arguments adduced by Dr. Morris and others in support of their position that probation stops with death, and find that these will not bear criticism." The correct doctrine, according to Dr. Briggs, is that the probation of the race was in Adam; that now the race is a lost race, not on probation at all, but with an opportunity of salvation; and that the great problem is to redeem as many as possible. But this is precisely what is meant by a Christian probation. Those who have it are on probation chiefly in the sense that they have an opportunity to accept Christ. Because those who die in infancy can have no probation in this life, Dr. Briggs, in company with Dr. Prentiss, whom he quotes, jumps to the conclusion that this life cannot be a probation, and that a probation is not necessary to salvation. This is a mere playing on the word probation, and does not recognize the significance of Christian probation. Dr. Briggs holds that regeneration in all cases, even in the case of infants, occurs in the present life. All other stages of redemption may belong to the intermediate state, — the conscious beginnings of spiritual life, justification by faith, adoption, assurance, sanctification, everything but regeneration. "We have already seen that the divine grace is not confined to this world, that sanctification by the divine grace must continue in the middle state. But we see no reason why the divine grace may not regenerate all the elect before they leave this world. If the divine grace may be applied to the millions of infants dying in infancy, why not also to millions of adult heathen?" But what proof is there that those dying in infancy are regenerated before death? And can we argue from innocent infants to adult heathen? "With regard to infants dying in infancy, we can understand that the dynamic work of regeneration has been wrought; but how can we conceive of the drawing to Jesus Christ, the answer to the call, the embracing of the grace freely offered, and the exercise of faith?" What is to be understood by dynamic regeneration, of which the subject is unconscious, and of which the drawing to Christ, etc., are the consequence rather than the condition? Why not say the magical or the unintelligible act of regeneration? "The relief is to be found in a more comprehensive view of redemption, and an extension of the gracious operations of God into the middle state, between death and resurrection, where the order of salvation, begun for infants and others in regeneration, may be conducted through all the processes of faith, adoption, sanctification by repentance, and glorification in love and holiness; in the communion of God and the Messiah." The only reason for refusing regeneration, or the initiation of the order of salvation, a place in the middle state, while all that is intelligible in salvation may go forward there, is an apparent reluctance on the part of the author to admit that any individual, even an infant or a heathen, who is in a lost or unregenerate state at death, can be brought into a saved or regenerate state after death. But why the initiation as well as the entire development of the new life may not occur there he leaves unexplained. And if that which is radical and decisive for salvation is in all cases accomplished before death, is there not private judgment at death, and does not the public judgment lose its significance? And why the doctrine of divine electing grace, through which some of those who are lost, and are not on probation, will be redeemed, necessarily throws the beginning, and

the beginning only, of the salvation of the elect into the earthly life is not so much as suggested. The author is worthy of all commendation, however, in demanding liberty of opinion on these subjects, and in contending that it is impossible to frame a theodicy unless the extension of God's grace to the intermediate state is recognized.

Space cannot be taken to notice the interesting scheme under which Dr. Briggs thinks it possible and desirable, though not at present probable, that the Christian union of Protestants with each other and of all with Catholics may be realized.

It is needless to say that from supporters and from opponents of its opinions the book "*Whither*" is having a warm reception.

George Harris.

INSTITUTES OF ECONOMICS. A Succinct Text-Book of Political Economy for the use of Classes in Colleges, High Schools, and Academies. By ELISHA BENJAMIN ANDREWS, D. D., LL. D., President of Brown University, late Professor of Political Economy and Finance in Cornell University. Pp. xii, 228. Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co. 1889. Introductory price, \$1.30.

The publication of a new text-book of Political Economy is amply justified by the unsettled condition and rapid advance of the science. Men who received their college training in it ten years ago find themselves already members of a bygone school of thought. The book before us brings the science down to date, and in this respect justifies itself. Furthermore, the manner in which the subject is presented is altogether new and admirable. The chapters are short, and aim at being suggestive rather than discursive. The leading statements are marked by Roman numerals, and the catch-words are leaded. Frequent references are made to explanatory notes, in small type, which are usually upon the same page. To each chapter is prefixed a list of authorities, with section or page. These references are very complete, particularly as regards the latest German and French authorities. This feature of the book will be of great value to teachers and mature students. Half the literature of Political Economy is inaccessible at any desired moment from the absence of just such an index of authors with detailed references. Moreover, the index is immensely more valuable because it accompanies each subject and chapter, instead of being prefixed to the entire work. With President Andrews to guide him, a serious student can find fresh inspiration from constant contact with the first-rate thinkers in Political Economy. This feature of the book should be especially appreciated by clergymen, many of whom need just such guidance in their solitary studies. It is a service of double value just now, when every thoughtful clergyman must inform himself upon Political Economy and Sociology. Nor has the brief rather than discursive method of treatment less to commend it. It is a common experience with teachers that the memory is apt to carry away no definite idea from a wordy and exhaustive paragraph, simply because the author leaves pupils no chance to think for themselves — doing it all for them. The process of explaining and justifying President Andrews's brief statements cannot but impress them upon the mind of both teacher and pupil — certainly it will lead both to think seriously. Probably in practice the leaded type will be found helpful in arresting the attention and aiding the memory, particularly with younger students. The notes have the great merit of being both learned and interesting. They are largely illustrative, and are always to

the point. The slightly scholastic tendency of style — cf. page 1 — disappears as the author proceeds.

In the subject-matter President Andrews has certainly shown a sound sense for facts and their meaning. We know of no book of its class that is as satisfactory. One fears to look into the writings of a German-trained economist lest he find a sentimentalist and socialist. But President Andrews is neither. He believes in the government undertaking certain enterprises. "Government can do much for the betterment of economic conditions without attacking the property rights or becoming dangerously paternal." Yet "in all economic activity the presumption is in favor of individual liberty and free competition (*laissez faire*), rightfulness of public intervention in no case admissible save after proof." The current craze of "Nationalism" finds no support from him. "We see insuperable obstacles to the launching of the system as advocated, and insufferable evils sure to spring from it if launched. It would (I) dangerously concentrate power, (II) abate thrift in some while promoting it in others, and (III) repress that marvelous inventiveness, enterprise, and daring in industrial undertakings which only the hope of great personal profit will at present induce in men."

His views upon international trade are by no means German, that is, protectionist, yet they are eminently fair and candid. He justly repudiates Walker's "Residual Claimant" theory of wages, and his treatment of the general subject is admirable. It is refreshing to find a chapter upon the neglected topic of economic "Consumption." A subject-index would have added much to the value of a book that is sure of a hearty welcome from teachers and thoughtful students.

D. Collin Wells.

AMERICAN STATESMEN — BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. By JOHN T. MORSE, JR., author of "Life of John Adams," "Life of John Quincy Adams," "Life of Thomas Jefferson," etc. Pp. vi, 428. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$1.25.

This is not a book that one feels enthusiastic over, whether the fault is in the biographer or the subject. Franklin is not exactly one to draw out any astonishing glow of enthusiasm. A great man, assuredly, sane and kindly, effective to the last fibre, for his city, his country — and himself. Self-forgetfulness has not always a very great present reward, which is doubtless one great reason why, besides its reward above, it has such a reward of loving remembrances. It is not precisely this that Benjamin Franklin inherits. But who is not proud of having handled his rude little electrical machine, and having peeped through the open space in the wall of Arch Street cemetery upon the two flat stones that bear the names of the unromantic couple resting beneath? It has been well said that Penn's "Holy Experiment" never fairly fruited for Philadelphia until Franklin came, and gave her libraries, and lamps, and fire-engines, and the Pennsylvania Hospital, and the University of Pennsylvania, and a more active political and intellectual life, all without disturbing that quiet friendliness which makes a fortnight in the Quaker City so deep a bath of repose.

The author shows by Franklin's conduct in the matter of provisioning Braddock's troops, that though he was a man of canny prudence, he was anything but a man of selfish prudence, but was quite ready to run the risk of ruining himself for the public good. He was emphatically the

Good Citizen. It is not likely that he would ever have brought about the detachment from England. But neither dangers nor labors (meaning so much more to a man of his age) were too much for him in the great enterprise of giving his country her independent life. Mr. Morse remarks that it is hard to say whether Washington was in more desperate straits at Valley Forge or Franklin in Paris, trying to raise endless moneys for a loose-jointed Confederation whose Congress had no securities to offer, and no power to offer them had they existed. Franklin's woes, however, do not cut quite as deep into our hearts as the burdens of Washington and the bleeding feet of the heroes of Valley Forge. The pleasures and flatteries of Paris were something of a solace, no doubt, to the venerable sage, who enjoyed himself among Voltairian wits as few Americans could have done. And during his previous years of colonial agency in London he found an enjoyment in the brilliant society always open to him that rendered his strenuous services to his native and his adopted colony none the less valuable, but somewhat the less exhausting. His long absences from Mrs. Franklin he bore with as easy a philosophy as in due time he bore the loss of her.

The author is right in saying that, after all that Benjamin Franklin had done for America, so much at home, and so much more abroad, by his efforts, and still more by his great name, it would have been against all the proprieties for him to die before he had seen the Confederation a nation. The rickety thing worries and exasperates us all through the dismal greatness of the achievements into which it groans, as if it were not our own country. And with every new biographical turn of the kaleidoscope the Continental Congress seems to become more exasperatingly incompetent. Certainly we ought to learn by it not to despise the present, when we see what can come out of what. The ineffable meanness of the Congress towards Franklin was merely in keeping with the rest.

The biographer says, very truly, no doubt, that Poor Richard has done a great deal to set the American character. It might have been set in a higher key, certainly. But there is a healthy largeness in Franklin which gives to Poor Richard a touch of ideality that makes it a true Epic of Pelf.

The author, in various parts of the little book, takes perhaps rather superfluous pains to assure us that Dr. Franklin was on very pleasant speaking terms with Christianity, as indeed he was. The naive absurdity of his assurance that Franklin had the Christian virtues detached from the Christian tenets may be left to contrast very favorably with the clumsy ridiculousness of Mr. Parton's description of him as the Great Christian of his age. Had the Gospel of God never flown a higher flight than in the works and life and essential character of Poor Richard, "the seal of originality" which Renan concedes to it would never have been heard of. Indeed, the Gospel would never have been heard of. It is enough that he was a kindly, deeply serviceable, not unbenignant, illustrious man, of singular worthiness and completeness within his eminent range, of whom his country may well be proud; above all, Boston that bore him, and Philadelphia that owes her second birth to him. There are greater things than the Genius of Common Sense, but, after all, the state of the world rests upon it.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Zwingli's Theologie, ihr Werden und ihr System, dargestellt von August Baur, Dr. Theol. Erster Band, pp. viii, 543. Mrk. 12. Zweiter Band, pp. ix, 864. Mrk. 18. Halle: Max Niemeyer. — Dr. Baur has done for Zwingli what Köstlin did for Luther and Herrlinger for Melancthon. He has furnished a comprehensive statement of Zwingli's system and a thorough analysis of his various writings. He has given to his doctrine an elaborate historical exposition, and to his theology a well-defined position. The declared aim is clearness and completeness both in statement and historical treatment, and the author has realized his purpose with marked success. It must be sharply emphasized that, though Zwingli and Luther agreed in the fundamentals, the work of Zwingli was an independent movement *throughout*. "Zwingli's conflict against Rome was more quiet, more circumspect, more radical; Luther's more passionate and stormy, but in its undercurrent conservative throughout." Zwingli's doctrines are more methodical in their development and more clearly defined. Dr. Baur makes of his work two parts, the historical and the systematic. The first part, comprising the greater part of the two volumes, has its centre in the history of the development of Zwingli's character and doctrine. His early scholastic training, his later devotion to Erasmus and humanism, his extensive classical studies, his development from a humanist into a preacher of the gospel, his fearless love as a pastor, the grounds of his hopes for a pure Christianity, suggest some of the thoughts by which Dr. Baur leads up to the year 1522, when Zwingli openly and earnestly began his literary work. His first effort was to secure a strong position against Rome. How he accomplished this we are told in the second chapter, pp. 89-286. The third chapter shows the theological activity of Zwingli in carrying out the reformation in Zürich, while the fourth chapter establishes the dogmatic conclusion of the evangelical doctrine in its opposition to the doctrine of Rome. The second volume opens with an elaborate exposition of Zwingli's conflict against radicalism and his controversy respecting baptism. The next chapter, "Zwingli's Opposition to the Doctrine of Luther," pp. 268-777, is divided into three parts: the origin and development of the differences, the conflict between Zwingli and Luther, and the final positions taken by Zwingli. This chapter, which rises to the length and dignity of a treatise, turns a somewhat profitless discussion into a source of light upon reformation, history, and doctrine. "The Theological System of Zwingli" stands in open opposition to Middle Age scholasticism and the Roman Church; it contains many of the better elements of humanism as represented by Erasmus, Beatus, and Rhenanus; it may be put in one phrase, "the grace of God in Jesus Christ for the salvation of men." The system is viewed in its fundamental elements and principles, and again as a system, pp. 777-834. Added to the work is a list of Zwingli's writings, an index of names, and a reference table of all the important subjects and ideas in the two volumes. These volumes show a breadth of view and a grasp of truth in its fullness that constitute them THE work on Zwingli.

Die Philosophie des Thomas von Aquino, Kritisch gewürdigt von J. Frohschammer. Pp. xxii, 537. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Mrk. 10. —

Within the last thirty years the writings of Thomas have acquired extraordinary importance. Drawn out of their close ecclesiastical trappings into the domain of practical philosophy, they have become a centre of widespread interest. This interest is in part historical, in part controversial. What is the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas? Dr. Frohschammer attempted to answer this question in 1854; the attempt was condemned. A second effort was likewise condemned, and Pope Pius IX. wrote to discourage the inquiry. From that day to this the centre of scholasticism has been a centre of discussion, and since the Thomas-encyclical of Pope Leo XIII., in 1879, the literature of the controversy has grown into a nuisance. The work before us is one of superlative value. It is not so much the result of a long conflict as the fruit of a life's study of scholasticism in its relations to the ancient and modern phases of thought. The author adheres to his purpose of avoiding useless questions and confining his exposition strictly to the main lines and unquestionable features of the philosophy of the great scholastic. The introduction outlines the Grecian philosophy with reference to Aquinas, and passes in review the literature of his subject. The six chapters of the work show a thorough analysis and treatment of the following doctrines: The Doctrine of Knowledge, Philosophy and Theology, Philosophical Theology, Natural Philosophy, Psychology and Anthropology, Ethics and Politics, and a supplementary essay on The Eternity of the World. Thomas was in the main a disciple of Aristotle, especially in his theory of knowledge and views on ethics and politics. The radical defect of his philosophy is that the high place he gives to the intellect is only apparent inasmuch as it is subjected to a faith which is itself not a matter of the reason but of the subjective will. The work is unique in many respects. It shows when Aquinas failed to harmonize his philosophy with his religion; shows the incrustation which his philosophy received in the hands of the papacy, and shows the futility of the attempt to make his philosophy a bulwark of the Catholic faith. A more important contribution to church history and doctrine has not recently been made.

Kants Begründung der Ethik. Pp. viii, 328. Mrk. 6. *Kants Begründung der Ästhetik.* Pp. xii, 334. Mrk. 8. Von Hermann Cohen, Professor an der Universität Marburg. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung. — Professor Cohen is one of the ablest expositors of the Kantian philosophy. These volumes are the fourth and fifth in a series of monographs on the doctrines of Kant. Kantian philosophy means to the author nothing other than philosophy as science, dogmatic but not dogma. Kant asserted of Logic that it had not taken one step backward since Aristotle, upon which it is remarked, he might have said with greater truth that ethics have not taken a step forward since Plato. After a review of the problems of ethics as they are presented in Plato and Aristotle, and as they are related to experimental philosophy, the task of exposition is divided into three parts. The first is an exhibition of the results of the doctrine of experience in their relations to the possibility of a science of ethics; the second is the exposition of ethical laws, and the third, the application of moral laws to the psychological nature of man. "Kant approaches æsthetics with a firm conviction that their foundations are entirely independent of ethics." The distinctions between ethics and æsthetics are well drawn. They are essentially those made by Plato, who, in his *Phædo* and *Republic*, places ethics at the highest point of knowledge and æsthetics in mathematical proportions. To make

ethics a part of æsthetics, as did Herbart, means the confusion of both departments. The introduction to the *Æsthetics* is divided into two parts, the historical and the systematic. "From the history of opinion we learn the problems, but without a dogmatic position and judgment nothing is understood and the fullest history remains barren." The chief systems noticed in the historical introduction are those of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Leibnitz, Baumgarten, Winckelmann who identified the beautiful and the good, Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Herder. The systematic introduction, pp. 93-144, shows the task of æsthetics to be to determine the relations between the theoretical or practical consciousness and sensibility. These relations form the whole sphere of æsthetics. This introduction is one of the best pieces of work we have seen, and is, in itself, an excellent preparation for a special study of the subject. The four chapters following have for their subjects: The Reliability of the *Æsthetic Consciousness*; The Contents of the *Æsthetic Consciousness*; The Arts as a means of generating the *Æsthetic Contents*; and Critical *Æstheticism*, its Friends and its Opponents. These two volumes are of special value not only in relation to the Kantian philosophy, but to ethics and æsthetics in general. The later volume gathers up so much of the author's twenty years' study of Kant, and shows such an intimate acquaintance with the subjects of æsthetics, that, apart from its excellent form and style, it deserves unqualified commendation.

Die Reine Vernunftwissenschaft. Systematische Darstellung von Schellings rationaler oder negativer Philosophie. Von Dr. Carl Groos. Pp. x, 190. Heidelberg: Geo. Weiss. Mrk. 3. — It is remarked that Schelling's Philosophy, once so popular and influential, is to-day but the faintest echo in the consciousness of the German nation. Yet Schelling's system is regarded of permanent value not only in theology but in practical philosophy. That Dr. Groos has shown this to the best possible advantage there can be little doubt. He has brought an elaborate and difficult system into a clear and intelligible form. The work falls into two parts, the first of which treats of the foundations of a pure rational science, and the second of its development. Those who are interested in discovering a basis of harmony for conflicting religious systems will find the present exposition full of suggestion. In speaking of the contemplative life three ways are indicated which lead to God. The inner way through meditation and mystical piety brings the soul into harmony with God. The contemplative study of the best art not only gives reality to the ideal, but deepens in us the idea of the divine personality. Through contemplative science, which is nothing other than practical philosophy or the study of the intelligible, the possible is ever suggested, and we are led from self outward and upward. The work is a mental stimulant.

Der Zweckbegriff bei Trendelenburg. Von Dr. Bernhard Liebermann. Pp. 168. Meiningen: Druck und Verlag von K. Keyssner. Mrk. 3. — In Germany Trendelenburg represents more of the permanent in philosophy than any name since Kant. Especially is this true in ethics and law. The present study reviews the philosopher's entire work to discover the exact idea of purpose or aim. This is found to be characteristically theological, conceiving of God as absolute intelligence and personality, in whom will and knowledge are identical. God, as the one, gives to the world the idea of unity as a ruling aim, and here ground, means, and end fall together.

Kompendium der Biblischen Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testa-

ments. Von Prof. Dr. Konstantin Schlottmann. Herausgegeben von Dr. Ernst Kühn. Pp. vi, 192. Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke. Mrk. 4. — Dr. Schlottmann, Professor of Theology in Halle, died in 1887. The present work is an abstract of his lectures on Biblical Theology. Biblical theology is defined as "the scientific statement of Biblical doctrine in its historical development upon the ground of a divine revelation and under the special guidance of the divine spirit." The compendium is of special value not only for its judicious selection and condensation of matter, but especially as it covers the whole of Biblical doctrine in a continuous historical review, bringing the Old Testament and the New Testament into well-defined relations by an admirable chapter on post-canonical Judaism. A more serviceable compendium could not be desired. Its references, inter-references, and index will lead many to keep it alongside their Bibles.

Das aristokratische Prinzip in Natur und Menschenleben. Hauptbestandteile einer neuen, im wesentlichen anti-darwinischen Lebensauffassung und Weltanschauung auf exact-naturwissenschaftlicher Basis allgemeinverständlich dargestellt. Von Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt. Pp. xiv, 230. Halle a. S.: Verlag von Richard Schroedel. Mrk. 5. — We are to understand by the aristocratic principle the permanent result of the impressions made by the best in natural and in human life. These impressions become influential principles. These goods are the useful, the good, the noble, and the beautiful. The work shows three main divisions. The first is an exposition of the aristocratic principles or a construction of the aristocracy; the second treats of the aristocratic principle in nature and life in general, and the third confines the investigation to the life of mankind. The spirit of the work opposes throughout all materialistic and pessimistic views of life, and furnishes many incentives to the life of faith in the true and the good. Against that theory of development propounded by Lamarck, and propped up by Darwin and Haeckel, the author discharges his arguments with good effect. Dr. Schmidt was formerly a disciple of this theory, but found it to represent a small and lean phase of truth, if not quite suspended from error. The criticism of this crude, vulgar form of evolution is excellent. The nobler elements in man are regarded as stronger and more enduring than brute force. The practical consequences of the author's views are drawn with reference to religious, social, and political life. Christianity is thought to hold a very strong position for the solution of social questions, yet it must abandon certain pessimistic phases of doctrine connected with whence and whither. The work will be found very serviceable as an introduction to the scientific discussion of life problems.

Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Althechristlichen. V Band. Heft 4. *Agrapha, Aussercanonische Evangelienfragmente in Möglichster Vollständigkeit Zusammengestellt und Quellenkritisch Untersucht.* Von P. prim. Alfred Resch, Kirchenrath. Anhang: *Das Evangelienfragment von Fajjum's.* Von Adolf Harnack. Pp. xii, 520. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 17. — Under the word *Agrapha* are comprehended all the traditional words of the Lord, in their different phrasings, which are found neither in the canonical and apocryphal gospels, nor in any of the recognized fragments of the same. The literature relating to this subject takes its origin from the French Cotelierius, who, between the years 1677 and 1688, published three volumes, under the title "*Ecclesiae Graecae Monumenta.*" The German Fabri-

cius carried on the investigation, and in 1703 issued his *Codex Apocryphus Novi Testamenti*, which reached a second edition in 1719, and has since remained the standard authority. The more recent works of Hofmann, Bunsen, Westcott, and Hilgenfeld easily give way to the complete and systematic study of Dr. Resch. The author attempts a full collection and arrangement of the *Agrapha*; a safe principle for the criticism of its sources, and the bases of a satisfactory exegetical treatment of its material. This chief part of the work, pp. 14-314, may be indicated in the following order: criticism of the patristic citations from the gospels; criticism of the sources of the canonical gospels; the Hebrew original and the Greek translations; criticism of the sources of the *Agrapha*; exegesis of the *Agrapha* in general; index of the text of the *Agrapha*, pp. 95-134; special criticism and exegesis, pp. 135-269. The doubtful and spurious *Agrapha* are divided into three groups, pp. 314-463: 1. The apocryphal fragments of the gospels with text and criticism. 2. The apostolic apocrypha. 3. The didactic and apocalyptic apocrypha. The book is well furnished with indices of Biblical texts, patristic authorities, and codices, which apart from its special subject make it a valuable handbook to patristic literature. Professor Harnack, pp. 483-497, argues *pro* and *con* respecting the Fajjum Papyrus, leaving the reader to draw his own inference respecting its value.

Das Gewissen. Von Dr. Wilh. Schmidt. Pp. v, 376. Mrk. 7. 20. *Die Mandäische Religion*, ihre Entwicklung und geschichtliche Bedeutung erforscht, dargestellt und beleuchtet. Von Dr. A. J. H. Wilhelm Brandt. Pp. xii, 236. Mrk. 8. *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*. Von D. Emil Schürer, Professor der Theologie zu Giessen. Zweite neu bearbeitete Auflage. Erster Theil. Erste Hälfte. Pp. 256. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. Mrk. 6. — "Das Gewissen" is a history of conscience from the earliest records up or down to our own day. Although conscience is as old as the race, the word *συνείδησις* is first met in the philosophy of the Stoics. (See a fragment from Chrysippus found in Diog. Laert. VII. 85.) Thus conscience among the Stoics is made the basis of the whole history. From this point the author first investigates the literature of the Greco-Roman world and then of the more prominent eastern races, such as the Chinese, Indians, Phœnicians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Egyptians. The centre of the work is the study of conscience in the Bible, pp. 81-205. The fourth and final chapter, "Conscience in the Christian Era," opens with Ignatius of Antioch, and reviews the opinions of the more important theologians and philosophers who have represented or influenced the course of religious and ethical thought. Though patristic times and the Middle Ages are well represented, the emphasis rests naturally upon the modern period. The thirty pages devoted to living writers on this subject are of extraordinary interest. The result of the study, pp. 369-376, represents conscience as the centre, faculty, and criterion of religious and ethical truth. Capable of education and development, it is yet, in power and principle, innate. The work is full of suggestion and interest, and merits from both its form and matter a good reception.

The Mandæans and their religion have long been recognized as most difficult and interesting subjects of study. This has been remarked in the works of Nöldeke, Petermann, and Siouffi. Dr. Brandt has been able, from his prolonged study, to give a more thorough representation of the Maudsæan system, and to correct many radical errors respecting it.

This people, overestimated by Ignatius at 25,000 families, number to-day not more than 4,000 persons. The first three chapters of the book treat of the theology, cosmology, anthropology, and religious life of the Mandæans. They know no other salvation than that of the future; no other means of salvation than a strict adherence to the rules of practical piety. These rules make known light and darkness and the burning fire. Although the Mandæans in their history have come into intimate contact with almost every form of faith and life, and done so fearlessly, yet their character and religious consciousness have been little disturbed. The marvelous energy with which they have resisted absorption is witnessed by the curious eclecticism of their doctrines combined with the strongest individuality. Singing and dancing are proscribed as wiles of Satan; monogamy is commanded, and slavery condemned. Excellent sanitary regulations are a part of their moral law, and moral law is the essence of religion. In the sixth chapter the author sets forth the relations between the Mandæan religion and the surrounding religions, such as those of Babylon, Judea, and Persia, in order to obtain some light upon its origin. A Greek origin, following upon the work of Alexander, is supposed.

Die Gemeindeverfassung des Urchristenthums. Eine Kirchenrechtliche Untersuchung. Von Dr. Edgar Loening, Professor der Rechte zu Halle. Pp. v. 154. Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer. Mrk. 4. *Muhamedanische Studie.* Von Ignaz Goldziher. Erster Theil. Pp. xii, 280. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Mrk. 8.—Dr. Loening presents this study as a memorial of the fifty years of labor which the illustrious Prof. Dr. Rudolf von Gneist has given to Constitutional History. It is of interest that a prominent jurist should have chosen this subject, inasmuch as theological science has held undisputed possession. The difficulties of the subject grow out of dogmatic suppositions and the conflicting testimony of the original sources. The question, were Bishop and Presbyter originally identical, the two terms signifying the same office, is regarded as the centre of the whole problem. The plan and execution of the work are of the highest order. The first chapter, pp. 1–33, is a masterly review of works, old and new, which investigate this field. The tenth chapter is a summary of such results and conclusions as have been obtained through the intermediate chapters, which treat of the main problems of the constitution of the early church and community. The early Christian community had a character of its own, it did not put new wine into the old skins of Judaism or heathenism. Before the end of the second century Christ was the sole High Priest of his people, but monarchistic ideas were rapidly growing, the powers of the Bishop were increasing, and at the end of the second century the Old Testament ideas of priesthood were pressed in upon Christendom. At the time of Cyprian Bishops and Presbyters were known only as Priests, who alone had the power of mediating between God and men. The value of this brief, comprehensive monograph lies not only in the clear and scholarly treatment of the whole field, but in a judicious emphasis of those points which are of fundamental importance, and in an indication of certain errors of fact and judgment found in recent volumes supposed to be authoritative. The book should find its way at once into the hands of teachers and students.

Mattoon M. Curtis.

DRESDEN.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Freiburg i. B. Das Apostolische Zeitalter der christlichen Kirche von Carl Weizsäcker. Sach- und Stellenregister. Pp. xix. 1889. 2 M.; — Sammlung Theologischer Lehrbücher. Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte von P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Dr. und ord. Professor der Theologie in Amsterdam. Zweiter Band. Pp. xvi, 406. 1889. 9 M.; — Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament in vier Bänden. Bearbeitet von Professor Dr. H. J. Holtzmann in Strassburg; Geh. Kirchenrath Professor Dr. R. A. Lipsius in Jena; Lic. P. W. Schmiedel in Jena; Prediger Lic. H. v. Soden in Berlin. Band I. Die synoptischen Evangelien; Apostelgeschichte. Professor Dr. H. J. Holtzmann. Pp. xvi, 432. 1889. 6 M.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The First Epistle to the Corinthians. By the Rev. Marcus Dods, D. D. Pp. vii, 399. 1889. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston; — Spurgeon's Salt-Cellars. Being a Collection of Proverbs, together with Homely Notes Thereon. By C. H. Spurgeon. Pp. viii, 334. 1889. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston.

John Martenson, Chicago. The Lord is Right. Meditations on the Twenty-Fifth Psalm in the Psalter of King David. By P. Waldenström, Ph. D., Professor of Theology and of Biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gefle, Sweden. Translation carefully Revised and some Notes added, together with an Introduction, by J. G. Princell. Pp. 303. 1889. \$1.25; — The Reconciliation. Who was to be Reconciled? God or Man? or God and Man? Some chapters on the Biblical View of the Atonement. By P. Waldenström, Ph. D., Professor of Theology and of Biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gefle, Sweden. Translated from the Swedish, with some Notes added, and an Introduction, by J. G. Princell. Pp. 120. 75 cents.

Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago. Sermons on the International Sunday-School Lessons for 1890. By the Monday Club. Fifteenth Series. Pp. 390. \$1.25.

Henry Holt & Co., New York. Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect. By James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Lake Forest University. 8vo, pp. xiii, 343.

Methodist Book Concern, Hunt & Eaton, Agents, New York. The Book Divine; or, How do I know the Bible is the Word of God? By Jacob Embury Price. Pp. 194. 1889. 75 cents; — Old Heroes. The Hittites of the Bible. By Rev. J. N. Fradenburgh, Ph. D., D. D., Member of the Oriental Society, the American Folk-Lore Society, etc., etc., author of "Beauty Crowned," "Witnesses from the Dust," etc., etc. Pp. 166. 1889. Paper 50, cloth 75 cents.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. The Reconstruction of Europe. A Sketch of the Diplomatic and Military History of Continental Europe from the Rise to the Fall of the Second French Empire. By Harold Murdock. With an Introduction by John Fiske. Pp. xxxii, 421. 1889. \$2.00; — The Struggle for Immortality. By Elizabeth Stuart Phelps. Pp. 245. 1889. \$1.25; — Essays on Government. By A. Lawrence Lowell. Pp. 229. 1889. \$1.25; — The Church in Modern Society. By Julius H. Ward. Pp. 232. 1889. \$1.00; — Memoirs of a Millionaire. By Lucia True Ames, author of "Great Thoughts for Little Thinkers." Pp. 325. 1889. \$1.25.

The Boston Book Company, Boston. The Australian Ballot System, as Embodied in the Legislation of Various Countries. With an Historical Introduction, and an Appendix of Decisions since 1856 in Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, and Australia. By John H. Wigmore, of the Boston Bar. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Pp. viii, 205. October, 1889.

The Century Company, New York. William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879. The Story of his Life, Told by his Children. Volume III. 1841-1860. Pp. xii, 509. 1889. Volume IV. 1861-1879. Pp. ix, 425. 1889.

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
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
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THE

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THE
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VOL. XII.—DECEMBER, 1889.—No. LXXII.

THE OLD PESSIMISM AND THE NEW.

THE publication of the recent work of Sir Monier Monier-Williams on Buddhism may remind one of the influx of Oriental ideas in various forms to be observed of late in Western thought. Signs of such movement are common enough just now, when many are turning in expectance, as in certain past ages mankind has turned, to the far East and its occult science; while recondite philosophies and esoteric theosophies are popularized, and adepts initiate eager disciples into the obscure terminology, mystic lore, and magic virtue of this and that imported cult. There is evidence besides in other and more remarkable phases of the intellectual history of our century. Conspicuous amidst this general tendency is the renaissance, in German philosophy, of Buddhism. Not unworthy of note is this revival of the essential principles of a system which had its origin under conditions so remote.

It was in the fifth century before the Christian era that Buddhism arose, as a humanitarian protest and reaction against Brāhmanism. It was a not unnatural development of the latter system in its philosophical stage. In the Upanishads, the sacred books of that phase of Brāhmanism, are found the Pantheistic conceptions of one universal and impersonal Spirit, man's personal individuality a delusion entailing misery, and deliverance therefrom in recognition of the delusion, and in final reabsorption in the Universal Spirit, as the river loses itself in the ocean. Buddhism, in its long history and wide extension, developed into

varying and contradictory forms. At its origin, however, it was atheistic and nihilistic. It evaporated into naught that conception of the Universal Spirit or Brahman, and correspondingly transformed the doctrine of reunion with the One Spirit into negation and extinction, in its Nirvāna and Pari-nirvāna. A further modification was that the way of knowledge, so barred by the caste restrictions of the older system, was in the younger system opened to all. No one was to be shut out from enlightenment. The Buddha founded a universal brotherhood of equality.

His way of knowledge had its point of departure in a main doctrine of the older system, namely, that life was fast bound in misery, being only a link in a series of existences whereby sin continued itself in woe. All Indian philosophy had, for its aim, deliverance from the horrors of the weary round of metempsychosis, involving the perpetuation of the misery of existence. Buddhism was essentially little else than Brāhmanism divested of its transcendentalism, broadened in its adaptation to mankind, and endowed with the potent spell of a central and most attractive personality. That which the older system, after laborious theorizing, had arrived at, Buddhism made its starting-point, namely, the illusion and evil of existence. The teaching of the Buddha had regard to the pain of life, its source, its cessation, and the means thereof. His "four noble truths," the ground of his whole doctrine, are stated by Sir Monier Monier-Williams substantially thus: (1.) Existence in any form, whether on earth or in heavenly spheres, necessarily involves pain and suffering. (2.) All suffering is caused by lust, craving, or desire, of three kinds, for sensual pleasure, for wealth, and for existence. (3.) Cessation of suffering is simultaneous with extinction of lust, craving, and desire. (4.) The way whereby to attain extinction of desire and cessation of suffering.¹

From the evil of existence, Brāhmanism sought deliverance through the soul's reunion with divinity in the Universal Spirit which was its source. Buddhism, expecting refuge only in negation and non-existence, was thorough and utter pessimism, remediless and hopeless.

This root of bitterness, to be found at the base of both Brāhmanism and Buddhism, and well-nigh constituting the very essence of the latter, bears its dark flower for the early portion of this century in the genius of Leopardi. This poet of pessimism, who wrote the melancholy lines —

¹ *Buddhism*, p. 43.

" Mai non veder la luce
Era, credo, il miglior : " ¹ —

sings to his own weary heart, —

" Assai
Palpitasti, non val cosa nessuna
I moti tuoi, nè di sospiri è degna
La terra. Amaro e noia
La vita, altro mai nulla. " ²

And from that heart of poet, with no elaborate theory about source or outcome of life's trouble, is wrung the bitter cry : —

" Nostra vita a che val ? Solo a spregiarla ! " ³

The same noxious root bore its fruit in an imposing system of pessimistic philosophy. In the same year which saw Leopardi turn from Christian faith to the creed of despair was published the great work of Schopenhauer. Thus, at that time unknown to each other, they were both reviving the hopelessness of ancient Asia. In the later appendix to his chief work Schopenhauer asserts that, at the time of its appearance, he knew little of Buddhism, and was not under its influence. It may be noted, however, that in the first volume ⁴ he had said, " Indian philosophy streams back to Europe, and will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought." Certain it is that this philosophy of modern Germany is, to a large extent, a renaissance of the principles of Buddhism.

It is to be observed that the personal element in the two systems respectively presents a striking contrast. German Pessimism has not its gentle Prince Gautama, lover and deliverer of mankind, and Buddhism had no Schopenhauer, scorner of women and hater of men. The personality, however, of the reviver of philosophic pessimism is not to be ignored in considering his thought. There is no more original and striking figure in nineteenth century literature, from the time when, at Jena, the girls laughing at the saturnine youth were rebuked by Goethe with the prediction, " In time he will grow over all our heads," to those later days when the " Sage of Frankfort " was like a second Dr. Johnson, with Frauenstädt as his Boswell, amidst a circle of almost adoring admirers.

¹ Better I believe it were
Never to see the light.

² Enough hast thou throbb'd, nothing is worth
Thine agitations, nor earth deserving of sighs.
Bitterness and vexation is life, nor ever aught besides.

³ Our life is worth — what ? Save to be despised !

⁴ Page 461.

Arthur Schopenhauer was born February 22, 1788, in Dantzig. He was nurtured in wealth, and traveled early and extensively. Having tried, at Hamburg, business life to his great disgust, he resumed his studies, entering the University of Göttingen, and later that of Berlin, taking the degree of Ph. D. at Jena at the age of twenty-five, when he presented an original and masterly thesis on "The Fourfold Root of the Sufficient Reason." Meanwhile, at the age of seventeen, he had lost his father. To him he always ascribed the credit of all that he was, while through him were probably inherited certain morbid tendencies of mind. Between himself and his mother, who was a popular romance writer, and a friend of Goethe's, there was no sympathy whatsoever. She writes him from Weimar: "I could tell you things that would make your hair stand on end, but I refrain, for I know how you love to brood over human misery in any case." Later she refused to have him live with her. "Your laments over the stupid world and human misery give me bad nights and unpleasant dreams." Receiving his Doctor's thesis, already mentioned, which he had filially dedicated to her, she said, "The Fourfold Root. Ah! a book for apothecaries!" His relations to his mother serve to reveal his character and disposition thus early, and also largely account, in the glimpses afforded of her, for his bitterness toward women. Indeed, with such a mother, it could not be said of him that

"faith in womankind

Beats with his blood, and trust in all things high
Comes easy to him."

At Dresden he composed his great work, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," The World as Will and Idea, which was published in 1818, and was at the time, and for many years, a dead failure. There was no second edition until 1844, nor a third one until 1859, and this in a land where the press was teeming with philosophical treatises. After travel and study in Italy, he spent two years in Berlin, where he was unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain pupils. Here he had an unfortunate encounter with a friend of his landlady. For injuries sustained at his hands she recovered damages in the shape of a life annuity, a burden which rested on him for over twenty years. At last on her death certificate he was able to write, "*Obit anus, abit onus.*" At Frankfort, whither he removed from Berlin, he lived many years, and died in 1860. The evening of his life was brightened by the late splendor of his fame. It was an article in the "Westminster Review,"

in 1853, that first called attention to him as one of the thinkers of the world, and he was introduced to public favor by Frauenstädt in 1854.

Notwithstanding this delay of nearly forty years in the world's recognition of him, Schopenhauer had decidedly literary and æsthetic genius. His style is not only brilliant and vividly picturesque, but is characterized by incisive force, and by a frequent play of wit. La Rochefoucauld was not more cynical, nor Swift more caustic. His thought is original and suggestive. His reflections upon art have undeniable interest and value. He was the father of the modern philosophy of music, and under his influence has been composed the greatest music of this century. If his philosophy was late in attracting attention, its influence is wide and extending to-day. Once it was unregarded, a cloud, no larger than a man's hand, rising out of the sea of speculation. Later it gathered volume and blackness, until it has darkened much of German thought, and threatens a cyclone in the nihilism of Russia. Now, portentous anywhere, it appears in our sky. Schopenhauer's chief work was published in English in 1883, a translation of his essays having appeared in America in 1881. His writings are finding here circulation, interpreters, and disciples.

In considering his system, it is foreign to our purpose to discuss Schopenhauer's modifications of the position of Kant. The latter's critical writings are pronounced "the most important phenomenon that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years." Their effect on a receptive mind having been compared to that of the operation for cataract on a blind man, Schopenhauer declares it to be his own purpose to "put into the hands of those upon whom that operation has been successfully performed, a pair of spectacles suitable to eyes that have recovered their sight." He follows Kant's subjective idealism, and opens his great work with the words, "The world is my idea." What one knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth. He knows the world only as an object of perception. The world he knows is thus phenomenal, and has merely a relative existence. Science is only systematized knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, the principle, that is, of the connection of things and relativity of knowledge, under the forms of time and space and causality. To that principle the world as idea is subject. We know only the relations of things to each other. It is as if we knew that a large company

were all cousins to one another, but did not know who each one himself really was. Beneath all that appears there is the real, the thing-in-itself. And what this is, Schopenhauer in his Second Book proceeds to discover by an original method. Man is not satisfied thus to discern the mere outer relationship of things as they appear. He seeks admission to the inner significance and essence of things as they are, and the key thereto he finds in his own body. His body is not only known as an object among other objects; it is, moreover, directly felt to be the immediate manifestation of the will, which reveals itself through the voluntary movements of the body, so that its action is the will passing into perception, and, while the body is the outward manifestation of the will, the will is the inward and essential principle of the body. Then will, thus intimately known as the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, is recognized also as underlying all vital actions and the phenomena of instinct, and the name is further extended to all forms of force. Thus, reasoning from the near and familiar to the unknown, he finds Will to be the inner nature of everything in the world, the thing-in-itself, the kernel and essence of the world. A natural cause only gives occasion for the manifestation of the one Will, which is the power of the world, and the essential reality of all things. That lies outside the limiting province of the principle of sufficient reason. It is itself free from all multiplicity; while its manifestations in time and space are innumerable, like the multiplication of one picture through many facets of a glass. It is separate from any consciousness or intelligence. In its lowest grades of manifestation, this Universal Will appears as obscure, blind, unconscious striving. Thus working in the dark, at last, in the formation of the brain, it kindles for itself the light of intellect. By this enlightenment, however, the hitherto infallible certainty of the Will is interrupted. Unerring instinct now gives place to deliberation, which is liable to error. The intellect is in subordination to the Will, whose true nature is the perpetual restlessness of continual flux and endless striving.

Knowledge can, however, in certain individuals, and for certain blissful hours, throw off this bondage. Such transitory consolation may be found in the æsthetic contemplation of the beautiful, whether in art, or in nature, whereby the mind rises out of the incessant stream of willing into the purely and eternally ideal, and is a clear and untroubled mirror of the world. This æsthetic contemplation of the beautiful and the sublime, Schopenhauer treats

of in his Third Book, where, with brilliant originality, he combines Kant's Thing-in-itself and Plato's Idea. Moreover, according to his ethics, as unfolded in his Fourth Book, knowledge may react upon the will, and secure complete deliverance from its misery of continual striving.

This ingenious system presents a striking correspondence to many of the features of Buddhism. A primary note of likeness is the denial of personality, whether human or divine. Gautama admitted no notion of an incorporeal spirit. There was, so far as man's knowledge could go, no god higher than the perfectly enlightened man. "As to the question, from whom? or whence? or how? came the original force or impetus that started the first movement, the Buddha hazarded no opinion. . . . He saw nothing but countless cycles of causes and effects, and never undertook to explain the first cause which set the first wheel in motion."¹ Having rejected, as beyond cognizance, the Supreme Being of Brāhmanism, Buddhism had not even so much acknowledgment of human personality as the older system had. What was there metempsychosis is here rather a continuous metamorphosis. Consciousness, with the other constituent elements of being, is dissolved at death. But the moral result of the life, the act-force (Karma), passes on into a new form. Thus, although existence was perpetuated or renewed through successive forms of being, there was not, in the absence of continued consciousness, any true personal identity. If there was no self-consciousness, there was no true self. Indeed, belief in the existence of a personal self or ego was the first of the ten fetters that must be got rid of.²

If we turn now to the German philosopher, we find him far from theism. In the very spirit of Buddhism he writes: "My philosophy, at least, does not by any means seek to know *whence* or *wherefore* the world exists, but merely *what* the world is."³ God is the creation of man's fancy, acting upon his sense of need and dependence, and he quotes the old saying, "Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor." What he objects to in Pantheism is its *theistic* element. Nor does he grant any human personality. The individual person is a manifestation of will, not real, but phenomenal. Persons are mere puppets of the world magician, waves rising and subsiding in the ocean, bubbles to be dissolved in the encasing air.

Buddhism made the first cause of the misery of life to be ignorance, namely, not to know that life is merely a link in a passing

¹ Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 127.

³ *The World*, etc., vol. i. p. 108.

series ; not a permanent good, but an evanescent and illusory appearance and an evil mockery. With Schopenhauer it is the beginning of philosophic wisdom to recognize that all phenomenal existence is an illusion, the world about us an evanescent appearance, our sense of self a delusion, and life a dream. What we call dreams are distinguished from real life by the fact that they do not fit into its continuity. Life he compares to the systematic reading of a book, while dreaming is the reading of a page here and there without method or connection. But life and dreams are leaves of the same book, and life is one long dream.¹ Again and again he refers to the doctrine of the Hindu Vedas and Purāṇas regarding the work of Mâyâ. This made the world only a summoned enchantment, an inconstant appearance without true being, a veil enveloping human consciousness, allowing it to see not the reality, the thing-in-itself, but the phenomenon in time and space, and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason. For the wise man, this veil of Mâyâ becomes transparent, and the illusion of the phenomenal is dispelled.

Buddhism, emphasizing the connection between sorrow and the indulgence of desires that ought to be suppressed, made the second great cause of the world's misery to be *tanhâ*, the thirst of craving or desire. The German philosopher, from his doctrine of will, and his identification of will with desire, so that it may be compared to an unquenchable thirst, derives a pessimism more acrid than ever embittered the soul of dreamy Asiatic. The essence of being is will. "But the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being. If, on the other hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible void and ennui comes over it, that is, its being, and existence itself, becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus its life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui."² The people are tormented by want, and the world of fashion by ennui, card-playing being peculiarly an index of the misery of humanity. The will is one continuous striving, always in conflict, and therefore always in suffering. As there is no final end of the striving, there can be no measure or end of the suffering, which is thus essential to life and inseparable from it. He holds that happiness is never really anything more than negative ; that, being only relief from pain, it cannot

¹ *The World*, etc., i. p. 22.

² *Ibid.* i. p. 402.

be positive; that the chief good things of life, as, for example, health, youth, and freedom, we do not appreciate as long as we possess them, but only after we have lost them; and that only pain is positive. Thus the essence of life, the Will, existence itself, is a constant sorrow and misery. Such are the counts of the indictment which Schopenhauer brings against existence, as partly pitiable, partly terrible, and altogether desperately hopeless, and against the world, as the worst that could possibly be. His theory of the malignant persistence of the will-to-live, ever renewing itself in the pain and suffering of the manifold forms of life, resolves itself into the Buddhist doctrine of the misery involved in the desire for existence, "the aching craze to live."

A further resemblance is to be found in ethical teachings. In the ethics of Buddhism we find, as we might expect, a chief prominence given to compassion for all who suffer. It was out of pity, and the desire to deliver from their misery living beings of every order, that Gautama had voluntarily endured those many births in different forms of existence, and those repeated sacrifices of self. And his follower was exhorted to further his own deliverance from the bondage of continued individuality by sympathetic regard for others, and by making their sufferings his own. He must not harm any living thing, because he himself might one day be born again like the being he had injured, and in his turn suffer the same injury. Very like the spirit of that ancient code of ethics is Schopenhauer's moral teaching. Do not injure your fellow-man, who is in reality not a separate individual, but one with you, a manifestation of the same will. It is simply self injury. His ethics he founds upon his doctrine that the principle of individuality belongs only to the phenomenal and not to the real. The distinction between him who wrongs and him who is wronged is only apparent and not real. The essential reality is the Will living in both, which thus buries its teeth in its own flesh. He who inflicts the injury and he who suffers it are one. The egoism, which gives rise to selfish hatred and wickedness, means simply that the mind is fettered by that delusion of the principle of individuality. Virtue means, to recognize the real identity of all beings. He quotes the ancient Asiatic formula pronounced over all the beings in the world, living and lifeless, *tat tvam asi*, "This thou art." This identity of self with all was, for the people, embodied by Brāhmanism in the myth of the transmigration of souls, and the same principle appears again in Buddhism, where metempsychosis is modified into a series of

renewals by a kind of palingenesis. This doctrine of metempsychosis, remarks Schopenhauer, "deviates from the truth merely through the circumstance that it transfers to the future what already is now. It makes my true inner nature exist in others only after my death, while, according to the truth, it already lives in them now."¹ Thus he makes the basis of justice and benevolence to be sympathy, which penetrates the delusive principle of individuality. All pure love is sympathy. Weeping he explains as arising from sympathy with our own selves, identifying self with the suffering. On pity rests every true virtue, and compassion is the ground of morality.

The penetration of that veil of *Mâyâ*, the principle of individuality, may go still further, and lead on into Schopenhauer's Way of Salvation. While egoistic knowledge, that is, of particular individuality, constantly gives motives of volition, on the other hand the knowledge of the whole, of the thing-in-itself, may become a quieter of all and every volition. The will now turns away from life. Man attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true indifference, and perfect will-lessness. I might compare it to that equatorial tract of ocean which sailors call the Doldrums, where they drift in dead calm without a wind to move them. Upon this condition of spirit, which is essentially the same as the Quietism of Madame Guion and others, Schopenhauer delights to dwell, although in his own character he never attained to it. In his language, it is the transition from virtue to asceticism. There arises within the man a horror of the nature, of which his own phenomenal existence is an expression, the will to live, the kernel and essence of that world which is recognized as full of misery. Himself essentially nothing else than a manifestation of will, he ceases to will anything. Complete continence is the first step in this denial of the will to live. If thus the human race were to die out, then the inferior manifestations of the Will, in the rest of the world, would also vanish, as the twilight passes after the light of day. Voluntary poverty, fasting, torture of the body, are other means of breaking down the will, until death completes the deliverance. Thus the inner nature of holiness is denial of the will to live. One may be brought to the conviction of it either by observation of the sufferings of the world, or by the felt experience of suffering. Illustrations are found in the stories of Raymond Lully, and the Abbé Rancé, reformer of the order of Trappists. Even in the lap of Protest-

¹ *The World, etc.*, iii. p. 418.

antism are found illustrations of this asceticism, in the American Shakers, who are compared to the ancient Essenes. This denial of the will to live is not fulfilled in suicide, which really is a strong assertion of will. Just because the suicide cannot give up willing, he gives up living. Schopenhauer is inclined, however, to approve suicide by slow starvation, and thinks that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take necessary nourishment, and the completely resigned ascetic cease to live because he has altogether ceased to will. Thus death is the final goal, beyond is nothingness, and holiness means not to care. Here Schopenhauer lapses into pure Buddhism. This doctrine of the denial of the will-to-live, this will-lessness, which desires nothing and hopes nothing, and aspires to nothingness as the welcome dénouement of the miserable drama of existence, is simply a revival of the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāna.

This is a much controverted term. It should be observed that it was a current expression adopted from Brāhmanism, and it is elastic and changeable in its meaning, as are the two systems wherein it occurs. It were not strange if, with masses of mankind, the vague and empty outline of Nirvāna came at length to be filled in with the beauty of an Elysian field or the gross attractions of a Mohammedan Paradise, or otherwise modified. Originally, however, the word means "the state of a blown-out flame," and refers to the extinction of the three fires of lust, ill-will, and delusion, and a release from all consequent ignorance and pain. Equivalent to Arahattam, sainthood, the more common word in the Pāli texts, it denoted the state reached by Gautama at the moment when, under the Bodhi-tree, he attained the perfect enlightenment of Buddhahood. It was not annihilation. It was not death, for forty-five years later came to the Buddha his Parinirvāna, when he passed away. That was the final close of the series of bodily organizations the cessation of re-births. Placed together, the two terms seem to explain themselves. Nirvāna is the extinction of the fire of desire, passion, and will. Parinirvāna is the extinction of the flame of existence. Schopenhauer's denial of the will, where desire has died, and not a hope survives, is precisely the Nirvāna of primitive Buddhism.

Thus does his system reproduce Oriental thought in the more precise terms of Western philosophy. We find here Sākya-muni in company with Plato and Kant. With them we roam through

an interesting but withal weird and repelling region. We seem to traverse a mighty forest, with its inviting glades and alluring vistas, its flowers in wasteful luxuriance of beauty and its towering growths of baleful shade, its fantastic shapes and grotesque monstrosities, its vast, noxious morasses, its dark, forbidding pools, its glooms, its miasmas. The characteristics of the personality whence this philosophy proceeded possessed some unusual significance. There was not only much egotism there, a cold, hard self-sufficiency, devoid alike of the sympathy with humanity which he inculcated, and the reverence toward God which he repudiated; but, moreover, in the personal make-up may be detected, running through it all, a thread of special singularity, into which entered at least two strands, a somewhat unhealthy mental tendency inherited through the father, and, largely on the mother's account, a certain unnatural disposition toward women, in spite of undenied susceptibility in this regard. Hence may have been derived a morbid over-sensitiveness and perversion of healthy sentiment regarding the relations of sex and the propagation of life, which would seem to have infected his philosophy and seriously affected his whole estimate of existence. Into his very characteristic metaphysico-physiological dissection of love we will not enter.

It is not possible here fully to consider the fallacies and contradictions observable in his system as a whole. A primary error underlies two prominent characteristics of the theory, the separation between will and intellect, and the derivative and subordinate position assigned to intellect. It is in vain that he seeks the solution of the world's enigma in will-power alone. There cannot be will in general that wills nothing in particular. And whatsoever is willed must be present in idea, for, if otherwise present, it would not be willed. Some cognition or idea must accompany will. He here comes short of a much earlier thinker, whom he more than once alludes to, that martyr of Italian philosophy to whom a statue was recently erected at Rome under remarkable circumstances. Schopenhauer might have learned wisdom from Giordano Bruno, and his "*intelligentia divina*," his recognition of purpose as the immanent life of the universe. It must be reserved for another paper to consider how Schopenhauer's system has here been modified by Von Hartmann, who introduces intellect as a constituent, together with will, of his infallible "Unconscious." Indeed, Schopenhauer does not at all prove, but simply assumes, his fundamental position that the body is a direct

objectification of will. It is an assertion which cannot be proved, in view of the limited control of the will over the body.

An important tributary to his pessimism is the doctrine of a mere puppet personality. This doctrine, which holds that the person belongs to the phenomenal, and that exemption from the sufferings of others is only in appearance, so that "according to the true nature of things every one has all the sufferings of the world as his own," is not in harmony with experience. In actual fact the whole world does not suffer in us; we suffer as individuals. Again, regarding the seat of the personality, the will, Schopenhauer's identification of will with desire is by no means accurate. Desire and will are distinct from each other. They may be in direct opposition, and each may master the other. It is far from adequate to describe will as implying the wretchedness of want. It might more truly be said to mean energy. And therein is joy. In healthy effort there is pleasure, as in all due exercise of function. The "*Journal Intime*" of Amiel bears pathetic testimony to the joyousness of will. "The Buddhist tendency in me blunts the faculty of free self-government and weakens the power of action. . . . I hold my own personality, my own aptitudes, my own aspirations too cheap. . . . In a word, I bear within me a perpetual self-detractor, and this is what takes all spring out of my life."¹ Even in the stress of stern conflict one may still drink delight of battle. It is evident that Schopenhauer, in his own personality, lacked that element of will which goes to make up courage. Physically he was without doubt a coward, in mortal dread of robbers, and of the contagion of disease. And it is probable he had not that stout heart and steadfast will which enter into moral courage, and enable a man to contend in evil days and never yield; as Browning puts it, —

"still struggling to effect
My warfare; happy that I can
Be crossed and thwarted as a man."

Indeed, while Schopenhauer made everything of will in general, he denied all freedom to the human will. It was powerless to control or modify the inevitable tendencies in the man. There was possible no improvement or progress of character, no joyous sense of moral growth and advance toward perfection. Little wonder, then, at the depressing principles thereupon ensuing, which all tended to lower and deaden the faculties of being. His doctrine plainly meant intellectual and spiritual suicide. And, although he

¹ Page 122.

disavowed the inculcation of literal suicide, yet self-murder is the practical outcome of his system, and according to its principles the shortest route out of misery. Indeed, his ascetic starvation is, notwithstanding all he may say to the contrary, simply a slow process of suicide. From the standpoint of his own theory, however, his denial of the will-to-live is involved in contradictions. How can a man annul his own individual will, when it is but a manifestation in him of that only and mighty Will? And if he could, how would his doing so at all affect the whole Will, which is continually rushing into life anew?

Schopenhauer's doctrine that happiness is only negative, so that there is no such thing as positive satisfaction, is an error which may be refuted by appeal to fact. There is pleasure which does not mean removal of pain, but arises directly. We might with as much truth say, with Leibnitz, that it is pain which is negative. Pleasure and pain are simply positive and negative to each other, like any other opposite poles. All assertions, also, of the preponderance of pain over pleasure can be as readily denied as made.

It is, however, upon higher ground that our strongest defense against Pessimism is to be made. The value of life is not to be reckoned in terms merely of pleasure and pain. Those terms cannot be satisfactorily computed. Nor are they the chief factors that enter into the problem. The question of the worth of life constitutes not primarily an æsthetic but an ethical problem. It is to be settled by appeal to truth of the moral order. It is there that, notwithstanding all the pain and sorrow the pessimist may adduce, we nevertheless may learn that life is solemn indeed, but if solemn also sacred, and because sacred therefore precious. The principles we have found to be common to the old pessimism and the new we may state in inverse order thus: (1.) Denial of will. (2.) Sympathy the ethical principle. (3.) The misery of will as desire. (4.) Knowledge of the illusion. (5.) No personality. (6.) No God. Over against those negations we may set, each against each, these positive truths, linked in a chain of sequence: (1.) A worthy end for the will. (2.) That worthy end found in right for its own sake. (3.) The joy of will as effort toward that end. (4.) Beneath all changing phenomena, great facts which give to the entire process worth and significance, namely, (5) Human personality, and (6) God. Or, in other words, our own personal life which may conform itself to goodness as its ideal, and a living Being who in perfection is all that we can aspire to be.

Thus moral energy may save us from any nightmare fancies of a blindly malignant will, working out its curse through all. Loyal faith in right and duty finds, as Amiel even in his lonely darkness found, "the holy will which is at the root of nature and destiny,"¹ and comes at length into the truth that Dante sang in his great line: —

"In la sua volontade è nostra pace."

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HOLMAN HUNT AND THE PRE-RAPHAELITES.

FEW "movements" in this age of "movements" have had a more interesting history than that of the modern Pre-Raphaelite School of Painting, so closely associated with the noble and serious life, high aims, and earnest purpose of Holman Hunt. Few lives and movements, moreover, have been more persistently misunderstood, more flagrantly misrepresented. All Mr. Ruskin's genius and influence have not, even yet, succeeded in winning for this school a thoroughly fair recognition, — possibly because the issue between it and its opponents is not yet, and may never be, a dead issue. But, however this may be, the story of the movement, from its first beginning, must always possess a special interest for every thoughtful lover of Art; particularly when told, as it has been told, truly and simply, by one so well qualified to tell it as the veteran leader himself.

About forty years ago, when the spirit of a political and intellectual unrest was actively at work in overturning old forms of government as well as of belief, three young painters, of earnest nature and profound insight, though of widely different types of genius, were united in a fellow feeling of rebellion against the traditional conventionality which, as they believed, had produced the general decline of English Art. A slavish imitation of Raffaele and his followers had well-nigh killed out originality. Art had become a conventional imitation of Art, instead of drawing perpetual freshness from her great model, Nature. She was, consequently, growing more and more blindly conventional, more and more servile in adhering to old established forms and standards. While feeling this profound dissatisfaction with the principles

¹ *Journal*, p. 210.

and practice of their contemporaries, these three young men were vaguely seeking, as one of them expressed it, "for some sure ground, some starting-point for our art, which would be secure, if it were ever so humble." Just at this critical moment in their career they hit upon an old book of engravings of the frescoes in the Campo Santo at Pisa by the early painters who preceded Raffaele. Here, to their unbounded delight, they found, or thought they found, "that freedom from corruption, pride, and disease, for which they sought." "Here there was, at least, no trace of decline, no conventionality, no arrogance. Whatever the imperfection, the whole spirit of the art was simple and sincere, — was, as Ruskin afterwards said, eternally and unalterably true." "Think," Hunt goes on to say, "what a revelation it was to find such work at such a moment, and to recognize with the triple enthusiasm of our three spirits!"

In order to understand how this should have been felt by them as a revelation, we should have to try to divest ourselves of ideas which have become inextricably interwoven with our modern thought, and which are not the least valuable portion of our heritage from the past. That *truthfulness* in Art which Mr. Ruskin's writings have made a note so familiar to modern ears was then, in form at least, new to the world of Art. But, to these young men, the new light on their path became a guiding star. *Truth* — fresh from the source of nature itself, in the place of dead conventionality and traditional imitation — was the principle that fired their youthful enthusiasm, and by which they resolved to stand or fall. And their steady and unwavering devotion to this principle, combined with the leavening force of Mr. Ruskin's teaching, have changed the whole temper and ideals of modern English Art. So thoroughly conscientious were they, was Holman Hunt at least, that he would not only have utterly disdained to evolve the proverbial "camel" out of his "own consciousness," but would also have refused to copy the camel of another painter, or even to draw the camel in the "Zoo," but would paint the camel as he stands in his native desert, or not at all. The influence of the new impulse they thus gave to Art, we may feel in every illustrated book and paper. Let any one exhume out of the fossilized remains of past ages one of the children's books published a generation ago, now happily an extinct species; let him notice the painfully stiff and wooden figures, the flat and impossible landscapes, and compare these with the real trees and flowers, the real children and men and women that adorn

even the nursery rhymes and primers of this happier age. This change is, in no small measure, due to the conjoint influence of Mr. Ruskin and the long-despised "Pre-Raphaelites," who did for painting what Burns did for poetry,—sent it back to the fresh, pure well-spring of nature, from which alone it can derive an ever fresh, perennial life. The three comrades who initiated this return were Holman Hunt, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, and John Millais, names which are now household words. Rossetti, whom most of us know rather as poet than as painter, had the most distinctly poetical style, subtle and fanciful indeed to an extreme. But as *he* certainly was no mere realist, neither did the other two profess to be mere copyists of nature. Art, of course, must always be much more than that. While seeking ruth to nature, down to the smallest detail, they sought to catch the ideal beauty, through the interpretation of which the true artist's mission is to "make a spectator feel how much more beautiful the world is than she seemed before."

The story of their brave fight for these principles—waged against opposition so bitter that it sometimes amounted to persecution—has been fully told by their veteran leader in his retrospective exposition of the views and aims which inspired them. It is closely interwoven, too, with the story of Holman Hunt's own career, which we happily thus get at first hand, without the intervention of a biographer. Here, at least, we can be sure of the authentic portraiture of an interesting life.

Holman Hunt shared the fate of many another embryo artist, in receiving no encouragement at home in his early predilection for artistic pursuits. His father, in common with the respectable British public of that period, believed that "Art was little better than loafing;" and, in order to turn the boy's thoughts into a more useful channel, he sent him, betimes, to learn business in the city. Here, shut up in a little room that looked out on three black walls, and employed all day in making entries in a ledger, the boy seemed far enough from realizing his artistic dreams. Yet, though his education was thus cut short, so far as school was concerned, the eager lad found at this office good literary pasture on which he could browse to his heart's content. His master was a man of scholarly tastes, and young Hunt used to read Homer and Plutarch and Shakespeare, in the intervals of office work, with a hunger unknown to boys who read them as task work; while he indulged in wistful day-dreams of the *Ægean* and the Troad, of Athens and Rome, Venice and Verona. His

natural bent for the pictorial art was too strong for repression ; and even here, in the dull and dingy office, he tried his hand at designing. It was one of his amusements to draw flies on the ground glass of the window pane, with as much success as the old Greek painter, in making them seem real to his employer. Happily, this gentleman had himself some love for art, and young Hunt eventually received permission to spend his own earnings in taking lessons from a city portrait painter. He worked away, *con amore*, until his success in a life-like portrait of an old orange-woman gave him courage to declare to his father that he would be an artist, and nothing but an artist ! The father yielded so far as to permit him to try his own way at his own risk.

There did not then exist the well-appointed art schools and other facilities for art study which abound to train the budding artist of to-day. Holman Hunt had, however, the British Museum close at hand, and here he drew faithfully two days in each week, while the other three days were spent in earning his own expenses by painting portraits, copying pictures, or doing anything else that happened to come in his way. He did not, as many a *dilet-tante* youth would have done, disdain even such humble employment as that of altering faces and draperies of portraits so as to suit the tastes of their originals. One of the commissions at this time executed by the future painter of the "Shadow of the Cross" and the "Light of the World" was that of remodeling an old portrait by altering the expression, and changing the color of the coat ; all which, with characteristic thoroughness, he faithfully performed, and was duly paid accordingly. He failed, however, in his first two attempts to enter the Academy, and his father, whose patience would hold out no longer, declared that if he could not succeed on the third trial, he must return to "the city" ! Persuasion won the day, however. At seventeen his first drawing was accepted, and he at last attained the object of his ambition.

And now having fairly started on his chosen career, with artistic intelligence and discrimination developed, to which of the great painters of the day should the enthusiastic young student look for the model he should set before him ? This important aid to a learner was not so easily found by one whose aspirations already surpassed those of his compeers. The last painter who had attempted to lead a school had been poor, ambitious, visionary Haydon, — a man who might have done great things had he gone to work on a truer principle, but who had just ended his tragic

career of struggle and disappointment by an equally tragic suicide. Etty, after twenty years of failure and heroic effort, had become "the rage," but his exaggerated melodramatic style repelled Hunt, who speaks of him as "painting classic subjects with the taste of a Parisian paper-hanger." Landseer he admired for point and poetry of design, but he disliked what he calls "the pomatum-y texture of his painting, the absence of firm bone beneath his skins, and the gentle melting away of every form into shapeless cloud." Turner, as he tersely expresses it, "was rapidly disappearing in a gorgeous sunset." Mulready seemed a safe guide, so far as his painstaking and studious tendencies were concerned, but his drawing was without any bold line, and he was injured by his taste for prettiness. Maclise, Leslie, Hollands, Dyce, — all had their admirable qualities, but each had for Hunt some drawback, when regarded in the light of a master to be followed; while the younger painters, along with perhaps a "fatal facility," gave evidence of their lack of a leader by their "diversity," which seems to have been at least one advantage arising from their lack of leadership. Of course, the Greeks and Raffaele were perpetually quoted, but the admiration expressed seemed to him hollow and indiscriminating. For there seemed to be no conception of the great interval which, to his eye, separated Raffaele from such painters as Guido, Murillo, and others, grouped under the general name of the "old masters." It is not surprising that a student so advanced in his ideas, and so hard to satisfy, should not have found much satisfaction in discussion with his fellows, and should have been often misunderstood.

But the history of this critical period of his art studies is best conveyed in his own words: —

"The majority of my compeers and immediate elders were worshippers of Etty, and inquired not at all of the beginning of his greatness, but strove to display at least equal mastery in execution to that which he had. Some followed other masters, but it amused me to observe that all alike adduced the Greeks and Raffaele as the prophets to sanctify their courses, and all took fire at the suggestion that the solid ground beneath their feet was the only foundation on which the greatest could stand. There was no discrimination then with artists, more than with the public, that Guido, Parmegiano, and Le Brun, Murillo, Sasso Ferato, and such crew, were birds of a different feather from their great idols, so that the name of the princely Urbinite was made to cover all conventional Art. We knew less of Michael Angelo in England

then, with the Sistine Chapel and the Medici tombs unphotographed; and Tintoretto was not known in his might at all. In the painting schools sober discussion seemed very unprofitable. When I put down my brush, which was not often, I preferred to joke, and I accepted the railing description of 'flat blasphemy,' until my outspoken denunciation of the gods became a password, though the students had no great faith in my sincerity. How could it be credited that one was in earnest in saying that Murillo's large 'Holy Family' in the National Gallery was rubbish?"

But if he felt that he "had to be his own master," he could at least assimilate any bits of instruction that came in his way. He thus describes the "first bit of genuine instruction" which he received, and which determined the whole course of his artistic life.

"While engaged in copying the 'Blind Fiddler,' a visitor, looking over me, said that Wilkie painted it without any dead coloring, but finished each bit as fresco was done." This was a revelation to him, and as he traced the purity of work of the early painters to their drilling in the exact manipulation needed in fresco painting, he tried to put aside the "loose, irresponsible painting" of the time, and to adapt himself to a style which allowed no excuse for a false touch. More and more there grew in him this love of "clean work," and clear forms and tints, as he saw it in these Francias and other Pre-Raphaelites. He desired to submit himself to the training of patient self-restraint "imposed by masters who had never indulged their hands in uncertainty and dash" on pupils who had "delighted in the devotion of humility till far on in their maturity!" Such a training he felt the more necessary for himself, as he was naturally "slovenly and impatient of results." Any idea of founding a school was most remote from his thoughts. He was simply feeling his way to the course that he felt most profitable for himself, although the study of certain paintings early forced on him the conviction that "in Art, as in other pursuits, it is a loss in the end both for schools and individuals to begin as masters."

But like draws to like. Millais and Rossetti were both students at the Academy, and it was not long before Hunt and Millais became close friends. Each cordially admired the other's work, and Millais introduced Hunt to his parents as "the student who drew so well." Hunt's picture from Keats — the "Eve of St. Agnes" — was partially painted in Millais's studio, and its appearance at the exhibition of the Academy brought Rossetti to

his side in enthusiastic admiration, — this picture being thus the means of drawing together the three leaders of the Pre-Raphaelite school.

Their "Brotherhood" was an after-thought, called into being by the developing genius and advancing aims of its members. Shortly before Hunt had begun the "Eve of St. Agnes," his earnest mind, just then in a state of eager receptivity, had come under the strong and congenial influence of a teacher who was to be, in a great degree, the inspiration, as well as the powerful ally, of the new school of Art. Ruskin's "Modern Painters" fell into his hands, and one may imagine the delight and enthusiasm with which the earnest young art student absorbed the teaching that fell, like good seed, into a soil so well fitted to receive it, and to bring forth an abundant harvest. This book revealed to him, too, for the first time, the truth, that the modern intellect was not, as he had rashly supposed, dead to all possibility of awakening a genuine passion for Art, and that it was not useless to look for any generous enthusiasm for it in the nineteenth century. The influence of this thought and the inspiration of such teaching remained with him long after he was obliged to return the book, — before, as he says, he had "got half the good there was in it." It is one of the pathetic incidents common in the lives of men of genius, that the future leader of a new school of Art — the reader who, as he said, felt more strongly than any one else could have done, "that it was written expressly for him" — should have been obliged to borrow this book from lack of ability to buy it, and should have had to sit up nearly all night, in order to finish it before returning it.

The companionship of the three young men proved a source of stimulus and strength to them all, — the strong points of each supplementing the weaker points of the others. It was just then, while still dissatisfied with existing standards and models, and looking for some sure ground to be a starting-point for their still vague aspirations towards reform, that they found, one evening, at the house of Millais, the book of engravings of the frescoes in the Campo Santo at Pisa, which, to their delight, furnished an actual embodiment of those principles of simplicity and sincerity towards which they had been feeling their way. Like "a flash of lightning" the truth of these principles appealed to each of the three spirits "with the force of a revelation," and, from that moment, they were pledged, as a "Brotherhood," to devote their lives to the revival of the simple sincerity which had been most

characteristic of the earliest painters. "Neither then, nor afterwards," says Hunt, "did they affirm that there was not much healthy and good art after the time of Raffaele, but only that after that time there could be traced a gradual degeneracy." To restore to its first purity, by a patient and careful return to the study of nature, was the task which these three enthusiasts now undertook. Their association was termed a "Brotherhood," and the prefix "Pre-Raphaelite"—originally applied in contempt by their enemies—was finally adopted as its distinctive name. This name was not, however, for the public, the initials "P. R. B." in their paintings being the sole visible sign of their union. "It was only in a little spirit of fun," says Hunt, "that we thus agreed that Raffaele, the Prince of Painters, was the inspiring influence of the art of the day, for we saw that the practice of contemporary painters was as different from that of the master whose example we quoted, as established interest or indifference had ever made the conduct of disciples."

The three young men thus united in a common aim and purpose were of widely differing character and genius. Hunt was the leading spirit, and may be called the conscience of the trio. Rossetti was the poet, while Millais, in the words of his friend, "showed a rare combination of extraordinary artistic faculty with sterling English common sense." Rossetti, as described by Hunt, was a young man of singularly marked and pronounced type of genius. Impulsive, passionate, impatient, yet refined and dreamy, he seemed "of imagination all compact," full of poetic fire, of generous, quick enthusiasm, with a spirit that, though subtle, was intense in all its beliefs and emotions, and made him eager to proselytize even, as Hunt says, to an absurd degree. He was singularly narrow, as well as intense, in his sympathies. He had devoted himself almost exclusively to the study of poetry, yet for such a poet as Homer he cared but little. Passionately enthusiastic as he was for painting, he had little admiration for the kindred art of sculpture, while we have Holman Hunt's word for the fact, otherwise scarcely credible, that "music he regarded as positively offensive." Much as he loved nature, his love did not go deeper than the outward aspect. The truth of science was distasteful to him. He was romantically attached to the old order of things, and to old ways of looking at things, and cared no more to have these disturbed by "the widening thoughts of men" than he would have cared to have a picturesque mass of ivy displaced from a mouldering old wall. "What could it matter," he

said, "whether the earth moved round the sun, or the sun traveled round the earth?" Naturally, therefore, he cared but little for that truth of detail for which Hunt cared so much, — thought "that attention to chronological costume, to the types of the different races of men, to climatic features or influences, were of no value in a painter's work, and that, therefore, Oriental proprieties in the treatment of Scriptural subjects were calculated to destroy the poetic nature of a design." With Hunt's idea, which he afterwards carried out, of making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in order to paint sacred subjects with greater truth, Rossetti did not much sympathize. Yet, though he had so much of the character of a *dilettante*, and carried his poetic idealism to a fantastic extreme, he was quite ready to join his forces with the effort of his two friends "to fight against the then current modes of art, as wanting in serious ambition, vital force, and thoroughness of expression," and to unite with them "in our manner of acquiring power direct from nature itself, to establish a healthier and more pervading taste than that which was frittering away the genius of the nation in trifles and bombast."

Holman Hunt has been called "a prosaic realist." It is possible that his strongly spiritual sensibilities somewhat overpowered in his works the easily appreciable poetry of sensuous beauty. But the boy who, when shut up in the dingy blankness of a city office, could console himself with Homer and Shakespeare, with visions of the *Ægean*, of Athens, and of Imperial Rome, — the painter whose symbolic religious pictures have exercised so powerful an influence over so many poetic natures, — must have had a strong vein of poetic feeling in himself. As to his "realism," the expression is one which is ambiguously used. A true realism and a true idealism are not opposed, but most closely related to each other. In fact, the realism which, while keeping close to nature, also seizes and suggests her essential spirit, meaning, and higher relations, may be said to be also the truest idealism. In regard to a charge, however, which has so frequently been made against Holman Hunt in particular, it is well to give the very words in which he himself replies to it.

"We both agreed," he says of himself and Rossetti, "that a man's work should be the reflex of the living image in his own mind of the idea treated, and not the icy double of the facts themselves. Carolus Duran has said, in almost exactly the same words, that art is not a reproduction of nature, but the conveyance, from one mind to another, of a fresh impression of it.

"It may be seen," Hunt goes on to say, "that we were never what we have often been called, — realists. I think the art would have ceased to have the slightest interest for any one of the three painters concerned, had the object been only to make a representation — elaborate or unelaborate — of a *fact* in nature. Independent of the consideration that the task would put out of operation the faculty, making man, — 'how like a god,' it seemed then, as it does now, — that a mere imitation gradually comes to see nature so claylike and meaningless, — so like only to what one sees when illness brings a heavy cloud before the eyes, — that the pictures or statues make a spectator feel, not how much more beautiful the world is than she seemed before, but only that she is a tedious infliction or even an oppressive nightmare. . . . In agreeing to use the utmost elaboration in painting our first pictures, we never meant more than that the practice was essential for training the eye and the hand of the young artist; we should never have admitted that the relinquishment of this habit of work by a matured painter would have made him less of a Pre-Raphaelite. I can say this the better now, because, although it is not true, as is often said, that my detail is microscopic, I have retained, later than either of my companions, the penciling of a student. When I take to large brushes, and enrich my canvases with impasto, it will imply that the remnant of my life would not suffice to enable me to express my thoughts in other fashion, and that I have in my own opinion obtained enough from severe discipline to trust myself again to the self-complacent handling of my youth, to which I have already referred."

Yet so persistently do men take that which is merely incidental for that which is radical and essential, that it has become habitual to call any very microscopic and prosaic rendering of nature "Pre-Raphaelite," and to cast the discredit of such work as a reproach on the school itself! Of course, when the new school had achieved a certain degree of popularity, it did not need the vigorous proselytism of Rossetti to attach to it many disciples, with some of whom, at least, their only claim to belong to it was their imitation of such unessential peculiarities. And as slavish imitation always kills out true spiritual kinship, and any one good custom may "corrupt the world," there has arisen a spurious and conventional "Pre-Raphaelitism" which has provoked salutary ridicule. There still exists, in some quarters, a popular superstition that any representation of a forlorn-looking damsel in very limp and dingy garments, standing in a lackadaisical attitude

amid a profusion of stiff sunflowers, is a fair specimen of "Pre-Raphaelite painting." What has been already quoted from Hunt will serve to show the absurdity of such a charge, in regard, especially, to that elaboration of details which is supposed to be an essential feature of this school. As to coloring, Hunt's own has called forth very divided opinion. It is certainly rich and glowing, whatever may be said of its harmony; the "Scape-Goat," in particular, being considered by competent critics a marvelous achievement of purity, translucency, and iridescence. Rossetti's, if occasionally morbid, was always refined and delicate, while that of Millais is too popular to need any comment.

All competent judges ought now to be able to acknowledge the real value of the service rendered to Art by these masters of the "Pre-Raphaelite School." But, even yet, they are scarcely out of the shadow of the cloud of misrepresentation and slander, the common fate of reformers, which so long obscured the fame of the young enthusiasts who boldly determined to turn their back on old conventions, and go to nature herself for inspiration. They were "chaffed," ridiculed, sneered at, and, as the opposition waxed sharper, were bitterly attacked and recklessly maligned. Unhappily, the weakness of Rossetti betrayed, to a gossiping friend, the meaning of the cabalistic letters "P. R. B.," and, before long, of course, the newspapers proclaimed the cherished secret. Then, indeed, the storm broke upon the heads of the audacious trio! As Holman Hunt expressed it: "It seemed as if the honor of Raphael were the feeling dearest of all to the bosom of England, and this we had impiously assailed!" Charles Dickens, scarcely a fitting defender of old precedents, attacked Millais in an article in "Household Words." So far did the tide of prejudice carry even better qualified critics, that professed artists could see nothing but "charlatanism" in works which to-day are prized as masterpieces. "Charlatanism" was the very last thing of which Hunt should have been accused. His principles were most strenuously opposed to everything that savored of it in the remotest degree. The vulgar idea of success in life, "money-making, notoriety, even prestige," he held in utter contempt. He scorned, as some of his noted contemporaries have not scorned, the achievement of an easy reputation, by appeals to the love of the marvelous, by eccentricities, by devices to keep his name constantly before the public. If he could not succeed by "pure and noble work in which he believed, he would do without success, and *could* do without it!"

As a specimen of the persistent misrepresentation and misunderstanding to which the Associates were exposed, the following incident is given in Hunt's own words. One morning, while sketching in the country, another sketching artist came upon him as he was reading, while waiting for a sea-mist to clear away. "He inquired whether I was making a sketch of the spot in oil or water, etc., etc., and I returned that I was trying my hand, when the weather permitted, with oil colors. He persevered until I thought myself rude in my reserve. At last, to escape the charge of being a downright bear, I remarked that painters recently appeared to make a greater point of working direct from nature. 'Yes,' he replied, 'all but the Pre-Raphaelites.' 'Oh! I have been given to understand,' I said, 'that *they* make a principle of doing everything from nature.' 'That's their humbug! they try to make ignorant people believe it; but, in fact, they do everything in their own studios.' At this I looked fully up from my book and said, 'Well, of course, I don't know, — how should I? But I have heard it stated so positively that, whatever their failings and incapacity, they do give themselves a chance of getting at truth by going to the fountain-head, that your assurance to the contrary surprises me. May I ask whether you speak this from hearsay or from your own knowledge? I was really made to believe that Millais and Hunt, with Collins, were living together last summer in Surrey, and that then they painted the "Ophelia," the "Huguenot," and the "Hireling Shepherd," which were in the Academy this year!' 'Not a word of truth in it,' he said; 'you have been entirely imposed upon. I know them as well as I know myself!' 'Personally?' I asked, looking fixedly at him. 'Yes,' he said, 'and they are all thorough charlatans! Don't you know how they do their landscapes? I will tell you. I've seen them do it. When they want to paint a tree, they have one single leaf brought to them, and a piece of the bark, and they go on repeating these until they have completed their Brummagem tree. They paint a field in the same manner, repeating one single blade of grass until the whole space is covered, and they call that nature!' 'By Jupiter!' I exclaimed, 'I am quite surprised to hear that they are such barefaced impostors.' And my visitor wished me again good-morning, saying that he was glad he had been able to undeceive me, and called out, as he walked away to a cottage up the glen where he was painting, 'You may take my word for that!' It was at first-hand, too, and quite as good as 'the very best authority,' since then and still quoted for

enforcement of conclusions. I never saw him any more," adds Hunt dryly, "or I might have been much wiser!"

If this was not a case of genuine "chaff," which does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Hunt, it was a curious instance of the power of prejudice, dislike, and self-interest combined, to drive men into willful slander. But the "Brotherhood" bravely kept on in their chosen path, and as they gained disciples, and extorted a grudging prestige, they gradually revolutionized the spirit of English Art.

Hunt had already made his mark to some extent in the Academy by his "Eve of St. Agnes." A picture called "The Christian Missionary" added to his nascent reputation. Three pictures sent in by the three comrades, Hunt's "Hireling Shepherd," Millais's "Huguenot," and Rossetti's "Ophelia," drew attention to the new school as soon as they appeared. The "Strayed Sheep," painted before this time, was the first of the purely sacred paintings which have formed the largest part of his work. Of it, Mr. Ruskin says with a little of his enthusiastic exaggeration:—

"Were it only the first that cast true sunshine on the grass, it would have been in that virtue sacred; but, in its deeper meaning, it is the first in which, for those who can read, the substance of the conviction and the teaching of his after life is written, though not distinctly told till afterwards, in the symbolic picture of the 'Scape-Goat,'—'*All we like sheep have gone astray, we have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all!*'"

Another small picture painted by him at this time, called "Fairlight Downs," helped both his reputation and his finances, which had been so low that, occasionally, he would not know where to find a stamp for a letter. He had always been willing to undertake any job work, however humble, that would help to fill his empty purse; and, among other things, had been employed by the painter Dyce to restore the frescoes of Rigaud at Trinity House, — a work of a good deal of labor and very little credit. He also painted copies of the works of other masters, and occasionally fulfilled orders for original work of his own, finding one or two kind friends, at least, who appreciated his genius and were glad to help him on. But, notwithstanding this, he was at one time so thoroughly discouraged that he thought he should have to go to Canada or Australia and take anything that offered itself as a means of earning a livelihood. Happily, this sacrifice was averted

by the generosity of his friend Millais, who placed at his disposal his own little hoard of five hundred pounds, to be used as Hunt required it. This kindness, accepted as frankly as it was offered, is equally creditable to both painters, and is frankly told and gratefully acknowledged in Hunt's reminiscences. He had, by this time, conceived the subject of his great painting, "The Light of the World," and had begun its execution, making careful studies of the orchard background in his country sketchings, and painting the figure and draperies from a lay figure so arranged that the moonlight should fall on it from an open window. He tells an amusing story of the manner in which this singular arrangement puzzled an omnibus driver, who, night after night, from his high perch, espied the painter at his task. The picture is so well known, and has created such diversity of opinion, that it is unnecessary to say anything about it, except that, whatever difference of opinion may exist in regard to the composition, there can be none as to the richness of its coloring. Critics differ widely in regard to the harmony of the color, but the painting seems to glow and throb with such intensely vivid hues, and so emblematically glorious is the jewelry in the breastplate, that the lantern, which many feel to be a superfluity in the picture, is comparatively unobtrusive; while the whole work is as pleasurable to the eye as it is, to many, intensely powerful in its mystic treatment. This painting while in progress, had often to be turned with its face to the wall, while the painter was working at "pot-boilers;" but when, at length, it was completed, it challenged at least a respectful attention.

In order to make studies on the spot for his next great work, the "Scape-Goat" and "The Finding of Christ in the Temple," Hunt went for two years to Palestine, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his friends that he was throwing away his chances with the public. But his motives were far too serious to be affected by such petty considerations. His explanation of them is best given in his own words:—

"In my time," he explains, "I had read Volney and Voltaire, and these, with Byron and Shelley, and the 'Vestiges of Creation' later, quite converted me to Materialism. Had I been wiser, I should have gained the good and not the evil from the independent study of these thinkers and poets. Now, I am a free-thinker more than when I dubbed myself specially so, because I am free from bondage to incredulous as much as to conventional dictates. There are arguments in Materialism itself which are convincing

to me of future life, and therefore a future purpose; and the service of souls made perfect by previous training. I am satisfied that the Father of all has not left us, made as we are with infinite care and thought, with intelligence to understand this, with the carefully stored up inheritance of all our predecessors, in faculties, hopes, and higher love, advancing so slowly to the dream of heavenly perfection, from such a remote beginning, bewildering in its infinity, — only to disappear in the black abyss. What an important conclusion! For me, this would be aimless mockery. The inheritance that the Greatest of the sons of God has won for us has its welcome in my soul. I want now to carry out my purpose of travel in Palestine, — to prove, so far as my painting can, that Christianity is a living faith, — that the fullest realization of its wondrous story cannot unspiritualize it; that, followed up, new lessons and fresh interests may present themselves by the teaching of art: it was used to teach — not only to divert — in the days when it was at its highest. The mere conventional treatment of the eternal story is altogether doomed. Its claims are too momentous to be trifled with. Adverse criticism is directed against Revelation as a whole, and against the Resurrection as taught by Christ in particular. Such honest and open attacks are far less dangerous than the retention of mere disproved and dead adjuncts to its history — retained reverently but unthinkingly by traditionalists. I am not afraid of the full truth, and I wish to help in propagating it."

In the same reverent, courageous, and truthful spirit he writes of his experience in the Holy Land: "I have met many persons and seen many books, and not a few pictures, bearing testimony that familiarity with the surroundings of holy history have encouraged a lower conception of that history than before. No such effect has it produced on my mind; I am not afraid of looking the matter through and through. I can, without loss of reverence, allow that the children, to whom the Father's messages were given, did use their own faltering lisps, and express themselves with the light of their own age, alone; but I recognize, through all, a divine charge, — a Father's adjuration to faith and trust. Brothers and sisters accept the parent's authority; they learn that he is at hand, — though the infant lips spoke the word in their own prattling manner. In fullness of time, a due interpretation arrives from Him who alone knows the end from the beginning. Perhaps, with less opportunity of knowing the real history, the Parisian sentimental travesty of the Gospels by Renan, or the romance by

Strauss, suiting modern intellect, would impress me with some of the respect which so many men have for them. To me, their theories present far greater obstacles to faith than the original Gospels offer. Is it beside the mark, in writing of my professional life, to say this? I think not, for I wish always to paint — as men are supposed to write — what I believe."

Holman Hunt accordingly went to Palestine to paint his "Scape-Goat," chiefly in the solitude of the "Wilderness of Judæa," taking his goat model with him, that he might the better harmonize him with the landscape. He visited Egypt on the way, and painted, on the Nile, a picture called "The After-Glow," — inspired by a certain poetical symbolism, — to express that "though the meridian glory of ancient Egypt has passed away, there is still a poetic reflection of it in the aspect of life there; the strong second-glow coming when the sun has sunk a few minutes below the horizon."

The Crimean War, then in progress, caused a good deal of disorder in the land, and the disturbed state of the country made it both more difficult and more perilous to travel, as he did, with only one or two necessary attendants. He has recorded the experiences of the journey with some minuteness, in an interesting paper in the "Nineteenth Century," and its perusal cannot but give the reader an added respect for the steadfast loyalty to principle which braced him to conquer the difficulties in the way, for the sake of more truly working out his noble conception. His goat, despite all his care, died on the journey; and at one time the little party was surprised by an armed force of Bedouins; but they turned out friendly to Englishmen at least. For "The Finding of Christ in the Temple," he made studies of the heads of Jewish Rabbis, after a good deal of difficulty in securing their consent. On his return, with exhausted purse, he was again crippled by lack of funds, — his father being disabled by heavy losses from aiding him materially, — and seriously delayed in completing the paintings which fairly established his position as a leading painter. Again and again, however, he had to resist the temptation of repeating himself, making copies of successful pictures for sale, instead of continuing the original work, which was his highest vocation, much hindered, it is true, by the lack of earlier appreciation.

At a later period he returned to Palestine to collect material for one of his most famous pictures, "The Shadow of the Cross." This widely known picture, it seems scarcely necessary to say, represents Christ as a youth in the workshop of Joseph, earnestly

contemplating the cross-like shadow thrown on the floor by an accidental arrangement of timber, while Mary is engaged in looking over the treasures brought by the Magi, and stored up by her in an ancient chest. This picture has met with very varied criticism, adverse as well as favorable. His latest great picture — probably his last — the daring originality of whose design made it still more open to criticism, is his remarkable painting of “The Flight into Egypt.” Mr. Ruskin’s brief description is so beautiful that it must be quoted entire : —

“ You know that, in the most beautiful conceptions of ‘The Flight into Egypt,’ the Holy Family were always represented as watched over and ministered to by attending angels. But only the safety and peace of the Divine Child and its mother are thought of. No sadness or wonder of meditation returns to the desolate homes of Bethlehem.

“ But, in this English picture, all the story of the Escape and of the Flight is told in fullness of peace and yet of compassion. The travel is in the dead of night, — but, partly stooping from the starlight, and partly floating on the desert mirage, move with the Holy Family the glorified souls of the Innocents. Clear in celestial light, and gathered into child-garlands of gladness, they look to the child in whom they live, and yet who came for them to die. Waters of the river of life flow before on the sands, — the Christ stretches out his arms to the nearest of them, — leaning from the mother’s breast. To how many bereaved households may not the happy vision of conquered death bring in the future days of peace ! ”

Dean Trench has expressed something of the same thought in a touching little poem on the same subject, beginning : —

“ Firstlings of faith ! — the murderer’s knife
Hath missed its deadly aim ;
The Lord for whom they gave their life
For them to suffer came ! ”

This picture has been the last great work submitted by Hunt to the British public. He has himself sufficiently indicated his aims and ideals, and the spirit in which he has done his lifework for Art. He appeals, it is true, to a limited public, — to those only who appreciate the higher symbolism of pictorial Art, and who esteem the expression of spiritual beauty a higher and nobler function than that of conveying impressions, however fresh and vivid, of purely sensuous delight. All who prize this power in him as a merit, vastly transcending any artistic defects that may

be legitimately noticed in his pictures, will join with the painter in his natural and pathetic regret that the hindrances and discouragements under which he worked and the tardy recognition he received have prevented him, as he himself expresses it, from doing more than a tithe of the work that he might otherwise have achieved.

Agnes Maule Machar.

KINGSTON, CANADA.

THE SPECTRE OF NEGRO RULE.

A GREAT evil has long roots and far consequences. If any supposed that the mischiefs of slavery would end with its formal abolition, the thought was little creditable to their judgment and forecast. So intertwined was slavery with the political and social life of the South that to many broad and dispassionate thinkers its removal seemed a simple impossibility. And it is scarcely extravagant to say that nothing but the providence of God in the awful form of war could have accomplished that result. When, now, we look back and think of what slavery was, what it threatened to become by a process of endless expansion, and how it was almost miraculously overthrown, we need not wonder that it has left an entail of bitter consequences to vex and discipline more than one generation of Americans. No one of the burning questions that confront us burns with a fiercer heat than this, — What is to be done with the negro, especially in his relation to the white people of the South?

It is full time to dismiss the fancy that this is any more a sectional question. It concerns most truly and practically, if not equally, our entire country, and should be studied and settled in the exercise of a patriotism and a wisdom as broad as the nation. The old style of crimination and recrimination, taunt and retort, menace and defiance, so long characteristic of all discussions over the negro, can no more plead for itself the slightest justification or excuse. The conditions are all changed, and former methods are out of date and out of place. They can prevent nothing, and accomplish nothing. If ever largeness of view, calmness of spirit, and sobriety of speech were in order, they are so in the presence of the great political and moral problem involved in the future relations of the white and black races in this country.

The negro problem must be solved, and it must be solved in

accordance with the principles of essential justice. Nothing else will stand. Makeshift compromises and slurring measures may sometimes help, but they will not help here and now. We are too far along for them. Anything else than a true solution will prove dissolution, not of the country, — for that can never come on this issue, — but of our social fabric itself.

While saying this I frankly own that a problem more novel and complex has rarely, if ever, taxed the resources of political wisdom. No real precedents exist to furnish us instruction or warning. It has never occurred in history that two races so dissimilar were placed in relations so peculiar. Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians, Teutons and Celts, have often lived together, but never under the conditions which rigorously prescribe and limit our action. In these instances, there was always lacking the broad and indelible distinction of color. When slaves, as has often happened, have been freed and absorbed into the citizen class, this distinction did not embarrass the process. It is even true that in other countries negroes have been manumitted and raised to political equality with the whites, but these are recent occurrences, whose results are yet matter of doubt and debate. Besides, the countries in which the experiment is in progress, such as Jamaica and Hayti, are so insignificant in territory and population, when compared with ours, as to forbid all thought of precedent or parallelism. In dealing with this great and difficult negro question we look in vain for guidance to the pages of history, and are thrown back upon a fair application of the simple principles of justice and humanity.

The hope of a possible and true solution of our race problem is strongly encouraged by the fact that it falls for determination at this precise moment of human progress. It may be questioned if any preceding age was prepared to settle it wisely and safely. The spirit of our time, the *zeitgeist*, is marked by a broad and tolerant philanthropy. Public opinion was never before so powerful, and never, certainly, so kind. This simple *zeitgeist*, with which the lower order of statesmen do not much reckon, constitutes a solvent for perplexing questions far truer and surer than the wisdom of the average legislator. The dullest and most passionate conservatism cannot wholly escape some influence from the prevalent temper and tendency of the age; and, if it does so escape, it will vainly seek to arrest or change the current which it is foolish enough to resist. The genuine Bourbon is now a distinct anachronism. Such men as Senators Eustis and Morgan belong

to a period some time since departed. A liberal and humane philosophy forms the very atmosphere of modern society, and in this atmosphere false principles and cruel prejudices, whatever the vogue they once enjoyed, will insensibly crumble and be evaporated. The last quarter of the nineteenth century is qualified for dealing even with the negro question.

Among the possible schemes of settling this question, the suggestion of deporting the blacks to their native African habitat may be regarded as utterly obsolete. Some of those noble men who founded and promoted the old Colonization Society permitted themselves to dream of the ultimate extinction of slavery by this process. The idea was, of course, chimerical, and perhaps was never very seriously entertained. Not taking into account the wishes of the colored people, it may go without argument that their transfer across the Atlantic would be an enterprise of such enormous difficulty and expense as to make the project unworthy of consideration.

While colonization to Africa is promptly ruled out as utterly impracticable, may not some part of our national domain be surrendered as the exclusive territory of the blacks? Have we not on our broad continent a region which they may be induced, by encouragement or gentle pressure, to accept as their Canaan, and in which, exempt from race friction and conflicts, they may develop on their own lines, and yet in the enjoyment of equal rights and privileges under the Constitution? On some accounts a negro reservation, which might grow into a state, would seem to offer very great advantages. Especially for communities in which there is an alarming congestion of the colored population such as Charleston and Savannah, might a provision of this sort prove a great relief. On visiting the first-named city, some years ago, I was appalled at the vast throng of colored children gathered on the Citadel Green to witness the manoeuvres of a colored military company. What is to become of them? I had to ask. And what is to become of the city which, some day, they may dominate? Assuming for the moment the desirableness of setting the blacks apart by themselves, and their own assent to the arrangement obtained, the question arises at once, Where is the territory which the greed of the white man would yield to their occupancy and control? Time was when Florida might have been regarded as presenting all the conditions requisite for founding a successful African state, but that time is past forever. Florida has already become the sanitarium and fruit garden of the nation. Its once

desolate wastes literally blossom as the rose, and the ocean breezes that fan it are everywhere laden with the perfume of the orange. Better speculate about turning over to the negro the sacred soil of South Carolina, than speak of making him sole possessor of the unique and varied charms of Florida. So, too, it might once have been allowable to think of finding a territory for the blacks in Texas or New Mexico, but it is quite too late now. The eager and unscrupulous white man frets against the barrier of solemn covenant engagements which holds him back from the Indian territory, and we may be sure that he would not be more patient with a negro reservation, if it were worth having. Even Mexico itself, on the contingency of its annexation, would just as little as Florida be recognized as a permissible refuge for the outcast race. It is true that in the event of our obtaining possession of any considerable portion of the Mexican domain a natural reservoir would be supplied into which it might be easy to drain off much of our surplus colored population; but their enjoyment in such a region of exclusive rights of occupancy and control is not a thing of rational contemplation.

On the whole, view it how we may, the whites and blacks seem shut up to the necessity of living together in this country. Indeed, there is no evidence that at present either party desires a separate and isolated lot. The whites do not wish to lose the blacks, and the blacks have no disposition to expatriate themselves or seek, by general emigration, to organize within our national limits a colored state. The former dimly comprehend, what outsiders know very well, that they now have in their recent slaves nearly the cheapest, if not in all respects the best, laboring class in the world. So far as the field and the kitchen are concerned, their condition is enviable as compared with that of their Northern brethren and sisters. In many Southern communities fair cooks go begging at five dollars a month, and farm hands at ten dollars, while day labor is easily had at fifty cents. True, certain drawbacks, frets, and worries must be accepted along with these low prices, but what system of labor is exempt from these? The Southern whites are not ignorant of the fact that their prosperity, their industrial life even, depends upon the retention of negro service. It is this service, in the main, that produces the seven million bales of cotton which pour an annual flood of gold over the South. The black toilers removed, who would do the work requisite to supply this inundation? So keenly is this source of wealth appreciated that when, as has occasionally happened,

efforts have been made to entice the negroes, in large numbers, from the older States to the richer lands of the West, the planters have indignantly protested against these efforts, and have even threatened violence towards the agents employed in making them. However much the whites of the South dislike the presence of the blacks, they dislike still more the thought of their absence.

We come back, then, to the conclusion that not destiny only, but interest, decrees that the two races shall remain side by side. The only real question is, Upon what terms and in what relations shall they so remain? What shall be their precise *modus vivendi*? Shall this be one of civil and political equality, or of definite arrangement into castes and classes? Shall the whites, by law or rigorous custom, be the exclusive rulers, and the blacks be degraded to a permanent condition of inferiority? Shall the former, by simple virtue of their color, enjoy civil rights and privileges from which the latter, by reason of *their* color, are forever shut out? Clearly this cannot be. A condition of unstable equilibrium is bad enough, but this would be a condition of organized inequality and injustice impossible to maintain in any country of Christendom, and least of all tolerable in our country. The law of our common Christianity, the spirit and letter of our free institutions, the history of the negro since his liberation from slavery, the prospective welfare of the Republic, all unite with the eternal principles of righteousness to condemn the establishment in American society of a color line and a Pariah caste. To suppose that in this country great masses of people, of whatever race, especially in regions where they constitute an overwhelming majority, can long be defrauded of equal political rights, is a fancy born of blind passion or blinder ignorance. The advancing education of the colored people, attended inevitably by the development of capable leaders, renders simply impossible the long suppression of their vote, or their patient endurance of any other flagrant outrage. The fact alleged in justification of their enforced inferiority is their frightfully rapid increase, so rapid, indeed, as to threaten in some quarters the utter swamping of the white element and the terrors of complete black domination. But this fact, if we may accept it as such, demonstrates the impolicy and futility, rather than the wisdom, of repression. When our seven millions of blacks shall have become ten or fifteen millions, where and what are the cords that shall bind them to quiet acquiescence in their degraded lot? One of the sorest evils of slavery, especially in communities where the negroes largely pre-

dominated, was the ever-haunting terror of insurrection. Would not this terror be increased tenfold when the negroes, no longer slaves but citizens, should feel themselves the victims of cruel disabilities? Volcanic explosions would be the normal thing in a society thus falsely organized.

Yes, the only hope of tolerable relations between the two races lies in the administration of equal and exact justice for both in an open field and the opportunity of a fair competition. Impartial protection to rights of person and property, eligibility to all offices of honor and trust, a free ballot and an honest count, these are the only terms of peace, order, and progress. To have a sixth of our population nominally free but practically in a state of semi-slavery is an anomaly fraught with demoralization and destruction for all concerned.

But it will at once be asked, Would life be worth living on these conditions? Is it endurable, even in thought, that intelligent, refined, proud, property-holding Anglo-Saxons should consent to accept as political equals a coarse, ignorant, brutal class, their recent slaves, and stamped with a different color? Especially, is it conceivable, as might here and there occur, that the former should consent to be ruled by the latter? I very frankly admit that the conception is not a pleasant one. Perhaps in regions where the black predominance is very great it would prove best for the whites to withdraw and go to their own place and people. But what I wish to insist upon is, that the prospect of negro rule, on any large scale, is the mere phantasm of an excited imagination. There is not a State in the Union that justice to the negro would threaten with negro supremacy. In the few small communities where such supremacy might emerge, it would prove but a transient condition. It involves on the part of the whites an unconscious confession of inferiority or of cowardice to be frightened at the spectre of negro rule. There is small reason to apprehend that the knowledge, experience, and pluck of the hitherto dominant race will not assert themselves, and maintain a substantial control of civil affairs. Various obvious considerations warrant the opinion that the anticipation of negro supremacy is a groundless terror.

As showing how unreasonable and exaggerated fears of this sort may be, let it not be forgotten that the Southern whites are now living side by side with their former slaves on very comfortable terms. Not very long ago this state of things was pronounced inconceivable. It was thought and asserted that, in case of eman-

cipation, existence for the white people would become an intolerable burden, and the country would turn to a desert. In point of fact, life in the South is now exceedingly pleasant; far more so than it was when the nightmare of slavery oppressed the land. Not one person in a hundred of those who predicted desolation and woe as the result of liberation to the blacks would now vote for their return to slavery. Freedom for the blacks is distinctly recognized as freedom and prosperity for the whites. Why, then, indulge gloomy forebodings and utter despairing cries in view of a yet further advance on the same lines of justice and humanity?

To mitigate anxieties on this subject, it is well to recall the fact that the problem in hand is almost as much a problem between whites and whites as it is between whites and blacks. In forms more or less complex and trying it confronts every State and nearly every community in the land. The commingling here of Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, Italians, Hungarians, and Canadian French, all with their particular traditions, tastes, and prejudices, is a constant threat of collision, and involves an enormous tax upon our distinctive American wisdom and patience. The Southern whites, in their difficult relations with the negroes, can hardly encounter wrongs and irritations greater than those which vex New York, Boston, and many other cities, under what seem to be the usurpations of aliens and intruders. The troubles incident, through all the later modern history, to the coördination of Catholics and Protestants under the same government — their clashing interests, their social frictions and repulsions, their bitter and bloody antagonisms — are not likely to be matched by any conflicts that may arise between the whites and blacks. Were it not for that unique element of differentiation, color, there is no reason why the relations of these races should not at once be emphatically kind and cordial. And none can deny that the antagonism incident to this difference is largely a mere prejudice, — a prejudice, too, especially American, and due very much to the fact that with us *black* and slave have always been associated. It is notorious that the people of other countries do not share our sensitiveness on this point. A few years since, in crossing the Atlantic I had as a fellow passenger a Scotchman from one of the West India islands, with his mulatto wife. He was evidently a gentleman of character and fortune, whose peculiar marriage relations attracted no insolent or unfavorable notice. Not long after I saw in Regent Street, London, a coal-black negro swinging along the pavement with a pretty young white woman on his

arm. The spectacle, rather startling to me, attracted no particular attention. Facts like these are familiar to everybody who has traveled. It is, indeed, very curious that the color prejudice in its intense form is a recent development in America. In the neighborhood of my birthplace there was a mulatto minister of the gospel whom I used to hear spoken of in my childhood as "black Haynes." His wife was a white woman of respectability and intelligence, and, what is very singular, he was for thirty years pastor of the Congregational Church in Rutland, Vt. A sermon which he preached in reply to Hosea Ballou, entitled "The Devil the First Universalist Preacher," had an immense circulation, and was translated, I believe, into some foreign languages. Mr. Haynes's death in 1833 synchronized with the beginnings of the Anti-Slavery movement, — a movement resulting, singularly enough, in the intensification of race prejudice. It may safely be assumed that with slavery ended and the blacks more and more putting on the dignity of true manhood, this prejudice will slowly diminish.

Reverting to the spectre of negro majorities and supremacy, it should be considered that it is highly improbable that the blacks will long go on multiplying at their present alleged rate of increase. Unlike other foreign elements of our population, their ranks are no more recruited by immigration. The infernal traffic that brought them here has ceased forever, and no voluntary movement in the dark continent threatens us with a fresh African inundation. With growing intelligence, property, and feelings of responsibility, the lower appetites of the blacks will be restrained. Propagation will become less rapid, and their families less numerous. To whatever causes it may be ascribed, the fact is palpable that the negroes of the North, if increasing at all, increase very slowly. The same thing may become true, to a degree at least, of the black race in the South. At all events, the sinister predictions, sometimes heard, as to its appalling numbers in the future are fairly liable to large modifications and discounts.

And then the apprehension that the negroes will remain solid either in their vote or their sympathies is warranted only by the supposition that they are to remain a degraded caste and the victims of unequal laws. What is needed above all things to break their solidity and disintegrate their racial alliances is the assurance of fair and impartial treatment. A sense of danger has kept them compactly together hitherto, and will do so while they have reason to complain of disabilities or suspect unfair designs

upon their franchises. When visiting Charleston in 1873, I had an interesting conversation with the Rev. Jacob Legare, the respectable and much esteemed pastor of the largest colored Baptist Church in the city. It was at the moment when an effort was making to enlist the better class of colored people to join with the whites in rescuing South Carolina from the abominations of carpet-bag rule. I had known Legare well in former years, and I asked him why he did not use his great influence to induce his friends and followers to aid the proposed measures of reform. He freely acknowledged and deplored the evils under which the State was groaning, but confessed that he could do nothing, explaining his inability in this very significant remark, "Our people are afraid to trust their liberties with their old masters." And they were no doubt right. Their shrewd sense taught them, however inferior to their former masters most of the adventurers who were plundering the State might be, that these adventurers were sure not to meddle with their most sacred rights. Once thoroughly satisfied on this point, natural jealousies, rivalries, and antagonisms among themselves might be counted on to break the solidarity of the colored people. With distinct race issues eliminated, they would divide and ally themselves with the whites on general party lines. They would soon come to desire not class or caste but good government, and a fair opportunity would be afforded for superior intelligence and merit to assert a predominant influence. If in certain communities a free vote and fair count should result in negro supremacy, this result, sure to be temporary, would involve evils not to be compared with those consequent upon a policy of everlasting repression and usurpation. The disposition of the negroes to divide on other than race issues has already had frequent and striking exemplification. The temperance agitation in Georgia, especially in Atlanta, effected a momentary alliance of the worthier blacks with the Prohibition whites, very honorable to the former and very welcome to the latter. One of the most eloquent orators in that campaign was a colored preacher, whose speeches were eagerly listened to by audiences made up of both races. On one occasion he courageously "improved" his opportunity by administering to his white hearers a caustic rebuko on their willingness to accept colored cooperation in their present struggle, as contrasted with their conduct when strictly political issues were in question.

It is fairly open to doubt and debate whether or not a mistake has been made in this country by adopting the policy of abso-

lutely universal suffrage, but it is quite beyond doubt that of all limitations of this right the color line would be the least defensible. For good or ill the tremendous experiment of unrestricted suffrage is upon us, and must be carried through with rigorous and impartial fidelity. It is by no means clear that the blacks are not rapidly qualifying to use the ballot more wisely and safely than some other of our alien races. They are making very encouraging progress in education and the accumulation of property. Their religious habits, though far from what could be wished, are much less than formerly characterized by superstitious and hysterical extravagances. One, like myself, acquainted with them in the days of their bondage, or just after, and who observes them now, is struck by their changed aspect, and the many tokens of their general improvement. A recent visit to the Atlanta University — and there are many schools at the South of a similar sort, if not of so high a grade — made to me some very surprising revelations as to the educational privileges and prospects of the colored people. The classes in Latin, Geometry, and Political Economy, whose recitations I chanced to hear, exhibited the best results of the best instruction in those branches. What was very noticeable, too, was the habits of refined speech, free from all provincialism, that characterized the students, both men and women. This visit left upon me the distinct, almost painful, impression that the white youth of the South must look to themselves lest they be distanced in the race for culture. I have since learned from many quarters that my impression, so far from being singular, is shared by not a few eminent Southerners who have the best opportunities for observation.

It should be added as a very important, perhaps determining, factor in the negro problem, that the agitation over his political rights once fairly quieted, a tide of white immigration would immediately roll over the South, and soon dissipate forever the fear of black majorities. What now restrains immigration, to an extent little appreciated there, is the apprehension of being caught in the horrors and confusions of a conflict of races. The remarkable development of mining and manufacturing interests is building up great towns, like Birmingham in Alabama. If to this tendency should be added the conviction that the negro question is settled, the operation of natural laws would inevitably redress the balance of population in favor of the whites, and happily lay the spectre of black rule. To this result all the considerations which have been presented distinctly point.

The discussion of social equality really has no proper place in any broad and fair treatment of the negro's claim to justice before the law. Such discussion raises a false issue, and introduces a bugbear serviceable only in obscuring and confusing the question. No doubt civil and social relations touch at some points and originate delicate complications, yet not in a way to be seriously disturbing. Beyond reasonable privileges in the enjoyment of public conveyances and places of general assembly, the negro will be inclined to demand very little. As for social equality in any intimate and offensive sense, there is no evidence that he much desires it, and when this is no longer obtrusively and insolently denied he will desire it still less. With his self-respect cultivated and his essential rights no longer threatened, he will be indisposed to thrust himself into companies where he would not be welcomed. The unwritten law of all civilized communities, which leaves each man free to determine his own associations, will assert itself in the relations of the white and black races, and relieve their intercourse of any serious friction.

And so, too, the horror of amalgamation may be dismissed as the misbegotten goblin of folly and prejudice. It lies almost entirely with the proud and sensitive whites to determine whether the corruption of the blue Caucasian blood, which went on so rapidly under the system of slavery, shall continue or be arrested. To affirm that this process can be restrained only by laws forbidding the intermarriage of the races is to make a very shameful confession. The truth is, that false and arbitrary restrictions here, as elsewhere, do but aggravate the evil they would prevent. As there is vastly less miscegenation now than there was in the days of slavery, so would there be still less if these restrictions were removed. Marriage or concubinage between the two races is almost unknown at the North. With the full recognition of the equal rights of the blacks, lifting them out of the relation of an inferior and degraded caste, the same result would inevitably occur at the South.

The sum of all that I have attempted to say is, that truth and justice are always the highest expediency, and that difficult relations settle themselves most easily and satisfactorily when freed from all arbitrary and embarrassing restrictions.

J. R. Kendrick.

POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK.

THE RECOVERY OF THE DEVOTIONAL ELEMENT
IN WORK AND WORSHIP.

It is not easy to define the term devotion. Two parties are concerned in it; one brings an offering, which the other receives or rejects. We speak of the devoted mother or explorer or reformer or missionary, who spend their lives for others, or for some noble cause. In a very different sense, we apply the same adjective to the ill-fated daughters of Jephthah and Agamemnon, and to the boat-load of youths and maidens annually sent by the Athenians to be devoured by the Minotaur. Voluntary and forced sacrifices are alike characterized by this one word. Literally, it is the making of a vow; secondarily, it is the sincere and complete laying on God's altar of all one has and is. Omniscience only can tell where this real virtue exists. The pledge may have been made in the secret chambers of the soul, where only the divine ear heard, but its fulfillment must be more or less open. Far more and other than the outward deed, yet this grace must have visible expression. Trees grow from the soil which has productive qualities in it, but the soil is by no means the tree. Worthy motions spring from a pure and holy heart, but the heart is not the act. The form, rather than that which originates it, is all that we can point to as proof of the devotional spirit. That which is plainly consecrated furnishes the only basis for judging whether the desire, of which it is the sign, gains or fails among us. We have invented no sphygmograph to register the character or strength of the pulsations of this vital organ.

It is not here affirmed, or implied, that the devotional element has been lost, or quite largely eliminated from the work and worship of the Christian Church. An indictment so grave and so sweeping would not have waited till this day to be made, if there were any occasion for it. Were such the case, it would be evident. Extinction, or decay of the true spirit of religion, would long ago have caused great alarm among faithful watchmen. Laments and exhortations would have been widely heard, and we should already be considering how to regain or recreate it. Athanasius, Savonarola, Luther, Knox, were forthcoming when there was need, each like the first

“With Paul's own mantle blest.”

Their successors would not be wanting. Yet it is possible to detect a somewhat general impression, that in our religious activi-

ties there is a weakened exercise of that spirit of devotion which once happily marked them. Serious minds are much concerned thereabouts. They note, on the one hand, an increasing flippancy or indifference, and, on the other, more formal and conventional methods in Christian worship and work. Between the growth of these opposite tendencies they fear that the highest ideals of religious communion may be gradually obscured. Self-consciousness and self-carelessness are hostile to it. The development of these traits is seen with anxiety.

Our inquiry has now to do with —

Any loss of the devotional element, in our religious life; some reasons for it; attempts to reinstate it; the true means of restoration.

Were an earnest and reverent soul of the last century to come into many of our religious assemblies to-day, he would be confused and saddened. He would look about in wonder upon the building called a church. It would have little suggestion to him that it was a sanctuary. If he had ever seen the ruins of an amphitheatre in the Old World, that heathen centre of amusement and cruelty, rather than the stately basilica, would appear to have furnished its model. He would look in vain for any "sacred desk." A gaudily painted set of organ pipes would stare at him, and windows ablaze with color shut out the light of day. A box barely large enough for four people to squeeze into, perched on some curiously carved bracket, he would be told was the singer's gallery. The pews would be gone, but in their place he would be ushered among rows of armed chairs, which move by a spring, and catch his hat and care for it so deftly that he suspects trickery. The floor falls away from his foot as he walks, and, looking at its converging point, he is relieved to find it is no bottomless pit. He must confess all these arrangements comfortable and costly, but they have only prompted the cry, "Oh that I knew where I might find Him" here. As he watches the gathering congregation, in rich and showy apparel, jauntily nodding to one another, he would infer that they had come together simply to meet earthly neighbors and acquaintances. The singing would puzzle him. Four well (or ill) assorted voices, singly and then unitedly wrestling with some syllable, whether English or Hebrew he could not tell, would plainly have supplanted the "young men and maidens, old men and children," who used to praise the name of the Lord. *Critical listening* is evidently counted *worship* among these moderns. When the minister rose to pray, only

here and there would a head be bowed. The audience would stare at him open-eyed. Highly wrought rhetorical figures and crisp aphorisms would be apt to form the staple of this exercise. He would hear it described as "eloquent." The sermon would interest him, both by the novelty of the text and the strangeness of application. Sharp and witty sentences would abound in it, eliciting a smile now and then, or even a cheer if striking patly and heavily some favorite folly or custom. Or it might chance to be a profound philosophical treatise, till Kant might as well have criticised "Pure Reason" before the unenlightened company, who think the ordinary collegiate titular symbols quite too few to label, properly, so masterly an intellect. Then comes the dismissal, welcomed as a rare chance for friend to meet friend, and interchange opinions as to the excellence of the entertainment. There has been frequent mention of the divine name in song and prayer and homily. There may have been many "Hallelujahs" and some "Amens" on the lips of choir and congregation, but the whole service has not indicated any strong sense of mortal need or aspiration for holy lives. Self-complacency has been everywhere prominent. Man would seem very skillfully to have stolen the attention professedly given his Maker. Our visitor would be ready to say with the famous critic of his time, "The fire of the altar is quenched, or it sends forth nothing but smoke of mushrooms and unpleasant gums."

If instead he entered the doors of a liturgical establishment, there he would find no rudeness or irreverence in outward behavior. He would be pleased with the dignity and solemnity of the place and the apparent humility, in oft-bended knee and multiplied confessions of unworthiness. No intemperate speech would jar upon his ear. The sound of all the people praising and praying would be impressive and pleasing. Strange furnishings, ceremonies, robes, and posturings, however, would interfere with his joy. Their close relationship to the "woman arrayed in purple and scarlet, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having in her hand a golden cup full of abominations," would seem to have grown dangerously during the years. He would, because of this, be led to suspect that underneath this show the Infinite had slight recognition. Pharisaism, however broad its phylacteries, or long or numerous its prayers, he would fear, had some intrenchment here. What is this he has seen, but the sacramentalist, over-careful about his dress and intonation and gesture? These, he knows by intuition, are not piety. Our inspector

comes away disturbed. He hopes, though, that these are exceptional, not typical assemblies, and asks how far they are representative of other branches of "the True Vine." It is to be informed that there he has seen a style of worship, greatly in favor now, toward which many are in their measure striving. These are the popular fashions. Churches where these features most obtain are most thronged. This is the day of funny advertising. The pulpit over against the circus-clown must throw frequent kisses to the crowd, or lose them next Sunday. It must placard the town with flaming posters, as the minstrel troupe, if it will arrest attention "Sugar-coat your pill," "Gild your hook, physician and fisherman for souls," so say the managers of these financial institutions, — the churches, — which must be run, as we do a store, to make money.

For the doctrinaire, the long-faced, the psalm-singing, Bible-searching, heart-searching priest and people, there is now no loud call. These, if they still maintain a living, are classed with fossils, curiosities, worthless in the present age. Organizations which keep these peculiarities are published as doomed to sterility, and a lingering death. "The fittest" have survived, whoever they have to their father.

Turning to inspect Christian work in its more aggressive and practical forms, our ancient friend comes upon the Evangelist — a new creation since his day. Here he expects to find the "holy man of God" indeed. Hearing at the very first the subdued rumble of earthly machinery, by which the revival interest is generated and kept at white heat, he is perplexed. The extensive case of professional tools, adapted to any patient, as a dentist's for any mouth, surprises him. The regular expedients, scriptural and unscriptural, by which a community is bestirred and all the available material is convicted, converted, and pronounced "whole" by this passing angel, are found to turn upon the amount of funds raised. Is it the theory of purgatory over again, only employed for men still alive, he queries? If friends will pay well for the captive, then he shall be freed! Demetrius, with his moulds for silver shrines, seems to be here engaged, rather than he who had "great heaviness and continual sorrow in his heart for his brethren" who were unreconciled to Christ. Frivolous songs on such lofty themes as dory-pulling and broken crockery and lions' dens do not betoken a very profound emotion, or solicitude, nor fifty prayers in twenty-five minutes, regulated by a leader, with stopwatch and gavel, in hand. This latest development of religious enterprise does not impress him as devotional.

He visits the great benevolent agencies of the church. Of course, business is chief here and must be, but along with it he looks for much of the Petrine charity and ministry in the divine name. These full treasures delight him, and these generous plans for relief, and enlargement of the kingdom of Christ. But, now and then, singular measures are proposed in this administration, and very human things are spoken, and bitter alienations arise, and murmurings, louder than those of the Grecian Jews against the Hebrews over the neglect of their widows, are heard because of other bereaved beneficiaries, and great debates go on, to the amusement of the godless, and our venerable listener does not detect in them aught of what he had been wont to regard as devotion. The warmth of a generous offering has been much abated, as it passes through these mediate channels. In his time, it was directly from the hand of the full to that of the needy that the gift went, with its double blessing.

In each and all of these forms of religious activity, our centenary is certain there is not so wholesome and pronounced a devotional life manifest, as once. Then, the preacher was solemnly weighted as he bore to men a message from God. Then, irreverence was held to be a sin, not an accomplishment. Then, there were broken hearts and trembling confessions and earnest entreaties for forgiveness and guidance. Jesus, the Saviour, was a very real presence then, and those about Him were loving, admiring, and willing disciples. He *led*, and they *followed*. Now, it appears to this observer that *these* are leading, expecting their Lord meekly to follow. If he is right, or even partially so, in his conclusions, then the devotional element does not have its proper exercise.

We next inquire for some of the causes of such declension.

The primitive revelation of Jehovah, through the Shekinah, no doubt made vivid impression upon the worshiper. The splendid ritual of the Temple helped greatly to actualize the unseen Deity to those who witnessed it. When this was abolished, and Christ, in himself Priest, Sacrifice, and Temple, took their place, it was to risk some loss of worship which relied on such aids. Frequently is still heard the request: "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." Till then, crucifix, painting, relic, vestment, shall serve to bring Him out of the darkness and posit Him before an adoring soul. Where there is but the bare wall, and no suggestion in structure, or furnishing, or rite, of "One greater than the Temple," the gross and thoughtless come and go, with scales upon

their eyes. The glory of the Eternal does not appear to them. There is no pleading, —

“Celestial King ! oh let thy presence pass
Before my spirit, and an image fair
Shall meet that look of mercy from on high,
As the reflected image in a glass
Doth meet the look of him who seeks it there,
And owes its being to the gazer's eye.”

They are in no presence chamber of God ; they bring thither no hallowed tribute.

Ours, too, is usually pronounced an age of hurry and unrest. That fever, when once it has fastened on a man, allows but brief chance for reflection. He may not waste the precious moments in mooning, when they are simply so much fortune and fame and learning. There is no time to develop the picture, caught on the plate, and tone it, till it shall reveal the beauties and grandeur of the religious life, and fill one with awe and desire as he beholds them. The conceit is subtle, but fatal to devotion, that in the other world we shall have nothing to do but to cultivate it. Going to meeting,

“Where the assembly ne'er breaks up,”

will atone for any abbreviation of the privilege here. Some, who would be ashamed did they perceive it, are thus thinking to adjourn their religiousness to that “convenient season.”

Then, too, there is the love of the sensational, strongly rooted in the average worshiper. Slang has of late been transformed into a celestial weapon. Liking for undraped figure has grown, both on the theatre stage and the pulpit platform. Boys and untutored geniuses from other occupations have suddenly “called themselves apostles,” and many have not yet found “they are not.” Spectacular and scenic effects have banished the thought that God is in his holy temple. Joss-house incantations would hardly dissipate serious impressions more surely than these tricks to draw the multitudes. They who come to gaze do not stay to pray. If they come again, it is with keener appetite for the unusual. Such have gradually dulled and deadened that religious faculty which we call reverence, and which Goethe well says “is of three kinds: for that which is above us ; for that which is on a par with ourselves ; for that which is beneath us.” They bow down only before that which in no wise concerns them, and then dare say they have worshiped. So did Renan on the Acropolis, apostrophizing Athena, and then go his way saying, for life, which

may or may not have here its end, "I have to thank some one ; I do not know exactly whom."

Still another reason for a lessened devotional fervor may lie in the studious attempt to rid sky and earth of any intelligent, conscious Lord. The scientific method of research is everywhere magnified, and material proofs and demonstrations are presented till he who cannot show the like for his theory is discredited. Darwin studies the earthworm, and affects a reverence for its office and work, yet he is hardly ready to canonize and count it sacred, as the Egyptian his scarabæus. The preacher is somewhat sensitive to the verdict of wise men who decry the supernatural. He finds himself inclined to question more closely. Incredulity gets to be a virtue. Before he is fairly aware of it, he is beginning to call out of their Apotheosis some who have long dwelt with the Immortals. In this delicate but degrading task, he unwittingly lowers the whole sphere of revered personalities. He breeds the suspicion that, were we fully informed, none who ever appeared on earth might rightfully now sit on the throne of universal dominion. So when he calls to honest, enthusiastic admiration for One that was among us in "the form of a servant," it is to share the fate of the eagle, striking his talons into the frozen carcass till its wings are fastened with it in the same death. Doubts are now loudly and learnedly proclaimed to be no longer our "traitors," but our saviors, rather. Yet, cherished, published, and extolled, they are to the devotional spirit as a frost on the tender herb.

Considering next the means and measures employed to rekindle or rouse to fuller action the devotional element, we notice a movement styled "enrichment of worship." This implies a belief that the public service has become too plain and repellent. Democratic ideas are everywhere in the ascendant, and happily. The gospel of individualism has not been published any too soon. Each person's right and duty to express himself in religious associations, as in political, must follow his perception that he "must give account of himself to God." A priest who cannot forgive his sins cannot confess them for him. One who cannot bestow a heavenly blessing cannot utter his gratitude for it either. Prayer and praise have come to be seen and felt, as fit for every lip in the waiting congregation. They are beginning to be impatient when these are delegated to one voice. The mouth of the bottle is too narrow for its contents to flow readily. Hence have come wide demands for responsive reading of Psalm and Scripture poetry ; and united repeating of creed and commandment and chant and

anthem are beginning to claim a participation from all. Manuals to answer this craving are constantly appearing, having the excellences and faults which mark uninspired work. Spite of the rule of cultured and accomplished musicians in our congregations, whose delicate nerves and fine taste are shocked by unmusical efforts, the people are wanting the luxury of voicing their own feelings. The Wesleyan, ringing out his hymns indifferent to the rules of the singing-master, but imparting his jubilant spirit to all within hearing, fills his chapel, his church, thereby. He does not care if the artist goes by on the other side, to listen in his splendid edifice to a prima donna. He is very certain that David did not engage one to precede the ark as it was borne to Mount Zion, and it is that same Jehovah who makes him "joyful in his house of prayer." The day of the chorus is breaking, and preparing the way for that better one, when the minister will not find his words coming back to him as the emptiest mockery, "Let the peoples praise thee, O God, let all the peoples praise thee." As indicating the desire for a deeper and more intimate union of the believer with his Lord, which would result in improved attitude in public worship, we are receiving constantly handbooks of devotion, both in prose and verse — anthologies, and the work of a single author. The market for suggestive thoughts, stirring exhortation, noble visions, is still unglutted. Every literature is ransacked, and the holiest souls give us of their best in these collections. It is in the hope that meditation will be more sweet, and prayer more essential, and life more complete to those who peruse them. So many queries are started by diligent study of the word of God, so many mysteries attend the unfolding and progress of each life, and of society, that if faith has light, and can impart courage and resignation, its accents in such pages are eagerly sought. While men are louder in their atheism and blasphemy than ever, so are they more sincerely testifying to the existence of Him in whose hands their breath is, and are more ready to cry, in simple trust, "My Father." To this end the numerous conventions called to discuss all phases of Christian work and privilege contribute. Retreats from worldly sounds and sights where, for a while, weary toilers and the spiritually impoverished may be closeted with their Infinite friend, also have this intent. Returning to their fellows with clarified views, purer motives, and braver hearts, it is the better to illustrate the prediction, "Fear God, and where you go, men shall think they walk in hallowed cathedrals." In the social meetings of the church, honored and

barren fashions have so long prevailed that there is a general impatience of them. A sense of distance from, and fear of, the Christ has been too often the outcome of these exercises. Just the opposite is their avowed purpose. Groping after some method which will break the cold reserve and let free the imprisoned spirit, till it shall pour forth its love and longings into his ear, who is ever reproving our lack of faith—that anxious state promises well for the future.

These yearnings and efforts, more or less conscious, to exalt and give control to the best that is within us, this struggling of the devotional element for liberty, may indicate the way to the true methods of obtaining it. Light shines from that quarter. The log of wood, the stake covered with dog-roses, the flight of land-birds, were tokens to Columbus that he drew near to the continent of his reason and faith. It may be presumed that large and blessed results will follow the habit of quiet religious meditation. We are in no danger, in this respect, of a return to the mistakes of other centuries. Neither the scholastic nor the mystic view of Christianity, — the one as an objective phenomenon, outward connection with which is salvation; the other, as an inward life, merely satisfied with having Christ formed within one, the hope of glory, — neither of these alone has much chance in this age. The church is too conspicuous and potent a force to be ignored by any that would honor its Head. It is not mighty enough in and of itself to confer eternal life upon any. We need not fear those hours, then, when, shut in with the *illuminating* word and spirit, the thoughtful are coming to certain truths of vital worth, in daily conduct and public profession. Monastic cells are desirable, if nowhere else a hasty, heedless soul finds a place to know itself and its proper position in the coming kingdom. In this free air which blows about us, many are imagining it to be their right to theorize at pleasure. Out of these seasons of retirement and honest searchings and balancings of meanings come no destructive speculations and dogmas. Of one thus engaged it has been well said, "He alone has the original datum, in virtue of communion with God, on which the dialectic lays hold." It was the advice of Dr. Payson that he who would cultivate devotion should take some one scene in the life of Christ for daily meditation which would bear speedy and choicest fruit in a more single aim and desire for conformity to Him. Going forth from such communion into the confusions and cares and temptations of society, he would not have to confess, as Seneca did, that "as often as he mingled in the company of men he came out of it less a man than

he went in." If virtue *had* gone out of him, it would have been to lift some stricken, cheerless soul into spiritual vigor, and inspire it with a new and mighty reason to give God the praise.

The chief secret of the recovery or the development of the devotional element is the easiest to find. *It is in the closet, in prayer.* The stress laid upon this agent by Him, whose whole earthly life was one prolonged petition, does not yet impress his followers as it should. Nothing less than this will bring us much abiding improvement, in the subject under discussion. Feeble and flickering representatives of his name and work abound, because they have not thus recruited their strength. Sickly and unsightly associations bearing his name may find in this the reason of their condition. Sacrifice, so-called, which refuses to rise above the altar on which it is consumed, has wanted this uplifting quality. The prayerlessness of the church and of the individual is their poverty. Whatever has caused it, whether the numerous and convincing demonstrations of the "reign of law," or greed, or love of doubtful pleasures, or untoward fortunes, to this lack may be traced the inefficiency which any observe and deplore. The remedy is at hand. Not, as has been already suggested, by simply resorting to an oratory more frequently, there to count petitions by the rosary; not by kneeling morning, noon, and night toward Jerusalem; not by louder voiced formulæ; not, as a famous Anglican recommends, "In your private devotions use the prayers of the Church" (upon which Frances Cobbe pithily comments, "as much as if he were to advise, 'When you write to your mother, copy the Complete Letter Writer'"), but in that self-surrender and entire conviction of helplessness which drives one out of very need and of a fervent heart to "call and the Lord shall answer," to cry and He shall say, "Here am I." It is an outgoing of the human spirit, in its blessed sense of relationship to the divine, which makes every act a petition and every word an appeal. Of Stonewall Jackson, it is related that using the phrase, "Instant in prayer," he was asked what he meant by it. "I have so fixed the habit in my own mind," he replied, "that I never raise a glass of water to my lips without a moment asking God's blessing. I never seal a letter without putting a prayer under the seal. I never take a letter from the post without a brief sending of my thought heavenward. I never change my classes in the lecture-room without a minute's petition on the cadets who go out and those who come in." "And don't you sometimes forget to do this?" "I think I can scarcely say that I do," was the answer; "the habit has become as fixed, almost, as breathing."

No slight responsibility for improvement in its devotional features rests with those who are called to conduct the public service. Their manner and conception of the office communicates itself insensibly to the rest. Reverence or irreverence of the many waits on the bearing of the one. "The Parson Praying," writes the saintly Herbert, "being first affected himself, may affect also his people, knowing that no sermon moves them so much to reverence, which they forget again when they come to pray, as a devout behavior in the very act of praying. Besides, he often instructs his people how to carry themselves in divine service." Example and precept tell mightily toward the worthy end sought, when the minister is full of the sense of his solemn task. Non-liturgical communions are liable to the worst offenses in this respect. "As the horse rusheth into battle," or as the lazy pupil comes before his teacher — with excitement or vacantly — yes, and sometimes with surprising egotism, some stand to minister. 'T were well if they might be transported awhile, to witness those august scenes at the Tabernacle on the great day of Atonement, and that trembling host which stood without: For this duty premeditation is essential. One of the most eminent clergymen in the early part of the century, fully alive to the great import of such exercises, anticipated them pen in hand. So he was always pertinent, and "led" his hearers, indeed, before the Throne of Grace. Familiarizing himself with the Scripture, and then with the thoughts and expressions of Flavel, Baxter, Watts, and Henry, he found himself, in the moments of this "sacrament," in that mood where language happily and helpfully fitted the varied needs which waited for utterance through him. His biographer said, "He had a *liturgy* of his own, which he could use, without any danger of promoting a LETHARGY of piety in himself or any one else." While the gifted author of "Ad Clerum" condemns the practice of transcribing and committing the prayer for the public service, yet it used to be possible, on leaving the church where he officiated, to buy for a sixpence a pamphlet containing the sermon just preached and the prayer just offered. Neither form without substance, nor substance without form, however beautiful the one or rugged the other, will much mend the undevout behavior of the average congregation. These must be wedded to each other, and few but will feel their influence, and be elevated in their ideals and find delight as they together "draw nigh unto God."

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PULPIT PRAYER.

THE close connection of thought or emotion with its expression compels attention to methods of public worship. What passes within the soul does not shape the utterance or the deed more surely than these affect the hidden life. It is this principle which prompts a public profession of religion. Aside from whatever new obligations it brings, joining the church makes tangible and definite and therefore lasting those already recognized. The same reasoning applies to the dedication of children in baptism. The passing volitions and longings which it is sought to crystallize by worship are as really valuable as the self-surrender which finds expression in covenant with the church. Persons whose spirits are already somewhat touched by the associations of the Sabbath and of the sanctuary will worship in spirit and in truth if the service gives them opportunity. This will not be the case if the singing is but an exhibition of musical skill, if the reading of the Scripture is expressionless, or if the prayer is a jumble of rambling exhortation and unmeaning repetition of Scripture. Under such circumstances aspirations will be checked, and wandering thoughts will speedily make the house of God far other than the gate of heaven. Not that elocution and rhetoric are to be unduly magnified. All enrichment of worship must rest upon an enrichment of the spiritual life. This truth cannot be too much insisted upon. The mechanical use of the best methods will be profitless. Just as cheap reproductions bring the works of painters and musical composers into ill repute, so impressive liturgies lose their charm if their letter is retained without the spirit which called them into being. Some ministers make their preaching a mere display of oratory, but the faithful pastor tries to be both devout in spirit and careful in the composition of his sermons. There is no reason why he should not seek to combine the two elements in the earlier part of the service.

The main rule for public prayer is that it should be for all present a conscious expression of their needs. The speaker should grasp by sympathy the wants of the people, and by faith the bountifulness of the All-giver. This twofold conception should so engross his mind as to preclude any variant thought or utterance. The words which fall from his lips should be obviously the echo of the people's heart-throbs. By this rule certain prevalent practices will be shunned. The prayer must not contain any

preaching. Dr. Watts's division of public prayer into "Invocation, Adoration, Confession, Petition, Pleading, Self Dedication, Thanksgiving, Blessing, and Conclusion," is a perilous aid. With these sections visibly articulated, the "Adoration" easily becomes a treatise upon the attributes of Deity, the "Confession" a tirade against popular tendencies, and the "Pleading" an expansion of one's theological system. Sayings directed to the audience rather than to the Almighty can creep into a prayer even without the thin disguise of such introductory phrases as "Help us to realize," "We have learned by sad experience," "Thou hast said," etc., etc. This rule also will not allow the unnecessary multiplying of words. The most common temptation of this sort is in the use of Biblical terms. Some hallowed phrase makes a fine sounding close to a sentence or to the development of some thought. Or else, when one has begun a familiar quotation, he can, by letting it run on a little further, gain time to think what he will say next. But if the preacher realizes that through his words the hearts of the whole assembly are to ascend Godward, the responsibility will make the exercise too intense and solemn for any careless verbiage. Another thing forbidden is the needless exhibition of one's personality. One may err in this respect through religious fervor. The culminating of his plans for the service and the presence of the congregation naturally bring him into a highly wrought emotional state. And when with closed eyes he feels that he is in the audience chamber of the Most High, his prayer may become through his very earnestness a pure and elevated rhapsody. Such an exercise, however delightful to him, will not be profitable to the people in the pews. Unable to accompany him, they will be only spectators of his ardent flight. Vain and morbid displays are even more blameworthy. The worshipers are to be led by this exercise to accept anew their privilege as priests-unto God, but they cannot do this unless the leader of their worship resolutely suppresses self. If he has the consciousness while speaking that he is impressing the people with his spiritual mindedness or the delicacy of his fancy or the choiceness of his diction, the exercise differs only in degree from the famous "most eloquent prayer ever offered to a Boston audience."

To prepare for public prayer, the minister must seek a right attitude both toward God and toward man. To the former of these ends all his Christian experience will contribute. Whatever deepens his character will equip him also for this serious duty. Grappling, for the sake of the Master, with disagreeable

parish work, endeavoring to spend his hours at the desk in hard study instead of in loitering or over light literature; in a word, every act that gives him nearness to God increases his fitness to conduct the worship of the sanctuary. This fact is an additional incentive to the pastor to apply to himself the maxims which he gives his people. Moreover, what E. P. Whipple says in another connection is true here: "The meaning of the word 'experience' must not be confined to what one has personally seen and felt, but is also to be extended to everything he has seen and felt through vital sympathy with facts, scenes, events, and characters, which he has learned by conversation with others and through books." An enlarged comprehension of divine truth, a deeper conviction of God's power and presence in the world, a clearer discernment of the purpose which underlies history — these will produce a corresponding ripeness both in thought and phrase. The importance of this service will also prompt more study of liturgies and other works of devotion than one's personal circumstances require. The literature of this class has been increased of late years by sundry collections of pulpit prayers, and there are numerous manuals of family prayer. These will suggest to the preacher new aspects and tokens of the Heavenly Father's interest in his earthly children, and he will imbibe from the best of them the humility and awe and the serene confidence with which devout souls have drawn near to the Infinite One. Such books will aid in his devotion in the same way in which it has been suggested that public prayer aids that of the worshipers. His mind should be schooled to take up at once a devotional train of thought; his feet should be familiar with the way to the Throne of Grace.

Such a study will, of course, furnish one with a fund of apt language. It is a thing to be wondered at that, among churches practicing extempore prayer, a divine should be entitled to distinction among his fellows by the fact that "he had a liturgy of his own," or that in this sacrament his language "happily and helpfully fitted the various needs which waited for utterance through him." If clergymen had to write their own hymns, they would study diligently the rules of prosody, and the prayers are certainly as important a part of the service as the hymns. Our non-liturgical clergy rejoice in their freedom, which a ritual would not allow, to adapt their prayers to the requirements of place and time. While holding fast to this advantage, they should also seek to attain a dignity of language equal to that of the Prayer

Book. It is possible for them to do this in the same way that it is possible for editorial writers under the stress of daily journalism to produce on demand English of which Macaulay would not have been ashamed. Such a result as this cannot, of course, be attained at once, but study in this department should be carried on side by side with other lines of study throughout one's active ministry.

These preliminaries must be supplemented by a sympathetic understanding of the needs of the congregation. The best way to secure this is for the pastor to review carefully his calling list, putting himself as nearly as possible in the place of those whose private life he knows so well. His reading of history, fiction, poetry, and current news will open to his view the workings of the soul, and he can trace parallels between the characters he thus becomes acquainted with and the beings of flesh and blood whom he meets daily. He must study human nature as the dramatist does, looking not merely at the outward incident and the accompanying play of emotion, but beneath these at the inevitable shaping of character and the constant strife of passion and purer purpose. It is hardly necessary to mention this, as the faithful shepherd will desire instinctively to look at his people with this penetrating gaze.

Now let the pastor, maintaining a constant familiarity with the best liturgies, enter the House of God each Sabbath in reverent mood, and let him from the pulpit ponder the condition of the people before him. He will perhaps be early in his seat that he may watch them as they enter. Let him ask himself what petition or what thanksgiving would be most appropriate for each individual. He cannot in the moment of prayer recall each one whose case he has thus hastily considered, but his estimate of their several necessities will lie in his mind, making, in the terms of photography, a composite conception of the burden of earthly life. This will furnish an undertone to his words which will make them suggestive. He will have the feeling, and will unconsciously impart it, that the congregation is one great family, and his supplication will be what family prayer should be, the united petition of those who share one another's secrets. The pulsations of his sympathy will be felt by all, and will make his utterance the outlet for the latent prayerfulness of the whole assembly. Or if the pastor wishes to make more specific preparation before going to the church, let him select several families or individuals of different circles and of different experiences, and let him re-

gard these as typical of the rest. It is safe to generalize. Human nature is the same everywhere, and the tragic elements are mingled in substantially the same manner in many careers. Let the minister ask himself how the parties he has selected would pray, if they analyzed their condition as he analyzes it, and if they had the resources of expression with which he is furnished. Having determined what these prayers would be, let him arrange them in such an order that each naturally leads to the one following, and he will be surprised at the completeness, the simplicity, and the directness of the product. It will not be suspected whom he has in mind if, as has been suggested, he gives less heed to outward circumstances than to the movements of the soul beneath. His phraseology will be both inclusive and exact; all will be able to appropriate some part of it, and no one will be compelled to do so.

It is a delicate question how far the pulpit prayer should mention particular cases of sickness, bereavement, or other trials. It is certainly a safe rule to make such a practice exceptional. The frequent introduction of these themes is apt to betray one into indiscriminate eulogy of the dead or flattery of the living. Moreover, it does not harmonize with the frame of mind which should prevail among the congregation during the time of prayer. A lady in a New England town met an acquaintance one Sunday noon and said, "I cannot tell you any news, for, as I was not at church, I did not hear my pastor's prayer, and so do not know who is sick or about to leave town."

The pulpit prayer, if carefully devised to call forth and define the nobler cravings of all souls, would become a potent means of religious impression. One of the best books upon the religious education of children urges that the teacher in the public schools does not lecture her pupils upon the desirability or best methods of learning to read, but puts a primer into their hands and says, "Now let's read together;" likewise, the argument runs, children should be brought into living contact with Christ without having their attention diverted too much to the process of their conversion. The lesson might be extended to the pulpit; when the preacher says, "Let us pray," he should mean it, and mean it for all who are present. Every congregation contains persons to whom the praises of the sanctuary are attractive simply as music, and the preaching merely as oratory. They must not be ignored. To this class a rambling, hortatory prayer means only so many tedious minutes. But let the genuine reverence of the pastor excite their respect, and let the petitions rest upon a tender, search-

ing scrutiny of human nature and its environment, and there will be a resistless charm in the words. The persons described cannot but listen. Then, while they are thinking perhaps of the literary quality of the prayer, they will be startled at the precision with which some need of their own or of dear ones is touched upon, and, almost before they are aware, their hearts will be led along with the preacher to lay that ill before Him who alone can provide its remedy. They will thus have a glimpse of the comfort of confiding in God, and for the instant they will know the desire with respect to this one thing that the will of God may be done. Such an experience, brief and secret though it be, will mellow the heart, and the worldling who forms the habit of joining in such an exercise is not far from the kingdom of God.

Fellowship with the piety of the past should form a background for all devotional exercises. It is more important that it should thus show itself than that it should be avowed in any ritual. Moreover, the employment of set forms when a service is well under way is apt to check the flow of devotional feeling. After the beginning of the exercises every word spoken and every stanza sung leads the thoughts of all present into the same channel, sympathy is kindled, and the heart of the assembly becomes more and more as the heart of one man. All worship must now be adapted to the occasion. No formula, however hallowed, will suffice. The repetition of the Lord's Prayer may not be out of place, but anything more formal must be introduced at this stage very cautiously. But the case is far different when the audience are first come together. Prayers which have the sacredness of long usage will then assist in producing a devout mood. Petitions adapted to the needs of humanity in general, and therefore less specific, will advance the worship at this point, although later they might retard it. It is well, therefore, that the invocation, whether uttered by the minister alone or with the congregation, should be in time-honored phrase. The clergyman who makes this prayer entirely original makes the mistake of trying to lead before the people are prepared to follow. There is no more effective way of preparing the invocation than by culling suitable extracts from the book of Psalms. These should be used in their simplicity, without ornament or extension. Few ministers are skillful enough in joinery to continue well in their own language a prayer begun with some such phrase as "How amiable are thy tabernacles."

The same reasoning leads to the conclusion that the last public

prayer of the day should be for every one present the most intimate and personal of all. The circumstances are favorable for this. The willfulness and restlessness of the morning have passed away, and the surrounding darkness produces a sense of helplessness and of mystery. It is the time when the purer, gentler impulses naturally find expression, as is shown in such poems as Bret Harte's "Dickens in Camp," and Longfellow's "The Day is Done." To the ordinary influences of the evening hour is to be added the calmness produced by a day of rest and by the services and associations of the Sabbath. Let the pastor take advantage of this state of things. Let him have the congregation resume their seats and bow their heads after the last hymn of the evening service. Then, amid the hush of the assembly, let him lead the people to the Throne of Grace. The prayer should be brief and simple. It should be in behalf of all loved ones as well as of the company present. Its petitions should be chiefly for protection and refreshment during the night, for the pardon of sins, and for grace for coming days. If at the morning service the pastor had the feeling that he was leading the worship of a family, he will now have the sense of awe at the Divine Presence which comes to him who kneels by the side of a little night-gowned figure while childish lips ask for a Heavenly Father's care. Nor will this impression be due to his imagination alone. In such a prayer at such a time all souls can join, and He who looks upon the heart may be able to say with joy of many a tempted, tired child of earth, "Behold, he prayeth."

Pastor.

THE PROBLEM OF DUTY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS.

In most cases of ordinary life it is unnecessary to inquire into the nature of duty, or to question the absoluteness of conscience; it is not even necessary to have a definite moral philosophy at all. As we do not need to know the precise operation of the great organs of our body like the heart and the lungs, but their healthiest work goes on without interruption by the interrogatories of consciousness, so our conscience ordinarily does best service when we simply obey its demands. And yet the discussion of the philosophy of duty, which we justly regard as unprof-

itable when compared with the practice of duty, is not without an indirect bearing upon practice.

Neither is our subject one of mere scientific or curious interest. There are strange moral phenomena which, like the variations of the magnetic needle, demand explanation, or left unexplained leave a painful sense of insecurity as regards the stability of moral standards. Thus, while conscience is commonly regarded as infallible, like a voice of God in each man's soul, instances happen to the watchful observer where conscience, though punctiliously followed, brings us up suddenly with the shock of having committed obvious injustice; the supposed duty for refusing which we had suffered remorse proves not to have been duty; or more subtly still, we find ourselves oppressed with guilt, not merely for overt acts, which we might have controlled, but for dispositions and moral tendencies which we did not personally incur, but doubtless inherited; or again, when blaming men's vices, we are urged in justice to inquire the limits of their responsibility, and are reminded that our own happy moral superiority depends largely at least upon the circumstances of our training, and on the fact that virtue has happened to be made agreeable, or at least expedient for us. These and other considerations are sufficient to suggest that the realm of duty, so far from being simple, as we often call it, touches on great mysteries. What constitutes duty? Is there such a thing as absolute or ideal duty? How is duty discovered, by revelation or experience; and how is it related to expediency? What is conscience? What gives it authority? How is it developed? What relation does it bear to duty? What is human freedom, and what is its scope? What is the range of responsibility? What is the significance of the sense of guilt? These questions both take hold of practical conduct and rise into the regions of the most abstruse thought.

We have already hinted at the kind of difficulties which attend our inquiry. They are partly metaphysical. The Divine Being, men said, is both omniscient and omnipotent. How could He be either, if a finite creature could originate independent action and therefore frustrate the purposes of his providence? For man's choice must always be either what God intended, and, therefore, not really free, but predetermined; or else man's choice must be what God did not intend nor foresee, a supposition irreconcilable with the idea of God. This is not all. Man's choice is determined by a conflict in which he always follows the strongest motive, and cannot be conceived of as following the weaker

motive. For, otherwise, there must be some previous stronger reason. The metaphysics of the will are almost amusingly illustrated by Jonathan Edwards's famous treatise. The reader will remember how his keen logic mercilessly follows the helpless human will in wearying circles of demonstration. Neither is there any escape from the conclusion of the metaphysical argument, except by that sort of evasion of argument which defends freedom behind the veil of mystery, or, like Dean Mansel, frankly asserts that we must believe contradictories. What, then, from the point of view of metaphysics, becomes of human responsibility after freedom has either been squarely denied or sent to play a game of hide and seek?

Metaphysics have not been interesting enough to the average mind to prove a formidable disturber of the ordinary philosophy of morals. Besides, men have rarely quite trusted the most thorough metaphysical or logical argument, especially if offset by the supposed testimony of their own senses or of consciousness. Did they not know that they were free, responsible agents? Meantime, science¹ has appeared, interesting the many when metaphysics interested the few, accurate as the other was hazy, taking hold of sensible facts while the other rested on subtleties, and even more mercilessly than its forerunner overturning the ordinary moral philosophy. Here, says science, is a reign of universal law which leaves nothing outside its sway, which controls human conduct as completely as the movements of planets. There is no exception, there is no real spontaneity; man is only one of the links of the endless chain. There is no human thought, no whim, no seeming caprice which stands outside of this chain of dependence. A thousand circumstances, bodily and mental, such as food and shelter, education, surroundings, parental influences, generations

¹ It is difficult not to use the word science in two different meanings. In the narrower sense it means physical science, or the observation and arrangement of the facts of the outward life. It is in this sense that science is necessarily agnostic. This is the only sense, moreover, in which, if one were a materialist, he would care to use the word. Perhaps this restricted meaning of the word could not have been helped, but it has led to much unfortunate misunderstanding. It must not be forgotten, therefore, that science in its broadest sense comprehends all the phenomena of life, what is called the inward or spiritual life as well as the outward or material facts. To those who are not materialists this distinction is real and important. This will explain how science is sometimes personified to represent the modern spirit of investigation, and again, more narrowly, the school of those who claim to account for everything upon the basis of material phenomena.

of inherited culture or barbarism, have been woven together into that thought, that whim, that seeming caprice. It is said that the position of a grain of sand on the beach is bound up with the history of the planet, that it could not be where it is without storms and floods and the rising and settling of continents before man appeared. So of each individual act of human conduct, which is bound equally fast by far-reaching laws with the ebb and flow of the tide of universal history.

Science goes further than this general statement of the doctrine of foreordination. It descends to particulars, and denies the responsibility of individuals and classes, and refers back their supposed guilt to generations before them. Their antecedents and conditions, and not their own wills, controlled their conduct. They do not want punishment, but education, food, and pure air. The sins of the theologians and metaphysicians are the only kind which prove hard to forgive. Science does not merely threaten to subvert the ordinary doctrine of freedom and responsibility, but to establish another philosophy of morals. Morals which used to be thought an absolute commandment from heaven, and therefore fixed from age to age, became simply as Lord Coleridge some time since correctly defined law, — the transcript of the best judgment of each generation. Right is therefore the highest utility, and wrong is its frustration. Conscience becomes changed from an inner divine voice to an inherited sense of the expedient; morals, therefore, shift from generation to generation, according to the degree of civilization and the changing standards of utility; conscience constantly shifts according to each man's changing point of view. If any course of conduct is permanently useful, as honesty or kindness, if any conduct is certain to remain useful as long as mankind exists, such conduct alone may be trusted to be reënforced by man's accumulating sense of its commanding utility, that is, by conscience.

There is something attractively simple and frank in this philosophy of morals. It has no contradictories like freedom and determination to reconcile. It answers the questions of the fluctuations of conscience and why the morals of one age become the sins of the next. Consciousness, moreover, though commonly cited for the support of the old-fashioned philosophy, proves, when fairly questioned, at least in some respects, a witness to the other side. The corner-stone of the common philosophy of morals is in man's so-called freedom of choice, namely, that whatever a man does, he could perfectly well do the opposite. Leaving aside

Jonathan Edwards and his metaphysical puzzles, which might be thought to confuse this problem, what does consciousness say about it? Does consciousness affirm that a man is free to act in either one of two opposite courses? On the contrary, we remember instances in which the force of circumstances or temptation seemed to consciousness to carry us irresistibly along. When we did right, it was not as though we did it ourselves, but some power not ourselves working in us did it. We did wrong, but it was as though we were possessed with an evil spirit. If we were to blame, the blame was not in the act which we could not then have helped; it must have been in our previous selves who were capable of such an act. Moral experience is full of the facts of such testimony.

Grant for a moment that these are exceptional instances; take up ordinary cases of choice in which, therefore, consciousness is less acute to notice what is taking place. There seem to be presented in these cases opposite sets of motives. There is an appetite, for example, urging and hungering. On the other side are prudential considerations, reinforced by a certain habit of abstinence or moderation. What does it mean when we say that the man is free? Does it mean, as in the case of the ass between the bundles of straw, that the impulse of the hunger exactly counterbalances the man's habits of prudence? No; the fact is that by the time the man has chosen, either the appetite or the abstinent habit has proved stronger than its opposite; that is to say, the opposites between which we are placed are not of equal weight, but one outweighs the other. The will, therefore, is not perfectly free, if, as is evident in every case, its choice is more or less weighted and biased, though by only the most delicate shading, towards one side or the other.

But perhaps freedom means that the will, though confessedly handicapped, for example, towards the side of the appetite, can yet of its own motion overthrow the existing weight. It is claimed that experience reports instances in which, by a desperate act of sheer will, we have turned the scale of motives and reinforced the weak and yielding virtue by a fresh and original impulse. On the contrary, if consciousness reports such apparent instances of independent volition, she tells us how they arose in the suggestion of a new thought, in the awakening of an old memory, in some sudden vision of a forgotten face, in some subtle impulse starting out like a concealed spring from the mysterious depths of our nature, stowed there, God only knows when, and resting on the accumulated instincts, habits, faiths, it

may be, of generations of ancestors. Thus we are perhaps never so little the independent originators of volition as when, being about to choose between opposite courses of action, mysterious impulses well up within us or from outside us (who shall say?) to reverse our expected choice. For either we choose upon the ground of well-known reasons and distinctly traceable motives evidently preponderating over their opposites, or else if ever we think that we overcome our own stronger motives by sheer force of will, we catch the hints, "beneath the surface stream of what we think we are," of deeper undercurrents of feeling and thought from time to time thrown up into action.

Let us now inquire, with regard to some given act, whether we could really have done the opposite if we had so chosen. Consciousness at first seems to answer, yes. What does she mean? Does she mean, when put on oath, that she could at that time have acted differently with the motives and reason then before her, with the impulses, habits, feelings, and passions (and no others) then swaying within her? We think not. How could she possibly know that with the same conditions, material, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, without and within, her action could have been altered? Does she not rather mean, merely, that if the conditions had been altered, her choice might have been reversed; or that she could now, if she had to choose over again, with new motives and reasons and enlarged experience, make a different choice?

Cross-examining consciousness, we seem to pursue the fleeting phantom of free will from one alleged hiding place to another. There is no narrow fringe of action in which it is found to exist; obviously, ordinary men in ordinary actions have no use for it; exceptional acts are better explained without it; but consciousness instead tells us of passions, impulses, thoughts, reasons, hopes, memories, habits, out of the correlation of which every act of choice springs. All moral education proceeds on the assumption of this fact. Through circumstances, material as well as moral, through the direction of thoughts, through the formation of habits, through the training of memory, through the discipline of impulses, through the filling the galleries of the mind with ideals and examples, the moralist proposes to bind over the soul of the youth to determined courses of virtuous conduct. The less of the semblance of independent will he leaves, the better educated he deems the youth. Nay, what men call free will he recognizes as undisciplined impulse, the least independent of all

things, becoming the prey of man's worst foes, namely, ignorance, unreason, and vice.

Are we ready, on the basis of the facts which we have considered, to render our verdict forthwith for the materialistic or utilitarian theory¹ of morals? On the contrary, objections arise which prove more weighty the more we consider them. In the first place, this theory is too simple and easy. It does not really explain the phenomena of moral conduct. If all that exists were only a concurrence of atoms or a blind energy, why trace any moral drift or tendency in the affairs of the world? Why should there be development, which means improvement, and implies a direction in which things move? Why should moral acts in the individual or the race tend towards prosperity? Such moral drift constitutes the basis of the utilitarian ethics which holds that to be right which is advantageous in its tendency. What is it, then, that compels, upon a concurrence of atoms or upon a blind energy, this advantageous, beneficent tendency, to follow which is held to be good, but to oppose which proves evil? The utilitarian theory does not touch the question of that which makes things useful and beneficent. On the contrary, it is the weakness of the materialistic philosophy that while it recognizes laws, principles, methods, tendencies, and a universal idea of development, it offers no explanation how these things could have been evolved out of matter.

There are certain suggestive analogies which seem to contradict the materialistic theory of ethics. There is art, literature, music, for example; who that knows anything of these subjects will maintain that there is no standard of beauty? That the din of a barbarian war-dance is as real music as a sonata of Beethoven? That, except for the changing fashion, a chromo is as good art as an original painting by Raphael? That all things of art, beauty, and taste are therefore only relative to the thoughts and habits of the time? One might, indeed, endeavor to make a special plea for this as for other unreasonable positions; but science itself shows certain principles and canons which hold art towards standards as absolute as mathematics, while mathematics itself is not subtle enough adequately to express, but only partially to illustrate, the higher laws of beauty.

There seems likewise to be a beauty of moral conduct, the laws of which are also unchanging. If human art, music, poetry,

¹ We do not care here to insist that the utilitarian theory is necessarily materialistic, but the materialistic theory is of course utilitarian.

are all approaches more or less successful towards an absolute standard of beauty, of forms, of harmony, of expression, so also human morals after a kindred but pertinent analogy seem to be approximations towards an absolute standard of beauty of conduct, or being, which existed as truly as did the canons of art, when men were only barbarians. As the first carvers in wood did not know the Venus of Milo but unconsciously groped towards it, so the early men who did not know the ideal of a Christ nevertheless unconsciously worked towards that ideal. For there are either differences in things as of better or worse, and, therefore, in turn, that which is best of all towards which so-called development tends, and, therefore, still further a power or principle of good, which causes such beneficent development, and which being eternally behind all things, we properly call the absolute, or God; or else there are no real differences, and no development but everlasting and insignificant flux from one indifferent event to another. This is the absurd conclusion to which the denial of an absolute standard of beauty of conduct would force us.

The moment, indeed, that one speaks of utility except in the most superficial sense, of the greater advantage of morality, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the moment that one claims this course of conduct as *better* than that, one seems to be begging the question at issue; for these terms are all methods of stating one's conviction that the drift of things is beneficent. The idea of God is hidden under every one of them. And if, indeed, good is at the foundation of the world, if all things move for the greatest good of the greatest number, if one thing is better than another, have we not come back again in another form to the idea of an absolute standard of beauty of conduct, towards which common conduct is an approximation? The truth is, materialism of itself, which sees nothing essentially or permanently higher or more beautiful in love or heroism than in hate and murder, has nothing to do with the idea of the good. The good is an idea which remains over from the ideal or spiritual philosophy, being, indeed, we think, hard to get rid of because, like the fact of God, it is embedded in the structure of human nature. For surely great wealth of meaning has to be imported into the definition of matter in order to say that it is capable of evolving out of itself its own laws, tendencies, and principles, as though thought or mathematical relations were a function of matter; but it is an outright jugglery of speech to define matter as that which has in itself the quality of producing good.

The questions of philosophy thus ultimately reduce themselves to one, namely, Is there a beneficent drift or tendency of things? Is there such a fact as the good? The affirmative of this question is the statement of the existence of God. The utilitarian moralist must either, in denying the reality of the good, himself undermine all real and philosophical basis of morality, or else in affirming this reality he also must stand on a religious basis; but if so, and there is therefore an absolute standard of conduct to which utility points, he falls as truly under the yoke of absolute duty as the old-fashioned moralist whom he thought that he was opposing.

We have another difficulty with the acceptance of the materialistic philosophy of conduct. Though free will in the ordinary sense may not properly belong to a man, there is a suspicion that if not freedom, something at least equally precious is concealed under our consciousness of the operations of choice; in other words, there is felt to be a factor in man's choice beyond the mere turning of the balance of a scale according to the amount of the weights put upon it, or the force of one nervous current overbearing another current. What is this subtle but real and important factor which permanently gives a reality to what has been too hastily named freedom? It is the standing miracle of consciousness, intellect, spirit, — whatever name you choose to call that thing in the man, unlike his body, above his material part by a wide and impassable gulf, by which he knows and loves, and which marks him as man.

In the act of choice, it is through man's consciousness that he recognizes the quality of both courses presented to him, the present pleasure of the one, the more durable excellence of the other. Through the grasp of his consciousness he is capable of being pleased with the one course or dissatisfied with the other. Because the average man sees the possibility of satisfaction in both alternatives, because he wants to have the advantage of each, the duty and the temptation, he is led to think himself free to choose either side. What he confounds with freedom is this recognition of possibilities of satisfaction on both sides. He is not really free between these possibilities; his choice is already predetermined by the contents of his consciousness. This predetermination, however, does not prevent him, while the choice is impending, from feeling an attraction towards both of the courses before him.

This is not all. The man takes the duty in place of the temp-

tation. He is able now, through his intelligent consciousness, as before, to be satisfied with his choice. This is actually the highest exercise of what has been called his freedom, but which should more accurately be called his consciousness. The most perfect man possible is he whose consciousness, because it is illuminated most clearly, recognizes the eternal excellence of the right course. To such a man, in this highest exercise of his consciousness, there are not two courses possible, the bad and the good, but only one. Where, then, is his freedom? His freedom is merely that, through his illuminated insight, he is completely satisfied and at rest in the course which he pursues. What freedom is better than, through clear consciousness of the excellence of the right, to be pleased to do it: that is, to be able to be pleased with what one has to do; to be bound like a star in its course, and yet, unlike the star, to be conscious of the beneficence of one's bondage? The difference between brute choice and the choice of men here finds explanation. The difference depends on the fullness of consciousness. The brute with only his bare gleam of consciousness, with his feeble prevision, is insensibly borne by currents and motions which he cannot analyze. The increase of the compass of the man's consciousness adds to every act of so-called choice the sight of new possibilities and complications. He is apt, whenever, unlike the brute, he stops to think, to be harassed by these possibilities, which, even after the choice is made, will not leave him at ease. So little pleasure does his supposed liberty give him! But the perfect man, or the average man in his highest moods, having still fuller and more active consciousness, recognizing, therefore, the lasting relations of things, is able to be at ease in that course which he knows to be good, and, indeed, is unable to take any other.

The significance of conscience is now suggested. We have seen how consciousness confers a sense of satisfaction, whenever that course which is recognized to be best is pursued. Corresponding to this satisfaction is the natural unrest which ensues when one is upon a course recognized to be evil. The clearer the consciousness, as before, the greater this unrest or pain. In the dumb creature, it doubtless depends upon the intensity of his prevision of the master's whip. It depends in the saint upon the grasp which his mind has upon the injuries which flow from his conduct, and upon the sacred principles to violate which gives his moral nature hurt, stain, or shock. Everywhere the fuller the consciousness and the higher its reach, the more sensitive the suffering which conscience gives and the louder its warnings.

Conscience not only works towards pain and dissatisfaction when we have knowingly entered on a wrong course; it also protests with strange pain and unrest against a wrong course on which we entered unconsciously without knowing its nature. Conscience upbraids men for their inherited faults. Indeed, the highest exercise of conscience does not apply to acts so much as to the motives and character out of which acts spring. The ancient cry of Paul: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" is the expression of the intense disapprobation with which consciousness recognizes the wrong and faulty self when compared with an ideal standard of excellence. Thus conscience acts to condemn a wrong state of being which had its beginning in no personal fault of the individual, but in the faults of his age, his training, and his inheritance, as really as it condemns those acts in which evil was consciously incurred. The distress occasioned by the consciousness of bad conduct, evil motives, or a faulty self is analogous to the distress which the artistic nature suffers at seeing, and especially at doing, inharmonious work. The sting of the consciousness of being evil is, or ought to be, more acute and profound than the consciousness of disorderly workmanship, by as much as the æsthetic sense only touches one side of the life of a man, while the moral character is involved in all that he does and in his relations to every one else. To discover that one's nature is untrue, or to feel the shame of a meanness, is a vastly more profound pain than to strike a false note or draw an ugly form. To recognize one's habitual motives as base is, or ought to be, a more terrible suffering than to have incurred the disgrace of a blunder. The difference in the intensity of the distress as well as in the character of the subjects it touches seems almost to amount at times to a difference in the quality of the pain.

Conscience is not a guide. She does not determine what is right or wrong. It is not conscience which affirms that one course is to be preferred to another. It is the understanding or judgment which, according to the measure of its enlightenment, sitting like a court and subject to the conditions of human evidence, makes these decisions. Conscience merely waits on the judgment as the sheriff upon the decrees of a court. Whatever the understanding or judgment, that is, the deliberating consciousness, recognizes to be the right course of conduct, conscience works to enforce. Conscience, therefore, is not the judgment or declaration of right, but the feeling which, when the right has been declared, pushes

towards it or against the opposite. It is the natural apprehension, pain, unrest, which a man experiences with reference to a course which he has been made to see is injurious. It is intense, sensitive, urgent, according to the habits, the character, and the ideals of each individual.

It follows, if the decree of the judgment is mistaken, if, for example, the unenlightened Hindoo mother has been persuaded to throw her child into the Ganges, that the conscience so far from preventing will further such evil act. It is exactly the same conscience which, when she has become educated to new principles, will make the old pagan conduct impossible. It is not that her conscience, which as we have seen is a blind feeling, has been changed, but the range of her consciousness has been enlarged, and her judgment has therefore been altered.

In other words, the decision that one course of conduct is better or higher than another does not constitute the sense of ought, but the sense of ought is instinctively present, more or less strongly felt, behind every such decision to enforce it. The decision of the judgment does not create this sense, but only stimulates it or calls it out. The sense of ought may be likened to a life force, a self-preservative instinct which, at the perception of danger, rushes in to save. In its lowest forms, it is seen in the dumb creatures, as in the dog, which it urges to avoid his master's censure. In its highest form, it protests in the saint against the slightest stain of dishonor or falsehood; in the philanthropist, against the shadow of a compromise with injustice.

This leads us to note the distinction between *duties*, or the separate acts to which conscience urges, and *duty* as the general obligation covering such separate acts and traversing the whole life. The materialistic ethics takes cognizance of separate acts as expedient or the contrary. The materialistic ethics fails to take account of duty as a grand whole into which these acts are linked as parts. For, as we have seen, one ceases to stand on materialistic ground as soon as one recognizes a universal plan of good towards which all things are made to gravitate, the resistance to which occasions the unrest and remorse of conscience.

We have not yet exhausted the factors present to consciousness in an act of choice. Besides the sight which the mind has of the opposite courses of conduct with their train of results; besides the attraction of appetite or the warning unrest of conscience; besides the conscious self hearing the evidence and witnessing the play of emotions, there is at the instant of choice

an impulse of force which we call will, and which is translated into action. What is this impulse of will? Is it a new, original, independent force which we that moment set loose? On the contrary, there is nothing more dependent. It is a resultant. It depends on the degree of our animal spirits, on the force of habits, on reserves of energy stored up as in a battery and set free, perhaps, by the touch of subtle, moral, or spiritual influences which we can hardly measure. What does this fact about will indicate? It has a higher explanation than the mere connection of our lives as bound up with the throbbing forces of matter. On the contrary, there is observable a steady, mighty set of the current of human will towards beneficence, towards righteousness. There is no other fair reading of human history. The apparent exceptions, startling and tremendous as they seem by themselves, are found to be the whirlpools and eddies made by the friction of the infinite current on its finite shores. The will of man, flowing again and again backwards to evil, is seen never to rest till turned into good. With the individual, with the nation, with the race, the force of human will finds stable equilibrium in good alone. Surely, then, it is a universal will out of which man is inspired; it is the beneficent life of God of which man partakes. If this were to be called only a working theory to interpret the facts and to guide life, it would nevertheless remain the theory which works best of all to develop moral health and happiness. In other words, it acts as the true theory should act.

There do not appear, then, to be millions of free and independent wills. There is only one Will, as there can be only one God. The one Will works in and through each one of us. We are sometimes conscious and often unconscious of its working; but it is only our egotism which makes us fancy that it is we who originate action. If, then, in the problem of free will there are said to be two factors or poles, and one pole is the fact of determination, the other pole is the fact of the will of the universe consciously felt in and through us. But there is no inconsistency between the two. The inconsistency is between the testimony of egotism and that of truth.

What validity shall we give now to the sense of human responsibility? The most serious difficulty with the materialistic ethics has been that it seemed to yield to a man no greater responsibility than to a tree. How could you justly blame or praise that which inward and outward circumstances had made? Have we, then, while denying the adequateness of material necessitarianism, put

on man's neck the yoke of a spiritual necessity equally unyielding? The key to the significance of responsibility, we answer, is found in the mysterious fact of consciousness. I am responsible for that act in which my consciousness presents the alternative of good and evil. From that moment, supposing I take the wrong course, the unrest of conscience pursues me. Responsibility affirms that *I am a man on a wrong course*. It affixes the hurt and the peril to me. It does not affirm that I could have done differently under the same circumstances, but it presses me to doing differently henceforth. It is another name for conscience testifying specifically, Thou art the man. This is equally the case when responsibility is applied not only to the man's wrong acts, but the man's wrong self. Responsibility began the instant that the man caught sight of the possibility or the ideal of a better self. Responsibility does not say that the man before consciousness presented new vision could have changed himself into the perfect life. That would be false; but responsibility says henceforth, Thou art the man who needs to be transformed, converted, perfected.

So of the fact of sin or guilt. Consciousness in her enlightenment compares the man's actual conduct with the conduct which should have been, the man's actual bad self with his possible perfect self. The discrepancy, the error, the injury committed, the faults, consciousness affixes to him. They make a stain, a blemish, a deformity in his life. In attributing them to him, consciousness does not affirm how they came to be; she only declares sin, guilt, disease, haunting him henceforth till remedy comes. The conviction of sin is the beginning of nature's process, sometimes of cure, always of development.

Does any one say, "I am not responsible for my wrong act, for my bad character; I must be like a tree, what nature and circumstances ordain"? We answer, Even a tree, if it could see, as you see, how evil comes, would instinctively avoid it; you are more than a tree; you have the endowment of consciousness; you have been made to see the pain and hurt of the evil life, the beauty and glory of the good life, and your consciousness having once comprehended this sight cannot let you alone. A mighty new circumstance has entered your life. In fact, no one whose consciousness is thus enlightened can be content to remain in evil. It is not that he originates a new life in himself, but God present in this awakened consciousness irresistibly starts the new life.

We must note the difference between the doctrine of material

necessity and spiritual or moral necessity. Science looks upon man from his physical side as an automaton, an ingenious mechanism of nerves and muscles played upon and through by the forces of physical nature. It is of no consequence that science calls him an automaton; for the moment that you add the fact of consciousness you introduce, besides the play of physical forces, the wholly different rule of thought and ideas. Law here, as before, holds absolute sway. There is no movement of feeling, or fabric of thought, or change of character, without its adequate cause; but the causes have ceased to be material merely. They become more spiritual according to the perfection of the man.

We ought by this time to have discovered the relation which utility bears to ethics. We have seen that ethics, to have any foundation as a science, must rest on unchanging, and therefore spiritual principles, and be directed by a faith in a permanent order of good; in short, that ethics must be religious in order to be moral. We must have always felt, however, the significant connection between morals and utility; for how could that be good which was not in some real sense also useful, that is, productive of happiness? If we could see as God sees, utility in its best and fullest sense would be the final test of morals.

Utility is also a practical guide of conduct. It is by utility discovered by experience that moral errors have been in every age corrected, that higher standards of conduct have been set up. There is a constant moral revelation that comes through the gathered experiences of utility.

Is utility, then, a satisfactory basis of morals? Is there not a disheartening sense of inadequacy in the ordinary statement of utilitarian philosophy? The fact is, human conduct is not guided merely by utility already experienced, but also by the expectation — in religious language, the faith — of utility to be. There are thus two factors in consciousness directing action: one is experience; the other is faith. Faith always outruns experience. You can see the processes of accumulation by which experience grows. It is conservative, timid, and receptive. It is, like habit, that by which men mostly live. The processes of the working of faith are more subtle. It comes in gleams and flashes, lighting the way in advance. It is progressive and fearless. It deals with surprises. Connected with experience, grafted on the body of experience, — experience only partially explains it. It is like the life force, always transcending the growth of the past, putting forth new

and untried developments, and mounting upwards by new gradations, — like the old, but more than the old.

It is not in regard to ethics alone that this distinction holds between the factor of experience and the progressive factor of faith. In every department of human progress there is the same difference. There is something more than experience which guides the march of science. From time to time there come gleams of anticipation, that is, faith, leading to new principles. Besides the men who plod, observe, and record the facts that have been, there come also scientific geniuses whose imagination transcends the facts of the past and predicts results heretofore unknown. Columbus did not sail for the new world on the unaided lead of experience, but his imagination, his faith, transcended his experience. So with all the great men by whose genius the world has advanced in art, discovery, science. While experience coasted along among the safe certainties, their faith voyaged out into unknown oceans. It was as though a power behind themselves drove and inspired them: as a power behind the plants makes them bud, as a power behind nature makes each higher thing to grow out of the lower. We touch here upon the mystery of life and growth, the mystery of consciousness, the mystery of thought, poetry, art, and fancy, — mysteries which no one ever has fathomed, mysteries which the fortuitous concurrence of atoms of matter does not reach, mysteries which in all times have forced on thinking man the idea of infinite mind or of God.

These two factors of experience and faith which everywhere else characterize human progress are only the more marked in the realm of morals and religion. The history of ethics has been a history of a blending of the two factors. There have been given two kinds of moral revelation, one of history and experience, the other the revelation of genius, or inspired men, as we have called them. Out of the dead level of habit and experience gleam anticipations of higher principles. Above the ordinary lives of men moral and spiritual geniuses rise, you know not how or why, inspired with faith in their visions of things to be. How could Isaiah know that it was eternally safe to be righteous? His certainty was more than experience of the utility of righteousness. On that point experience was just then extremely unsatisfactory. No, it was the kind of certainty which the painter has that it is eternally safe — despite all men's solicitations to pander to unworthy tastes — to trust the noblest conceptions of his art. We call this faith inspired, by which we mean that the spirit of

the universe is behind it. We do not call it infallible. Its certainty depends upon the purity and illumination of the mind which it possesses. One sees, then, two ideas of utility. One is narrow, namely, the utility which has already been tried. The other, more comprehensive, is the utility which, rising above actual experience, this inspired faith of genius assures will be in the end. It constitutes the second kind of moral revelation.

In this higher sense, utility transcends personal advantage. It has always been one of the difficulties with the ordinary utilitarianism that it has seemed to reduce all virtue to subtler forms of selfishness. It is true that average conduct admits of being reduced to the motives of personal advantage, as we have seen that average conduct may be accounted for by habit and experience; but there is a class of action which is always rising above the average, and is not so easily accounted for. It is without any doubt something more than the experience or even the hope of personal advantage which binds a scientific man, as Faraday, to the statement of the accurate truth, which forbids a great musician from inharmonious work, which compels Jesus to die rather than be made a king. In such class of acts the man is, as it were, in the grip of great, inspiring, compelling forces, which bear him along towards their great ends irresistibly. As Paul exclaimed, "Necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is unto me, if I preach not the gospel." Not that it would not be misery to such a man to throw over his principles, but what urges the man is above personal happiness or the dread of personal pain. The individual is lifted out of his individualism; his personal gain or loss is merged in the conception of the universal good. There is something of this in the compelling power of a habit which often breaks and bends to itself the personal advantage. The personal advantage is not strong enough to overcome the inertia of, it may be, generations of habit. But this of which we speak is higher and more imperative than any habit. It is more like those strange appetites and instincts, sexual, migratory, and so on, through which, in beasts and birds, the life power speaks and compels the individual, sometimes, indeed, by the channel of pleasure, but also on occasion by the channel of pain, for the good of the race. So God seems to bend men towards the absolute law of the perfect ethical life. He bends them through the constant pressure of personal advantage, but He also bends them none the less by pressure even more imperative, through personal pain, where no man's experience shows him the issue, and

where even his faith, if it sees others' good, cannot see his own. It is as if all human lives were parts of a mighty orchestra. Happiness will prove in the end to lie in coming into accord. Experience indicates this, but experience nowhere is complete enough to prove it. Meanwhile, beyond experience, there is in every man's soul, more or less keen, according to its health, a compelling perception of harmony, drawing man towards his best good, vexing him even in the midst of all lower pleasures, when this harmony is lost. On all men is this pressure towards harmony. On most it is too feeble as yet to overcome the weight of their experience of low kinds of satisfaction and the counter pressure of present personal enjoyment; but in some God makes this instinct for harmony, what Jesus calls the "hunger and thirst after righteousness," so keen, intense, unappeasable, that, with pleasure or without pleasure, the man must needs follow its bidding. The stronger this kind of hunger, the more impersonal it becomes, as though it were not its own satisfaction which is wanted, but the universal harmony. It is as if a higher impersonal self, careless of personal praise or blame, held the helm of the life.

This craving or instinct pressing man's life into harmony with the laws of the world, that is, with the divine beneficence, is the philosophy of conscience. As there are natural instincts, cravings, pressures from the great life forces towards everything else; as these instincts and pressures are more than the accumulation of experience, being the forces which have made experience; as they always press upwards towards higher reaches of development; as they have no infallible immunity from mistakes of detail, but find constant guidance and direction, being taught through experience of failure as well as success, — so what we call conscience is the great spiritual craving which lies behind and produces all moral phenomena. So conscience, while constantly pressing upwards after the unseen and holier utilities of its visions, has no infallible guidance, but requires the lessons of experience and the trained, healthy judgment, and so far from being less real for its occasional failure of detail, only thereby rises into more steady and earnest movement towards the perfect life. Duty means to follow this upward pressure. Sin means to be conscious of this pressure and not to heed it.

We have suggested here the philosophy of the doctrine of the forgiveness of sin. There is no blame laid up for the past to the soul which here and now has brought itself into harmony with

the laws of his life. There is, or should be, no pain of conscience to the man who is now consciously right, that is, in his place. The only use of the sense of the pain or remorse for sin is in binding men over henceforth to keep the peace of the universe.

We see here the relation which the great body of human laws bears to conscience. They are the recorded experience of the race, the results of its experiments, successes, sometimes its mistakes, as it has grown from its moral infancy. The laws differ in value and imperativeness from one nation or age to another, according to varying degrees of enlightenment and moral insight. Conscience was always behind them, expressing itself in them and enforcing them, or again rising from an imperfect to a more perfect expression of its universal pressure towards ideal righteousness. She was always urging and inspiring her chosen geniuses with clearer sight. The judgment and reason were always correcting or giving higher significance to the old laws. Through conscience, through experience, through reason, the divinity behind all was always shaping the course of the race. This is the philosophy of history.

We are ready now to gather the separate strands of our argument. We have granted that man is no exception to the grand rule of the universe by which all things are bound. We have been unable to grant man the least freedom to originate motion, thought, or will. On the contrary, in a more literal sense than is usually imagined, God moves men's lives,¹ not sporadically and intermittently, but always. Every prayer is his motion, and the choice or act which follow prayer, likewise. Every passion, appetite, aspiration, has its significance in his motion flowing through us; every act through which the appetite or the aspiration is gratified flows from his force. At our best, being in conscious unison with the Eternal Will, we can almost feel ourselves moved and urged. In our ordinary state, we are still moved by that accumulation of little motions which we call the force of habit. At our worst, and when we do wrong, we still move in accordance with God's laws of motion, sometimes for want of flow of the higher power to turn us towards good, sometimes on the misdirected momentum of motion which started in good. On the one hand, it is all of necessity.

It is not, however, necessity of matter or brute unintellectual forces, but much more a necessity, also, of thought, emotion, and spirit. It was here that we discovered the secret of the reality

¹ "In whom we live and *move* and have our being."

underneath what men have called human freedom. Forasmuch as man has consciousness, he is able to recognize and weigh the influences, motions, and forces which are playing through him ; to see their differences and their results ; to be moved by all the considerations of better and worse, of good and evil, of present and permanent, temporal and eternal, relative and absolute. His consciousness raises him into the range of the play of all these higher motives. He is capable through enlightenment of his consciousness to be satisfied in the good, in the permanent, the eternal, the absolute. A bias is established in him towards these things which he recognizes as best. His perfect freedom is when he only wishes the best, that is, when through clearness of sight the motives which sway him towards the best have no rival motives, and he therefore does good without inward conflict, resistance, or friction. This marvel of consciousness recognizing differences, motives, passions, desires, inspired in itself, akin to the good, satisfied only with the good, — this is the divine thing which men have called freedom. It is freedom to know, freedom to enter into the divine thought, to be at rest in the divine will, the capacity to love, — the motion of the soul in love being the highest freedom. It is not freedom to originate anything. It is freedom which is given and is dependent. It is a freedom which is imposed upon it by its nature. There is no harm in using the word, if one sees in what sense it has significance, not as freedom of the will, but the sublime gift of consciousness or the free spirit, to which the thoughts and movements of God are open, unfolded, and made acceptable as though they were our own.

We also agreed that utility, in the high sense of that which is ultimately beneficent, is at the root of the ethical life and will prove to be at last the final test of right. Man's experience does not constitute utility, but only discovers it and approximates towards it. Behind experience is the pressure of God, like a life force, working out experience and impelling men in sublime faith to untried paths. While we were obliged to deny that conscience was a voice of God in the soul infallibly determining right and wrong, we found the essence of the meaning of this old doctrine of conscience in the fact of this constant pressure of God on men's souls, like the atmosphere, more or less felt, more or less intelligently directed, but always approximating towards the perfect life. We found that in men's noblest actions there is no petty weighing of personal motives, of individual happiness, but a com-

elling inspiration of God which, with its broad visions of good, universal, and absolute, drowns out the individual selfishness.

The chief objection which this philosophy of ethics would seem to incur is that it makes God responsible for sin. In fact, any philosophy does this which claims that the world is a part of a universe. It requires some species of dualism, which to modern thought is abhorrent and false philosophically, to relieve the Creator of the light from the responsibility of the shadows which the light casts. We therefore reverently suspect that what we call sin, as well as disease, pain, ignorance, must be a necessary condition of finite growth. There cannot be a better unless there is also a worse; or virtues, that is, progress towards a moral harmony, unless there are also sins, that is, discords or noises out of which harmony is to be evolved. Neither is the sin, the discord, the ignorance, the disease, the pain, less real or dreadful to us, who, from our finite and relative point of view, have to feel its distress, because from God's sight it proves to be the necessary means to beneficent ends. It is less difficult morally to conceive of God as using what we call evil as the needful discipline towards good, than it is to think of evil as absolute, and yet God as powerless to overcome it. No, it is only the good which is absolute.

It happens that we actually proceed on the principles of the philosophy of ethics which we have been considering. We want a moral race of children, for instance. We enlighten their consciousness by education. We make them see the difference between good and evil. We show them the beauty of the great moral ideals and examples. We rely on the constant natural pressure of their conscience to sway them towards right. The conditions of our treatment are indeed more subtle than when we construct in material elements, but they are none the less certain. Are you not afraid, some one asks, that the man will excuse himself in sin? No more than we are afraid that the same man will excuse himself in putting his hand in the fire. For against evil of every kind, moral no less than material, God has made barriers and pains to threaten, to warn, and to rouse men's consciousness to escape. A burn only hurts for a day, and needs no free will, but only the feeblest ray of consciousness, to avoid it.

Finally, our philosophy is seen to have what a merely materialistic philosophy of conduct omits, namely, the divine or eternal sanction which in every age has proved the mightiest practical

motive power towards righteousness. We hold that we ought to do right because it is good, but when we say good, we mean not good for us or good now, but good eternally, good for all, good for us only as a part of all. Can there be any more powerful, far-reaching, threatening, or inspiring sanction than that? In fact, we really come to the same point with those who say that we ought to do right "because it is right." What do they mean? They do not mean, as the expression is sometimes unintelligently emphasized, right because it *is* right, a child's reason, a mere identical expression; but they mean right because it is *right*, that is, the straightest way, the eternal way to good; that way, therefore, which an enlightened consciousness does not dare to refuse; which is precisely another term for what we have said, that we ought to do right because the right in the widest sense is beneficent; and this, again, is the same with doing right because God commands, for, as we have seen, what is beneficent God does command, press, urge men towards, not out of willfulness, but out of infinite love. We call this sanction of the absolute and eternal the master motive in conduct, not because ordinary average conduct more than half consciously feels it, but because in those moral crises in which, if ever, the individual or the race makes its advances, when on the mere ground of personal advantage the soul has not momentum to resist the gravitation of evil,—in such crises, out of the contending forces and passions present to consciousness, or over against the apathy of personal indifference, there rises this divine, inspired faith in the eternal, in every generation, the mightiest motive power towards patience, resistance, heroism, moral victory.

Charles F. Dole.

BOSTON (JAMAICA PLAIN), MASS.

EDITORIAL.

FROM PROGRESS TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: THE ANDOVER
REVIEW FOR 1890.

WHEN the ANDOVER REVIEW was established in 1884, the immediate and urgent demand of the religious life of New England and of many parts of the country was for theological progress. It was quite as much a spiritual as it was an intellectual demand. Theology had lost to a very appreciable degree its vitalizing and quickening power. The theological advance of the previous generation along the lines of moral freedom and universal atonement, which formulated itself in the "new school" theology of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches, and which found practical expression in so many religious awakenings within those bodies, had nearly spent its force. The remaining sign of its power was a certain metaphysical acuteness with very decided rationalistic tendencies, rather than philosophical breadth or spiritual enlargement.

It was evident that this school of theological thought was insufficient, in two important particulars, to meet the new demands upon the church. First, its method was metaphysical: the method demanded was the critical. The problems which were beginning to press upon the church could not be reasoned out, they must be investigated. The proof called for was the proof of fact. The doctrine of the Scriptures which was now coming to the front was not to be determined by *a priori* reasoning, but by the candid examination of the sources of the Scriptural record. Biblical and historical criticism was the only science which could recover and reestablish the outward authority of the Scriptures. And the same critical or scientific method was needed to rescue natural theology from the danger which threatened it. As has since been shown, the conclusions of natural theology were not to be substantially changed, but these conclusions needed new supports. The arguments which evolution had destroyed were to be replaced by arguments which evolution furnished.

And, secondly, its conception of life was altogether individualistic: the conception demanded was one which should give to the individual his natural and necessary relations to society and the race. The individualistic conception was not to be abandoned. It never can be. But whenever it is exaggerated and intensified, as it had then come to be, it loses its appropriate power and becomes thin, sharp, and artificial, with the inevitable result of alienating society from the church. But the time had come at the date referred to — it had come before, though it had not been clearly recognized — when society needed to be permeated in all its parts and through all its life by the church, not simply to be wrought upon by the church according to its individualistic methods. And the time had come in missionary operations, brought about as we acknowledge in large degree by these same methods, when the question of the

salvation of individuals among the heathen was beginning to widen into the promise of the regeneration of nations and of races.

It was perhaps unavoidable that theological progress in New England should begin in controversy. Unfortunately that had been its history from the beginning, and the theological controversies of the past as of the present had been embittered and confused by personalities. But the controversy which ushered in the last theological advance accomplished one unexpected but on the whole necessary end. It exposed, as nothing else could have exposed, the serious and culpable neglect of the church in respect to the dogmas which were being called in question. Nothing, for example, has been more humiliating than the confusion and emptiness of the church, as it has been revealed by recent discussions, before the vital and human problems involved in Eschatology. The sad spectacle has been presented of the church, so far as represented by traditional belief, obliged to take refuge in dogmatism or agnosticism. Certainly the advance came none too quickly, even though it came at the price of controversy, which made it necessary for the church to set itself in good earnest about the development of a doctrine of the future which should be at once positive and tenable, which should have in it the scope, the seriousness, and the humanity of the gospel of its Lord, Redeemer, and Judge.

We have naturally instanced this particular illustration of the theological ferment which was then making itself manifest. But the signs were abundant. Demands began to be heard from various quarters calling for modification or advance. And the demands were none the less serious and imperative because they were not couched in revolutionary terms. What was asked for was progress, enlargement, reconstruction, and readjustment. Even revision soon came to have a meaning sufficient to waken the fears or hopes of those who employed it. And though the moving causes were various and differing, yet the end aimed at was the same, — a more natural, a more real, a more vital faith. Evolution demanded a theory of the universe less mechanical and arbitrary, which should courageously acknowledge and classify, if it did not altogether interpret, the phenomena of nature. Criticism demanded a doctrine of the Bible which should be true to the facts of its origin and development, and which should recognize the agencies through which the Spirit of God wrought in the unfolding and communication of religious truth. And theology proper demanded a conception of God inspired and controlled by the revelation of himself in the person of Jesus Christ, and in harmony with the workings of his spirit and providence in history. Naturally, the stress of these demands was felt most in the churches whose spiritual life was centred in the Confessions or in private creeds, like the Presbyterian and Congregational or Independent (including the Baptist) Churches of Great Britain and America. In all these the

movement has been earnest and at times strenuous. But also in the churches whose spiritual life is more directly associated with ritual or organization, like the Episcopal and Methodist Churches, the same spirit has been at work, though from the nature of the case without reaching formulated results in doctrine. The Episcopal Church openly recognizes the rights of theological opinion. The Methodist Church wisely overlooks or ignores the assertion of individual freedom. In fact, look where one will, advances have been made, or movements have been inaugurated involving theological progress, which few would have dared to prophesy, and which many would have declared impossible, ten years ago.

Meanwhile a movement has been going on, quite as marked as the theological advance of the past years, and which has in many ways exerted a strong influence upon it, namely, the movement toward comprehensiveness. The singular fact appears — it has arrested the attention of the secular journals — that the theological discussions of the present, even when they have passed into controversies and contentions, have in no case resulted in schism. They have not divided a single denomination. They have not produced a new sect. The attempt has been made, in some instances, to provoke schism, to force progressive minorities into open revolt or withdrawal, but in no instance has the attempt succeeded. The tendencies toward unity have proved far stronger than the efforts for schism. The Congregational Church of this country has given a twofold example of this fact: first, in the action of its Creed Commission, which eliminated all divisive dogmas, and more recently in the action of the American Board, which placed itself upon the platform of a tolerant comprehensiveness.

There are various religious manifestations which may be regarded either as causes or as signs of the movement toward a comprehensive unity. We will simply enumerate them. One is the remarkable phenomenon, to which we have referred, of theological progress going on in and through all branches of the Protestant Church, rather than organizing itself into a new sect. A new bond of intellectual and spiritual fellowship has thus been created without breaking the ecclesiastical bond which already existed. Another is the increasing desire for the enlargement and enrichment of worship, a desire which is bringing the liturgical and non-liturgical churches into closer sympathy. Another is the enlarging opportunity for coöperation, which in the cities is becoming almost an imperative necessity. And another still is the spirit of concession in favor of ecclesiastical unity, of which the advances of the Lambeth Conference and the response of several ecclesiastical bodies is the most conspicuous and the most assuring example. All these manifestations, whether we regard them as causes or signs, point toward a growing unity, of the type of which we have been speaking, the unity of compre-

hensiveness. This is not the highest type. No one would make such a claim in its behalf. But it is a type which allows and encourages the higher developments. In its lowest form it insures toleration, and it easily and naturally rises into the power of practical coöperation, and into the warmth and glow of spiritual fellowship.

The retrospect which we have taken may serve to bring before our readers the aim of the Editors of the REVIEW for the coming year. Theological progress is assured. The movement has passed beyond recall, and beyond question. Nothing remains to any who have opposed it, and who continue to oppose it, except to call it names, and declare that it is not progress at all. The time has come, in our judgment, to seek to give the utmost steadiness, breadth, and spiritual power to the movement. We are not impatient of systematized results. Very much remains to be investigated and discussed by the methods of a reverent and patient Christian scholarship, and to be tested in the experience and work of the church. Many comparisons are yet to be made among those who have been at work in different fields of investigation or along different lines of speculative inquiry. But no one who has been observant can fail to note the growing consensus of opinion as well as purpose on the part of those who have committed themselves to theological progress. It will be our object during the coming year to reflect upon the pages of the REVIEW this advanced stage in inquiry and discussion; to show how theological progress is beginning to express itself in theological unity. It is, therefore, with especial gratification that we announce, through our prospectus,¹ the coöperation of so many scholars and thinkers in the various denominations whose names have become representative of progress in theology. Our work in Biblical interpretation and historical criticism will be peculiarly enriched by their contributions. And this aid will be of great value to our readers in the careful criticism of the best books, as the REVIEW is now to be enlarged in each third number for the more complete notice of current theological literature.

We desire no less to recognize that unity of moral purpose and of Christian service which is wider than any possible theological unity. The names of previous contributors to the REVIEW in these wider relations, and of those who are announced for the coming year, are, we trust, a sufficient guarantee of the catholicity of the REVIEW in its treatment of the greater questions of the church and the school, of literature, and of society. We are not blind to the fact that progress is going on elsewhere than in theology. Indeed, we are not sure that greater advance has not been made in the science of sociology, — the science, as a recent writer has termed it, of the second commandment, as theology is that of the first commandment. We desire to acknowledge and record progress

¹ For prospectus, see Publishers' notice in advertising columns.

in method and in result in all departments that are germane to the purpose of a theological and religious review.

And in our endeavor to make the REVIEW more representative of the general interests with which it is identified, we do not hesitate to ask our readers, and all who belong to its natural constituency, to aid us in the enlargement of its influence, through the improvement of its pages, and through the increase of its circulation. The extent and variety of its circulation have been most gratifying from the beginning. We ask our friends to second us in our personal efforts to increase its efficiency and to extend its influence.

THE MODERN PULPIT: LIMITATION OR EMANCIPATION?

FROM time to time statements are published concerning the reduced influence of the pulpit of to-day as compared with its influence in former periods. The latest generalization to that effect is an article in the November "Forum," entitled "Modern Claims upon the Pulpit," by Canon Farrar, who says at the end of his observations:—

"To conclude, then, and sum up, I maintain that the modern preacher must never forget that though sermons yet retain an immense force in the moral, the spiritual, and even the intellectual world, they can no longer occupy the place which once they did. There was a time when to most hearers the sermon was the Bible, the history, the romance, the newspaper, and the political harangue, all in one. It occupies a different position in these days. The schoolmaster is abroad, and of writing many books there is no end. Not only is the Bible in every hand, but the best information respecting its meaning and history has been so widely popularized that even a hearer of moderate attainments may know as much about it as the preacher. Science has been revolutionized, opinions altered, doctrines reconsidered and set in new lights, Scripture retranslated, and multitudes of texts rescued into their true significance. Let the modern preacher adapt himself to these changed conditions."

The burden of his contention is that, as people know more than at previous times, the mistakes of a preacher are more likely now than before to be found out, and that therefore in respect to science, Biblical criticism, and things in general, he should venture no statements of fact unless he knows what he is talking about. The implication is very broad that, in view of the constant demands upon the time of a parish clergyman, he can hardly expect to know as much on science, history, and politics as many of his hearers know, and therefore should confine himself to setting his face as a flint "against greed and oppression, against falsehood and uncleanness, against robbery and wrong," and to "maintaining with modest conviction the central truths of the Christian faith." Especially should he refrain from invading the domain of science, as he will in all probability merely add one to the long list of those who have damaged religion by antagonizing science.

The New York "Nation," under the title "Remarkable Admissions

by a Preacher," devotes an editorial to Canon Farrar's article, calling it "one of the most remarkable contributions yet made to the discussion of the relations between religion and science," and predicting that when the article reaches England the Canon will "have to listen to some pretty severe strictures from his brethren on the way in which he has taken upon himself to cut down the authority of the pulpit in nearly all the graver concerns of life." But the statements of Canon Farrar concerning the intelligence of congregations, concerning the harm that has been done by opposition to science on the part of ill-informed clergymen, and concerning the loss of ministerial authority have been made by others a thousand times over, till they have become the commonplace of homiletical magazines and religious newspapers. If the Canon had never startled his brethren more than he is likely to do in this article, no breath of criticism would ever have been directed against him.

But although such assertions are frequently made, the inquiry is well worthy of consideration whether, in comparison with other periods, the pulpit of to-day really is more limited in range of topics and method of treatment. The "Nation" pertinently asks in conclusion how the pulpit is to maintain its influence and authority, at the same time giving its own opinion that "there will always be great preachers, but they must hereafter bear a smaller and smaller proportion to the mass." We maintain that the transformation of preaching from past conditions is not a limitation, but rather an emancipation from a narrow range of topics and a superficial method of treatment.

In passing, however, we would remark that the "Nation" misunderstands Canon Farrar on one important point when it says that he inexorably warns preachers away from Biblical criticism as forbidden territory. He warns them only against making attacks on Biblical criticism without having gained knowledge of its results and methods, but at the same time emphasizes the necessity of correct knowledge of Scripture so that preachers shall not appeal to it in an "uncritical, unhistoric, and indiscriminate way," and remarks that "they who listen Sunday after Sunday, in the hope of gaining some instruction in things divine, have a right to expect that their teachers shall take some pains to ascertain the real sense and right rendering of the passages from which their texts are taken." England doubtless would be startled if Canon Farrar should advise preachers to have nothing to do with Biblical criticism.

We proceed to the main question of the alleged limitation of the modern pulpit.

We are somewhat at a loss to know what period is brought into comparison with the present to show the waning power of the pulpit, but we suppose it is the period just preceding the last half century, inasmuch as the vast gains of knowledge referred to have been chiefly made during the last fifty years. Perhaps the entire colonial period in this country is in view, and in England the time since the Protestant Reformation began,

followed by the Puritan era and the religious dryness of the eighteenth century. For the sake of definiteness and convenience, we will endeavor to keep in thought the first two centuries of American history till about 1830, as representing the former period when the pulpit is said to have had more influence and a wider range of topics than at present.

It is at once admitted that at almost any time during that long period the clerical office, as an office, was taken more seriously than at present. Every clergyman was treated with deference. He was held up above criticism and ridicule. He was usually an autocrat in the affairs of the church. His learning exceeded that of the great majority of his congregation. He was led thus to cultivate a dignified or a pompous manner. He seldom laughed heartily, and took his mild diversions somewhat under protest or on the sly. When he approached a house it was a signal for the children to hide and for their elders to put on a double layer of soberness. Certainly this kind of regard for the ministerial office no longer exists. The minister's authority, however, was not wholly derived from the excellence of his preaching, but from regard for all his functions as a clergyman. His preaching may have been, often was, wordy, stilted, wearisome, and destitute of moral impression. That conception of his office which removed him from common life and set him apart must have tended to reduce the power of his preaching. And, at all events, authority which elicits deference is not identical with influence. If we may judge from the state of things in this country towards the close of the eighteenth century, when infidelity was widespread and few were joining the churches, we might conclude that the real influence of preachers was in no sort of proportion to the apparent regard for their office.

The rapid advance of knowledge in some directions during recent years is a very singular reason to assign for a limitation of the range and interest of preaching. It might be expected to produce quite the opposite effect. It does, indeed, make trouble for ignorant ministers, but we believe enlarges the opportunity of intelligent preachers. One is most conscious of limitation in addressing immature minds, such as a company of savages, a congregation of Southern negroes, a crowd drawn in by a city mission, or an audience of children. Unusual powers are requisite that the interest and profit of such hearers may be secured, just because the ground held in common by speaker and hearer is so narrow. But there are numberless points of contact with those who know as much as the preacher knows, and who are intelligent concerning the moral and social problems which confront him. The reminder that hearers are now so well informed seems intended as an intimation that it is a waste of time for a preacher to teach what they already know, and that he should deal only with subjects of which they are ignorant and he is not. And yet ignorance is the most difficult condition to address. It is intellectual deafness. A cultivated preacher must be of a very noble

spirit to do his work among those who are scarcely beyond the alphabet and multiplication table. Intelligence gives mental fellowship. Reading and knowledge make minds alert for new suggestions. But we have been granting too much in respect to the diminution of intellectual difference between preacher and hearer. Throughout nearly all of the earlier period the staple of preaching was the Biblical exposition and illustration of Christian doctrine. In every congregation were many minds saturated with the teachings of Scripture and familiar with the exact phraseology of its most important parts. The minister's chief advantage was his acquaintance with the Hebrew and Greek originals. The children may have slept, but their elders were awake. A misquotation of Scripture or a misstatement of doctrine was sure to be detected. Indeed, the whole community was better instructed than now in the Bible, and the average knowledge of Christianity according to the current understanding of it was higher than at present. The minister then need not be very learned outside his Bible, but must be learned in it, whereas now he is more likely to be overtaken in a fault by his hearers in respect to his secular than in respect to his religious learning.

And we take issue decidedly with the statement that the range of the preacher's topics is reduced. Formerly sermons were limited to personal religious life and the corresponding doctrines, except in times of public danger, when patriotism both in the earlier and the later period has been aroused by the voice of the preacher. But now the demands of society, the rivalries of classes, moral reforms, the missionary movements of the church, and other phases of the kingdom of God on earth as a new social order have extended the range within which Christianity seeks its application. It is enough evidence of this broadening of scope to compare the isolated village and farm life of the last century, having infrequent communication with the world and a rather languid interest in it, destitute of missionary zeal, and having no social problem, with the life of to-day in great cities which are in close communication with outlying communities, a life diversified in its relations, and reaching out all over the world in its interests and responsibilities.

But the change which has come about in preaching is not measured by the more or less of knowledge, by the degree of outward deference paid to the clergyman, nor by the restriction or expansion of topics germane to the pulpit. The real change is an emancipation which has been produced by a radical change of method. It is a change from outward to inward contemplation of truth, from external evidence to spiritual insight, from the defense of truth to that unfolding of truth which is always its best defense. It was formerly the principal function of the pulpit to explain and defend the doctrines of Christianity as doctrines, by adducing arguments and meeting objections. This method involved much quotation of Scripture, some metaphysics, and a little logic. It was the method of external evidence. There was also discussion of religious experience cor-

responding with objective doctrine, and this involved some attempts to gain a psychology extending from man's moral ability to his assurance of faith. The real strength of the pulpit at that time was in its portrayal of the moral attributes of God by which feelings of solemnity and even sentiments of grandeur were awakened, and in its emphasis on the moral law of God which aroused conscience. But in general the gospel was a doctrine rather than a life, a revelation rather than an inspiration. When the more eminent ministers published sermons they were for the most part bodies of divinity, that is, discourses on systematic theology with appended "improvements." Like the theology of the time, the preaching (and preaching is usually in tune with contemporaneous theology) was a defense of Christian truth from the outside. It used the Bible as an arsenal of proof texts, it attacked the errors of Unitarianism, Universalism, Arminianism, Pelagianism, etc., and came inevitably to the aridity of the closing years of the last century. That type of preaching is virtually extinct. The method has changed so that religious truth is now developed from within outwards. A principle is recognized and unfolded, an ideal is reproduced, a precept is illuminated, an incident is translated into its meaning, and these are traced out along the lines of their working power in personal life and in society. Not all preachers are of this sort, as not all formerly were shut up to the mechanical method, but, broadly speaking, the modern type is in this contrast with the earlier type. Christianity is now disclosed in its intrinsic character as truth for life. It reaches not only conscience but also aspiration, sympathy, and living faith, and fills out its relation to society according to the various needs of humanity. The comprehensiveness of Christianity and the breadth of human life have been opening simultaneously to the preacher and to the church. As life broadens, the truth which can match it broadens. Whereas formerly public and social affairs were outside interests, the detached topics of Fast Day or Thanksgiving, now they are included in the restored idea of the kingdom of God, and constantly associated with its underlying principles.

It follows that fresh knowledge held in common by preacher and congregation is not thereby rendered unavailable lest he should only tell them what they know already, but is the most available material for illustration and enforcement of religious truth. Even physical science furnishes many an analogy between the natural and the spiritual world, and from every realm of knowledge some contribution may be made to the reality of the highest truth. The principal function of the pulpit has never been the dissemination of knowledge. It has never, except incidentally, been employed in conveying new information. Then, indeed, with the spread of knowledge its range would be contracted. Its aim is to verify knowledge by reducing facts to order under the principles of religious truth, to employ knowledge as the expositor of religion, to find over against that evolution which multiplies the relations of life the

truth which shall guide it, and to impart to those who are mentally alert the motive which shall utilize their knowledge and gifts in the service of mankind.

The pulpit thus is enlarged in range and emancipated from bondage. It no longer expends its force in defending a system of doctrines against objection, and in showing that they may reasonably be believed. But it takes the living truth and makes it real to life, thus most cogently defending it. It restores the history of the human Jesus in its actual detail, so that it has gospel as well as epistle. The type of preaching to-day, to which, of course, there are many exceptions, as at any former time to the prevalent type, is the interpretation and application of spiritual Christianity by the aid of all the light which God's ways in nature and history afford. In comparison with almost any period of the past there is greater comprehensiveness and a real deliverance from yokes of bondage.

It may be said, however, and it is often implied, that while the range of topics suitable to the pulpit is widened, yet the same subjects are so thoroughly treated elsewhere that there is little interest in what the preacher has to say about them. We have a true respect for the intelligence of our fellow-citizens, but, at the same time, believe that the reading of the vast majority of those who attend church will not exhaust their interest in the preacher's views. The religious newspaper is for news of organizations and churches, with occasional discussion on social and moral questions so brief that the reader's appetite is only sharpened for more. The magazines are filled with stories and sketches, interspersed with articles on the public aspects or the controverted forms of a few religious movements. Such articles are not as widely read as others of a more popular character. Books pertaining to subjects which are suitable to the pulpit are read scarcely at all except by specialists. Besides, as we have already said, the more people read and become interested, the more strongly disposed they are to get a religious interpretation of what they read and talk about. The preacher has a decided advantage when he can assume a knowledge equal with his own on subjects which have a relation to Christianity, and of which they and he are seeking the controlling use or principle.

Canon Farrar, in the passage we have quoted, remarks that "there was a time when to most hearers the sermon was the Bible, the history, the romance, the newspaper, and the political harangue, all in one." We are curious to know when that time was. We should like to see a sample of one of those remarkably comprehensive and exciting discourses. Perhaps the Canon means that while we now have sermon, Bible, history, romance, newspaper, and political harangue, there was a time when people had only sermon and Bible, and that these filled the place now filled also by history, romance, newspaper, and political harangue. The remark may, however, suggest the thought that these additional sources of inter-

est have a tendency to take just so much away from interest in church and preaching. The apprehension is groundless. Only irreligious interests can draw men away from Christianity. The social and political movements of the world, past and present, for which history, romance, newspaper, and political harangue stand, are related to religion, and require its interpretation. And besides, it is a law of the mind that the multiplication of intellectual interests does not leave less energy for each, but makes the mind more active in all it touches, while a limitation which approaches narrowness creates stagnation through monotony.

Canon Farrar opened his article by alluding to the dullness of modern sermons, as if it were a new complaint. "It has become," he says, "a fashion of society to speak of the weariness and emptiness of preaching. To listen to a sermon is jestingly recommended as the surest soporific." If any jest is ancient and endowed with perpetual motion more than another, it is this. It is a jest which will doubtless have its occasion till the millennial dawn. It probably has more vitality in England than in America, for the average preaching of the Church of England is but little, if any, more wakeful than it was when Sydney Smith characterized the discourses of the preachers of that church as nothing but Bible and water. But there are preachers and preachers, and, in comparison of types, the present with the former, there cannot be a doubt that the later type has more scope, more intelligence, and more power. What Canon Farrar himself says about sermons formerly preached on atonement and retribution and the change which has occurred refutes his argument concerning the diminishing power of preaching.

In a word, then, we maintain that the pulpit, in its own sphere, has ample room. While it does not profess to make its province all knowledge, while it does not discuss farming, electrical engineering, deep-sea dredging, or Darwinism (all of which, however, furnish illustration), it does occupy the field of religion as truth and as life. And in respect to its great theme, it is now in part emancipated from former limitations, and is gaining, with all progress, new and more commanding points of view from which to find the correspondences of Christian truth with human life.

PUBLIC READING OF THE SCRIPTURES.

A PARAGRAPH in a recent number of the "Old Testament Student" recommends the custom of making more or less extended comments while reading a passage of Scripture in the public worship of the church. In our opinion, however, such comment should be the exception rather than the custom. It is admitted in the paragraph that peculiar gifts of mind are necessary to achieve the highest success in scattered or running comment. But peculiar gifts are needed to achieve any success whatever in such a practice. The rule should be to make no remarks, either explan-

atory, instructive, or hortatory, when a passage of the Bible is being read in immediate connection with public worship. There are proper times for exposition of Scripture. Expository may profitably supplement textual and topical preaching. An extended section of the Bible may be made the subject of instruction and persuasion at that part of the services when attention is definitely called to such objects. The second service of the Lord's day, the midweek meeting of the church, the meetings of teachers, and the sessions of the Sunday-school are also suitable occasions for explanatory and practical comments on portions of Scripture. But the place which readings from the Bible have in the midst of public worship and as part of it is not appropriate to comment. The thoughts of the congregation are disposed for worship. There has already been prayer and praise. The reading is to be followed by the prayer of thanksgiving, confession, and adoration. Scripture at that time is read as an adjunct of worship, and is listened to as the authoritative word of God, speaking out of its own dignity and divineness to the humble worshiper. If reverently and intelligently read, it may be trusted to make its own impression without the aid of interjected remarks. The remarks may be correct as explanation, and proper enough as application, but the transition into comment and back to the word of God is unnatural. The contrast is painful. A listener's mind is jolted along, bumping every moment against the obstacle of a needless if not an irrelevant remark. The verse read is of stately diction, the observation is colloquial; the truth announced is profound, the explanation is superficial; the sentence heard has that inimitable quality which is called Scriptural, the comment is destitute of any fine quality but is only a bald comment. It is as if one personating a character of Shakespeare's, attempting to render in his own words and very spirit the thought of the dramatist, should halt now and then to explain that there are various readings of a certain line, that allusion is made to an obsolete custom, that a popular proverb is quoted, or that in the locality described other important events had occurred several centuries before, and then resume the tone and manner from which he had broken off. In a lecture on Othello such explanations would be entirely appropriate, but not in a personation. Reading in public worship should be not so much as a personation, but no less than a reproduction, of the truth in its original, simple, natural impression, without impeding the progress or reducing the elevation of the truth. A closer comparison to scattered comments is the practice of one who, when he is reading a fine poem aloud, with cadence, rhythm, tone, expression in keeping, stops now and then at the end or in the middle of a line to read a foot-note, and then tries to resume where and as he left off. It may be doubted if there are five clergymen alive who can so weave in phraseology, suggestion, and tone with the diction and thought of Scripture that there shall be no loss of spiritual impressiveness. It is much better to ponder the selected pas-

sage in advance, to catch the lights and shades of its meaning, to recognize the delicate suggestiveness of its every phrase, and then to read it with just emphasis and with faithful correctness of expression, to let it say what it really does say of itself, than to depend on bringing in something from outside as if to complete what seems insufficient. For our own part, we go so far in the direction of a reverent reading of the Word that we object to that manner which, although no comment is made, converts the reading into an address to the audience. We do not like to see the eye frequently raised from the page and turned on the congregation, but rather to see attention earnestly fixed on the words, as if for the purpose of losing nothing, and of assuring the listeners that what they hear is identically that which is written. We agree with the Scotchman who said to a clergyman: "I enjoyed your reading of the Bible. You did not lift your eyes from the page, but read the word reverently and gentlemanly." Good taste as well as reverence dictate that in the public reading of Scripture heart and mind should be concentrated on the message from heaven, which should be rendered without interpolated remark and wandering glance. As a public reader does not explain by additions, but interprets by using his author's own expressions, so the reader of Scripture should not try to preach when he reads, but should reproduce with fidelity and reverence the exact thought of the Word of God.

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS IN MASSACHUSETTS.

COMPLETE statistical reports of the number of scholars attending parochial schools in Massachusetts appear in the Boston "Daily Advertiser" of November 12. The reports come from school superintendents, supervisors, members of school boards, and others, and are believed to include all the parochial schools in the State, with the possible exception of a few opened recently. No section of the country affords a better illustration of the growth of the parochial system than Massachusetts, which has a larger proportion of Catholic population than any State in the Union, and which has that population distributed in many cities and manufacturing towns all over its territory.

In those places where Catholic schools have been established the actual numbers are as follows: Number of scholars in the public schools, 178,097; number of scholars in parochial schools, 39,301; whole number, 217,398. That is, about 18 per cent. of the scholars reported as in actual attendance are sent to parochial schools. Boston sends 55,599 to the public and 8,000 to the parochial schools, or 12.5 per cent.; Worcester, 12,000 to public, 1,935 to parochial schools, or 13.9 per cent.; Cambridge, 10,462 and 1,400, or 11.8 per cent.; Fall River, 8,605 and 3,000, or 25.8 per cent.; Lowell, 7,700 and 2,500, or 24.5 per cent.; Lynn, 7,723 and 600, or 7.2 per cent.; Springfield, 6,639 and 800, or

10.8 per cent.; Somerville, 5,488 and 640, or 9.8 per cent.; Lawrence, 5,300 and 1,670, or 24 per cent.; Chelsea, 5,000 and 550, or 9.9 per cent.; New Bedford, 4,643 and 1,818, or 28.2 per cent.; Gloucester, 4,000 and 250, or 5.9 per cent.; Holyoke, 3,387 and 3,220, or 48.8 per cent.; Haverhill, 3,200 and 900, or 21.9 per cent.; Salem, 3,600 and 1,268, or 26 per cent.; Newburyport, 1,600 and 800, or 33 per cent.; Chicopee, 2,200 and 1,000, or 31.3 per cent. In Southbridge only is the parochial in excess of the public school attendance, the numbers being 830 and 725 respectively. The town has a large French population, and 650 of the 830 parochial scholars are in the French parochial school. There are thirty-seven towns and cities in which parochial schools exist, and in six of these places the whole number of parochial scholars is only 1,313. Computing the entire school population between the ages of five and fifteen at 350,000 and the number in attendance at 320,000, there would remain in other towns and cities about 100,000 school children attending the public schools. The percentage of attendance in parochial schools in the entire State is, then, about 12.3 per cent. (39,301 to 320,000). It is really less than that, for the number of pupils over fifteen years of age is not included. It appears, then, that the extension of parochial schools has been considerable only at a few centres, and has not reached nine tenths of the towns of Massachusetts at all, and that in those centres there is accommodation for only a fraction of the children even of Catholic parents. In Boston, the children of Catholic parents number about 30,000, of whom only 8,000 can be accommodated in the parochial schools. Even in Holyoke, where there are only 1,638 Protestant children out of a total school population of 6,402, there is room in the parochial schools for only about 3,000, so that one half the pupils in the public schools are Catholics.

In nearly all cases where the Catholics build a school-house, the immediate effect is to relieve over-crowded public schools of the neighborhood. The relief is usually temporary only, as increase of population soon fills up every room. In a few instances, the number of teachers and the appropriation of money have been reduced. Fifty teachers in all have been displaced, twelve of them in Fall River and nine in Southbridge. In six places only has the appropriation been reduced, Newburyport, Malden, Woburn, Waltham, Canton, and Southbridge.

The rate of increase is not indicated by the statistics of the "Advertiser." In Boston, several school-houses have been built since the Baltimore decree of 1886, which urged more activity in religious education. In Worcester, since 1874, when a large school-house was built, the only increase is a French school opened in 1880, two small houses a little later, and in 1888 a school for boys, with 200 pupils. In Woburn, a school-house was built in 1884, but nothing has been done since. In New Bedford, no buildings have been erected since the first was built in 1884. In Fall River, some of the six school-houses have been opened recently.

The same is true of Holyoke. The rather rapid increase of Canadian-French population has led to the erection of new buildings within the last three or four years. On the whole, there has been no recent increase of parochial schools at all corresponding to the increase of public schools and of population.

The zeal of the Catholic clergy for church schools is general if not universal, but the laity are not sufficiently in sympathy with the priests to be at the expense of building and maintaining independent schools for their children. And there is little probability of more activity, if a few simple and sensible conditions are complied with by Protestants. One condition is, to keep up and to increase the efficiency of the public schools. Thus far there has been no question of the superiority of the public over the parochial schools. This is so well understood by Catholic parents that of their own accord they seldom remove their children from the public schools; and very often, after removal at the request of the priest, children are sent back again to the schools from which they had been withdrawn. Let there be intelligent direction of elementary education in respect to text-books, teachers, hours of study, school hours, manual, training, the usefulness of studies, and the subordination of method to result, and there is little doubt that the large majority of Catholic children will remain in the public schools.

There should be no discrimination against Catholic teachers who are as well trained and as competent as Protestant teachers. They have an advantage in teaching children of their own faith, and their participation in the work of instruction removes one objection from the mouths of the priests. An important part of the testimony which has been collected bears on this very matter. In Blackstone, where there is no parochial school, twelve of the twenty-five teachers are Catholics. Of Winchester, which is without a parochial school, the superintendent, Mr. Hunt, says: "We have four Catholic teachers in one school, and the pupils are all Catholics. The teachers are graduates of the Salem Normal School, and are among our very best qualified, and their work is not easily equaled anywhere by any teachers of the same grade. They all do not believe in parochial schools. Give Catholic teachers an equal chance with Protestant teachers; give them full credit for excellent work. I can show some of their work I have never seen equaled in Boston."

Above all, every effort should be made to avoid public discussion and agitation as against Catholics. In view of the facts, it must be seen that nearly all of the alarm which exists in many minds is groundless. Nothing is more likely to further the plans of the Catholic clergy than violent opposition and the appearance of religious persecution. Nothing else can consolidate American Catholics against public schools, or unite them to provide educational facilities for all their children. There are causes enough and more than enough to counteract the efforts of priests in

behalf of church schools. The excellence of public schools, the advantage of association with Protestants, the political equality of this country, and unwillingness to be taxed again for what is already provided are among the causes which work effectively against the establishment of a separate system of education. We repeat what we said a year ago on this subject: "The church does not control the people in all things, and is not the only interest of their lives. They live in modern times, in intelligent and enterprising communities, and in a republic. If these influences are allowed to produce their legitimate effects, public schools will continue to do an important work for the children of Catholic parents. Nothing can play more effectually into the hands of ecclesiastical leaders than courses which have a tendency to solidify the Catholic population. Attempts to array Protestants against Catholics, to attribute dark designs and underground methods to the clergy, to accuse the whole church of hostility to American institutions and ideas, are more likely to solidify Catholics in defense of their church than to alienate them from it." With this agrees the opinion of the reports made to the "Advertiser." "The Boston school supervisors and teachers, many of whom were interviewed in the preparation of this article, are of the opinion that the less agitation there is on this subject the better. They say that hundreds of parents and children prefer the common schools, and are only keeping their children in the church's private schools from religious motives. Their pockets would soon get the better of their religious pride if the latter were not kept alive by what they regard as religious persecution." S. C. Bancroft, secretary of the School Board of Peabody, says: "The parochial school question is not agitated in Peabody, and probably will not be for years to come, as there are no signs of any serious difference of opinions. I am of opinion that if it were left to Catholics to decide they would vote down parochial schools. Our population is half Catholic, but a spirit of mutual toleration is carefully cultivated. Neither side tries to get ahead of the other, but both sides try to be just." F. W. Sweet, superintendent of schools in Bridgewater and Walpole, where there are no Catholic schools, thinks that if Protestants stir up no controversies to keep up prejudice, the Catholic schools will not be in existence ten years hence. He says: "I give our Catholic brethren credit for a good degree of common sense, and as they become more enlightened by experience and comparison of results with the public schools, I think they will return of their own preference. Instead of wasting our breath criticising their action, let us use every means to improve the public school, and the parochial school will fall of its own weight." Superintendent Marble, of Worcester, says: "I am glad that no partisan or sectarian use will be made of the information you are collecting. It cannot fail to be useful; for it will show, I think, that the whole people believe in and will support the public schools, and that there is less cause for alarm than some people have imagined."

None of those reporting intimate that in their opinion parochial schools are desirable, although they afford temporary relief to overcrowded school-rooms and reduce taxes, but seem to be unanimous in the conviction that all Catholic children should attend the public schools.

The recent Catholic Church Congress in Baltimore adopted resolutions of a general character concerning education, which support the policy already avowed by the decree of 1886, but indicate no purpose of seeking exemption from taxation in support of public schools, nor of securing appropriations for parochial schools. The resolutions are as follows:—

“We recognize, next in importance to religion itself, education as one of the chief factors in forming the character of the citizen and promoting the advance of a true civilization. Therefore we are committed to a bound popular education, which demands not only physical and intellectual, but also the moral and religious training of our youth.

“As in the state schools no provision is made for teaching religion, we must continue to support our own schools, colleges, and universities already established, and multiply and perfect others so that the benefit of a Christian education may be brought within the reach of every Catholic child within these United States.”

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION.

As an indication that in our age the dignity and value of a purely intellectual life are overestimated, a German professor has recently calculated that there are more than twice as many students in the German Universities as can possibly hope to get a living in the pursuits for which they are preparing themselves. If true of Germany with its limited number of universities, what shall we say of the United States with its hundreds of such universities, so-called? Is our college education the most desirable education for fifty per cent. of our college graduates? How shall we make about that percentage of them good artisans and men of business rather than bad lawyers or physicians?

Again, it is strange that we, who are the most practical people in the world, give in our public schools an education that is far from practical. We give a purely intellectual training to the masses, although ninety per cent. of them must earn their bread in manual occupations. Can it be that an exclusively mental education is the best training for manual occupations? We must deny it, and for two reasons. First, because the eye and hand can only be trained during the period of growth. A high degree of mechanical dexterity can only be acquired early in life. Secondly, exclusively bookish training crams the mind with knowledge sufficient for criticism and unrest, but almost useless *in itself*. The result is a mechanical and mental incapacity for manual labor. The *laissez-faire* argument that only a minimum education should be given in the public schools does not apply here, for the question is as to what

is the minimum. Certainly the public schools should not *unfit* boys and girls for industrial and social life. We are then face to face with the most serious educational and sociological problem of our time. It is gratifying, therefore, to note the rapid progress of a popular movement in favor of industrial education, either separate from the public school system, such separation in the case of children's schools being usually regarded as temporary, or as a part of the school curriculum. It is pretty generally conceded that the teaching of special trades — as distinguished from general mechanical dexterity — cannot be demanded of the public schools. Such teaching applies to many of the boys who go to college, but ought not to go, and to most of those who have finished at the public schools or academies. Such as are to make business or scientific men find commercial and scientific schools at hand. But those who ought and desire to learn a trade have hitherto been unable to do so, primarily because the trade unions allow "a master mechanic to graduate one journeyman in each year, or one in two years, a number insufficient to fill the vacancies, much less to meet the ever-increasing demand for skilled labor in growing communities," — and because there were no trade schools. In this field, perhaps, the most interesting and typical institution is the "New York Trade Schools," whose ninth annual programme is at hand. Founded and supported by Colonel Auchmuty, it has outlived the hostility of the Unions, who now furnish skilled instructors to the school, the Merchant Tailors' Society providing free instruction in tailoring. Here 450 young men are given day or evening instruction in plumbing, carpentry, painting, metal work, etc., the charge for instruction — including tools — varying from ten to forty dollars, the latter figure only for one course. The year is about five months, one year constituting the course. The workshops are well equipped, and this year a dormitory has been built for the school. The institution is not yet self-supporting, nor is it intended to be money making. Two thousand young men have already received instruction in it, and were soon receiving skilled workmen's wages. The new Pratt Institute of Brooklyn does much the same kind of work for pupils a little younger — both boys and girls. It has over 1,300 enrolled upon its books. Other large cities have taken up the work in some form with surprising success, for example, the Fourteenth Ward Industrial School of the Children's Aid Society, of New York.

As applied to public schools the system is less pretentious, confined to teaching girls cooking and sewing, and boys the use of simple tools; this, too, as only a part of the curriculum — a pleasing diversion from books and recitation. In some of the grammar schools, for example, the Ninth Ward, New York, and the Cambridge schools, the results are thoroughly satisfactory, though it is too early to summarize them. The moral effect ought to be good, to judge by the words of a correspondent of the "New York Times" in reference to the New York Trade Schools: "Though valuable tools are scattered about, there has been (in eight years) only one instance of theft. Rude or profane language is never heard among them; and not even a scratch or pencil mark has been made on the walls since the schools were opened." Such ideas of workmanship are not learned easily from books.

In the same general field, though of a very much higher order, is the work of Mr. John Ward Stimson's "New York Institute for Artist Artisans," whose first annual report deserves to be widely circulated.

The title indicates the aim of the undertaking, — to make real artists of our artisans, in decorating, designing, drawing, carving, etc. It instructs bright workmen in the laws of beauty as applied in form and color. The tuition is fifty dollars per year, sometimes paid by firms like Tiffany, for their employees. Mr. Stimson, the organizer, is an enthusiastic and successful teacher, for many years connected with the Metropolitan Museum. His ambition is largely philanthropic, and entirely patriotic. Certainly such a school will do much for the beauty and refinement of American homes, to say nothing of the increased earning power of really educated artist artisans.

PROFIT SHARING.

The widespread unrest of the laboring classes, which finds expression in strikes, socialistic agitation, and utopian schemes, arises largely from a belief that the present distribution of the products of industry is an unjust one. While it is true that most of the evils complained of are incident to human nature, and beyond the reach of any revolution save a moral one, it must be admitted that the present distribution of the products of industry is often unwise, if it is not unjust. It would certainly appear unwise to treat laborers as mere hired instruments who had no material or moral interest in the quality and results of their work. This interest is awakened when they are allowed not merely wages, but a share in the profits. Profit sharing offers a modest and yet sensible solution of this difficult question, and has received the approval of the wisest political economists from Mill to Walker. Profit sharing is not coöperation, as many suppose. Coöperation endeavors to get rid of the manager. It is nothing but an association of workmen. As such it is, except in a restricted field, doomed to failure, simply because any business of importance must have a manager, and good managers must be rewarded. A man of executive talent is rare, and will not remain the mere clerk of an association of workmen when independent enterprises are competing for his services. Coöperation must then do without managers, or cease to be pure coöperation. Profit sharing recognizes these facts. It says to the manager: "Manage the business; take the reward of talent, but allow us a percentage of profit as an incentive to greater care, energy, faithfulness, and economy. In a word, give us what would otherwise be wasted." Both parties are now better off; the work is done with less friction and more economically, while the laborer becomes a partner in the business, with a partner's incentives. This is not charity or theory, but economic fact. Naturally, there is a limit to the share of the profits which labor can take. If it is too large, the manager finds the share remaining to him too small, — he can do better elsewhere. Or, if the business is a feeble one upon the no-profit line, the manager and business will disappear together if any demand is made upon the slender profits. The economic law seems to run as follows: If the profits divided among workmen exceed the amount saved under the incentives of profit sharing, the establishment, unless a monopoly, must go to the wall in competition with establishments which give out as profits to their employees only the amount saved under the system, or less. And this amount laborers can reasonably expect. If the amount is greater, the establishment will lose its market, and then its manager. On the other hand, it seems certain that a wise sharing of profits is in many industries a condition of the most economical and successful production. If this is so,

it is bound to become the accepted system. We have before us what we have hitherto lacked — a fairly complete history of this most interesting and growing economic movement.¹ It is an original work, much of the information having been collected by correspondence and personal investigation. While the philanthropy of the author is beyond question, he confines himself entirely to facts, and sets forth candidly all the facts whether they tell for or against profit sharing. He follows the various experiments through from their beginning, and this detailed history is exceedingly interesting and instructive. As seen in Mr. Gilman's pages, profit-sharing is by no means a cast-iron system. Its forms are about as various as the experiments, and in this very elasticity is its strength. Sometimes the employees' share of the profits goes into an insurance fund against age and sickness, accomplishing voluntarily what Bismarck's State Socialism strives to accomplish. In other cases, the bonus can be invested in the shares of the establishment, — a safe and admirable plan when the workingmen's shares are given the preference in any bankruptcy proceedings. They should certainly be out of the reach of scheming and speculating managers. Again, the workingmen's profits go into building associations, or build and equip reading-rooms, libraries, apprentice schools, etc. Mr. Gilman's account of the earliest and most successful instance of profit sharing — the *Maison Leclaire*, house painters, of Paris — is most interesting. In this house the system has been in successful operation since 1842. The experiment was begun timidly and amid great difficulties by Leclaire — himself a workman. He grew rich and famous through it, and to-day the association of workmen of the house, the Mutual Aid Society, is half owner of the business, but not liable except to the extent of its capital. The society receives, in common with the individual partners, five per cent. upon its capital. After this has been paid, along with salaries, wages, and all other expenses, one fourth of the profits go to the individual partners, one fourth to the Mutual Aid Society, while the remaining one half is divided in cash among all workmen and employees of the house in proportion to their wages. This cash payment amounts to an annual addition of about twenty per cent. to their wages, though the wages themselves are as high as any in Paris. The executive body of workmen is the *noyau* or nucleus, a select body comprising about one sixth of their number. This body elects the individual partners, when a vacancy occurs by death or removal. In several cases the person so elected has been the chief employee of the house, who must, of course, purchase his one fourth interest in the business from his predecessor or his heirs. The Mutual Aid Society provides for sickness, also a pension of twelve hundred francs per annum for those who have passed their fiftieth year, and have been twenty years in the employ of the house. It also provides a life insurance of one thousand francs. Doubtless the business of house painting and decorating, where the ratio of wages to other elements of cost is very large, that is, where investments and risks are small, furnishes the most promising field for profit sharing. But Mr. Gilman gives the history of many successes in profit sharing in manufacturing; notably, the experiment of Edmond Laruche-Joubert in the manufacture of paper. Though most popular in Europe, the system appears to be rapidly spreading in

¹ *Profit Sharing between Employer and Employee. A Study in the Evolution of the Wages System.* By Nicholas Paine Gilman. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1889. Pp. 460.

America. The number of cases in which profit sharing has been abandoned, thirty-five, and those in which it is now in operation, 135, suggests too unfavorable an estimate of the feasibility of the scheme. For in nine of the thirty-five cases of abandonment it was successful, but terminated for other reasons. Failure in many of the remaining twenty-six cases can be traced to blunders of employees or the antagonism of socialists and labor unions. On the whole, one concludes from Mr. Gilman's admirable study that profit sharing has approved itself in practice to be most helpful. It is economically sound, though not universally applicable, or a panacea for all human ills.

D. Collin Wells.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. By MAX MÜLLER. In two volumes. Pp. xxix, 656. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887. \$4.00.

The author of this book regards his work as marking an epoch in the history of Psychology and Philosophy. As Kant revolutionized Philosophy by making the question, What is the origin of knowledge? obsolete, so Max Müller thinks he has revolutionized the study of Psychology and Philosophy by discovering the autobiography of the mind. Since Kant the question has not been, Does all our knowledge come from experience? but What makes experience possible? In like manner, no one hereafter, in the opinion of our author, can study Psychology and Philosophy — without being guilty of the grossest anachronism — anywhere but in the autobiography of the mind language. "The science of language is the science of thought; the science of thought is the science of language. Trace language to its source, and you have found the birth-place of reason; find the origin of reason, and you will know the origin of language. Language is the other side of reason; reason is the other side of language. Reason lives its entire life in language; language, apart from reason, is dead. Like the Siamese twins, they are born together, they live together, and should either of them die, they would die together.

Sometimes the author uses the phrase "inseparableness of language and thought," sometimes "the identity of language and thought," to express his theory. Properly interpreted, the two phrases mean precisely the same thing, but the latter is the more accurate statement of his theory. Language, as he defines it, consists of *symbols used intelligently*. In other words, language, in order to be language, must have thought for its inside, and thought cannot exist at all unless it has language for its outside. They are, then, as he conceives them, one fact, which we may look at from two points of view. Taking our position without the mind, we call it language, looking at the same fact from within, we call it thought. He uses the phrase "inseparableness of language and thought" only out of deference to the untechnical, inaccurate senses in which the words are commonly used.

Since language and thought are thus identical, no shade of thought can exist which is not embodied in language. Language and thought are like the two sides of an equation: for every value of one there is a precise equivalent in the other.

I believe the experience of every one who has ever tried to express his thoughts on a subject of any difficulty will completely disprove this theory. Who is there who has not, on such occasions, often been obliged to say to himself, This is not what I mean. This does not express what I think? Sometimes while one is groping around for words to express his thought, the fit words flash into his mind. He *knows* by a direct and delightful experience the difference between words that express the mere outline of his thought and words that seem coined for the purpose of delineating every shade of it.

Our author considers a case very similar to this. He says: "Sometimes we feel dissatisfied at the imperfection of language which compels us to seek among old words some that seem appropriate for our new purposes, or to trust to composition, or to try what can be done by making a new word out of the materials accumulated in our own or even in foreign languages. But all this only serves to show that thought without language is impossible."

I submit that in this paragraph the author gives up his case. What he has to prove is that language and thought are identical. But here he admits that we sometimes have thoughts that we cannot express by words in current usage, and while they remain unexpressed, or but imperfectly expressed, we try to find an obsolete word, or to coin a word, to express them — try to find *that which according to the theory must be a part and a conscious part of that which is!* The very fact that we can be conscious that our words express our thoughts imperfectly proves that there is something in the thought that has not gone into the words, an inside without an outside, a soul without a body. What our author has to do is to prove that thought and language are like the two sides of a perfect equation. But if he admits that sometimes the fittest words we can think of express our thought imperfectly, he admits that the equation is not perfect. Instead of writing, Thought = words, we must write, Thought = words + *x*.

In another paragraph he gives up his case even more unequivocally. Here he manages to avoid directly admitting the rottenness of the foundation of his "system" by an *ignoratio elenchi*. His business is to show that thought and language are identical. Instead of that he says, "But all this only serves to show that thought without words is impossible," overlooking the immense difference between saying, Thought without language is impossible, and Language and thought are identical. But in the paragraph to which I refer he practically admits that thought is possible without words. He is discussing the formation of words, and is undertaking to show how words become more and more general by dropping out of their meaning details that originally formed a part of it. He illustrates his meaning by the word foot. A foot had originally a very full intention. It meant the member of a living body, made of flesh and bone and muscle, with five toes, and used for locomotion. It was meant for a human foot, and implied very soon a certain length. But many of its attributes not being attended to, foot became applicable to the locomotive organs of other animals, quadrupeds, insects, birds, till at last it lost even the attribute of locomotion, retaining only the meaning of what we stand on, and thus was used as the foot of a table, or the foot of a mountain, signifying what is most lifeless and motionless.

And here again we see very clearly how language and thought march hand in hand. It was not that man did not know by what is called

sensuous knowledge the foot of a table or the foot of a mountain before he gave it a name. The carpenter who made the foot knew it as a piece of wood, as a stick, as properly shaped, whether square or round. But until he conceived it as something supporting the top of a table, as the foot supports the body, he did not know it as a foot, "*and it is impossible to say which came first, concept or name, in what must have been an almost simultaneous process.*"¹

In the words which I have italicised he distinctly says that the concept may have come before the name. To be sure, he says the process must have been almost simultaneous. But the *amount* of the interval between the formation of a concept and the attribution of a name to it is not material. The question whether thought can exist without words is as completely settled if thought can be shown to exist for a second without its appropriate name, as if it could be shown to exist for a lifetime. Besides, the word does not come into the mind so quickly because thought depends on words, but because of the laws of association of ideas. As soon as the resemblance between the foot of the table and the foot of the body was seen, the laws of association inevitably brought the word foot into the mind. The author seems to be in doubt as to which came first, concept or name. Those who have no theory to support will not be in doubt. There are *laws* of mind as well as of language. If I think of this or of that, it is because of some law of the mind. Now what law of the mind could bring the word foot into consciousness just before the concept of which it is the name? Or did the name come into the mind accidentally, and then, by suggesting the idea of supporting, did the concept of the foot of the table, as supporting the table, occur to the mind? But even this supposition, absurd as it is, will not save the author's theory. For the name *foot*, which according to the supposition, occurred to the mind, was the name of the foot of a man, and not until *after* the foot of the table was seen to resemble the foot of a man in certain particulars did the name *foot* as applied to a part of the table occur to the mind. In truth, the order of causation is always first concept and then name, and if often they seem simultaneous, it is no more strange than that apparent simultaneity which we so often see in nature.

I believe — I suppose every one does — that there is a good deal of truth in the theory that language is the autobiography of the race. In the extreme form in which our author maintains it, I have tried to show that it is false. But in any case he is wrong in the significance he attaches to it. On any supposition, can the science of language throw any light on the origin of our ideas of space and time and causality? Hume says they came from experience; Kant says they are shadows projected into the external world from the mind itself, and mistaken for ontological realities. McCosh says they are intuitions — direct perceptions of ontological facts. Which is right? Can the science of language tell us? Can it tell us how our sensations are built up into the external world? Undoubtedly the science of language renders substantial assistance to students of mind. But Max Müller has very much overestimated the nature and amount of that assistance. Whatever the mind creates — science, literature, music, language — is material which can be used in the study of mind. But to claim that thought and language are so closely related that the careful study of language will reveal every secret of thought is altogether unwarranted.

¹ Italics are mine.

But there is not a grain of truth in his opinion as to the significance of his doctrine for philosophy. Can the science of language tell us whether space and time are realities of things, or only of thought? Can it tell us whether matter or mind is the ultimate reality of the universe? Or whether both are alike ultimate? Or whether both are but phenomenal manifestations of some unknown reality? Can it tell us what mind is? Can it give us the test of truth?

In this brief examination I have confined myself to what I regard as the salient points of the book. There is much in it to commend if one had the space to do it, and if the reputation of its author did not make it superfluous. It is of course learned, and often suggestive. But as a contribution to the science of thought and philosophy, I am obliged to say that I regard it as of very little worth.

J. P. Gordy.

ATHENS, OHIO.

ÆGYPTEN UND ÆGYPTISCHES LEBEN IM ALTERTHUM. Geschildert von ADOLF ERMAN. Erster Band. 8vo, pp. xvi, 350. Zweiter Band. Pp. viii, 392. Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung.

The strength of Erman's "Ancient Egypt and Egyptian Life" is not in the chapter on religion. The Gods of Greece are alive. The Gods of Egypt are puppets. Yet we could ill spare the threescore pages on the mysterious theme. The author gives a lucid translation of the Rebellion of Men, which has its interest in comparison with the Biblical story of the Fall. More valuable still are the details concerning the priesthood. The offerings enumerated of bread and cakes, beer and wine, geese and oxen, seem to be destined for the laity as well as the clergy. Here were sacrificial feasts. In early times, there was a lay element in the *personnel* of the hierarchy. In the New Empire this disappeared totally. In its stead sprang up female singers and musicians, so-called, who attached themselves in countless numbers to the temples of Thebes.

The priesthood contained *orders*. Such was the libation priest the *ueb*, the reading priest *cherheb*, the servant of God *honef netar*, whom the Greeks called prophet. The high priest of Heliopolis has a title as though he were a scientist as well as ecclesiast, — "He who sees the secrets of Heaven." In the Middle Empire a temporary priesthood appears, reminding us of the secular clergy of the Middle Ages. They are excluded from temple-income and service, and depend on private charity. The ordinary priest received in the same period a salary in kind. In one case it was three hundred and sixty pitchers of beer, nine hundred loaves of white bread, and thirty-six thousand smaller rolls. The high priesthood itself was a prize for ambition. A man born a soldier, and a common priest at sixteen, tells us that at fifty-nine he had passed through all the grades and was "first prophet of Ammon and chief of the prophets of all the gods." With the Asiatic wars of the New Empire came the golden age of the Egyptian priesthood. Spoils poured into the treasury of the gods. The high priest became not only a spiritual father and an educator of youth; he was a temple-builder, like the bishops to whom the Middle Ages owed their cathedrals. Wealth of metals, woods, fields, gardens, slaves, cattle, vessels, made him first equal, then supersede the Pharaoh. The priest-king dynasty of Hir-Hor was the issue to this overweening material, artistic, and military influence.

The realism of the foregoing chapter makes it properly head the second volume of a most learned, fresh, and helpful handbook. All the more that the contribution is a reluctant one. Both author and critic must assign a far higher worth, however, to the chapter on the Family in volume first.

It may be suspected that the intensity of family life had something to do with the duration of the Egyptian as of the Chinese civilization. This thought is confirmed by Dr. Erman's statement, "The relation betwixt husband and wife is in all periods seemingly a tender and affectionate one." There is polygamy even of two wives in one house only as an exception. The Egyptian Rachel and Leah, unlike the Hebrew, are not eaten up with jealousy. They name their children each for the other. Inheritance, which was for the Israelite vested more in the son than in the daughter, was in Egypt more in the daughter than in the son. Sometimes we have a portrait of the mother of the deceased while that of the father is wanting. His *maternal* grandfather glories in the career of a successful public officer. Side by side with a filial feeling which is profound and passionate, we see a want of ancestral pride. The Hebrew genealogies have no counterpart on the Nile. The individual rather than the family comes to the front. There are no family names. This singular circumstance makes the history confusing. Names abound expressing physical and intellectual qualities, commemorating domestic joy, breathing religion — "Ra is content." But they recur and interweave. Add to this the custom of subjects naming themselves from a prince, and servants from a master, and brothers after one another, with the further complication of curtailing the given into a pet name, and we need not be surprised at the frequency of mistakes of identity. The blot on the Egyptian home was marriage with a sister. This may be explained by the myth of Isis and Nephthys, who were the wives and sisters of Osiris and Set respectively.

Professor Erman gives his readers some four hundred illustrations. These are tasteful and trustworthy. Better still for the recreation of the past are his hieroglyphics and the references at the foot of every page. Best of all is the ordering of his subject, so that the ordinary reader can take up each chapter by itself and learn from one of the first of living Egyptologists about Decipherment, Land, People, History, Monarch, and Court, the State of the Old and New Empire, the Administration of Police and Trials of Criminals, Home, Costume, Diet, Sports, Science and Art among the Teachers of Greece, Agriculture, Trade and Commerce, the Wars of the Living, and the Literature of the Dead. The book does with the *pen* what the Egypt Exploration Fund is doing with the *spade*.

John Phelps Taylor.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE. A Sketch of the Diplomatic and Military History of Continental Europe from the Rise to the Fall of the Second French Empire. By HAROLD MURDOCK, with an introduction by JOHN FISKE. Pp. xxxii, 421. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$2.00.

This is a noble book, and has a noble preface. The optimism of both book and preface is of that thoroughly strengthening and legitimate kind which without idealizing the present, or closing the mind from the con-

temptation of dangers in the future, recognizes that within the last generation Europe has secured essential and permanent good in the reintegration of genuine nationalities, and that reaction, in the civil and the spiritual sphere, has suffered essential discomfiture.

The author regrets that there is so much of the "drum and trumpet" style of narration in the book, but pleads with reason that "on nearly every battlefield great questions of dynastic and national reconstruction have hung in the balance." As to the Crimean war, he is right in thinking that for the most of us his lucid summary supersedes the necessity of wading through Kinglake.

Mr. Fiske gives good reason for our putting aside that contemptuous distrust of Austria which still lingers in Mr. Freeman's writings, and which once betrayed Mr. Gladstone into a very awkward strait. "From the moment that she was freed from the deadly burden of peoples held in unwilling subjection, Austria began to show symptoms of healthy national life." He is on more doubtful ground when he condemns (though with avowed hesitation) the patient Germany for taking back her own. She knew that France would meditate revenge anyhow; then why should she have any longer borne

"Die Bundesfahn' in fremder Hand
Der Thurm in welscher Macht"?

Mr. Murdock shows well enough that Louis Napoleon went to war with Russia simply because he wanted to make a figure, and chose his field of display with the intention of forcing the English Queen and people through their Indian jealousies to change their dislike into alliance. He succeeded far too well for the honor of England and of her sovereign.

The author gives a clear and deeply interesting description of the siege of Sebastopol, and of its noble defenders, of whom the most of us knew as good as nothing previously. Korniloff, especially, comes out to view in all his enthusiasm, tenacity, patriotism, and piety. "Tell all," he said, when struck down by the cannon-ball, "it is sweet to die when the conscience is at rest." On the other hand, the battle of Inkermann, "the soldiers' battle," demonstrated as to the English "that forty years of enervating peace had failed to eradicate from the national character those indomitable qualities that rendered Wellington's squares impregnable on the slopes of Mont St. Jean." The author remarks, moreover, that the English exaggerated the inferiority of their own military administration. "In England, every weakness in the army was ruthlessly exposed by an unhampered press. In France, disagreeable facts were smothered, or so perverted by a cringing press as to suit the ends of a government whose existence depended upon success." The year 1870 crushed the rotten shell. The author sums up on page 95 the results of the Crimean war, futile to France and England, fruitful only, through Sardinia, to Italy.

The author concedes that if there was any touch of generosity in Louis Napoleon it was a desire to benefit Italy — for a consideration. But of his military claims he says: "The battle of Magenta consisted of two distinct battles, for the emperor at San Martino and MacMahon on the north did not communicate from morning until after the fighting was over. The Emperor of the French did nothing to merit approbation. He did not plunge into the smoke, sword in hand, as at one time

the world was led to believe, but with muddled brain and brooding dread watched from a distance the varying fortunes of the day."

Mr. Murdock does not let Bismarck's cynical contempt of the Schleswig Holstein treaties lose anything in the telling. As in many other cases of Bismarck's policy, the ill faith was formal more largely than substantial. The time had come for reconstituting Germany, through Prussia, and therefore Austria, the Diet, and the Augustenburgs were pitched out of the way. The enlarging logic of an enlarging necessity no doubt controlled Bismarck himself, as it had once controlled Luther before him, who at first kept giving promises which he then had to break. Supreme conjunctures will not courtesy too nicely to common times. The issue of all, the Seven Weeks' War, and the regenerating defeat of Sadowa, is told with the cheerful interest belonging to the frank contest of German with German, which brought a blessing to both. And in spite of all English dissuasives from the Triple Alliance, Bismarck knew what he was saying: "We had powerful support in the incorruptible fidelity of Italy. . . . From this fact we may draw strong hopes that in the future the most cordial relations will unite Germany and Italy."

The advancing turn of fortune is described: "France was the centre in 1867 around which Europe was revolving. She held the key to the Roman question, and Italy was her suitor; she possessed an unbeaten army, and Austria was her flatterer; but she sought a slice of Rhineland and Prussia was her foe." The author describes Napoleon's dream of Prussia's defeat by Austria. It was shattered. The war, however, would not have come without the empress and the priests. Infallibility and Luther were again to try their strength together, and the 1st of September was the answer to the 18th of July. The moody usurper "was borne along on the current of brag and bluster," with small hope of the issue. However, if it was any comfort to him, he might have reflected that he had gained by an association with the golden lilies, as being the third French monarch whom a battle had left a prisoner. "On the 4th of September Napoleon left Sedan for the castle of Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel, which the Prussian king had placed at his disposal. The day was dark and sad, and the falling rain converted the roads into mire. So, bidding adieu to France forever, escorted by a hostile soldiery, the Man of December, the Arbiter of Europe, the Modern Cæsar, was whirled away northward into the mist and gloom that enshrouded the Belgian hills."

Why is it, asks the author in conclusion, that after all these achievements militarism still weighs so heavy on continental Europe that everywhere "above the roar of the city street sounds the sharp drum-beat of the passing regiment; in the sweet rural country the village church-bell cannot drown the bugle peal from the fortress on the hill"? "It means that the Eastern and Alsatian questions are not settled; that Republican France broods darkly over the exactions of 1871, while it casts friendly glances upon aggressive and despotic Russia; that Austria, dreading Russian power, draws nearer to Germany, and that Germany, still united with Austria and Italy, holds fast what she has won by the sword, while with the old assurance that has never yet betrayed him, Bismarck proclaims both to the east and west, 'We Germans fear God, and nothing in the world beside.'"

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

The Lord is Right. Meditations on the Twenty-fifth Psalm in the Psalter of King David. By *P. Waldenström, Ph. D.*, Professor of Theology and of Biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gefle, Sweden. Translated from the Latest Swedish Edition by an American Minister of the Gospel. Translation carefully Revised, and some Notes added, together with an Introduction, by *J. G. Princell*. Pp. 303. Chicago: John Martenson, Publisher, 205 Oak Street. 1889. — A book of meditations of somewhat diffuse style, but of that deep, evangelical religiousness which has in a manner been made native to Sweden by the Reformation. The Swedish language is of less compass and depth than the German, but has been taken hold of through and through by the spirit of Luther. The full flavor of Lutheran devotion can hardly have been conveyed into the translation, but a good deal of it seems to be there. Professor Waldenström will be remembered as the leader of a movement in the Swedish Church which it has been proposed to bring into union with American Congregationalism. It is hard to see, however, why Lutherans in Scandinavia cannot have their differentiated schools among themselves, without seeking for remote and apparently artificial affinities. The title *Herren är from, Der Herr ist fromm*, is hard to translate. The translator has done the best he could.

Hildebrand and his Times. By *W. R. W. Stephens, M. A.*, Prebendary of Chichester and Rector of Woolbeding, Sussex. Author of "Life of S. John Chrysostom," etc. Pp. xiii, 230. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. — The author remarks that after the first great contest of the church, that with paganism, and the second, with fundamental depravations of doctrine, came the third, with the rough races of the North. In taming these the church suffered severely, and the hierarchy came near being permanently secularized. The joint elevation of a religious empire and of a regenerated Papacy averted this. Hildebrand marks the point at which the Teutonically regenerated Papacy began to push its claims against the Teutonic empire. This contest the author recognizes as having been inevitable. Yet Hildebrand waged implacable war against clerical marriage, simony, and lay investiture. The author at once admits the greatness and beneficence of his aim and the immoderateness of his spirit.

Hildebrand had directed the Papacy through five or six pontificates; there is no doubt that his own election was strictly a compelled one. He was less austere spiritually than his friend Peter Damiani; essentially a great statesman with religious ends. His liberality to Berengar shows this. The author brings out that in his hardness to Henry he overshot himself. Yet he shows him as the central man of his age; corresponding in all tones with all men, even Saracen emirs, as worshipers of the One God. "It was not the habit of men in that age to look very far ahead and speculate about the remote consequences of their acts: what they believed to be right, or good, or desirable, this they commonly pursued with simple faith and eagerness. Gregory was no doubt hurried sometimes by excess of zeal into acts of indefensible severity, and sometimes, in moments of perplexity, he stooped to unworthy subterfuges; but his aim was a noble one: he never lost sight of it; by his transcendent genius he came near to attaining it, and left the more complete attainment possible for his successors." This is good; but the author hardly emphasizes enough Gregory's heedless disparagement of the civil order. His rude assaults upon metropolitan authority, also, have promoted the servility, but injured the local vitality, of the church.

The Epistles of St. John. Twenty-one Discourses, with Greek Text, Comparative Versions, and Notes chiefly Exegetical. By *William Alexander, D. D., D. C. L.*, Brasenose College, Oxford, Lord Bishop of Derry and Raphoe. Pp. xi, 309. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. — Somewhat pompous and prolix, a little overweighted by the mitre, but good and scholarly, with many pregnant remarks scattered through it. His attempt to make the Epistle a synopsis and index of the Gospel seems a little tiresome, but we dare say there is something in it. He does well to emphasize the truth that the love of which St. John is the exponent is pervaded by a pure relentlessness towards evil and false teaching. For *ἀγάπη* he would prefer *caritas*, saying that if "charity" is sometimes a little *metallic*, "love" seems sometimes a little *maundering*. He sometimes drags in commendations of ritualism and sacramentalism where it is a little hard to see how they belong there. But then, he treats them only as the vehicle, not as the substance, of the regenerate life. As to the order of the Johannean writings, it seems an extraordinary *tour de force*, or *de foi*, to put the Apocalypse so late among them, regardless of its Greek, its style, its saturation with the Old Testament, and its Judæo-Christian temper. How can we allow that this and the Gospel come from the same mind and pen, unless we allow for the effects of old age, history, and years of Gentile intercourse? If the author's position is just, it will need some one less deeply immersed in ecclesiastical convention to prove it to us.

The Popes and the Hohenstaufen. By *Ugo Balzani*. Pp. vi, 261. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. — The long contest between the Roman Church and this most magnificent and aspiring of regal dynasties cannot be set forth except by some great poet and dramatist. But this little compendium is a faithful rendering of the facts, characters, and issues. It must be owned that Barbarossa, though a father to Germany, was a tyrant to Italy. And as Mr. Ruskin says, Italy and Alexander III., in their requirements of forgiveness for some twenty-two years of impious devastation, showed a most Christian mildness. As to Frederick II., how Milman can talk of his "lofty spirit of tolerance," it is hard to see. The whole spirit of the man and of his reign was at variance with the essence of Christianity. But Gregory IX. showed a relentless hardheartedness towards him and the unhappy relics of his race that assuredly Gregory's great uncle, Innocent III., would not have shown, and which was condemned by Christ in him who of that age most fully embodied him, St. Louis. The author closes by saying, of the policy which brought in the unworthy brother of Louis, Charles of Anjou, to overthrow the well governing usurper Manfred, and cut off the hopes of the gallant boy Conradin, that "the French influence invoked by the Popes was destined not only to turn against the Papacy, but to humiliate it. At Palermo the vesper-bell was to sound the hour of vengeance for the blood of Manfred and Conradin; while at Anagni the men of Philip le Bel, led by Nogaret and Sciarra, in forcing themselves into the apartments of Boniface VIII., were destined to drag through the mud the church which had invoked French intervention in Italy."

The Man of Galilee. By *Atticus G. Haygood*. "Lord to whom shall we go but unto thee? Thou hast the words of eternal life." *Simon Peter*. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1889. Pp. 156. \$0.80. — These are lectures to the eminent author's "Emory Boys." Of course they are bright, fresh, crisp, and thoroughly apprehensible. The aim of the little book is to show that He

who has sprung out of no ideal, who contradicted every contemporary ideal, the unity of whose character is not a composite of ideals, has come from the God who has sent Him into the world to touch, appropriate, purify, and rectify every true ideal, and to lead them all continually on beyond themselves. Among the many excellent illustrations of his truth, the author uses one which would tell on his auditors with special force, in contrasting the far-reaching and subtle organization which Wesley has given to his movement with the "Divine carelessness" of Jesus as to the future form of his church, which High Church pedantry in all its forms is so wholly unable to appreciate.

The Reconciliation. Who was to be Reconciled? God or Man? or God and Man? Some Chapters on the Biblical View of The Atonement. By P. Waldenström, Ph.D., Professor of Theology and of Biblical Hebrew and Greek in the College of Gefle, Sweden. Translated from the Swedish, with some Notes added, and an Introduction, by J. G. Princell. Pp. 120. Chicago: John Martenson, Publisher. 1888.—The author insists, with equal clearness and energy, and with a thorough grasp of his subject, that the doctrine of a reconciliation of God to men is wholly pagan, and that the doctrine of a reconciliation of man to God is alone Scriptural. The author, however, does not fall into the error of his countryman Swedenborg (perhaps only an unbalanced representation) of denying that God can hate. He holds that God is irreconcilably hostile to sin, and always ready to receive the sinner, so soon as he quits his sin. He does not, apparently (as he might), propound the stronger statement that God hates the sinner, so long and so far as he is implicated with the sin. He denies, as utterly unscriptural, the statement that the Atonement is a satisfaction of the justice of God, declaring that it is right and just that God should seek the salvation of the sinner. As "the many died," he says, the reconciliation was not to save them from dying, but to restore them to life. "The righteousness and justice which he enjoins on men is the expression of his own righteousness and justice." A payment to penal justice he utterly denies — and with good reason. Professor Waldenström's thought as to this theme is all of one piece. His rejection of the unscriptural conception of Atonement instead of the New Testament reconciliation proceeds from no Pelagianism, but from Apostolic apprehensions of the love of God in the work of Christ. He might, however, bring out more fully that in the Old Testament this ultimate plane of Scripture is the end, not the beginning.

There are certain ambiguities in the Swedish, much the same as they would be in German, which the translator takes pains to explain in annotations. The greater theological subtilty of the two sister languages, German and Swedish, has certain correlative disadvantages.

Charles C. Starbuck.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. Sermons and Addresses. By Rev. Jacob Merrill Manning, D. D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston, Mass. Pp. vi, 543. 1889. \$2.00; — Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States in the Formative Period. 1775-1789. By Graduates and Former Members of the Johns Hopkins University. Edited by J. Franklin Jameson, Ph. D., late Associate in the Johns Hopkins University,

Professor of History in Brown University. Pp. xiii, 321. 1889. \$2.25; — The Continuous Creation, an Application of the Evolutionary Philosophy to the Christian Religion. By Myron Adams. Pp. viii, 259. 1889. \$1.50; — Standish of Standish. A Story of the Pilgrims. By Jane G. Austin, author of "A Nameless Nobleman," "The Desmond Hundred," "Mrs. Beauchamp Brown," "Nantucket Scraps," "Moon Folk," etc., etc. Pp. vi, 422. 1889. \$1.25.

Roberts Brothers, Boston. Belief. By George Leonard Chaney, author of "Every-Day Life and Every-Day Morals," "Alhoa," "Travels in the Sandwich Islands," etc. Pp. 159. 1889. \$1.00.

Charles H. Woodman, Boston. The Extinction of Evil. Three Theological Essays. By Rev. E. Petavel, D. D., Free Lecturer at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. Translated, with an Introductory Chapter, by Rev. Charles H. Oliphant. The Preface by Rev. Edward White, Minister of Allam St. Chapel, Kensington, London; author of "Life in Christ," "Mystery of Growth," etc. Pp. xii, 184. 1889. Cloth. 12mo. 75 cents.

J. A. Hill & Co., New York. The Lutherans in America. A Story of Struggle, Progress, Influence, and Marvelous Growth. By Edmund Jacob Wolf, D. D. With an Introduction by Henry Eyster Jacobs, D. D. Pp. xx, 544. 1889.

Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., New York. The Kings of Israel and Judah. By George Rawlinson, M. A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Academy of Turin; author of "The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World," "Moses, His Life and Times," etc., etc. Pp. xii, 238. \$1.00.

Empire Book Bureau, New York. The Kingdom of the Unselfish; or, Empire of the Wise. By John Lord Peck. Pp. 486. \$1.50.

Fords, Howard & Hulbert, New York. Unto the Uttermost. By James L. Campbell. Pp. 254. 1889.

Scribner & Welford, New York. Iris: Studies in Colour and Talks about Flowers. By Frans Delitzsch, D. D., Professor of Theology, Leipsic. Translated from the Original by the Rev. A. Cusin, M. A., Edinburgh. Pp. 227. 1889. \$2.00.

Nims & Knight, Troy, N. Y. Aryan Sun Myths, the Origin of Religions, with an Introduction by Charles Morris, author of "A Manual of Classical Literature," and "The Aryan Race; its Origin and its Achievements." Pp. 192. 1889. \$1.25. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston.

Philadelphia. Margaret Ellison: a Story of Tuna Valley. By Mary Graham, author of "Nellie West, from Ten to Twenty," "Gertrude Terry," etc., etc. Pp. 325. 1889. \$1.25. For sale by M. G. Connell, La Grange, 27th Ward, Philadelphia, Pa.

The University Press, Cambridge, England. The Psalms in Greek according to the Septuagint. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press, by Henry Barclay Swete, D. D., Honorary Fellow of Gonville and Caius College. Pp. xiv, 415. 1889. For sale by C. J. Clay and Sons, Cambridge University Press Warehouse, Ave Maria Lane, London, England.

Librairie Hachette et Cie. 79 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, France. Précis D'Histoire Juive depuis les Origines jusqu'à l'Epoque Persane (v^e siècle avant J.-C.). Par Maurice Vernes, Directeur Adjoint à l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études. Ouvrage contenant Deux Cartes. Pp. 828. 1889.

PAMPHLETS. — *Methodist Book Concern.* Hunt & Eaton, New York; Cranston & Stowe, Cincinnati. Studies in the Four Gospels. By Rev. Jesse M. Hurlbut, D. D., author of "A Manual of Bible Geography," etc. Pp. 80. 1889. 25 cents. — *John Martenson, Chicago.* The Blood of Jesus. What is its Significance. By P. Waldenström, Ph. D. Pp. 48. 1888. 10 cents. — *The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.* The Evolution of Morals. By Frances Emily White, M. D. Reprinted from "The Open Court" of August 15 and 22, 1889. Pp. 20. 1889. — *Thos. M. Johnson, Osceola, Mo.* Bibliotheca Platonica. An Exponent of the Platonic Philosophy. Edited by Thos. M. Johnson. Vol. I. No. 1. July-August, 1889. Pp. 81.

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